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Name of researcher: Stephen Bauer
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The Topic
This dissertation explores and analyzes James Rachels’s efforts to prove that 
Darwin’s theory of evolution has catastrophic implications for traditional Christian ethics.
The Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the question of 
whether or not protology affects ethics. In particular, I propose to distill the implications 
of evolutionary views of origins for ethics, mainly in reference to the issue of human 
preference over nature in ethics. I propose to disclose Rachels’s understanding of the 
implications of evolution on human preference (greater protections for human beings over
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
non-humans) in ethics (such as biblical-Christian ethics), and to evaluate his views on the 
basis of his internal consistency, and the accuracy of his use of Christian history and 
biblical data.
The Sources
In order to accomplish this purpose, many sources were consulted, starting with 
the works of Rachels himself. Some of the additional authors consulted include: J. V. 
Langmead Casserly, Richard Dawkins, Stephen J. Gould, John F. Haught, Cornelius 
Hunter, Jerry Korsmeyer, Andrew Linzey, John Rawls, Tom Regan, Lewis Regenstein, 
Michael Ruse, Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, Gerhard von Rad, Stephen Webb, Lynn 
White, Jr., and Benjamin Wiker.
Conclusions
First, James Rachels is essentially correct in his analysis of the impact of Darwinian 
evolution on Christian Ethics. Second, possibly Rachels’s greatest contribution is 
identifying Darwin’s rejection of teleology as the philosophical nerve o f Darwinism. 
Third, Rachels correctly identifies two key pillars of human preference in Christian ethics 
and shows how evolution undermines each pillar. Fourth, the work o f evolutionary 
theologians corroborate Rachels’s assertion that any kind of theism incorporating 
Darwin’s theory cannot sustain a traditional Christian view of morality. Fifth, the 
dependence of evolutionary theologians on Process Theology undermines the grounding 
of God’s moral authority by limiting His foreknowledge. Sixth, Wiker is correct in his 
assertion that cosmology affects morality, and that changing from a biblical cosmology to 
a materialist one will eventually undermine Christian ethics. Seventh, I conclude that in
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background to the Problem
Ever since Charles Darwin published his ideas on the theory of evolution, 
individuals have been passionately pursuing the questions regarding the relationship of 
Darwinian theory to ethics and morality. Churchmen, philosophers, and scientists alike 
have made claims for and against the viability of such an endeavor.1 A recent attempt to 
construct a theory of ethics based on evolution has been made by James Rachels, 
professor of philosophy at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, from 1977 to 2003.2
‘James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications o f Darwinism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-4. Hereafter cited as CfA. Rachels’s book 
has a well-done presentation on the history of the debate between Christians and 
evolutionists regarding the moral implications of Darwinian evolution. See also, C. Leon 
Harris, Evolution: Genesis and Revelations (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1981), 17-18, who also presents a series of fundamentalist assertions regarding the 
moral implications of evolution. A more general history is found in Duane McCampbell, 
“The Development and Failure of the Nineteenth-Century Evolutionary Theory of 
Ethics,” Restoration Quarterly 26 (1983): 161-71. For a conservative Christian overview 
of evolutionary ethics see, Ian T. Taylor, In the Minds o f  Men: Darwin and the New 
World Order (Toronto, Ontario: TFE Publishing, 1984), 340-430. Taylor credits 
Darwinism for being the root of today's teaching of situation ethics. He likewise cites a 
humanist author as declaring that Darwin's discovery sounded the death knell of religious 
and moral values (421-22).
2James Rachels (1941-2003) first served as chair of the philosophy department, 
then as dean of arts and humanities. He returned to regular professorship in 1983 and 
continued in that capacity until death from cancer in 2003. According to the University
1
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This dissertation will endeavor to analyze and evaluate his views. Before presenting the 
problem, purpose, and method, I shall briefly sketch the historical background of this 
topic.
Historical Summary of Evolutionary Ethics 
“Evolutionary ethics,” says Michael Ruse, “is a subject with a bad reputation, not 
entirely undeserved.”1 Indeed, as Paul Lawrence Farber observes, previous attempts to 
construct a model of ideal behavior based in evolutionary theory have produced some 
notable disasters including the British, German, and American practice o f eugenics, and 
the Nazi racial hygiene policies.2 In addition to these notorious attempts to create an 
evolutionary ethics, we find there has been a small but steady stream o f thinkers who 
have pursued this task.
Farber divides the history of evolutionary ethics into three stages. Stage one 
extends from the latter portion of Darwin’s life to about World War I. The second stage
Radio Station, WBHM, his textbook, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, is about to 
become the most sold ethics textbook in history, currently used as required reading in 
about one-third of all university ethics courses in U. S. colleges and universities. See, 
WBHM, “In Memoriam: James Rachels 1941-2003,” Undated, http://www.wbhm.org/ 
News/2003/rachels.html (18 May 2004). For an obituary of James Rachels copied from 
the Birmingham News, see, “James Rachels, Ph.D. 1941-2003,” 6 September 2003, 
http://www.bradpriddy.com/rachels/obituary.htm (18 May 2004).
'Michael Ruse, “The Significance o f  Evolution,” in A Com panion to Ethics, 
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1991; 1993 paperback with corrections), 500. Ruse is one of the most 
prominent evolutionary ethicists during the last decade.
2Paul Lawrence Farber, The Temptations o f  Evolutionary Ethics (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994), 3-4. See also I. Taylor, 406-11.
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covers the era from World War I to the 1960s. The third stage originated in the 1970s and 
continues to the present.1 Farber asserts that the third stage is simply a revival of the 
previous, discredited attempts to construct an evolutionary ethics. Thus Farber and like- 
minded thinkers assert the third stage was defeated before it even started.2
It is my contention that the third stage must still be taken seriously. While the third 
stage of evolutionary ethics tends to be more an explanation of the moral nature of man 
in evolutionary terms than a system of ethics, it is of greater significance than the prior 
two stages for at least three reasons.
First, a leading advocate for the third stage, Robert Wright, openly declares that the 
new Darwinian synthesis3 is more than just a scientific theory. He asserts that it is, in 
reality, a new worldview,4 thus ascribing a metaphysical dimension to evolution.5
'Farber, 6. Farber outlines the representative proponents of evolutionary ethics for 
each of these three stages as well as their opponents. See pp. 6-8. See also, Robert 
Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science o f Evolutionary Psychology (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1994), 4-5, 39-42, where he outlines the key players in the development 
of what Farber describes as stage three.
2Farber, 2. Timothy Anders, Anthony Flew, and Elliot Sober likewise reject 
current attempts to create an evolutionary explanation of morality or an evolutionary 
ethics. See, Timothy Anders, The Evolution o f Evil (Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1994), 
329-330; Anthony G. N. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1967), 5; Elliot 
Sober, From a Biological Point o f View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111.
3Wright repeatedly uses the technical terminology the new synthesis to describe this 
new stage of ethical thinking informed and guided by evolutionary theory.
4Wright, 4-5.
5Wright may be the first evolutionist to make such a blunt confession, but Julian 
Huxley comes very close to asserting the same viewpoint. See Julian Huxley, Essays o f  a 
Humanist (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 73.
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Second, the third stage is unique in its ubiquity, spilling out of the ivory towers into 
everyday publications,1 particularly since about 1990. Third, this stage of evolutionary 
theory and ethics revives teleology and design. The new paradigm seems bent on a quest 
to find, in Antony Flew's words, “some immanent substitute for Divine Providence.”2 
These three characteristics of the third stage seem to make it significantly different 
from the first two stages of evolutionary ethics. Thus we should not dismiss it with glib 
comments.
‘See Farber, where he laments that, “We read daily in journals and magazines that 
biology holds the key to human nature” (2). Examples include two cover features in 
Time: First, Paul Gray, “What Is Love?” Time, February 15, 1993, 47-49; Anastasia 
Toufexis, “The Right Chemistry,” Time, February 15, 1993,49-51; the cover title being 
“The Chemistry of Love”; second, Robert Wright, “Our Cheating Hearts,” Time, August 
15, 1994,44-52; the cover title being, “Infidelity: It May Be in Our Genes.” Other 
articles include: Paul Galloway, “Darwin II,” Chicago Tribune, October 5, 1994, Tempo 
1-2; Daniel Goleman, “Science: Flirtatious Come-ons Are Linked to Our Survival,”
South Bend Tribune, February 16,1995, A12; Natalie Angier, “Sexual Harassment: An 
Activity Throughout the Animal Kingdom,” South Bend Tribune, October 12,1995, A13; 
Robert Wright, “Science and Original Sin,” Time, October 28,1996, 76-77; idem, “Styles 
of Polygamy,” 30 August 1996, http://www.slate.com/id/2013/ (7 November 2005). 
Another vein related to the biological roots of human nature is the attempt to blur the 
distinction between humans and other animals by showing evolutionary roots of human 
characteristics in lower animals. Examples include: Nathan Myrhvold, “So You're a 
Human Being: Isn't that Special?” Time, August 26, 1996, 64, condensed from idem, 
“Mars to Humanity: Get Over Yourself,” 15 August 1996, http://www.slate.com/id/2361/ 
(7 November 2005); Paul Davies, “The Harmony of the Spheres,” Time, February 15, 
1996, 58; Turning Point [Television Broadcast], October 10, 1996 (New York: ABC 
Television)[hosted by Diane Sawyer]; Kenneth Miller and Anne Hollister, “What Does It 
Mean to Be One of Us?” Life, November 1996, 50.
2Flew, 4. See also McCampbell, who describes Flew's concern as “surrogate divine 
providence” (171). For a more recent assertion of an immanent, self-ordering principle, 
see Davies, “The Harmony of the Spheres,” Time, 58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Christian Moral Foundations Challenged by 
the Third Stage of Evolutionary Ethics
Christian concepts o f morality are implicitly and openly challenged in the new 
synthesis. For example, Ruse asserts that there are no philosophically objective 
foundations for ethics. Morality “is just an illusion, fobbed off on us to promote 
biological ‘altruism.’” Thus, morality and ethics become simply another example of an 
evolutionary adaptation aiding the prowess of the species, and limiting the explanation of 
ethics to causal argumentation.1 More specific challenges to Christian ethics are found in 
regard to man's relationship to (or position in) nature.
Christian Morals and Man's Relationship to Nature
The General Issue
H. James Birx addresses the contrast of evolutionary thinking with Christian 
thought, writing: “The theory of evolution is indispensable for both believers and non­
believers if they are to achieve a sound understanding of and proper appreciation for the 
true place of humankind in nature.”2 Birx asserts that the proper understanding of man's 
place in nature requires man to overcome geocentrism and cosmocentrism.3
Nathan Myrhvold similarly asserts that the recent assertion of finding bacterial life
’Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen,” Zygon 21 (1986): 102. 
See also idem, “The Significance of Evolution,” m A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter 
Singer (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 43-44.
2H. James Birx, Interpreting Evolution (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991),
104.
3Ibid., 101.
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from Mars opens the next frontier of hubris: “Humans are still the only intelligent 
life—right? The wagons will circle to defend this last bastion of human conceit.”1 
Similar claims are also originating in the areas of genetics and embryology.2
The Imago Dei and Man's Relationship to Nature
Several authors have directly addressed the issue of man as the image of God. 
Philip Hefner briefly explores how evolution undermines Western religious tradition 
which separates man from nature and gives him moral preference over nature.3 Paul 
Davies asserts that if extra-terrestrial life is discovered, evolution would be affirmed 
while traditional Christian belief in the special relation of mankind with God would be 
undermined.4 Ruse concludes, “We believe that it simply has to matter that we are 
modified monkeys rather than a special creation of a good God, in his image, on the sixth 
day.”5 J. H. Randall likewise declares: “Man's relation to nature was basically altered. 
He was no longer a fallen angel, but a great ape trying to make good, the last and best-
'Myrhvold, 64.
2See Miller and Hollister, 50. Significantly, the magazine cover reads “The Dawn 
of Life,” then in another part o f the cover, “Revolutionary prenatal photographs of 
humans and animals challenge our view of our origins—and of ourselves.”
3Philip Hefner, “Nature, God's Great Project,” Zygon 27 (1992): 327, 334-339.
"Davies, 58.
5Ruse, “Significance,” 502. See also idem, “Phoenix,” 95, where Ruse restates his 
view as follows: “We humans are modified monkeys, not the favored creation of a 
benevolent God, on the sixth day.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bom of nature's children.”1 If these statements are true, then humans must be viewed as 
merely moral monkeys and angelic apes for they are, as Wright implies, the only animal 
to evolve a moral dimension.2
The Work of James Rachels
Of even greater significance, however, is the work of James Rachels. Rachels 
expressly recognizes the importance to ethics of the place and role of man in nature. He 
convincingly argues that traditional morality depends on human beings being placed in a 
special moral category.3
Rachels, an avowed Darwinist, clearly seeks to show how Darwinian evolution 
undermines two classic justifications of the special status of man: That man is different 
from animals because he is the image of God, and that man is different from animals 
because he possesses reason. By destroying these two distinctions, man no longer can be 
special and treated on a different standard from animals. Humans are different only in 
degree, not in kind.4
’J. H. Randall, “The Changing Impact of Darwin on Philosophy,” in Darwin, ed. 
Philip Appleman (New York: Norton, 1970), 415. Also quoted in McCampbell, 163.
2See Wright, Moral Animal, 3-4, where morality is treated as being a unique trait of 
the human animal. Also note his book title, The Moral Animal.
3Rachels, CfA, 4-5. The full development of Rachels’s arguments is delineated 
especially in chapters 4 and 5 of his book. Chapters 1-3 are the foundational and 
background material that prepares the way for his exposition of man's place in nature (his 
non-uniqueness) in chapter 4. His exposition of his ethical system, “Moral 
Individualism,” is in chapter 5.
4Ibid., 171-172. This is Rachels’s own summary of the first four chapters of his 
book. It gives the essential points without the detailed arguments.
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Rachels offers a new morality called “Moral Individualism.” He asserts that ethics 
are determined by the individual's characteristics and the situation, not by the “species” 
of the creature. One's view of human life thus will no longer be a form of superstitious 
awe, and non-human life will be treated with greater dignity.1
While Rachels is quite convincing in his depiction of the impact o f evolution on 
human preference ethics, there appear to be at least two key areas o f possible weakness. 
First, Rachels is clearly an ardent animal rights supporter (and also seems to support 
euthanasia).2 He seems almost polemically driven in his attempts to equalize animal and 
human rights.
Second, Rachels also seems to create a straw-man by generally limiting himself to 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (i.e., industrial revolution era) viewpoints in depicting 
the model of human preference ethics, which he then challenges. The model he rejects 
seems to take a rather extreme view of human preference and may actually turn out to be 
a mix of Enlightenment-Humanism and Christian thinking.
Problem
Since Rachels uses evolution to challenge the concept of human preference over 
nature and ethics rooted in a preferential view of humans, Christians (and those of similar 
belief such as Jews) are faced with the problem of the veracity o f his conclusions and 
their implications for Christian ethics. In what ways will ethics be affected by how
'Ibid., 4-5, 171-172.
2Ibid., 173-223.
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protology defines man's relationship to nature? In particular, how will ethics be changed 
by abandoning human preference as Rachels does by accepting Darwinian protology?
More specifically, this study must evaluate the accuracy of his depiction of 
Christian ethics and ethical foundations. How he treats Christian ethics may undermine 
the veracity of his depiction of the implications that evolution would have on ethics based 
on human preference. Additionally, this study must examine if Rachels has adequately 
established the possibility of doing evolutionary ethics.
Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and evaluate the question of whether 
or not protology affects ethics. In particular, I propose to distill the implications of 
evolutionary views of origins for ethics, mainly in reference to the issue of human 
preference over nature in ethics, particularly in reference to the views of James Rachels.
I propose to disclose Rachels’s understanding of the implications of evolution on 
human preference ethics (such as biblical-Christian ethics), and to evaluate his views on 
the basis of his internal consistency, and the accuracy of his use of Christian history and 
biblical data. Likewise, I shall assess and evaluate Rachels’s assertion of the 
foundational role of human preference in Christian ethics. My analysis will presume a 
biblically oriented Christian perspective, as represented by Seventh-day Adventism. I 
shall, of course, not study Rachels in isolation from evolutionary ethicists contemporary 
to him (such as Michael Ruse and Robert Wright).
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Significance of This Study
This study of Rachels is significant for several reasons. First, Rachels offers a new 
approach to ethics yet one finds no scholarly responses to Rachels’s position. Peter 
Singer receives much attention. By contrast Rachels remains essentially untouched, even 
in Christian literature.
Second, the fact that Rachels builds his ethics by going head to head against 
Christian ethics begs for further investigation. His attacks on the view of man as the 
image of God and his evaluation of the moral implications of that doctrine provide a 
direct comparison of the ethical implications of two views of human origins. 
Additionally, his rebuttals raise serious questions regarding what it means to be a human 
being.
Third, some branches of Christianity have accepted evolutionary theories of 
origins. Mainline Protestants, and now the Pope, have taken a territorial approach to the 
issue of origins: Science gives us the physical mechanisms of origins through the theory 
of evolution while Religion explains the metaphysical soul dimension of man.1 The 
Presbyterians made some social statements in the mid-1980’s that clearly propound an 
evolutionary-based social ethics similar to Julian Huxley’s. However, there seems to be 
no organized, Evangelical-Conservative Christian response. I find a strong impetus for
Barnes Collins, “Vatican Thinking Evolves,” Time, November 4, 1996, 85. Many 
newspapers reported the Pope's declaration of acceptance of the theory of evolution in 
reference to the physical evolution of man (October 24-26, 1996, depending on the 
newspaper), but only Time notes the territorial issue.
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this research in the silence of most Christian scholarship regarding positions such as 
Rachels’s.
Finally, Rachels appears to be compatible with a Postmodern emphasis on 
debunking human preference in morality, and in advocating animal rights.1 In addition, 
his connection to the larger, animal rights movement is of some significance due to its 
use of evolution to minimize human specialness, though in a less thorough manner than 
Rachels.
Limitations and Delimitations
In this dissertation, I shall focus primarily on the work of Rachels. Since most of 
the work in evolutionary ethics has been done by American or British thinkers, I shall 
primarily focus on these thinkers when going beyond Rachels himself.
This dissertation is not designed to address directly the relative merits of creationist 
or evolutionary theories of origins.2 It rather will focus on the ethical/meta-ethical
‘See Gene Edward Veith, Jr., Postmodern Times (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 
1994), 72-79; Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1996), 92-93; Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the 
Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 342-43. See also, J. Richard 
Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a 
Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 57, where some meta- 
ethical implications o f the human identity issue are mentioned.
2It is also not necessary to argue directly over the merits of Darwinism versus other 
naturalistic theories o f origins. In regard to human preference, it seems likely that 
Rachels could have chosen any theory of origins which eliminates divine providence, 
depicts man as just a highly developed animal, and still have produced the same or 
similar results as his analysis o f the implications of Darwinism on ethics. Man still 
would lose his special status with God and over nature. Also, the veracity of a given 
theory of origins does not change the implications of that view on human preference 
ethics. Rather, veracity affects how widely the implications will be distributed. Finally,
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implications of evolution on ethics, with a special emphasis on the issue of human 
preference in ethics. Additionally, I do not address the dualistic view that the physical 
nature of man evolved while the soul is created or generated by God.
Methodology
To accomplish this purpose, I describe and delineate Rachels’s evolutionary ethics 
and his portrayal of Christian-based ethics. I compare these two approaches as explicated 
by Rachels, particularly how the issue of human preference is influenced by evolutionary 
and Creationist protologies, and how the resulting views of human preference affect the 
respective ethics. I analyze Rachels’s presentation of Christian ethics and his proposed 
evolutionary ethics, testing the consistency and strength of his arguments. I evaluate 
Rachels’s methods and conclusions, and identify implications of Rachels’s assertions 
regarding evolution and human preference for Biblically based ethics.
Finally, I attempt to introduce some biblical concepts of the relationship of man to 
nature that Rachels does not seem to consider. I particularly focus on the basis of human 
preference in the biblical data, with a special emphasis on the Image of God (.Imago Dei) 
and human dominion over nature. With these points in mind, let us turn to a more 
detailed look at historical views on man’s relationship to nature.
the significance and influence of Darwinism on the intellectual world cannot be 
minimized in spite of the criticisms against it.




Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution brought to full fruition a tension between two 
views of the world. This tension first appeared in the pre-Socratic philosophers but has 
been especially acute since the advent of modem science. Morris Goldman describes 
these viewpoints, and in so doing, introduces the key issue to understanding the ethics 
proposed by James Rachels. This issue is the relationship of man to nature. In 
Goldman’s words:
The religious outlook is characterized by a view of man as a transcendental 
creature who has, inherently, duties and privileges that extend beyond what is 
applicable to the rest of nature. Furthermore . . .  is the concept that there exists a 
God who . . .  controls and directs the natural w orld.. ..
The secular view denies both these propositions.. . .  It sees man as one 
animal species among millions of others, with no inherently special privileges 
beyond what it makes for itself by virtue of its unique mental capabilities. There is 
no supernatural God.1
The Theocentric half of this opposing pair of ideas has been a key principle in not only 
Christianity, but also in the Jewish and Moslem faiths. Thus Cragg notes that the 
underlying belief in Christian, Jewish, and the Moslem faiths is the “concept of man as
‘Morris Goldman, “Man’s Place in Nature,” Tradition: A Journal o f  Orthodox 
Thought 10 (1968): 100.
13
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the proper imperialist, the dominion-holder in the earth.” Man is seen “as the vicegerent 
set over the things under God.”1
It is this so-called imperialist view that led to Lynn White’s landmark article in 
1967,2 charging that the current ecological crisis is a result of the influence of 
Christianity. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson distills these accusations against Christianity 
into four specific charges: First, that Gen 1:28 “sets humanity apart from nature and 
directs humanity to conquer and exploit it.” Thus humans are viewed as “divinely 
appointed . . .  to place nature firmly under its subjugation.” Second, “Christian values in 
the Middle Ages encouraged the development of modem technology, which flourished 
under a doctrine of humanity’s transcendence over nature. These two new 
forces—science and technology—then merged together with the blessing of Christianity, 
giving humanity unprecedented and uncontrolled power over nature.” Third, the 
Christian dualism between the spiritual and the material, the heavenly and earthly, made 
the things of this earth of little importance, or even regarding the material world as 
inherently evil. Thus man is distinct from nature because he is “spiritual” while nature is 
“material.” Finally, “the belief in the Second Coming . . .  negates any reason to improve 
or
‘Kenneth Cragg, The Privilege o f Man: A Theme in Judaism, Islam, and 
Christianity (London: University of London/Athlone Press, 1968), 3.
2Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155 
(1967): 1203-1207. This article was reprinted as a chapter in, Western Man and 
Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1973), 18-30. Hereafter, page citations are 
to Barbour’s edited book.
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even preserve the world until then.” Granberg-Michaelson specifically cites Hal
Lindsay’s dispensationalist eschatology as an example of this attitude.1
Ever since White’s article, Christian scholars have been debating whether Christian
beliefs have caused or contributed to the current strains on the earth’s environment.
Central to this discussion is the issue of how Christianity views man’s relation and role to
nature. Part of the challenge is that, up to the present time, no systematic theologies have
dedicated a specific section to nature and man’s relationship to it. As John Jefferson
Davis has observed, twenty major Systematic theologies have been produced in
Evangelical circles since White’s article but very few have addressed the issue of our
ethical obligations to the rest of nature. In fact, for these twenty systematic theologies,
the median percentage of material dedicated to environmental stewardship is 1 percent,
with a range from 0-12.5 percent.2
Andrew Linzey picks up and intensifies the charge, noting that
Mainstream Christianity still propagates a range of ideas about animals which are 
hugely detrimental to their status and welfare. Animals are “here for our use,” 
indeed, “made for us.” Animals have no immortal soul, no rationality, no intrinsic 
worth. Animals are subordinate to humankind, who have be given ‘dominion’ 
(commonly understood as despotism) over them. How far these ideas are distinctly 
and authentically Christian is beside the point; the fact is that the Christian tradition 
has propagated them—and still defends them.
Indeed, those who wish to justify the exploitation of animals regard the 
Christian tradition as the last bastion of the anti-progressive sentiment.. . .  Ethical
‘Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, A Worldly Spirituality: The Call to Redeem Life 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 30-32.
2John Jefferson Davis, “Ecological ‘Blind Spots’ in the Structure and Content of 
Recent Evangelical Systematic Theologies,” Journal o f the Evangelical Theological 
Society 43, no. 2 (2000): 274, 284.
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sensitivity, it was supposed, constitutes nothing less than a rejection of Christian 
Values: It seems increasingly part of a post-Christian ethic, however to nourish the 
belief that animals possess dignity, personality and spirit that entitle their interests 
to be considered in the same fashion as the rest of us.1
It is precisely argumentation along this line that appears to have influenced Rachels 
in rejecting Christian ethics as insufficient and thus the need to move beyond Christianity 
and attempt to create an ethics based in neo-Darwinism. It therefore seems prudent to 
delve a little more deeply into the dominant strains to Christian thought to see if these 
charges are substantiated and to provide the theological context for understanding 
Rachels’s ethics.
Man and Nature in Patristic Thought
Introduction: Greek Philosophical Influence 
The relationship of man to nature in the Patristic literature is a sketchy matter since 
their viewpoint can only be derived by incidental comments and discussions. However, 
it does appear that the early fathers were significantly influenced by Greek philosophy.2
'Andrew Linzey, “Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” in 
Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew 
Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books], 
1998), xi-xii.
2There appears to be some historical significance to the pre-Socratic philosophers 
which fits better in the context of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, than with the Early 
Church Fathers. Richard Tamas asserts that while some Greeks like the Pythagoreans 
sought to maintain the ancient myths and mystery religions, while simultaneously 
pursuing philosophical development, by contrast, “the general tenor of Greek intellectual 
evolution was otherwise, as from Thales and Anaximander to Leucippus and Democritus 
a naturalistic science matured in step with an increasingly skeptical rationalism.. . .  With 
the exception of the . . .  Pythagoreans, the Hellenic mind before Socrates followed a 
definite, if at times ambiguous, direction away from the supernatural and toward the 
natural: from the divine to the mundane.” Richard Tamas, The Passion o f the Western
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One example of this influence can be found in the work of Aristotle.
In his discussion on acquiring wealth, Aristotle makes an argument that would be
often repeated in Classic Christian interpretations of the Genesis statement on human
dominion over nature. In his Politics (1:3), he asserts that it is nature’s order,
that the plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of 
man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and . . .  most of the 
wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that 
they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore 
nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all 
the animals for the sake of men.1
Robert Reneham observes that classic Greek philosophers argued that man was 
superior to animals because man alone, has reason and rational speech and can 
experience an emotional sense of anticipation to future events. Man alone has unique 
abilities with his hands. Man alone stands erect on two legs as a primary posture. 
Laughter is unique to humans. Because of these unique attributes, man alone is seen as 
being, in a sense, divine.2
Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped Our World View (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1991), 23-24. Benjamin Wiker sets forth the position that Epicurean 
materialism was revived in the Renascence and came to its culmination in Charles 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Thus the pre-Socratic and Epicurean draining of divinity 
from nature may have helped transform nature into an object of scientific study, but 
seems to have had little bearing on early Christian theology. See also, Julian Marias, 
History o f  Philosophy, trans. Stanley Appelbaum and Clarence C. Snowbridge 
(NewYork: Dover Publications, 1967), 95; and Benjamin Wiker, Moral Darwinism: How 
We Becam e H edonists  (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 34.
'Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 21, Politics, trans. H. Rackham, 
Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1977), 37.
2Robert Reneham, “The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man,” Harvard Studies 
in Classical Philology 85 (1981): 248-51.
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In addition to Aristotle, Robin Attfield observes that the Stoics believed that the 
irrational existed for the sake of the rational, and thus man can do to non-human nature 
whatever he pleases.1
D. S. Wallace-Hadril declares that for most of the early church fathers, man’s erect 
posture and rational ability allows him to transcend the material world and look to 
heaven. Rationality was viewed as a reflection or image of divinity.2 Three well-known 
church fathers illustrate this orientation reported by Wallace-Hadril: Gregory of Nyssa, 
Basil, and Ambrose.
Gregory of Nyssa (A.D. 330-395)
Gregory of Nyssa has one of the best developed expositions on man’s relationship 
to nature found in Patristic literature. In his treatise, On the Making o f Man, Gregory 
asserts that man’s great significance is found in the fact that “no other existing thing, save 
the human creation, has been made like to God,” especially noting that the “soul was 
fashioned in the image of Him Who created him.”3 Gregory outlines to the reader, thirty 
points of discussion he will pursue on the topic of man’s creation, several of which 
impinge on man’s relationship to nature.
In Point 2, Gregory uses royal language to describe man’s relation to nature. Man
lRobin Attfield, “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” Journal o f  the History o f Ideas 
44, no. 3 (1983): 371.
2D. S. Wallace-Hadril, The Greek Patristic View o f Nature (New York: Barnes 
and Noble, 1968), 75.
3St. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making o f  Man, trans. Henry Austin Wilson 
(Manassas, VA: Eternal Word Television Network, 1996), 1.
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was created last because it is not fitting “that the ruler should appear before the subjects 
of his rule; but when his dominion was prepared, the next step was that the king should 
be manifested.” The earth was thus “a royal lodging for the future king” in which “all 
kinds of wealth had been stored in this palace [i.e., the earth]” for his use. He further 
states that man’s position as ruler over nature was “assigned to him” by God.1
Gregory further proposes in Point 3 “that the nature of man is more precious than 
all the visible creation.” His explanation is that the “the elemental foundation for the 
formation of the universe, the creation is, so to say, made offhand by the Divine power, 
existing at once on His command, while counsel precedes the making of 
man.” He reiterates this argument a second time: “O marvellous! a sun is made, and no 
counsel precedes; a heaven likewise;. . .  All are brought into being with a word, while 
only to the making of man does the Maker of all draw near with circumspection, so as to 
prepare beforehand for him material for his formation.”2 The conclusion, then, is that 
man must be more precious than the rest of creation due to the more intricate divine 
involvement in his creation.
Point 4 continues the regal argumentation introduced in Part 2. Gregory asserts 
that man’s nature was made “as it were a formation fit for the exercise of royalty.”
Again, “our nature was created to be royal from the first.” He ties this rulership to the 
concept of the image of God by making an analogy to the artisan who makes an image of
Tbid., 5.
2Ibid., 5-6.
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a royal personage. The artist indicates its “royal rank by the vesture of purple.” In the 
same way, “the human nature also, as it was made to rule the rest, was, by its likeness to 
the King of all, made as it were a living image, partaking of the archetype both in rank 
and in name, not vested in purple,. . .  but instead of the purple robe, clothed in virtue, 
which in truth is the most royal of all raiment.”1 Here (more clearly than in Part 2) 
Gregory more clearly ties the royal rank of humanity to its being created in the image of 
God.
These comments constitute the major corpus of Gregory’s argument on human 
superiority over nature, and indeed shows a highly developed theology of human 
primacy. Thus, for Gregory, Man is superior to nature because he was made like God 
(i.e., in God’s image), he was made to be a sovereign ruler over the things of nature, he 
was given the virtues for rulership, and therefore, the riches of nature are for man’s use.
Saint Basil (329-379)
Basil does not make a formal exposition on man’s relationship to nature as did 
Gregory of Nyssa. His views must be distilled from incidental comments scattered in his 
Exegetic Homilies. In Homily 6, he describes fallen man as “the work of the divine 
hands, falling far short of the animals in strength, but an appointed ruler of the creatures 
without reason, inferior in physical constitution, but able by the benefit of reason to be
‘Ibid., 6.
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lifted up to the very heavens.”1 Basil here seems to echo Gregory’s emphasis on man’s 
being an “appointed ruler,” as well as touching on the theme of reason as being the 
faculty separating man from animals. We also see a hint at the idea that humans are 
immortal while animals are not, for the possession of reason made man capable of being 
“lifted up to the very heavens.” Apparently, the creatures who lack reason are not 
capable of such “lifting up.”
Basil continues, in Homily 8, to catagorize the creation into three divisions: aquatic 
animals, terrestrial animals, and the highest level of created being, man, because his soul 
is different from the soul of animals. The animals are “irrational,” and “the soul of 
beasts is earth.” Thus animals are mortal, without capacity for eternal life. Concerning 
the animal soul, Basil states, “Do not think that it is antecedent to the essence of their 
bodies or that it remains after the dissolution of the flesh.”2
By contrast, in Homily 9, Man’s soul is contrasted with the animals. “The herds 
are earthly and are bent towards the earth, but man is a heavenly creature who excels 
them as much by the excellence of his soul as by the character of his bodily structure.. . .  
Your head stands erect towards the heavens.” He further argues that in the Scriptures, if 
you as a human “dishonor yourself, serving your belly and your lowest parts, ‘you are
‘St. Basil, Exegetic Homilies, trans. Sister Agnes Claire Way, The Fathers of the 
Church, vol. 46 (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1963), 84.
2Ibid., 118-119. See also Homily 9, p. 138, where again animals are inferior to 
man because they lack reason. Basil also exhorts the reader in Homily 8, p. 119, not to 
be like an animal, for example, not to hold anger for retribution as Camels do.
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compared to senseless beasts, and are become like to them.’”1 Thus man is clearly seen 
as elevated above the beasts, which, in turn, explains why in Homily 8, Basil condemns 
“the proud philosophers, who are not ashamed to regard their own soul and that of dog’s 
as similar.”2 It seems evident, then, that Basil held a very similar view of man to 
Gregory. Their contemporary, Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, likewise will show agreement 
with the view that man is superior to nature.
Saint Ambrose: Bishop of Milan (339-374)
A comment by Ambrose concerning the benefit of death to man gives us a brief 
hint at his view of man and nature. In his Seven Exegetical Works, Ambrose teaches that 
in death the body “lies still and is shut in the hollow tomb like a wild beast. Its savagery 
is bereft of life.” Meanwhile, the soul flies away “on high.”3 Ambrose thus equates the 
body with a wild, savage beast that must be trapped in a tomb and subdued, while the 
soul has a natural affinity to virtue and God. It seems quite clear that Ambrose sees the 
locus of man in the immortal soul, and even more apparent that man is superior to 
“savage” animals.
The Patristics, therefore, project a very high view of man, and a low view of nature. 
That which is not a human soul is irrational, deserving to be shut up in the tomb and
Tbid., 138.
2Ibid., 119.
3St. Ambrose, Seven Exegetical Works, trans. Michael P. McHugh, The Fathers 
of the Church, vol. 65 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1971), 97. 
Emphasis mine.
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otherwise put into oblivion. Man is appointed the ruler of creation by God, is superior to 
animals by virtue of having reason, and the Creator stored riches in the earth for the 
kingly man to use for his own interests. This is the general picture of man and nature that 
Augustine would inherit and develop a generation later.
Saint Augustine (354-430)
Much like the Patristic authors before him, as Gillian Clark notes, Augustine did 
not dedicate a particular portion of his work to the issue of man’s relationship to the 
animals, and nature in general. However, a sense of his theology can be derived from 
incidental remarks about man and nature scattered throughout his works.1
Augustine appears to make three key points about the relationship of man to nature. 
First, humans are spiritual, having an immortal soul, while animals are corporeal, with 
no soul. The spiritual is said to be superior to the corporeal.2
Second, he refers to the statement in Gen 1 that gives man dominion over the 
animals. Augustine insists that this dominion is not over the heavenly luminaries, etc., 
but rather over the various animals.3
Third, man is different from, and gains his preeminence over, the animals because
'Gillian Clark, “The Fathers and the Animals: The Rule of Reason?” in Animals 
on the Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r  Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey 
and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books], 1998), 
67.
2Augustine, St. Augustine’s Confessions, vol. 2, trans. William Watts 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912; reprint, 1988), 377-79.
3Ibid., 435, 437.
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he was made in God’s image while the animals were made according to their kind. The 
image of God is interpreted primarily in terms of having reason and intellect which 
elevates man over the beasts.1 Thus, the sixth commandment does not apply to animals 
because they “are not partakers with us in the faculty of reason, the privilege not being 
given them to share it in common with us—and therefore by the altogether righteous 
ordinance of the Creator both their life and their death are a matter subordinate to our 
needs.”2 Animals thus seem viewed primarily in reference to their utility to man.
This final proposition is especially cited as a foundational statement demonstrating 
the alleged despotic view of human dominion within Christianity. While it is true that 
Augustine states that the animals’ lives and deaths are subject to our use, Santmire 
correctly points out that, for Augustine, human dominion is a “minor m otif’ and that 
“there is no suggestion that God places humanity over a lesser or valueless thing in order 
to dominate it.”3 He rightly concludes, “Although Augustine believes that all things . . .  
are created as a blessing for humanity, this by no means exhausts their reason d ’etre.
'Augustine, St. Augustine: The Literal Meaning o f  Genesis (De Genesi ad 
Litteram), trans. John Hammond Taylor, S.J., Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of 
the Fathers in Translation, vol. 41, ed. Johannes Quasten, Walter J. Burghardt, and 
Thomas Comerford Lawler (New York: Newman Press, 1982), 192-93 (Section 6.12.); 
Confessions, 431; idem, “On Free Will,” in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. 
John H. S. Burleigh, Library of Christian Classics, vol. 6 (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster 
Press, 1953), 138,143. See also the editor’s introduction and analysis on p. 109.
2Augustine, The City o f  God Against the Pagans, trans. George E.
McCracken, The Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 93. This statement is part of the explanation for why the 
sixth commandment does not forbid killing animals.
3H. Paul Santmire, “St. Augustine’s Theology of the Biophysical World,” Dialog 
19 (1980): 181.
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Human utility is not the sole reason for the existence of all visible things in the hierarchy. 
Rather, for Augustine, the most fundamental telos o f the whole creation is beauty, and the 
glorification of God.”1
Overall, however, it does appear that Augustine definitively favors man over the 
rest of nature. It is easy to see how those of a later, more technologically advanced era 
could use Augustinian theology, as well as the Patristic writers, to justify a despotic 
dominion of man over nature. However, Augustine never authorizes an unbridled, 
exploitative human dominion over nature, but rather seems to advocate a limited 
authority. So while we can see seeds of future despotism lying in Augustine, we shall 
see that those seeds did not germinate and bear fruit till much later in history. With this 
in mind, let us turn our attention to developments in the Medieval era.
Medieval Theology Concerning Man and Nature
The Medieval Christian theologians appear to pick up the views of Augustine and 
possibly sharpen them a bit further towards a despotic view of human dominion. Linzey 
asserts there was a “hardening of scholastic theology against animals” after the twelfth 
century, blaming this hardening on the influence of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas.2 
Ian McHarg observes that Medieval Christianity, in general, saw nature as rotten and 
rotting. But man was seen as having a divine mandate giving him dominion over all 
earthly life and non-life, and a commission to subdue the earth. Furthermore, the
'Ibid., 177.
2Linzey, xii-xiii.
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cosmos was thought of as a pyramid with man at the pinnacle and all below him are 
placed there to support man at the peak.1 Two Medieval theologians will suffice to 
illustrate the extension and refining of Augustine’s animal theology: John Duns Scotus, 
and the prince of Medieval theology, Thomas Aquinas.
John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)
John Duns Scotus appears not to have systematically dealt with the relationship of 
man to nature in general, or animals in particular. However, some of his incidental 
comments, and his citations of Augustine point to a fundamental agreement with 
Augustine’s thinking concerning man’s relation to animals and nature.
Quoting Augustine, he states that “a man is not called the image of God according 
to everything that pertains to his nature, but according to the mind alone.” He then 
comments on this, saying that “from this and other passages [referring to what was just 
quoted from Augustine], one would conclude that every image is in the intellective part, 
understanding by this the part that transcends the sensitive [i.e., physical sensory 
abilities].”2 A little later, Duns Scotus again uses a statement by Augustine that 
“intellection” requires memory which man has but which animals don’t have, while 
emphasizing the independence of the intellect from the senses. He then adds further
‘Ian McHarg, “The Place of Nature in the City of Man,” in Western Man and 
Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1973), 174-175.
2John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions 15:15-16 
(trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1975], 348-49).
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commentary, saying, “The memory, which animals lack, viz., that which is properly 
intellectual, has a likeness to the Father. . . A few pages later he once more broaches 
the same issue saying, “Now the ‘image’ [of God in us] consists of what is best in our 
nature.”2
While not fully addressing the relationship between man and nature, these 
comments clearly seem to indicate a harmony with Augustine’s sharp distinction between 
man and nature, and especially between man and the animals. The primary focus is the 
intellect and reason as the definitive separator of man from animals. Such a theme is 
developed much more clearly in his more famous contemporary, Thomas Aquinas.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
Dorothy Yamomoto asserts that the Thomistic view of animals and their role “has 
exerted an enormous influence on Christian tradition.”3 She further notes that Aquinas’s 
view of the animals is based on a philosophical hierarchy of being ranked according to 
the degree of participation in the divine nature. Thus, humans, who have reason, are 
placed above all other animals, with, the elements intended to serve the higher.4
‘Ibid., 15:17-18.
2Ibid., 15:44.
3Dorothy Yamamoto, “Aquinas and Animals: Patrolling the Boundary?” in 
Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew 
Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press (Illini Books), 
1998), 80.
“Ibid. See also, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.65.2 (trans. The Fathers 
of the English Dominical Province [New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947], 1:327).
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Yamomoto frames the issue in a way that will play a significant role in Rachels’s 
reaction: “It is a cornerstone of Aquinas’ scheme that there is an absolute difference 
between animals and humans. Humans have reason, ‘intellectual nature’; animals have 
none, and are guided purely by instinct.”1 Aquinas asserts this absolute difference in 
several ways, often citing Aristotle.
First, he reiterates the patristic refrain that man is superior to animals because of his 
reason, and by virtue of possessing an “intellectual soul,” which is immortal. On the 
other hand, animals have a “sensitive soul,” which is corruptible.2
St. Thomas also argues that prior to the fall, man had total dominion over the 
animals, but that part of God’s punishment for the fall is that animals now disobey us.
He concludes that all animals are naturally subject to man as part of the natural order of 
the use of things. “Thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make 
use o f the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes 
use o f both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature that 
man should be master over the animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Politic i. 5) that 
the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural 
right.”3 Such arguments really make Aquinas sound like he advocates despotic 
dominion. Certainly he seems to state the issue in stronger terms than Augustine.
'Yamamoto, 85.
2Aquinas, 1.76.3. This argument is later expanded in 1.91.4 and 1.93.2.
3Ibid., 1.96.1; see also, 2-2.64.1 for an almost identical argument.
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However, Aquinas has tried to constrain man’s exercise of dominion, even as Augustine 
did.
William French notes that, “for Thomas, animals are a path to God, for God created 
them and sustains them in being.”1 He further asserts that for Aquinas, animals are 
created in the likeness of God and bear the marks of their creator. Furthermore, French 
declares that for Thomas, “Humans are of the same genus as other animals, but differ in 
species.”2
Attfield notes that Aquinas argued that cruelty to animals is wrong only because of 
the effects on the agent’s character and on the owner’s property (the animal).3 This 
clearly puts some moral limits on man regarding animals. But this means that animals, 
and by extrapolation, the rest of nature, have little or no moral standing except in 
reference to their impact on humans. Such an ethical position could very easily develop 
into a potent moral cocktail of despotic human dominion over nature. The Thomistic 
view of nature has dominated much of Christian thought ever since. Even the Reformers 
who favored Augustine were influenced by Aquinas’s thinking.
'William French, “Beast Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life: A 
Creation-Centered Perspective,” in Good News fo r  Animals? Christian Approaches for  
Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1993), 38.
2Ibid., 38. The portions of Aquinas cited by French can be found in Aquinas, 
1.13.1.2; 1.65.1.3; 1.75.3.1; 1.76.1.
3Attfield, 379.
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Selected Reformation Views of Man and Nature
Martin Luther (1483-1546)
It should come as no surprise that Luther, the former Augustinian monk, had strong 
affinities to Augustine’s thinking in the area of man’s relationship to nature. Scott Ickert 
notes, that Luther did not treat animals separately as a theological subject, and that “for 
Luther the non-human creation is a function of anthropology as anthropology is a 
function of the doctrine of G od.. . .  Animals are subordinate to human beings as the 
latter exist to glorify—and exemplify—God. Therefore, the dominion that human beings 
exercise over the non-human creation, is a part of the divine ordering of creation.. . .  
Human dominion is not merely advised but is expressly commanded by God.”1 Luther 
primarily addresses human-animal issues in his expositions on Genesis.
Luther on Man and Animals
Luther expounds on the creation of man by asserting “an outstanding difference” 
between man and the animals.2 He justifies this assertion on the grounds that man was 
made by a special command and plan of God as opposed to the animals, and that man 
was made in the image of God, while the animals were not. God created man to be ruler 
of the earth, sea, and air, but “No beast is told to exercise dominion.”3 By contrast, “the
‘Scott Ickert, “Luther and Animals: Subject to Adam’s Fall?” in Animals on the 
Agenda: Questions about Animals fo r  Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and 
Dorothy Yamamoto (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press [Illini Books], 1998), 90.
2Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on Genesis-Chapters 1-5, 54 vols., ed. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmust T. Lehman (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 1955), 1:56-57.
3Ibid., 1:66-67.
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beasts of the field and the birds of the heaven were created for mankind; these are the 
wealth and possessions of men.”1 However, Luther himself laments that the original 
dominion was lost,2 and that what dominion we still have “is extremely small and far 
inferior to that first dominion.. . .  Therefore, we retain the name and word, ‘dominion,’ 
as a bare title.”3
Yet after the Flood, Luther sees God as increasing human dominion in a way that 
required putting the fear of man into the animals. This is because Luther believed that 
before the Flood, animals were not slaughtered for food. Instead, man was a gentle 
master of the beasts. After the Flood, however, the animals could now be killed and their 
flesh eaten, thus putting them under a “more oppressive form of bondage,” being 
“subjected to man as to a tyrant.” Therefore, concludes Luther, at the present time, “It is 
a great liberty that with impunity man may kill and eat animals of every edible kind.”4
Luther and Compassion to Animals
In spite of his despotic-sounding viewpoint, Luther did believe in being kind to 
animals. The purpose of the Mosaic command not to muzzle the ox when it is treading 
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become more benevolent toward people.”1 Like Augustine, Luther here exhorts 
kindness to beasts, not so much for their benefit but for ours.
In his comments on Eccl 3:1, Luther declares, “Therefore God wants us to make 
use of creatures, but freely, as He has provided them, without prescribing the time, the 
manner, and the hour. . . .  so that we should not think that it is in our hands to use things 
as we wish if He does not give them.”2 Luther here clearly advocates that there are 
divine limits on man’s use of nature. Ickert further observes that the arbitrary killing of 
animals for sport and pleasure was not sanctioned by Luther, who asserted that we must 
not act like wild beasts.3
John Calvin (1509-64)
John Calvin, a contemporary of Luther, and being a devoted student of Augustine, 
holds a very similar view to both of these men. As Robin Attfield states it, “Peter 
Lombard, and later John Calvin, held that everything was made for man.” However, as 
Attfield also observes, Calvin’s great emphasis on the sovereignty of God led him to 




3Ickert, 97-99. Emphasis mine.
4Attfield, 379-80.
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Calvin on Man versus Animals
In his Institutes, Calvin asserts that the immortal soul distinguishes man from the 
“brutes” and that this soul constitutes the image of God. He further teaches “that where 
the image of God is said to be in man, there is implied a tacit antithesis, which exalts man 
above all the other creatures, and as it were separates him from the vulgar herd.”1 
In his commentaries on Gen 1 and Ps 8, Calvin argues that man was divinely 
appointed, as the image of God, to be lord of the world to rule in God’s stead. This 
authority was given both to Adam and to his posterity. Furthermore, the rest of creation 
was made for man’s welfare so that “man was rich before he was bom.”2 Thus, “it is by 
the wonderful providence of God that horses and oxen yield their service to men; that 
sheep bear wool to clothe them with; and that all kind of cattle yield even their flesh to 
feed them.”3
Calvin and Limits to Human Dominion
Like Luther, Calvin sees limits to man’s dominion, especially in light of the Fall. 
Thus, the current exercises of dominion over cattle, horses, sheep, etc., that we now enjoy
'John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. John Allen 
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936), 1:206,208. 
Emphasis mine.
2Jean [John] Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book o f Moses Called Genesis, 
trans. John King, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 96.
3Ibid. See also, Jean [John] Calvin, A Commentary on the Psalms o f David, vol. 1, 
trans. unnamed (Oxford: Printed by D. A. Talboys for Thomas Tegg, 1860), 71-74.
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are “the remnants of the good things whereof they were despoiled in Adam.”1 
Furthermore, in his exposition of Gen 2:15, Calvin asserts a thoroughgoing stewardship 
model with man giving strict accountability to God for how he cares for the world.2 
Thus Calvin supplies a strong check and balance to arrest a despotic view of dominion.
Nevertheless, Calvin’s language regarding horses, oxen, and sheep would reappear 
in a new social context, the Industrial Revolution, and be used to justify an exploitative 
despotism of man over nature. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, man could not afford to 
use the animals in an abusive fashion as he was too dependent on them for his own 
prosperity. But the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution allowed man to 
perform his tasks without animals, thus opening the door for the development of a more 
domineering orientation.
The Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries
It was shortly after the deaths of Luther and Calvin that three forces began to assert 
a powerful influence on Christian interpretations of man’s dominion of nature: The new 
technological prowess of the Industrial Revolution, the mechanistic-secularized view of 
nature emerging from the Renaissance, and the rise of a capitalist economic system.3
Protestantism was a suitable religious milieu for capitalistic thinking to grow and
‘Calvin, Psalms, 72-75.
2Calvin, Genesis, 125.
3David Livingstone, “The Historical Roots of Our Eschatological Crisis: A 
Reassessment,” Fides Historia 26 (1994): 43-45; Jeremy Cohen, “The Bible, Man, and 
Nature in the History of Western Thought: A Call for Reassessment,” Journal o f Religion 
65 (1985): 156.
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develop, as Cohen observes, because of its “worldly asceticism” which secularized the 
world.1 Ronald J. Sider expresses a similar sentiment when he states that “the eighteenth 
century, however, abandoned the biblical worldview. The isolated, autonomous 
individual replaced God at the center of reality.. . .  The destructive, unbridled 
consumerism of modem society is rooted in this narcissistic individualism and 
materialistic naturalism that flows from the Enlightenment.”2
The roots of the shift to a more mechanistic view of nature originated a couple of 
centuries earlier. Brother Aiden notes that starting in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries there “was the massive influx of Aristotelian literature and Arabic philosophy 
into thirteenth century Europe which effected a shift from a truly Christian cosmology to 
a more pagan and mechanistic one.” Thus, “Man and not God was declared to be the 
measure of all things.”3 In other words, Aiden implies that we cannot lay all blame for an 
exploitative view of nature solely at the feet of Christianity, for other philosophical 
influences were uniting with Christian thinking in producing this result. Aiden further 
argues that Nominalism played a key role in developing this mechanistic view of nature.4
'Cohen, 156.
2Ronald J. Sider, “Message from an Evangelical: The Place of Humans in the 
Garden of God,” The Amicus Journal 17 (1995): 14.
3Brother Aiden, “Man and H is Role in the Environment,” Epiphany Journal 12 
(1992): 30.
4Ibid., 29. Aiden describes Nominalism as teaching that ultimate reality resides in 
particulars, which means that Nominalism does not see a larger, universal reality from 
which all is derived (such as God), but rather these principles are only in particular 
things. This logically leads to the belief that higher levels emerge from lower levels 
based on ultimate realities contained in the lower levels. Aiden credits William of
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The key reason is that Nominalism follows Greek thinking in dismantling and studying 
individual parts. This dismantling, asserts Aiden, leads to a reductionist, mechanistic 
view of reality which tends to secularize nature.1 This approach to nature was most 
influentially promoted by Francis Bacon.
Sixteenth Century 
Francis Bacon’s Influence (1551-1626)
Francis Bacon associated his new, scientific approach to nature, not to Scripture, 
but to the Greeks just as Aiden has asserted. In Bacon’s own words, “The sciences we 
possess have been principally derived from the Greeks; for the additions of the Roman, 
Arabic, or modem writers, are but few and of small importance, and such as they are, are 
founded on the basis of Greek invention.”2 Thus Bacon himself discredits the charge that 
Christianity is the primary culprit in developing the exploitative view of human 
dominion.
Bacon’s significance is that he is the first one to systematically promote the 
legitimate goal of the sciences as “the endowment of human life with new inventions and 
riches.”3 He asserted that Science should extend “to a greater distance the boundaries of
Ockham as being one o f the best promoters of Nominalist philosophy.
•ibid., 29-31.
2Sir Francis Bacon, Advancement o f Learning; Novum Organum; New Atlantis, ed. 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 30 (Chicago, IL: 
William Benton, 1952), 117. This is from Novum, Aphorism 71.
3Bacon, 120 {Novum, Aphorism 81). See also Bacon, 34 {Advancement).
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human power and dignity,”1 and was to be used to “to renew and enlarge the power of the 
empire of mankind in general over the universe.”2 Science was to be used to mine the 
secrets of nature so the craftsmen could produce new things for use in serving man.3
Significantly, Bacon welded the biblical concept of the dominion of man to his 
imperative to harness and control nature through science. Science was to be the means 
for man to recapture the powers over nature lost in the Fall. Bacon argued that the 
potential misuse and abuse of this scientific power was worth the risk to gain the benefits, 
and then concludes his exhortation, “Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, 
assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be 
governed by right reason and true religion.”4
Bacon here clearly indicates science as a means to “regain their rights over nature,” 
and truly gives theological justification to a despotic view of dominion over nature. Yet 
Bacon himself tried to set some governing limits to this enterprise of conquering nature 
through science. Geisler astutely observes that Bacon’s closing phrase in the previous 
quote states, “The exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion.”5 
Thus Bacon does not seem to have intended the unbridled exploitation of nature by man.
'Ibid., 131 {Novum, Aphorism 116).
2Ibid., 135 {Novum, Aphorism 129). Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 41-42 {Advancement).
4Ibid., 135 {Novum, Aphorism 129). Emphasis mine.
5Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1989), 308.
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However, the exploitative vein is precisely what the succeeding generations popularized 
and secularized.
The Theological Impact of Bacon
Bacon’s work is recognized by many as the pivotal point where the secularized 
view of nature reached its critical mass in terms of becoming the dominant viewpoint. 
Merchant insightfully captures the significance of Bacon’s theological proposition, when 
she declares: “While some, accepting God’s punishment, had obeyed the medieval 
strictures against searching too deeply into God’s secrets, Bacon turned the constraints 
into sanctions. Only by ‘digging further and further into the mine of natural knowledge’ 
could mankind recover that lost dominion. In this way, ‘the narrow limits of man’s 
dominion over the universe’ could be stretched ‘to their promised bounds.’”1 Merchant 
polemically announces that Bacon’s “science legitimized the domination of 
nature . . .  [and] fashioned a new ethic sanctioning the exploitation of nature.’”2
William Leiss likewise comes to the conclusion that
‘Carolyn Merchant, The Death o f Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific 
Revolution (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1980), 170. See also, Livingstone, 43, 
44.
2Merchant, 169-170. Merchant creatively strings phrases together from Bacon’s 
Advancement o f Learning, 33, to assert that Bacon “treats nature as a female to be 
tortured through mechanical inventions, [which] strongly suggests the interrogations o f  
the witch trials and mechanical devices torture witches” (Merchant, 168). However, 
when read in context, Bacon is doing no such thing. Rather, his mention of witchcraft is 
in the context of not rejecting paranormal phenomena such as “sorceries, witchcrafts, 
dreams, divinations, and the like,” as possibly producing valid, verifiable scientific 
evidence. Outside of this gender-biased twisting of Bacon, Merchant appears to have 
correctly interpreted the significance of Bacon in shaping modem, exploitative attitudes 
towards nature.
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Bacon’s great achievement was to formulate the concept of human mastery 
over nature much more clearly than had been done previously and to assign it a 
prominent place among men’s concerns. Its dangerous connection with the 
megalomaniacal delusions of the alchemists were severed; and, still infused with 
Renaissance energies, it was wedded to the predominant cultural force of the time, 
namely, Christianity.
In Bacon’s view religion and science were engaged in a mutual effort to 
compensate for the damage incurred as a result of the expulsion from Paradise.1
Leiss thus shows us that, for Bacon, recovery of lost dominion over nature was the task
of science and religion. But in so doing, Leiss concludes that Bacon “unwittingly charted
a course for later generations which led to the gradual secularization of the idea.”2
Granberg-Michaelson likewise points to Bacon as the root of the despotic
viewpoint, but adds Rene Descartes (1596-1650)3 and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) as
accomplices. Descartes, he says, detached the human mind from nature. Bacon supplied
the rationale, the goal of using science to regain dominion over nature, and Newton’s
view of the universe as a cosmic machine combined to lead to a mechanical paradigm
'William Leiss, The Domination o f Nature (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 
48-49. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 52-53.
3Descartes does not seem to develop the man-nature relationship the way Bacon 
does. However, he does repeat the familiar refrain that reason “is the only thing that 
makes us men (and distinguishes us from animals).” He also, like Bacon, promotes the 
potential use of science to improve the lot of man, advocating that instead o f teaching 
“speculative philosophy,” schools should teach “a practical one, by which, knowing the 
nature and behavior o f  fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all other bodies which 
surround us, as well as we now understand the different skills of our workers, we can 
employ these entities for all the purposes for which they are suited, and so make 
ourselves masters and possessors of nature.” Thus Descartes echoes the Baconian mind­
set and shows how it was becoming mainstream thinking barely a generation later. See, 
Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays: Discourse on Method; Meditations; Rules fo r  the 
Direction o f the Mind, trans. Laurence J. LaFleur (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merril 
Company, 1964), 4,45. Both quotes are from Discourse on Method, parts 1 and 6.
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which excluded God from the explanation of the world. “Once Bacon, Descartes, 
Newton, and others liberated God from running the world, John Locke set God free from 
the task of upholding government and society. Natural reason and self-interest would 
suffice.”1
It should be no surprise that as technological prowess increased, there would be 
those who would try to express a theology of dominion compatible with Bacon’s bold 
vision. Thus the new understanding of dominion spawned by Bacon appears to have 
been infiltrating Christian thinking. This can be seen in several, influential works of 




Robert Boyle states that people were studying nature for two reasons. Some 
merely wanted only to know nature. Others were studying nature in order to command 
her. This second group, says Boyle, would “bring nature to be serviceable to their 
particular ends, whether of health, or riches, or sensual delight.”2 Boyle thus affirms 
that Bacon’s vision was indeed becoming mainstream science. Apart from this statement, 
Boyle has little else to say concerning the relationship of man to nature. Much more
1 Granberg-Michaelson, 42.
2Robert Boyle, The Works o f  the Honourable Robert Boyle in Six Volumes, vol. 1 
(London: J. and F. Rivingdon, L. Davis, W. Johnston, S. Crowder, T. Payne, et al., 1772), 
310.
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prominent, however, is Boyle’s contemporary, Sir Matthew Hale.
Sir Matthew Hale (1609-76)
In The Primitive Origination o f Mankind, Hale appears to weld Calvin’s language 
of oxen and sheep, with Bacon’s imperative to subvert nature to man’s use. Early in his 
discussion of the relationship between man and nature, Hale asserts, “If we consider of 
Animals [sic], we shall find admirable accommodations in them one to another, and 
especially to Man: the Horse, high-spirited, yet very docible [sic], fitted for swiftness, 
carriage, and agility,. . .  the Ox patient, painful, strong, fitted for draught; the Camel 
fitted for Strength, and a natural Saddle for Burthen; the Cow for yielding Milk; the 
Sheep for Cloathing; the Beasts and Birds of greatest use being most commonly made 
tame, and affecting a spontaneous subjection to Man: among the Vegetables some are for 
Food, some for Medicines.”1 It is no surprise, then, when Hale declares, “Yet the chief 
and ultimate accommodation of things seems principally to terminate in Man.”2
Hale does put some limitation on human dominion by stating that the subjection of 
nature to man is not so much in terms of subservience and service, but rather is more 
related to their place in the divine regiment and order. Thus, in keeping with the divine
'Sir Matthew Hale, The Primitive Origination o f  Mankind, Considered and 
Examined According to the Light o f  Nature (London: William Godbid, 1677), 359.
2Ibid., 360, 362. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, John Ray would 
likewise argue that the animals and resources in this world were made for man’s use and 
benefit. Ray postulates that there are still many, unknown uses yet to be discovered.
See, John Ray, The Wisdom o f God Manifested in the Works o f the Creation, 12th ed., 
corrected (London: n.p., 1754), 367-370. Originally published in 1691.
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order, “Lions, Tigers, Wolves, Foxes, Dragons, Serpents; and that these stand in need of 
some coercive power over them, that they destroy not the Species of more profitable, and 
yet weaker Animals.. . .  Man was invested with power, authority, right, dominion, trust, 
and care, to correct and abridge the excesses and cruelties of the fiercer Animals, to give 
protection and defence [sic] to the Mansuete [sic]1 and useful.”2 Hale further declares 
that God made man to be “Vice-Roy of the great God of Heaven and Earth . . . ;  his 
Steward, Villicus, Bayliff or Farmer of this goodly Farm of the lower World. . .  Gen 9. 3. 
Psal. 8. 6.”3
Hale’s beliefs in human supremacy over nature would carry over into the 
eighteenth century. In England, William Derham would assume the prophetic mantle of 
Hale, and in America, Cotton Mather would rely on the work of both Hale and Derham.
Eighteenth Century
William Derham (1657-1735)
Besides Matthew Hale, William Derham is most often cited as a leading influence 
in championing a high-handed view of man’s dominion over nature. In a series of 
sixteen lectures given in 1711-12, Derham periodically expounds on the dominion of man 
and that the things of nature are here primarily for the benefit of man.
Derham declared that God gave man the power of reason to make effective use of
'I.e., tame, or gentle, now spelled, “mansuetude.”
2Ibid., 369-370.
3Ibid., 371.
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the materials and resources of this world. This provision of materials was made for man 
by the creator. Animal skins, trees, plants, even stones, are all from God for us to use in 
making our habitations, clothing ourselves, and providing for our needs.1 He more 
explicitly incorporates the Baconian ideal than does Hale, when he states that “M an’s 
invention should reach to such a great variety of matters, that it should hit upon every 
thing that may be of any use, either to himself, or to human society, or that may any ways 
promote (what in him lies) the benefit of this lower part of the creation.”2 Thus Derham 
furthers the merger of the new, Greek-based science, with the Genesis concept of human 
dominion.
Like those before him, Derham claims a biblical mandate supporting the 
advantageous use of nature by artisans and tradesmen, declaring that man was made “to 
bear the great Creator’s vicegerency in this lower world, to employ the several creatures, 
to make use of the various materials, to manage the grand business.”3 Thus, “a duty 
ariseth thence on every man, to pursue the ends, and answer all the designs of the Divine
'Wfilliam] Derham, Physico-Theology: or, A Demonstration o f the Being and 
Attributes o f God, from His Works o f Creation, vol. 2, From Sixteen Discourses given in 
1711-12 (London: Printed for A. Strahan; T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, 1798), 61-62.
2Ibid., 145. Emphasis in original. See also, where he also declares: “And for 
this lower world, what material is there to be found; what kind of earth, or stone, or 
metal; what animal, tree, or plant, yea even the very shrubs of the field; in a word, what 
of all the excellent variety the Creator has furnished the world with, for all its uses and 
occasions, in all ages; what, I say, that man’s contrivance doth not extend unto, and make 
some way or other advantageous to himself, and useful for building, cloathing, food, 
physic, or for tools or utensils, or for even only pleasure or diversion?” (146). The 
answer is, “All of it.”
Tbid., 153ff.
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Providence.” Derham here turns the bending nature to human ends (which is the divine 
design for nature) into a moral duty.
However, Derham does try to limit human dominion, arguing, like Calvin, that 
human dominion operates on a stewardship model where man is held accountable by God 
and must not abuse his privileges.1 He also gives us a hint that the secularization of 
Bacon’s vision was well underway when he laments the fact that “men are ready to 
imagine their wit, learning, genius, riches, authority . . .  to be works of nature [as 
opposed to being gifts of God]. . . ;  that they are the masters o f them, and at liberty to use 
them as they please, to gratify their lust or humour and satisfy their depraved appetites.”2 
Thus Derham points us to the secularization of man’s view of nature as causing the 
unconditional, exploitative view of man’s dominion over nature, in which he is at liberty 
to do whatever he pleases with the natural world.
Cotton Mather (1663-1728)
That Derham’s and Boyle’s influence reached the settlements on the American 
continent is evident in the work of Cotton Mather, an American Puritan, for Mather 
explicitly mentions both men in his natural theology.3 Mather essentially takes up their 
refrain, though in a more indirect and abbreviated form.
‘Ibid., 164.
2Ibid., 163-164.
3Cotton Mather, “The Christian Philosopher,” in Selections from Cotton Mather, 
ed. Kenneth B. Murdock (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), 293-294.
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For example, Mather opens his essay entitled, “Of the Earth,” by quoting Prov 
3:19, “The Lord by Wisdom has founded the Earth.” He then proceeds to assemble 
natural data reported by men such as Boyle and Derham to show how nature is a system 
of harmonious design. One example of this divine wisdom being manifest in creation is 
said to be “that the Ridges of the Mountains being placed thro the midst of their 
Continents, do serve as Alembicks,1 to distil fresh Waters in vast Quantities for the Use 
of the World.”2 Another illustration is that “minerals are dug out of the Mountains; 
which if they were sought only in level countries, the Delfs would be so flown with 
Waters, that it would be impossible to make Addits and Soughs to drein them.”3 Thus 
God in his wisdom put the minerals in the mountains so that we can be above the water 
line to dig and retrieve them. Mather gives mountains yet another divine function for 
human benefit. “Mountains also are the most convenient Boundaries to Territories, and 
afford a Defence unto them. One calls them the Bulwarks of Nature, cast up at the 
Charges of the Almighty.” These and other marvels should, declares Mather, cause us to 
say, “Great God, the Earth is full of thy Goodness!”4 In a later essay, he goes on to assert 
that a host of useful things in nature are clearly there for the happiness of mankind. They
*An alembic was a device for purifying water akin to distilling.
2Ibid., 294.
3Ibid., 295. The editor notes in footnote 2 on this page that “Delf = a ditch; addits 
and soughs = drains, gutters.”
4Ibid., 297.
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“answer the chief End of man.”1 Thus in Mather, we see a continuation of dominionist 
theology.
The Puritans’ View of Nature
Mather reflects not only the influence of Boyle and Derham, but to a degree, a 
culmination of his own Puritan heritage. This heritage was most developed in the 
struggle to plant new colonies and settlements in the newly discovered American 
continent. In the American context, Santmire notes that Puritanism contributed to this 
exploitative mentality by strongly emphasizing the text in Genesis where God commands 
man to subdue the earth. Furthermore, the Puritans put heavy emphasis on proving their 
election with good works that bring glory to God. “Generations of Americans,” says 
Santmire, “were instructed in their Churches that nature is properly man’s sphere of 
lordship, given to him by God, and now at his disposal to use, by the sweat of his brow, 
in order to bring honor to the name of God.”2
From the very onset of British settlement in New England, and Puritan authors 
advocated a strong assertion of dominion over nature.3 The wilderness was an evil entity
•Ibid., 352.
2Paul Santmire, “Historical Dimensions of the American Crisis,” in Western Man 
and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature, and Technology, ed. Ian Barbour 
(Reading, MA: Addison-W esley Publishing Co., 1973), 71.
3This is best traced by studying the Puritan theology of the wilderness, which goes 
far beyond mere replenishment of the earth. For a fuller exposition on the Puritan 
theology of the wilderness, see Peter N. Carroll’s landmark work, Puritanism and the 
Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance o f  the New England Frontier 1629-1700 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969). This work is an excellent resource for finding 
original Puritan documents.
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which had to be tamed. This can be seen in the work of Puritan poet Michael 
Wigglesworth, who described the uninhabited New England country as, “a waste and 
howling wilderness, Where none inhabited But hellish fiends, and brutish men That 
Devils worshiped.. . .  in darkness . . .  Far off from Heaven’s light, Amidst the shaddows 
[57c] of grim death. . . Such a disordered and evil land must be inhabited and subdued. 
This led to the problem of justifying the occupation of Indian tribal lands. Their 
justification reveals much about their understanding of man’s relationship to nature.
The Puritans argued that the Indians had no valid claim to vacant lands, and thus 
the Colonies had free right to move in. Winthrop, White, and Cotton, among others, 
argue that God establishes nations and peoples to “replenish the earth,” in fulfillment of 
the command of Gen 1:28, and its restatement to Noah in Gen 9: l.2 This command,
'Michael Wigglesworth, “God’s Controversy with New England,” in The Poems o f 
Michael Wigglesworth, ed. Ronald A. Bosco (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1989), 90. According to Carroll, two other major aspects of the wilderness 
theology were the apocalyptic interpretation in which the wilderness provides protection 
(i.e., Rev 12:14) to set up a model, theocratic-biblical society (a “city upon a hill”), and a 
strong missiology in reference to seeking to convert the native Indians. See Carroll, 61- 
63. William Bradford, Mayflower passenger and first Governor of the Plymouth 
plantation and a Pilgim (not a Puritan), describing the first views of the new land, wrote, 
“What could they see but a hidious and desolate wilderness, full of wild beasts and wild 
men? . . .  the whole countrie, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage 
heiw [hue, appearance].” William Bradford, Bradford’s History o f Plymouth Plantation, 
ed. William T. Davis, Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Barnes 
and Noble, 1964), 96.
2John Winthrop, Winthrop Papers, 5 vols. ([Boston, MA]: The Massachusetts 
Historical Society, 1929, 2:123 [This portion was written in 1629]; John White, The 
Planters Plea or the Grounds o f Plantations Examined and Usuall Objections Answered 
(London: William Iones, 1630), in Proceedings o f the Massachusetts Historical Society, 
vol. 62 ([Boston, MA]: n.p., 1930), pages 371-75; John Cotton, God’s Promise to His 
Plantations, as it was Delivered in a Sermon (London: William Jones for John Bellamy, 
1634; reprint, Boston in New England [MA]: Samuel Green, 1686), 4-6.
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argues White, is universal and is still binding “as long as the earth yeelds [sic] empty 
places to be replenished.”1 Thus, in Cotton’s words, when a land is “void of Inhabitants,” 
and “is a vacant place, there is liberty for the Son of Adam or Noah to come and inhabit, 
though they neither buy it, nor ask their leaves.. . .  If therefore any Son of Adam come, 
and find a place empty, he hath liberty to come, and to fill, and subdue the Earth there.”2 
White argues that the New England Colonies had “sufficient warrant from the mouth of 
God” to replenish the “wast and voyd Countries,” and that the “Colonies . . .  have their 
warrant from God’s direction and command [cites Gen 1:28-29].”3 Both Winthrop and 
White attach the idea of fulfilling the Genesis command to the concept of giving God His 
“due honor,” and advancing God’s glory. Thus it is our moral duty to replenish the 
earth.4 Both Winthrop and White thus invoked the principle that men are only entitled to 
as much land as they can improve, concluding that the vacant lands were free for the 
colonies to possess and subdue.5
The Puritans also invoked the argument that the rest of the creation was made for 
man’s use and benefit. Thus, the Colonies had received God’s blessing on their 
industrious subjection of the land. Whatever they needed was said to be “treasured vp in
’John White, 372.
2Cotton, 4-5.
3John White, 376, 371.
4Winthrop, 2:123; John White, 372-73.
5Winthrop, 4:101-102; John White, 385.
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the earthe by the Creator, and is to be fetched thence by the sweatt of our browes.”1 In 
this way, the American culture developed a clear tendency towards a strong, aggressive 
view of human dominion over nature, believed to have divine sanction and approval.
This interpretation received some criticism and opposition in the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth-Century Reaction to American Dominionist Theology 
Francis Wayland (1796-1865)
According to Peter Singer, The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy by Francis Wayland 
was “perhaps the most widely used work on moral philosophy in nineteenth-century 
America.”2 In this work, Wayland has a short section entitled “Our Duty to Brutes,” in 
which he asserts of that animal “brutes are sensitive beings, capable of, probably, as great 
degrees of physical pleasure and pain as ourselves.. . .  They differ from us chiefly in 
being destitute of any moral facility.”3
While Wayland explicitly rejects viewing animals as being our moral equals, and 
further asserting that human rights are paramount, nonetheless, he argues that human 
treatment of animals must be consistent with what God permits, as animals are under His 
protection. Thus, “we are forbidden to treat them unkindly on any pretense, or for any 
reason.”4 Wayland cites most forms of hunting, as well as horse racing, as examples of
'Winthrop, 2:136.
2Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1977), 222.
3Francis Wayland, The Elements o f  Moral Science (Boston, MA: Gould, Kendall, 
and Lincoln, 1848), 395.
4Ibid.
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cruelty to animals that is “wrong.”1 If Singer has correctly depicted the popularity of 
Wayland, then it may be that his influence is seen in two great activists who opposed 
human despotism over nature, John Muir and Henry Thoreau.
John Muir (1838-1914)
Muir, in the language of Calvin and Hale, repeats and criticizes the despotic view
of human dominion inherited from the Puritans and touted in the mid-1800s,2 saying:
The world, we are told was made especially for man — a presumption not 
supported by all the facts. A numerous class of men are painfully astonished
whenever they find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe, which they 
cannot eat or render in some way what they call useful to themselves.. . .  To such 
properly trimmed people, the sheep, for example, is an easy problem—food and 
clothing “for us.” . . .
In the same pleasant plan, whales are storehouses of oil for us . . .  until the 
discovery of the Pennsylvania oil wells. Among plants, hemp, to say nothing of the 
cereals, is a case of evident destination for ship's rigging, wrapping packages, and 
hanging the wicked. Cotton is just another plain case of clothing. Iron was made 
for hammers and ploughs, and lead for bullets; all intended for us. And so of other 
small handfuls of insignificant things.. . .
. . .  Why does water drown its lord? Why do so many minerals poison him? 
Why are so many plants and fishes deadly enemies? Why is the lord of creation 
subjected to the same laws of life as his subjects?3
•ibid.
2See, for example, George Bush, Questions and Notes Critical and Practical upon 
the Book o f Genesis (New York: John P. Haven, 1831), 45, where he says, “How exalted 
the original dignity o f  man! Made in the image o f  his Creator, not only in moral 
similitude but in official supremacy, he beheld himself head of the terrestrial creation, 
with every department of nature, animate and inanimate, subservient to his use!”
3 John Muir, The Wilderness World o f John Muir, ed. Edwin Way Teal (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954), 316-318. Second emphasis mine.
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Muir’s reaction to dominion theology suggests it was alive, well, and commonly 
advocated during his lifetime. Thus we have evidence through his reaction that the 
Puritan influence was alive and well in nineteenth-century America. Furthermore, Muir 
is significant in the fact that he represents one of first critics to directly connect 
Christianity with a despotic view of human dominion, and, as seen above, one of the first 
to put forth evidence to disprove such claims.
Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862)
Thoreau likewise objected to the total subjugation of nature, and likewise tied it to 
Christianity. “I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and wildness, as 
contrasted with a freedom merely civil.” He wished to promote wild nature because 
“there are enough champions of civilization: the minister and school committee and 
everyone will take care of that.”1 Thus, in Thoreau and Muir, we see the beginnings, 
both of environmental activism, and of seeing the Christian understanding as anti-nature. 
A century later, Lynn White, Jr., would develop the latter thought into a full blown 
charge against Christianity.
‘Henry David Thoreau, Walking (n.p.: The Riverside Press, 1914;
[Originally published posthumously by his wife in 1863], 3. Excerpts of Walking are 
found in his journals from 1850-52; See also Huckleberries, ed. Leo Stoller (New York: 
New York Public Library, 1970; Originally published in 1861), 30-31, where Thoreau 
announces, “I am not overflowing with respect and gratitude to the fathers who thus laid 
out our New England villages,” because they built churches, but “did not preserve from 
desecration and destruction, far grander temples not made with hands.”




While Lynn White, Jr., does not explicitly mention John Muir, it is precisely the 
exploitative mentality towards nature to which Muir reacted that also seems to be the 
basis of White’s controversial article in 1967.1 This article has become the flagship work 
of those who wish to blame the current ecological stress on Christianity.
White asserts that Christianity has inherited from Judaism “a striking story of 
creation.. . .  Man named all the animals, thus establishing dominance over them. God 
planned all this explicitly for man’s benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had 
any purpose save to serve man’s purposes.. . .  He is not simply part of nature: he is made 
in God’s image.”2 This led him to charge that Christianity is the most anthropocentric 
religion the world has ever seen for, “Man shares, in great measure, God’s transcendence 
of nature.” He insists that from the creation perspective, “it is God’s will that man 
exploit nature for his proper ends.”3
Not only does White see the creation theology as shaping Christian thought into 
support for despotic dominion, but he also sees Christianity as having achieved a 
stunning intellectual victory over other perspectives that has sealed the victory of the
'Lynn White, Jr., 18-30.
2Ibid., 25.
3Ibid.
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exploitative viewpoint. He specifically cites the demise of paganism and its tendency to 
animism, as the “greatest psychic revolution in the history of our culture.”1
When White’s understanding of the creation story is examined, one begins to 
question if  he has actually read it on its own terms. In other words, is it possible that 
White has built up a straw man by reading industrial revolution thinking into the original 
text instead of exegeting it on its own terms?
Challenges to Lynn White, Jr.
Lynn White’s article has aroused much discussion and criticism.2 Some, like J. 
Baird Callicot, do not choose to quarrel with White’s premise that science and 
technology grew primarily in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Instead, he asserts that 
White’s analysis is incomplete. “What he fails to note is that the cognitive stock-in-trade 
of modem science . . .  is of Greek philosophical [roots], not biblical or religious
‘Ibid., 24-25.
2Some representative examples include: J. Baird Callicot, “Genesis and John 
Muir,” ReVision 12, no. 3 (1990): 2 (paging is from an electronic version in 
EBSCOhost, an electronic library source); Granberg-Michaelson, 40-41; Geisler, 308- 
309; Henry Morris, “The Bible, Creation, and Ecology,” 1 November 1991, 
http://www.icr.org/index.php?module=articles&action=view&ID=350 (7 November 
2005); Steve Bishop, “Green Theology and Deep Ecology: New Age or New Creation?” 
Themelios 16 (1991): 8-14; and John B. Bennet, “On Responding to Lynn White: 
Ecology and Christianity,” Ohio Journal o f  Religious Studies 5 (1977): 71-77. In this 
list, Bennet is unique in arguing from a Process Theology perspective. Bishop is rich in 
other sources for Christian Eco-theology. A final article with, perhaps, a withering 
criticism of White is by John Richardson, “The Spiritual Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis—Was Lynn White Right?” November 1998, 
http://www.btintemet.eom/~j.p.richardson /lynnwhite.html (6 July 2003).
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provenance.”1 He declares that Newton’s imperative to “think God’s thoughts after 
Him,” was “inspired by Pythagoras and Democritus, not Moses and Paul.” He concludes, 
“In my opinion, the more culpable conceptual roots of our ecological crisis, are traceable 
to the intellectual legacy of Greek natural philosophy, reworked by the early modems, 
rather than to the intellectual legacy of the Old and New Testaments.”2
Granberg-Michaelson likewise rejects the charge that Christianity is the cause of 
our ecological woes, clearly asserting the impact of the Enlightenment in opening the 
way for an exploitative viewpoint. He further argues that a number of non-Christian 
cultures have been scientifically advanced and have had major impacts on the 
environment. Egypt’s technology was highly developed, while the Hebrew’s technology 
was quite inferior.3
Norman Geisler takes White to task on his conclusions, rightly asserting that, “it is 
not the Christian world view that encourages the abuse of nature, but the materialistic 
view. Those who see nature’s resources as unlimited and man as the ultimate authority in 
the use of them are the exploitative ones.”4 That is, Christianity corrupted by 
Enlightement, materialistic thinking has inappropriately interpreted human dominion in 
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Finally, Callicot notes that, by and large, most Christian responses to views such as 
held by White promote a stewardship model of man’s relation to nature instead of a 
despotic model.1 Steve Bishop also argues that human dominion is in the context of 
God’s ownership of the earth. Thus, “Creation is not anthropocentric, it is theocentric.” 
Furthermore, Bishop argues that human dominion “is not rulership without limits.” He 
cites various limits on man’s use of nature, prescribed in the Pentateuch, as evidence that 
man was not seen as empowered to do whatever he pleases with nature.2 This implies, as 
I have suggested earlier, that White has not accurately portrayed the creation theology of 
Genesis. But having noted some criticism of White’s position, it is important to 
remember White’s challenge to Christians that we cannot get out of our ecological crisis 
until we rethink our religion.3 Andrew Linzey has set out to do precisely this—to 
reformulate Christian theology in terms of Animal Ethics.
Andrew Linzey
Andrew Linzey, the first professor of animal theology in the world, has set out to 
rethink Christian theology in terms of animals and their rights in their relationship with
‘Callicot, 2.
2Bishop, 8-9. Bishop catalogs Mosaic regulations of man’s use of nature as 
evidence that man did not have unbridled freedom to exploit nature in the name of 
dominion. A  partial list o f  B ishop’s evidence includes divine limits on human diet (Gen 
1:29-30; Lev 17:10-14), the prohibition of using fruit trees to build siege works (Deut 
20:19), the prohibition of taking a mother bird with her young (Deut 22:6); the 
prohibition of muzzling the ox when it is threshing grain (Deut 25:4); and the 
requirement to rest the land every seventh year (Lev 25:1-12).
3Lynn White, Jr., 28.
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man.1 Linzey, like Rachels, flat out rejects “speciesism” which he defines as “an 
arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over another.”2 Linzey sees Christian 
theology as generally focusing on the difference between animals and humans. Besides 
the creation theology and philosophical arguments on man having reason, Linzey adds 
one more reason animals are second class in Christian theology. Citing Barth’s 
soteriology, he shows that in Christian thinking, man is special because Christ incarnated 
as a human, and died to save humans. “The incarnation is the trump card to vanquish all 
other creaturely rights to specialness, intrinsic worth, and respectful treatment.”3
Linzey’s significance lies in the fact that he appears to be the first Christian 
theologian to seriously attempt to reinterpret the “Christian” exploitative view of nature 
and animals, and thus to establish a Christian theology of animal rights. Linzey thus is 
breaking new ground in Christian theological circles.
Ironically, Linzey claims that his work is not inspired by the ongoing debate 
encapsulated in Lynn White’s article. In his words, “Confronting speciesism, then, is not 
about Christian theology’s latest concession to secular fashion, it is an imperative derived 
from the heart of theology’s mission: to render a truthful, non-partial account of the 
creation God has made.” While this is ostensibly so, it seems odd that Linzey has 
undertaken this task at the peak explosion of the animal rights movement which, like
‘Linzey claims this title for himself. See, Andrew Linzey, “Notes on Contributors,” 
in Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals fo r  Theology and Ethics, ed.
Andrew Linzey (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, Illini Books, 1998), 251.
2Linzey, “Introduction,” xii.
3Ibid., xii-xv.
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Rachels, is usually based in evolutionary and not Christian thinking. Yamamoto hints at 
this in one of her chapters in Linzey’s book, arguing that we can find no indisputable 
factor distinguishing us from animals.1 This distinction has been precisely where this 
historical survey interfaces with Rachels's work.
It is in this historical context that I launch my investigation of James Rachels and 
his view of the moral implications of Darwinian evolution. Rachels will criticize 
Christianity for holding a despotic view of dominion which is neither philosophically 
nor scientifically tenable in the light of Darwin’s theory of evolution. He will also offer 
an alternative approach to ethics based on the principles of Darwinian evolution.
‘Yamamoto, 88.
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CHAPTER THREE
SPECIESISM AND THE ROLE OF HUMAN 
PREFERENCE IN ETHICS
Introduction
James Rachels has two dimensions to his Darwinist ethics that impinge on the issue 
of human specialness. In the first dimension, he shares common ground with other 
current thinkers, most easily seen through the eyes of the animal rights movement. In 
short, Rachels joins many in the cry against “speciesism.” This chapter will focus on this 
dimension of Rachels’s ethics. It will place Rachels in the context of fellow animal 
rights advocates. Chapter 4 will focus on Rachels’s unique contributions among modem 
thinkers concerning evolution and ethics. These two chapters will have but little critique 
of Rachels and his peers. My purpose is to set forth their side of the arguments as 
accurately and unbiasedly as possible. I shall respond to the arguments in this chapter in 
chapter 5 and likewise for chapter 4 in chapter 6. With this in mind, let us explore the 
issue of speciesism to see where Rachels fits into the contemporary landscape, and to 
discover how Darwinian evolution is used in a manner that generates significant moral 
implications.
58
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The Oxford Group and Speciesism
According to Tom Regan,
In 1971, three young Oxford Philosophers—Roslind and Stanley Godlovich, 
and John Harris—published Animals, Men and Morals.1 The volume marked the 
first time philosophers had collaborated to craft a book that had to do with the 
moral status of nonhuman animals.
In the past twenty-five years, these philosophers have written more on “the 
animal question” than philosophers of whatever stripe had written in the previous 
two thousand.2
Richard Ryder notes the significance of this landmark event, observing that the 
philosophical enterprise of addressing the moral significance of animals has been 
primarily within British circles, especially in connection with Oxford University. Key 
participants in the “Oxford Group,” as he christens these scholars, include the 
Godlovitches, John Harris, Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, Stephen Clark, and Andrew 
Linzey. The movement reached its critical mass in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Ryder further declares that while the British philosophers (i.e., the Oxford Group) 
pioneered the issue, American philosophers have joined the British bandwagon in further 
exploring and developing the issues surrounding the moral status of animals.3
'Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris, eds., Animals, Men 
and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment o f  Non-humans (New York: Taplinger 
Publishing Company, 1972).
2Tom Regan, foreward to Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, 
ed. H. Peter Steeves, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. Dennis 
J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), xi.
3Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism 
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 1-4.
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Ryder believes that the counter-cultural social movements of the 1960s like hippies 
and flower children were a key factor in opening the door for considering moral issues as 
related to animals.1 Indeed, a number of authors in this animal rights movement use 
strong revolutionary and ideological rhetoric to promote their cause. Peter Singer says, 
“Only by making a radical break with more than two thousand years of Western thought 
about animals can we build on a solid foundation.”2 Similarly, Ryder asserts, “The 
struggle against speciesism is not a sideshow; it is one of the main arenas of moral and 
psychological change in the world today. It is part of a new and enlarged vision for peace
'Ibid., 3. He additionally asserts that the animal rights movement is a result of an 
eclectic collection of ideas such as the counterculture of the hippie movement, 
individualist rejection of social institutions, science demystifying man into an animal, 
higher education, and television which combined to produce the anti-speciesist 
movement. See pp. 3-5. On pp. 309-311, Ryder expands his explanation of origins of 
speciesism, giving four factors: (1) Punishing non-humans for our sexual weakness [he 
ties viewing man as an animal, contrary to Puritan theology, as one factor in looser 
attitudes to sexuality]; (2) Social classes—The Middle and Upper classes are asserted to 
look down on animals in a similar way to looking down on the lower social classes of 
humans; (3) Repressing “perennial guilt surrounding humankind’s speciesism,” by over­
arguing the case in favor of speciesism; (4) The lower classes tyrannize animals to get a 
sense of power for themselves. He also roots speciesism in Puritan theology where what 
is “natural” for animals is “unnatural” for humans (again focused greatly on sex drives), 
but credits Freud for educating us to accept our “animal natures.”
Finally, Ryder believes that “the gradual decline in the overt importance attached to 
Christian values has left an amoral vacuum,” opening the way for an alternative ethical 
approach (329). Peter Carruthers also points to a weakness in Christianity as opening the 
way for an alternative ethical approach when he asserts that Christian values carry little 
conviction in an increasingly secular era. See Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue:
M oral Theory in P ractice  (N ew  York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13-14.
Both Ryder and Carruthers cite urbanization of Western culture for aiding the shift 
towards anti-speciesism. Urbanization has disconnected most from direct use of animals, 
and significant numbers of pets have increased our sentimentality towards animals in 
general. Animals to a great degree are not seen as a threat to our safety. See, Ryder, 
Animal Revolution, 318, and Carruthers, xii.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 224.
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and happiness.. . .  The time has come for a revolution in our attitudes.”1 These changing 
attitudes towards animals are indicative, in Ryder’s words, “of the gradual triumph of 
reason and compassion over habit, vested interest, and convenience.”2 Regan argues that 
human preference over animals is unjust to the core and this means that advocates of 
animal rights are not reformists but abolitionists!3 This moral preference for humans is 
now called “speciesism,” a word Regan claims to have coined for this purpose in 1970.4 
Since this word was created in the context of a counter-cultural movement, we need to 
briefly explore its nuances.
The Nature of Speciesism
General Concepts
In their article on Speciesism in the Dictionary o f Ethics, Theology and Society, 
Andrew Linzey and Paul Waldau give the following definition of speciesism:
“Speciesism is the arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over the interests of 
others.”5 Two years later, Andrew Linzey used almost identical language in declaring
'Ryder, Animal Revolution, 1.
2Ibid., 2. On p. 4, he pejoratively labels what he calls discrimination on the basis of 
species as “illogicaF and “unjust.” Emphasis in original.
3Tom Regan, “Animal Rights: What’s in a Name?” in Animal Welfare and the 
Environment: An RSPCA Book, ed. Richard D. Ryder (London: Gerald Duckworth &
Co., 1992), 55.
4Ibid„ 328.
5Andrew Linzey and Paul Waldau, “Speciesism,” Dictionary o f  Ethics, Theology 
and Society, ed. Paul Barry Clarke and Andrew Linzey (New York: Routledge, 1996), 
788.
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speciesism to be “an arbitrary favoring of one species’ interests over another.”1 Kevin 
Dolan begins to narrow the definitional focus by asserting that “the essence of speciesism 
can be summed up in the phrase: ‘the boundary of my group is the boundary of my 
concern’.”2 Paul Waldau makes it clear that the implied focus of the term is human 
speciesism3—the preference of humans over other animals simply because they are 
human. Richard Ryder believes human speciesism is rooted in appearance, like racism.4 
Evelyn Pluhar echos Ryder’s focus on appearance by noting that “not coincidentally, we 
humans tend to assume that we are the paradigms of moral significance. As other beings 
depart in greater and greater degree from our model, most of us find progressively more 
difficult to accord than our moral concern.” Pluhar later concludes, “Not surprisingly, 
the further we depart from our own characteristics, the less likely we are to extend our 
moral concern.”5 Roslind Godlovitch makes a similar observation in her statement that, 
“This view about animals runs alongside another generally accepted view concerning 
human beings. Whereas we think that a few animals may be sacrificed for the benefit of 
many humans. . .  we do not accept this utilitarian reasoning with regard to humans and
’Linzey, “Introduction,” xii. Emphasis in original.
2Kevin Dolan, Ethics, Animals, and Science (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Science, 
1999), 127.
3Paul Waldau, The Specter o f  Speciesism : Buddhist and Christian Views ofA nim als  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27.
4Richard Ryder, Victims o f Science: The Use o f  Animals in Research (London: 
Davis-Poynter, 1975), 16.
5Evelyn Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance o f  Human and 
Nonhuman Animals (London: Duke University Press, 1995), 1, 8.
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allow experiments which cause suffering and death to be carried out on a minority of our 
fellows in order to ‘maximize the happiness’ of the scope of the remainder. Thus seems 
that our moral principles differ substantially when we apply them to human beings in 
animals.”1 Singer explicitly likens speciesism to racism, sexism, and slavery.2 Thus to 
be accused of speciesism is highly pejorative, similar to being accused of being racist. It 
is also interesting to note that the term is not used for preferential value o f a non-human 
species. It is used only in reference to preference of humans over the animal kingdom.
Singer asserts that speciesism violates the “fundamental moral principle of equality 
and consideration of interests that ought to govern our relations with all beings.” This, he 
asserts, causes us to inflict suffering on non-humans for “trivial purposes,” but that 
“generation after generation of Western thinkers have sought to defend the right of 
humans to do this.”3 Singer here reveals the cultural target of the indictment as 
“speciesism”: It is primarily Western culture and thinking that comes under attack for 
being “speciesist.” Also, even human preference for “trivial purposes” is clearly 
condemned. Waldau criticizes the inclusion of the adjective “trivial” as a weakness. 
Some trivial issues, he argues, favor humans without being objectionable. Therefore, he 
maintains that the definition would be much stronger and more useful if  speciesism is
‘Roslind Godlovitch, “Animals and Morals,” in Animals, Men and Morals: An 
Enquiry into the Maltreatment o f Non-humans, ed. Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind 
Godlovitch, and John Harris (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 156.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 55-56. Much of the “pop literature” on Animal Rights 
makes this same comparison.
3Ibid., 223.
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restricted to undue human preference in a “critical issue.”1 However, he offers no 
suggestion on determining the difference between trivial and critical, leaving the reader 
with no clear means of making the distinction.
James Rachels reiterates the concept of speciesism found in such authors as Singer, 
and repeats those sentiments in his own writings. He argues that “the traditional doctrine 
o f human dignity is speciesist to the core, for it implies that the interests of humans have 
priority over those of all other creatures.”2
Rachels believes this speciesism exists largely because of what he calls “traditional 
morality.”3 But what does Rachels mean by traditional morality? Another statement 
clarifies his intent: “Darwin’s earliest readers realized that an evolutionary outlook might 
undermine the traditional doctrine of human dignity, a doctrine which is at the core o f  
Western morals”* Rachels observes that this means that as we probe the relationship of 
morality to religion, the religious focus is likely to be on Christianity because it is the 
dominant religion of Western society.5 Specifically he mentions the doctrine of man
’Waldau, 37.
2James Rachels, CfA, 181.
3Ibid., 1-5.
4Ibid., 79. Emphasis mine.
5James Rachels, The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, 3d ed. (Boston, MA: 
McGraw-Hill College, 1999), 55; idem, CfA, 102. See also CfA, 182, where Rachels 
states that “many defenders of traditional morality have embraced the radical form of 
speciesism. Aquinas and Kant . . .  both held that the interests of non-humans count for 
nothing.” Thus Aquinas, a major Christian theologian, is identified with “traditional” 
morality. Although unstated, Rachels’s writings seem to imply that other religions are 
not seen as posing the kind of speciesist threat that he claims to find in Christianity. In
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being the “image of God” as a major culprit in causing speciesism.1 Rachels sees 
Aquinas’s incorporation of the Aristotelian hierarchy of being as a corollary cause of 
Western speciesism.2 Thus, for Rachels, ethical systems rooted in “human hubris” are 
focused on protecting HUMAN rights and interests.3
Elements (1999), 61, it seems clear that by “Christianity,” Rachels is essentially referring 
to Roman Catholic moral theology and Catholic based natural law theory.
'Rachels, CfA, 4,171; idem, Elements (1999), 102.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 60-61, 102. Rachels’s mention of the Aristotelian view 
of reality points to a fundamental issue undergirding the speciesism debate. Stephen 
Toulmin asserts that there has been a fundamental shift from an “ahistorical” view of 
nature and reality to a historical one. In the ahistorical view, there was an “‘immutable’ 
order of nature and human knowledge.” The cosmos was “a fixed and ‘well-ordered’ 
body of eternal entities and their relationships.” Toulmin argues this concept of an 
underlying, immutable reality which shapes and structures our history, is rooted in Greek 
philosophy, citing especially Plato. Concerning the shift to a historical, more relativist 
paradigm, Toulmin observes: “Only from 1750 on did the new historical point of view 
begin to put down serious roots. At first, it made inroads only into the human sciences; 
but it soon spread into natural sciences: first, into the history of the earth, by way of 
paleontology and historical geology, and next into biology, with the discovery of organic 
evolution, which led to Darwin’s theory of variation and natural selection.” Stephen 
Toulmin, “The Historization of Natural Science: Its Implications for Theology,” in 
Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium fo r the Future, ed. Hans Kiing and David 
Tracy (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1989), 233-241, esp. 233-235. Thus, 
Darwinism cannot see any fixity of species for this would reflect the immutable order of 
the ahistorical approaches to nature. If fixity of species is thus rejected, then this would 
imply that the concept of species is an artificial and arbitrary categorization that can have 
no moral significance. We shall see Rachels develop this argument in chapter 4.
3Rachels, Elements (1999), 195. Rachels here attributes human tendencies to 
speciesism as being part of our evolutionary development, and in this context asserts that 
humanocentric ethics restricts morality to the protection o f  human interests. However, 
since Rachels accuses traditional ethics as being founded on foundations of human 
preference, and thus inherently speciesist, the clear implication of Rachels’s assertion is 
that any ethics recognizing human preference is ultimately an ethics which protects only 
human interests, whether explained by evolution, or justified by theological and 
philosophical concepts.
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Four Forms of Speciesism 
Radical versus Mild Speciesism
Unlike the previous authors, Rachels classifies speciesism into different forms, 
consisting of two sets of paired categories. In the first pair, radical speciesism and mild 
speciesism, his contrast “has to do with the extent of the view.”1 In radical speciesism, 
“even the relatively trivial interests of humans take priority over vital interests of 
nonhumans. Thus, if we have to choose between causing mild discomfort to a human, 
and causing excruciating pain to a non-human, we should prefer to cause pain to the non­
human and spare the human.”2
In mild speciesism, “when the choice is between a relatively trivial human interest 
and a more substantial interest of a non-human, we may choose for the 
non-human.. . .  However, if the interests are comparable . . .  we should give preference 
to the human’s welfare.”3 Thus, only when human interests are either greater than or 
approximately equal to animal interests is human preference given. But for Rachels, this 
is not the only way to categorize speciesism.
Qualified versus Unqualified Speciesism
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saying, “In addition to distinguishing between radical and mild speciesism, we may 
distinguish between qualified and unqualified versions of the doctrine.”1 Rachels asserts 
that this method of comparing forms of speciesism differs from the former in that it “has 
to do with its logical basis.”2 Rachels defines unqualified speciesism as “the view that 
mere species alone is morally important. On this view, the fact that an individual is a 
member of a certain species, unsupplemented by any other consideration, is enough to 
make a difference in how the individual should be treated.”3 In other words, unqualified 
speciesism asserts that species membership alone is the basis of having moral 
significance and protection. Applied to humans, any human would automatically have 
superior rights over an animal merely because of membership in the human race. Thus, it 
seems closely related to the view of radical speciesism discussed earlier. Unqualified 
speciesism is essentially an entitlement model of morality regardless of personal function 
and ability. It is this concept of speciesism that Rachels likens to racism, a comparison 




4Ibid., 181, 183. On p. 181, Rachels uses a quote from Singer, cited below to 
establish the racism analogy. Then on p. 183, he uses the example of a “martian” who 
differs from humans only in bodily appearance, yet is discriminated against on the basis 
of not being human. This clearly builds on the racism model borrowed from Singer two 
pages earlier. Comparing speciesism with racism and sexism is commonplace in animal 
rights literature. For example, see Ryder, Animal Revolution, 3-4; Singer, Animal 
Liberation, 1, 7-9, 234. Rachels’s quotation of Singer is from p. 9.
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and equally as sensitive, with just the same cares and interests as anyone else. The only 
difference is that he has a different kind of body.”1
By contrast, Rachels proposes qualified speciesism, introducing it as “a more 
sophisticated view of the relation between morality and species.. . .  On this view, 
species alone is not regarded as morally significant. However, species-membership is 
correlated with other differences that are significant. The interests of humans are said to 
be more important, not simply because they are human, but because humans have 
morally relevant characteristics that other animals lack.” In other words, this form of 
speciesism is based on the functional abilities of the typical member of the species, not 
on the membership itself. Rachels gives several examples of typical human traits used to 
justify human preference in morality. He notes that characteristics such as ability to 
reason, language, being the image of God, the ability to enter into morally binding 
agreements, and greater sensitivity to pain and suffering (due to our superior intelligence) 
have all been suggested as justifications of human preference.2 It appears that, for 
Rachels, once the human function is verified, this form of speciesism will still have more 
affinity to radical speciesism than to mild speciesism.
'Rachels, CfA, 182, 183.
2Ibid., 184.
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Animal Rights as a Foil for Exploring Evolution and Ethics 
A classic argument in the animal rights literature is to blame human preference 
ethics on Christianity.1 Thus, we find in the literature of the animal rights advocates, 
discussion and argumentation of moral standing based on an Darwinian-evolutionary 
world-view opposing perspective of traditional, theocentric morality which they label as 
being speciesist.
If we wish to discover some of the ethical implications of Darwinism, then, it 
seems likely that we can find fruitful insights by examining the work of animal rights 
authors. It should be noted, however, that we are not interacting with animal rights 
literature to debate animal rights, but rather to identify possible implications of 
Darwinian evolution for ethics, and especially for Christian ethics. All the arguments 
examined in this chapter are to be understood as occurring in the context of a moral 
revolution intended to replace traditional Western ethics with a morality based in the 
“facts” of Darwinian evolution. Thus how do animal rights advocates use Darwinian 
Evolution to address the issue of speciesism?
One key proposal comes from Richard Dawkins. A second, complementary 
approach is found in James Rachels. Because Rachels’s contribution is closely linked to
'See for example, Peter Singer, “Heavy Petting,” undated from 2001, 
http://www.nerve.com/Opinions/Singer/heavyPetting/main.asp (22 May 2003), also 
located at http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001— .htm. This article is a response to 
a book on bestiality by Midas Dekkers, Dearest Pet: On Bestiality, trans. Paul Vincent 
(n.p.: Verso, 2000). See also, Singer, Animal Liberation, chapter 5; Ryder, Animal 
Revolution, 309-312; Pluhar, 11-12. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation for more on 
the history of human preference in Western culture.
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his unique arguments for a Darwinist ethics, I shall save most of his work in this area for 
chapter 4. I shall start, then, by exploring Dawkins’s proposal of an approach to morality 
based on belief in the evolutionary kinship of man and animals. Then we shall explore 
kinship-based criteria for granting moral status to humans and animals.
Morality Based on Evolutionary Kinship
Zoologist Richard Dawkins, from Oxford, expresses his opposition to human 
preference speciesism by attacking the speciesist structure of thought which he calls, 
“discontinuous thinking.” For Dawkins, discontinuous thinking is a mind-set which has a 
great need to categorize everything into separate, unrelated entities. He illustrates it with 
South African courts (during the Apartheid era) adjudicating whether particular 
individuals of mixed parentage (racially) are legally Black, White, or Colored. In a 
similar fashion, the discontinuous mind chooses to divide the animals (including the 
human animal) into discontinuous species having no relation to each other. Thus, for the 
speciesist, “humans are humans while gorillas are animals. There is an unquestioned 
yawning gulf between them such that the life of a single human child is worth much more 
than the lives of all the gorillas in the world.”1 Dawkins restates the issue this way: “But
‘Richard Dawkins, “Gaps in the Mind,” in The Great Ape Project: Equality 
Beyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993), 81. Dawkins’s juxtaposition of a human child with gorillas is in reference to the 
following hypothetical letter used to open the article: “Sir, You appeal for money to save 
the gorillas. Very laudable, no doubt. But doesn’t it seem to have occurred to you that 
there are thousands of human children suffering on the very same continent of Africa. 
There’ll be time enough to worry about gorillas when we’ve taken care of every last one 
of the kiddies. Let’s get our priorities right, please" (emphases in original). He then 
suggests (pp. 80-81) that we can illustrate the speciesist double-standard by substituting
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tie the label Homo sapiens even to a tiny piece of insensible, embryonic tissue, and its 
life suddenly leaps to infinite, incomputable value.”1 Dawkins concedes that while a 
good case may be made for saving human children over gorillas, he also adds that “a 
good case could be made the other way.”2
From Discontinuous Thinking to the Concept of Kinship
Dawkins seeks to undermine the discontinuous mind-set with his concept of the 
“ring species.” He illustrates the concept of a ring species with two species of seagulls 
found in England, the herring and lesser black-backed gulls. If you start with herring 
gulls in England and move westward from Europe around the world, the herring gulls 
slowly change in characteristics. By the time you get back to England, the ring of species 
change you have followed will have changed from herring gulls, through small 
incremental steps, into the lesser black-backed gull, a distinctly separate species. The 
neighboring members in the ring can interbreed while the two species at the ends of the 
ring cannot.3 These incremental steps Dawkins likens to the extinct evolutionary links
the word “aardvarks” for “humans” and see if you still agree with the concept of the 
letter.
‘Ibid. The implications of this statement for issues like abortion, stem cell 
research, cloning, and genetic manipulation should not be underestimated. Most 
Christian opponents of these invoke the human status of the cells and organisms involved 
as the grounds for moral and legal protection. Dawkins’s removal o f  such status opens 
the door for severely undermining the traditional foundations for exercising extreme 
caution in some of these issues, or even prohibiting others. These implications do not fall 
within the scope of this work. Nevertheless, they beg for further investigation.
2Ibid„ 80.
3From a purely geometric perspective, a ring does not have ends. The only
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between humans and apes, and thus he argues that humans are a ring species as well. As 
a ring species, Dawkins asserts that humans have a kinship with the apes (and maybe 
other animals) which is not discontinuous, but rather, continuous. He reasons that “there 
is no natural category that includes chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans but excludes 
humans.” Dawkins concludes that to distinguish between man and apes as separate 
categories is to make an artificial distinction not found in reality.1 In a similar vein, 
Dolan asserts that our early evolutionary ancestors had no theological basis for separating 
humans from animals and thus tended to view animals as creatures who were fellow kin.2 
Such arguments clearly challenge speciesism and any humanocentric ethics associated 
with it.
Ryder also argues for a moral kinship between man and animals. Ryder opines, 
“Surely if animals are related through evolution, then we should all be related morally,” 
and then declares his belief that Darwinism provides “grounds for asserting the moral 
kinship of all animals.” He further asserts that while Darwinism has almost universally 
demonstrated the “physical kinship” of men and animals, it has not yet caused most 
people to take “the logical next step of admitting moral kinship.”3 Ryder argues that
exception is when drawing a picture of a ring. Dawkins uses a conceptual trip around the 
globe with the same starting and ending point, to draw such a ring. The significance of 
the ring species illustration is its depiction of a continuum of being. Dawkins then 
transfers the concept of a geographic continuum of being going around the world to a 
continuum of being going through time, which is called evolution.
‘Ibid., 82-84.
2Dolan, 123.
3Ryder, Animal Revolution, 3, 330-31. Emphasis in original.
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when we establish the kinship of humans and animals, we must go beyond the basic 
concept of animal welfare to the stronger concept of animal rights. 1 So what moral 
implications come when the “logical next step” is taken?
Moral Implications of Evolutionary Kinship 
“Continuously Distributed Morality”
Dawkins’s ring-species argument raises the question of the nature of ethics in the 
context of evolutionary kinship. He declares that “as long as our social mores are 
governed by discontinuously minded lawyers and theologians, it is premature to advocate 
a quantitative, continuously distributed morality.”2 In the context of the larger debate 
over speciesism, when Dawkins proposes an ethics that is “quantitative,” he is using this 
term in juxtaposition to the term, “qualitative.” This means that, for Dawkins, being 
entitled to rights and privileges is not to be based on possession of a special quality or 
qualities (such a being human, and thus a qualitative criterion). Instead of looking for 
ontological qualities to gain moral status, one would look at how many functional factors 
there are to entitle the subject to rights.3 The phrase, “continuously distributed,” refers to 
the ring-species concept. The scope of ethics and morality is to be continuously 
distributed across the species ring instead of being discontinuously restricted to a
'Ibid., 3.
2R. Dawkins, “Gaps,” 87.
3In the next chapter, we shall see that this quantitative versus quality argument is a 
major foundation for James Rachels’s proposed ethical system.
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privileged species or group of species in the ring. Thus ethical privilege would be based 
in functional attributes, and not on a qualitative status such as being human. Once 
morality is based on functional attributes, it cannot avoid becoming relativist. A number 
of authors assert that ethical relativism is precisely what one would expect from a 
Darwinist world-view.
Inherent Relativism
Dawkins asserts that “ethical principles that are based upon accidental caprice 
should not be respected as if cast in stone.”1 In other words, for Dawkins, humans are an 
accidental product of a designless evolution. Thus, human preference ethics are based on 
a meaningless act of chance. Dawkins not only challenges the validity of human 
preference in ethics due to these principles of evolution, but he also undermines any 
concept of ethical absolutes because “ethical principles . . .  should not be respected as if 
cast in stone.” From an evolutionary perspective, then, ethical principles, standards, and 
norms, must now be viewed as relative, evolving with man, ever adaptable, never 
absolute. Dawkins is not the only one to come to such a conclusion.
Julian Huxley, the great evolutionary ethicist of the mid-twentieth century (A.D.), 
likewise points out the relativist bent in ethics rooted in evolutionary thinking, noting that 
“any standards of right and wrong must in some way be related to the movement of that 
process [evolution] through time.”2 Thus, ethics is the product of evolution and is itself
‘Ibid., 87.
2Julian Huxley, Touchstone fo r  Ethics: 1893-1943 (New York: Harper and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
evolving.1 Huxley is echoed by Antony Flew in his discussion of Darwin’s position that 
man is totally part of nature, having evolved from it. Flew states: “As applied to ethics in 
particular this involves that all moral ideas and ideals have originated in the world; and 
that, having thus in the past been subject to change, they will presumably in the future 
too, for better or worse, continue to evolve.”2 Due to Darwin’s influence, Huxley 
declares that prior ethical systems have been “replaced with a thoroughgoing ethical 
relativism.”3 Huxley even observed that the concept of “Absolute,” as result of Darwin’s 
theory, seems destined to disappear in all fields—truth, beauty, goodness or any other 
value.4 Huxley asserted that evolutionary thought “will have nothing to do with 
Absolutes, including absolute truth, absolute morality, absolute perfection, and absolute 
authority.”5
Michael Ruse joins Huxley in asserting that human morality is an evolutionary 
adaptation built into us by natural selection. In particular, Ruse defines morality in terms 





4Julian Huxley, New Bottle for New Wine (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957),
59.
5 Julian Huxley, Essays o f a Humanist (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 73-74.
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folk.”1 Again, he states that “if morality means anything, it means being prepared to hold 
out a helping hand to others.”2 By defining morality in terms of helping others, Ruse sets 
his reader up for the assertion that morality (i.e., helpfulness) evolved in humans through 
the “good biological strategy” of “cooperation,” which gave humans an advantage in the 
“struggle for existence.”3 Altruism, then, is seen as the root of human morality.4
Because altruistic cooperation is seen as so crucial to human survival and 
evolution, Ruse argues that natural selection had to produce a sense of binding obligation 
to make humans act altruistically. Otherwise, there would be no universal cooperation 
necessary to produce the advantages humans have enjoyed. Ruse calls these genetically 
generated moral impulses “epigenetic rules.”5 Ruse observes that this explanation of 
moral origins in humans reduces morality, to a great degree, to feelings and sentiments of
‘Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 208. For Ruse’s full discussion of the evolution of 
morality in man see chapter 6, esp. 217-222, and 250-252.
2Ibid., 217.
3Michael Ruse, “The New Evolutionary Ethics,” in Evolutionary Ethics, ed. 
Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1993), 144. This chapter is a condensed refinement of the arguments in Taking 
Darwin Seriously, chapter 6.
4Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, 218-219.
5Ibid., 222, 251-252. Interestingly, Ruse places epigenetic rules in comparison to 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, arguing that the latter is “embedded” in the former [p. 
244]. Ruse discusses Kant twice in this chapter [pp. 210-211; 244-247], without directly 
referring to Kant’s epistemological theory and categories. In my opinion, having a set of 
epigenetic moral rules programmed into our very nature sounds suspiciously close to 
Kant’s preprogrammed epistemological categories found in his view of human nature. 
While not directly related to the topic of this work, pursuing this potential 
interrelationship of Ruse’s and Kantian thought would be an interesting study.
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obligation.1 Thus, Ruse declares, “Morality has neither meaning nor justification, outside 
the human context. Morality is subjective.”2 In a later work he goes further in declaring 
the evolutionary advantages of a genetically generated sense of duty to others, stating, 
“Often we perform better if we are deceived by our biology.. . .  We think we ought to 
help, that we have obligations to others, because it is in our biological interests to have 
these thoughts.”3
Because of his belief that morality is essentially genetically generated trickery, this 
leads Ruse to some key conclusions concerning the nature of morality and ethics. Ruse 
opines that, “there is no foundation for ethics at a ll! . . .  The supposed underpinning is 
chimerical in some sense or another.”4 Ruse boldly concludes that, “morality is no more 
than a collective illusion fobbed off on us by our genes for reproductive ends.”5 Thus, for 
Ruse, morality is not based on any objective standard of right or wrong but, rather, is 
rooted in a fictitious fable that our “genes make us believe.”5 If morality is merely an 
illusion, a hereditary deception, then its principles certainly cannot be absolute, but must 
of necessity be relative.
‘Ibid., 252.
2Ibid.
3Ruse, “The New Evolutionary Ethics,” 147. Emphasis mine.
4Ibid., 150-151.
Tbid., 151.
Tbid., 152. Ruse’s seminal form of this argument can be found in his book, 
Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies (Reading, MA: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1982), 272-273.
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Others have also noted the relativistic bent introduced by evolutionary thinking. 
Robert Morrison explicitly asserts that evolution “tends to lead to a relativistic 
philosophy. Goodness can be only judged in relation to prevailing circumstances. There 
is no absolute scale of righteousness against which the individual can measure himself 
for all time.”1 Ian Taylor, an opponent of evolution, describes humanists as declaring 
Darwinian evolution to be the “death knell of religious and moral values” as part of his 
own assertions to this effect.2 The evolutionist, H. James Birx, likewise hints at a moral 
revolution when he asserts that “the empirical truth of organic evolution still challenges 
those entrenched beliefs of traditional theology concerning a god, freewill, immortality, 
and a divine destiny.”3 Dawkins more deeply develops these implications through his 
kinship model of morality.
Evolutionary Kinship Said to Undermine Religiously Rooted Ethics 
What if Missing Links Were Not Extinct?
Dawkins unpacks some key moral implications of Darwinian evolution, when, in 
reference to kinship, he declares, “The point I want to make is that, as far as morality is 
concerned, it should be incidental that the intermediates are dead. What if they were 
not? What if a clutch of intermediate types had survived, enough to link us to modem
‘Robert S. Morrison, “Darwinism: Foundation for an Ethical System?” 
Christianity and Crisis 20 (1960): 120.
2Ian Taylor, 422.
3Birx, 102.
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chimpanzees by a chain . . .  of interbreeders?”1 In other words, from an evolutionary 
perspective, if enough of the missing links between chimpanzees and man had survived, 
so that interbreeding was possible between all the neighboring forms in the ring between 
chimps and humans (like the gulls), how could we claim humans were special and 
distinct? Where could the discontinuous mind draw the line of moral favoritism?
It is precisely the concept that we can have intermediates who might be, in 
discontinuous terminology, 80 percent human, 93 percent human, or 61 percent human, 
that suddenly makes it hard to draw the moral boundary of inclusion. The almost infinite 
number of variables makes a concrete answer seem ludicrous. In a similar way, Dawkins 
is arguing that the many intermediates implied in the evolutionary model makes it 
ridiculous to try to establish a definition of essential humanness entitling us to special 
moral consideration over the animals.2 Dawkins boldly asserts that “we need only to 
discover a single survivor [of an intermediate species], say a relict [sz'c] Australopithecus 
in the Budongo Forest, and our precious system of norms and ethics would come 
crashing about our ears. The boundaries with which we segregate our world would be all 
shot to pieces. Racism would blur with speciesism in obdurate and vicious confusion.”3
'R. Dawkins, “Gaps,” 85. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid. On p. 82, Dawkins illustrates the difficulty of defining the boundary of 
humanness in discontinuous terms by noting the fight of pro-life opponents of abortion 
who view the concept of “human” as absolute, the opposite of Dawkins’s concept of ring- 
species continuity. These people cannot be argued with, he says, because their 
discontinuous minds cannot accommodate the concept that “the fetus could be half 
human or a hundredth human.” Their way of thinking is an all-or-nothing mentality with 
no capacity for half-measures.
3Ibid., 85.
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The ring-species argument has much in common with Rachels’s argument that for 
Darwin there could be no set species, but rather, there is a continuum of being in which 
individuals share some characteristics in common while differing in others. However, it 
is different from Rachels in scope, because its focus is primarily on establishing kinship 
through an organic union of man to animals through evolution, while Rachels is more 
focused on the alleged arbitrariness of defining species. The organic nature of Dawkins’s 
view is seen in two ways: first in his word picture in which an imaginary line of 
individuals is envisioned representing the stages of evolutionary development up to man. 
Each individual stands about a yard apart across the continent of Africa. Near mid-line, 
there is a common ancestor from which two lines of primates descended, ours being one 
of the lines. Starting at the Indian Ocean in Somalia, we would reach this common 
ancestor, depicted as a female midway through the species ring. “The ancestor is 
standing well to the east of Mount Kenya, and holding in her hand the entire chain o f her 
lineal descendants, culminating in you standing on the Somali beach.”1 The other hand 
holds the second line of descendants, the apes. Thus, through this ancestor, there is an 
organic tie between the two lines of descendants.
The second way in which we see an organic connection between man and animals 
in Dawkins’s position is in the appeals made to the ability o f one species in the ring of 
species to interbreed with the neighboring species in the ring sequence. Only when 
separated by multiple steps does interbreeding become impossible, as is illustrated by the
Tbid. Emphasis mine.
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two species of sea gulls at opposite ends of the same ring. This ability to interbreed with 
neighboring species in the ring is asserted to mean that if the closest evolutionary 
ancestors of humans were still alive, then we would be able to interbreed with them. The 
kinship argument, then, claims in part that this organic connection to animals makes them 
our evolutionary relatives, which, in turn, makes them entitled to equal consideration 
with humans. Ergo, it is morally wrong to discriminate against one’s evolutionary family 
on the basis that there is no interconnection between you as a human and them as 
animals. The theoretical possibility of finding a surviving member o f our ring of species, 
especially one we could interbreed with, begs a corresponding question: What if science 
were to create a transgenic hybrid of human and non-human beings?
Implications of Human-Animal Transgenic Hybrids
Dawkins raises this very issue when he continues:
But I can assert, without fear of contradiction, that if somebody succeeded in 
breeding a chimpanzee/human hybrid the news would be earth-shattering. Bishops 
would bleat, lawyers would gloat in anticipation, conservative politicians would 
thunder, Socialists wouldn’t know where to put their barricades.. . .  Politics would 
never be the same again, nor would theology, sociology, psychology or most 
branches of philosophy. The world that would be so shaken, by such an incidental 
event as a hybridisation [s/c], is a speciesist world indeed, dominated by the 
discontinuous mind.1
Ryder stretches the issue further by asking, “One day, if human apes are interbred 
with other apes, will it be justifiable to hunt, or eat, or experiment upon the hybrid child,
'Ibid., 86-87.
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or should he or she be sent to school?”1 This is an excellent question for it stretches the 
issue of what it means to be human. Would such a hybrid be entitled to equal rights with 
“pure” humans?
Ryder raises a second question in reference to the transgenic issue which clarifies
this moral identity issue:
In order to produce cheaper meat, pigs have already been bom who contain human 
genes. Yet surely this makes a nonsense of our speciesist morality?[sic] Is it not 
partial cannibalism to eat such a Humanopig? How many human genes are 
required to make a creature human in the eyes o f the lawl2
By asking how many genes are required to make a creature legally (or morally) human,
Ryder effectively brings us back to Dawkins’s proposed ring-species continuum of
creatures, meaning we can have beings who are only X or Y percent human. How is
their moral status to be determined? Ryder’s purpose seems to be to try to elevate the
animals to human-style preference, instead of lowering human status. But is it possible
that his argument may make it possible to devaluate humans instead of increasing the
moral value of animals?
Elevation of Animals or Demotion of Humans?
Ryder raises the possibility that kinship could demote human moral value instead 
of elevating the moral status of animals when he states:
The real and awful prospect of interbreeding human and nonhuman in the 1990's
‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 7.
2Ibid.
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becomes daily more probable.. . .  Within years, the ancient conceptual gulf 
between man and beast will be closed by the scientists. Will this lead to increased 
callousness to humans, or to a sudden dawning that we owe duties toward all 
sentient life?1
Ryder consistently pursues the track of seeking to increase our sense of duties to all 
sentient life, human or animal. Says Ryder, “One is left with the startlingly simple 
position, already stated, that whatever is morally wrong in the human case, is probably 
wrong in the nonhuman case as w ell.. . .  What holds for humans, especially for such 
categories as mentally handicapped and infants, should apply to in the case of 
nonhumans.”2 Ryder pushes this new ethics to the conclusion that “where it is wrong to 
inflict pain upon a human animal, it is probably wrong to do so to a non-human sentient. 
The actual killing o f  a non-human animal may be wrong i f  it causes suffering or, more 
contentiously, i f  it deprives the non-human offuture pleasures'* Thus Ryder seeks to 
shut out the degradation of our attitude towards human live and increase our protection of 
non-human sentient life. But on what grounds does Ryder come to these conclusions 
about morality? Why not lower our view of human life instead? This last statement by 
Ryder seems to beg the question of moral foundations, for it reveals an assumed criteria 
by which inclusion in moral protection is granted. He appears to assume a utilitarian 
hedonism as the fundamental criterion of moral good and evil. But why should one
‘Ibid., 318.
2Ibid., 6. By asserting that the rights of less than fully functional humans are 
grounds for extending the same rights to at least some animals, Ryder is using a 
technique that is known as the argument from marginal cases. This category of argument 
will be examined later in the chapter.
3Ibid., 6-7. Emphasis mine.
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accept this foundation for launching moral imperatives? What criteria for moral 
protection are proposed by anti-speciesist thinkers?
Proposed Characteristics That Entitle One to Moral Standing
Waldau notes that animal rights advocates are not uniformly agreed on this matter.1 
If the boundary of moral preference is not to be defined by membership in the human 
race, then where are we to draw the new line? Ryder argues that it is not differences 
between the species but differences within a species that are morally relevant.2 This 
would seem to imply that shared characteristics could also have moral relevancy.
Roslind Godlovitch asserts, however, that it is not just any shared characteristics between 
men and animals, but that it is only “relevant similarities” that matter.3 But what are 
relevant similarities? What kinship characteristics really matter in reference to moral 
standing?
Waldau asserts that there are several key standards proposed for redrawing the 
moral preference boundary line. Beyond invoking the status of being a “fellow 
creatures”with us, the proposed boundaries of moral inclusion include, sentience, mental 
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The Sentiency Criterion 
The Basic Grounds of the Sentiency Position
Peter Singer asserts that Jeremy Bentham is significant in that he appears to be the
first to denounce human dominion over nature as tyranny rather than legitimate
government.1 In addition Bentham is significant for forging the fundamental argument
for sentiency as the ultimate criterion for determining moral status. Said Bentham,
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. 
The French have already discovered that the blackness o f the skin is no reason why 
a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. 
It may one day come to be recognized that the number o f the legs, the villosity of 
the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for 
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the 
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? 
But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a 
more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. 
But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can 
they reason? nor Can they talkl but, Can they suffer! Why should the law refuse 
its protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when humanity will 
extend its mantle over everything which breathes.2
In particular, the phrase, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk] but,
Can they suffer?” has become the chief slogan of the animal rights movement. Richard
Ryder aptly has coined the term “Painism” as a label for defining the boundary of moral
protection for an individual on the ability to suffer, where suffering is defined in terms of
pain. The moral aspect of this approach applies to the pain of others. Thus, “we should do
1 Singer, Animal Liberation, 211.
2Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation 
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1876), 311. All emphases are original except the 
final two.
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to others what we believe will give them pleasure and not do to them what we believe will 
cause them pain.”1
Singer points out that Bentham rejects any kind of contractualist foundation for 
ethics, proposing instead a hedonist basis of morality: Pain and suffering are inherently 
morally evil while pleasure and happiness are the essence of the morally good. In 
Ryder’s words, “Pain, can be said, is the quintessence of evil. All painful events are bad 
and all bad events are painful. It is on this premise that Singer declares that the only 
grounds for having interests, and thus rights, is the capacity to be able to suffer (i.e. 
experience pain).”2 The ability to experience pain, then, becomes the criterion of 
defining sentience or consciousness. Says Ryder,
Whatever are the causes of consciousness, its moral importance is clearly 
paramount. It matters not if an animal, whether human or nonhuman, is intelligent 
or communicative, or has an immortal soul. All that matters is that it is conscious: 
in particular that it can be conscious o f pain and pleasure. This should be the 
bedrock of our morality. Pain is pain regardless o f the species suffering it.3
Thus, says Ryder, all major theories of behavior (including Freud and Skinner) are based
on the principle that pleasure is desired and pain is avoided.4 Since animals can seek to
gain pleasure and avoid pain, Ryder declares that our laws must recognize that
“nonhumans have claims to life, freedom, and the pursuit o f happiness just as we do; and
'Richard Ryder, “Painism: The Ethics of Animal Rights and the Environment,” in 
Animal Welfare and the Environment: An RSPCA Book, ed. Richard Ryder (New York: 
Avon Books, 1977), 196, 198-199.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 7-9.
3Ryder, Animal Revolution, 325.
4Ryder, “Painism,” 198.
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among the liberties that individual non-humans should be able to enjoy is the freedom 
from exploitation by humankind.”1 Why individual nonhumans?
Ryder declares, that since pain is non-transferrable—that is, one can never 
consciously and directly feel another’s pain—ethics based on the ability to suffer pain 
must be individualistic since species cannot feel pain. For Ryder there can be no sum or 
averaging of pains because what is morally significant is the pain of one, not the 
combined pain of a group.2 Rachels likewise argues that the capacity to suffer belongs to 
individuals, not groups, and thus moral status is based on individual characteristics, not 
on species membership.3 This painist criterion, and specifically the use o f Bentham, 
belies, then, a tendency of these ethicists to favor a utilitarian approach to morality.4
‘Ibid.
2Ibid., 202. It should be noted that Ryder seems to contradict this argument to some 
degree in Victims, 15. On pp. 14-15, he gives a brief, but classic sentience argument 
based on individual abilities to suffer. He then argues in the context o f challenging 
politicians with the significance of the sentience criterion, that “those politicians who still 
believe that politics have some remote connection with morality or who vaguely believe 
that their job has to do with increasing the total sum of happiness, should question why 
non-human animals should not be also represented by them?” Here Ryder focuses on the 
classic utilitarian formula of the greatest sum of happiness for the greatest number of 
sentient beings, explicitly citing Bentham. However, it is to be the sum of individual 
experiences of happiness, and not a conglomerate sum that essentially turns into an 
averaging of happiness. Thus Ryder would probably not feel that there is any 
contradiction between his two books.
3Rachels, CfA, 173,192.
4In CfA, pp. 190-192, Rachels is seeking to rebut the idea that moral protection 
depends on the capacity to create and maintain social contracts with reciprocal 
obligations. He asserts that the proponents of the contractual foundation fail “to 
distinguish the conditions necessary for having a moral obligation from the conditions 
necessary for being the beneficiary of a moral obligation.” For example, Rachels notes 
that adult humans are considered morally obligated not to torture one another. If a
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Current Assertions of Utilitarianism
Richard Ryder demonstrates the bent to utilitarianism when he declares that 
“animal liberation” has “its foundation partly in utilitarian philosophy.”1 The key to 
Ryder’s declaration is that the sentiency/painism argument is rooted in a statement of 
Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, where animals are to be included in the 
calculation of pain and suffering. Since the foundational principle underlying these 
assertions is the evolutionary kinship of man with the animals, it becomes relatively easy 
to shift the concept of rights from a humanocentric focus to a sentiency-based view of 
suffering that includes the animals.
Singer likewise confesses his utilitarian leanings,2 and Carruthers confirms the 
utilitarian bent of the animal rights advocates by noting that from a utilitarian standpoint, 
there is no reason for “an impartial, benevolent observer,” who is equally sympathetic to 
the interests of all affected, to count animal interests as of lower importance than our
mentally retarded person violates this norm, we tend not hold them responsible because 
of their diminished capacity to responsibly know what they are doing. But in the reverse, 
we still hold the rational adult responsible for torturing a mentally handicapped person 
who is unable to recognize the moral issue, but is still capable of experiencing pain.
Thus we have a person who lacks the ability to enter into a reciprocal social contract, yet 
who can benefit from a moral standard. But it is the capacity to experience pain, not the 
human species membership, that is morally significant for Rachels. Emphases in 
original.
‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 329.
2Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uninversity Press, 
1993), 14.
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own.1 It would seem, though, that as soon as anti-speciesist ethics is admittedly a form 
of utilitarianism, that it becomes subject to the classic criticisms leveled against 
utilitarianism, an issue that seems to be avoided in animal rights literature. On the other 
hand, utilitarian hedonism may play a role in using the concept of marginal cases to try to 
help define the circle of moral inclusion.
The Argument from Marginal Cases and Human Preference in Ethics 
Basic Forms of the Argument
The argument from marginal cases is a classic tactic for exploring the extended 
implications of a particular position. The animal rights advocates regularly resort to the 
marginal-cases argument in attempting to discredit support for human preference over 
animals in ethics. According to Waldau, the “marginal cases argument” essentially holds 
that certain “higher” non-human animals cannot fairly be denied basic moral rights 
because there are “marginal” humans who have fewer abilities than the animals, but are 
still granted full moral status.2 Thus, the argument concludes, the animal should receive 
rights similar to those granted to the human. Singer frames the issue in a slightly 
different manner:
If equality is related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics
‘Carruthers, 55-56.
2Waldau, 26.
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must be some lowest common denominator, and pitched so low that no human 
lacks them—but then the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set 
of characteristics which covers all animals will not be possessed only by humans.1
These articulations illustrate a type of the marginal-cases argument that Evelyn
Pluhar asserts is the favorite form of this argument in current usage, which she labels as
the “categorical version.”2 It should be noted that the categorical version essentially
assumes that marginal humans have rights and thus argues that animals of similar
characteristics (i.e., functionally) to marginal humans deserve the same rights.
Pluhar labels the second genre of the argument from marginal cases as the
“bioconditional version.” The bioconditional version does not assume rights are granted
to marginal humans, but rather asserts that marginal humans and animals of similar
characteristics (functionally) either share the same rights, or are equally deprived of
rights. The argument, then, is conditioned on marginal humans having rights. This
results in the conclusion that, in Pluhar’s words, “either both marginal humans and any
nonhumans who are similar to them in all morally relevant respects are maximally
morally significant, are highly morally significant, or neither are.”3 The key difference
‘Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,”in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 226. See also, idem, Unsanctijying Human 
Life: Essays on Ethics, ed. Helga Kuhse (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 89. 
In Applied Ethics, Singer informs the reader in the first footnote of the chapter containing 
this quote, that the chapter is “an abridged version of an essay which was first published 
in Philosohpic Exchange  vol. 1, no. 5, (Summer 1974).” It is the 1974 version which was 
republished in Unsanctijying Human Life, 79-93. This is indicated in the footnote on p. 
79.
2Pluhar, 63.
3Ibid., 66. The abbreviated form appears on p. 120: “Either both are highly morally 
significant or neither are.”
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between bioconditional and categorical versions is that the bioconditional version poses a 
direct threat to the rights of marginal humans. Thus, Pluhar asserts that full-personhood 
arguments are toppled by marginal cases because, “according to their view, those who 
are not full persons, be they humans or non-humans, are in the same moral (or to be more 
exact, nonmoral) boat.”1
Intended Purpose
It is critical to understand why this argument is used. Frey provides a key insight 
into the core motives of the marginal-cases argument. He diagrams the argument 
structure as follows:
1. Criterion X, while excluding animals, also excludes babies and the severely 
mentally-enfeebled from the class of right holders;
2. Babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled, however, do have rights and so fall 
within this class;2
3. Therefore, criterion X must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights. 
He continues, “Obviously, this argument is essentially negative and indirect, in that it 
does not seek to establish that animals have rights but rather to undermine criteria the 
application of which yield [s/c] the result that they do not have rights.”3 Pluhar concurs 
with Frey in stating that “the entire point of the bioconditional version of the argument is
'Ibid., 120.
2The key assumption is premise #2. The marginal-cases argument thus is 
essentially trying to argue, “Since babies and mentally handicapped humans still have 
rights, the sentient animals ought to have similar rights.”
3R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), 28-29.
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to show us exactly where the fiill-personhood view leads. It is a challenge to that view.”1 
Nevertheless, the context in which the argument is presented is always in reference to 
advocating the elevation of certain animals to equal moral status with people, and not to 
devaluate the moral status of marginal humans. As Waldau points out, one must accept 
the argument of marginal cases and protect other animals, or deny protection to both.2
One sees the intent is not to undermine human rights, but rather to expand animal 
rights in many statements by many authors. For example, Christoph Anstotz argues that 
the modem, enlightened “opposition to discrimination against intellectually disabled 
people is based on principles that lead to opposition to discrimination against other 
sentient beings who are also unable to defend their own interests.”3 In a similar vein 
Singer opines that since we have now established universal human rights, the same 
criteria should now be extended to animals.4 He also argues that the elimination of 
human preference will not only bring better treatment of animals, but more compassion 
to humans!5 Rachels remarks, “I fancy that human beings may be more humane when 
they realize that, as their dependent associates live a life in which man has a share, so
’Pluhar, 73.
2Waldau, 37.
3Christoph Anstotz, “Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great 
Apes,” in The Great A pe Project: Equality B eyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri and 
Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 158.
4Singer, Practical Ethics, 55.
5Singer, Animal Liberation, 234-235.
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they have rights which man is bound to respect.”1 Ryder supports the same sentiment but 
from a negative statement, that if humans persist in the total subordination of nonhumans, 
we are paving the way for a more callous attitude towards the weak, elderly, and 
handicapped of our own species.2
Pluhar, in fact, reveals her distaste for this very implication raised by Ryder. She 
declares that attempts to restrict “maximum moral significance” to humans, either lapse 
into unfounded prejudice (i.e., speciesism) or imply that many humans are not really 
morally significant at all. She then concludes that “neither form of this dilemma is 
particularly enticing.”3 For an ethics based in individual functionality, however, the 
marginal-cases argument is very significant. Pluhar has aptly shown that if  preference 
and prejudice are set aside, the marginal-cases argument intended to elevate the moral 
status of non-humans can just as easily demote them. There is no guarantee that 
marginally functional humans will find protection. The marginal-cases argument 
becomes empowered because an evolutionary understanding of origins and life leads to a 
model of moral entitlement based on an individual’s functional capabilities. It is this
Barnes Rachels, “Why Darwinians Should Support Equal Treatment for Other 
Great Apes,” in The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri 
and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 153.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 11.
3Pluhar, 120-121. It is significant to note the emotional response of Pluhar to the 
bioconditional version’s implication that many marginally functional humans could lose 
rights. Pluhar thus reflects the general preference for the categorical version seen in most 
uses of this tactic. Their desire is not to undermine human rights but to elevate the moral 
status of animals.
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individualism that will become the foundation of Rachels’s unique system of ethics based 
on Darwinian evolution. Let us now turn to examining Rachels’s singular contribution.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DARWINIST MORAL THEORY OF JAMES RACHELS
Introduction
What might a system of ethics based on Darwinian evolution look like? We have 
already observed some general implications of Darwinism for ethics including a tendency 
to favor Utilitarian ethics, and a propensity to relativism in ethics. But so far we have not 
looked at how a moral theory or system based on the principles of Darwinian evolution 
might be structured. No doubt there could be some variations based on differing 
individual interpretations of the moral significance of Darwinism. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that most connections of ethics to Darwin have remained disjointed and isolated 
from systematic ethical theory. One exception, however, is James Rachels.
In terms of recognition, Rachels stands in sharp contrast with the more renown 
Peter Singer. In The New Yorker, Michael Specter characterizes Singer as follows: 
“Peter Singer may be the most controversial philosopher alive; he is certainly among the 
most influential.”1 By contrast, Rachels is comparatively unknown, yet he appears to 
have made a more significant contribution in unpacking the moral implications of
‘Michael Specter, “The Dangerous Philosopher,” The New Yorker, September 6, 
1999, 46.
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Darwinian evolution. This is because Rachels goes where no one else has gone. 
Rachels’s significance is twofold: First, he explicitly sets out to build an ethics based in 
the “facts” of Darwinism, and second, he seeks to undermine the pillars of traditional 
Judeo-Christian ethics in order to create a need for a revised ethics. In so doing he 
engages Christian ethics and theology much more directly and fully than Singer.1 Thus 
Rachels, in explicitly seeking to establish a Darwinst ethics at the expense of Christian 
ethics, stands alone.
Rachels has expounded his moral theory in two key books, as well as in a few 
articles. The first book he published was a college textbook on ethics, The Elements o f
'A brief comment on the differences between Rachels and Singer is in order. In 
some ways, they are virtually indistinguishable in their overall thrust, especially in 
reference to animal rights. Their differences seem mostly to be more in emphases, than 
in content. However, there are some key divergences that we shall summarize here.
Singer is more explicitly and more purely Utilitarian than Rachels. He builds his 
ethics first on Utilitarian reasoning, with gleanings from Evolution. By contrast, Rachels 
directly seeks to build his ethics on Darwinism and ends up with a type of Utilitarianism 
as the result. Other differences include the fact that Rachels focuses on the principles of 
equal consideration of interests, and the concept of being subjects of a life, much more 
than Singer does. Also, Singer regularly invokes and discusses the principle of 
universifiability, whereas Rachels never mentions it. While both advocate abortion and 
euthanasia, Singer seems more prone to push the discussion to the extreme possibilities, 
including the issue of infanticide.
The single biggest difference between them is that Singer will take the principle of 
utility to the point of rejecting any preferentialism or parochialism so that he sees no 
difference between one’s moral obligations to one’s family and to poor starving people in 
India or Africa. By contrast, we shall see Rachels explicitly build such preferentialism 
into his ethics because it results in a Utilitarian type o f  good for the community, though 
the primary motivation is not Utilitarian.
What they share in common is a rejection of any theistic influence in ethics, and a 
penchant to blame Christian ethics for producing anti-animal morality. Both thus do 
ethics in a completely secular fashion rooted in human reason. Since Rachels is more 
explicitly built from Darwinism, and more directly interacts with Christian ethics and 
theology, he seems more significant for the purposes of this study.
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Moral Philosophy,1 which has passed through four editions, as of this writing. The 
second book, Created from Animals, sets the philosophical foundations for his ethics, 
explicitly basing them on Darwinism. Thus, this book provides the centerpiece of this 
study, while his other works play a supplemental role.
Rachels’s Use of Darwin to Inform and Ground Ethics
How Darwinism Interfaces with Traditional Ethics
In his introduction to Created from Animals, Rachels explicitly declares his intent 
to discuss and explore the moral implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution and 
intimates that Darwinism undermines the foundations of Christian ethics, especially in 
reference to the issue of human preference in ethics.2 This does not mean that he takes 
Christian ethics as insignificant. To the contrary, in another work, he makes it clear that 
the “traditional theory” must be taken seriously, both due to its enormous influence, and 
due to its being the only fully worked-out, systematically elaborated theory of morality 
we have.3 It is important to note that Rachels does not claim to have falsified the
’James Rachels, The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy, 1st ed. (Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 1986); 3d ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill College, 1999); 4th 
ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill College, 2002). Hereafter will be footnoted respectively 
as Rachels, Elements (1986), Elements (1999), and Elements (2002). If there is a second 
edition, it appears to exist only in theory as I have been unable to find a library holding it. 
However, since there is a third edition, it seems there must have been a second.
2Rachels, CfA, 1-5.
3James Rachels, The End o f  Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 4. Rachels’s comment seems to have the unspoken implication 
that with Christian ethics having a nearly 2000-year head start, Rachels's proposed ethics 
will not be as complete or as systematic since his theory is still in its formative stages.
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Christian position. In his own words, “I would not argue that Darwinism entails the 
falsity of the doctrine of human dignity; rather, I would contend that Darwinism 
undermines human dignity by taking away its support.”1
The focal point of this confrontation between Rachels’s Darwinian ethics and 
traditional Christian ethics, then, is the issue of human preference in moral theory and 
thinking. He asserts that “after Darwin, we can no longer think of ourselves as 
occupying a special place in creation.” This, in turn, leads Rachels to state that 
“traditional morality is based, in part on the idea that human life has a special value and 
worth. If we must give up on our inflated conception of ourselves, and our picture of the 
world as made exclusively for our habitation, will we not have to give up, at the same 
time, those elements of our morality which depend on such conceptions?”2 Thus Rachels 
proposes the possibility that “Darwinism is incompatible with traditional morality, and so 
provides reason for rejecting that morality and replacing it with something better.”3
Rachels notes that there has been a history of reactions to Darwin, in which the 
general pattern has been to assert that the theory of evolution devalues man, and threatens 
to undermine traditional Western morals. Says Rachels, “There is an idea about how
‘Rachels, CfA, 171.
2Ibid., 2-4.
3Ibid. See also Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse o f Our 
Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), 1, 187-89. Peter Singer 
likewise sees a need and reason to replace traditional (i.e., Christian) morality with a new 
and improved theory of morals. He likens the ethical movement to which he and Rachels 
belong as the moral equivalent to the Copemican Revolution in astronomy—imperfect 
but a great improvement over the previous theory. He depicts Christian ethics as all but 
dead but still lingering in influence due to the populist masses.
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Darwinism might be related to ethics that is older and deeper than either ‘evolutionary 
ethics’ or sociobiology. Darwin’s earliest readers realized that an evolutionary outlook 
might undermine the traditional doctrine of human dignity, a doctrine which is at the core 
of Western morals. Darwin himself seems to suggest this when he says that the 
conception of man as ‘created from animals’ contradicts the arrogant notion that we are a 
‘great work’.”1 Rachels suggests, however, that the significance of this point has been 
underestimated. “I shall argue, however, that discrediting ‘human dignity ’ is one of the 
most important implications of Darwinism, and that it has consequences that people have 
hardly begun to appreciate.”2
However, Rachels is careful not to assert that the traditional ethical view of human 
preference is patently false. Rachels asserts that “Darwin’s theory does not entail that the 
idea of human dignity is false.. . .  Darwinism does, however, undermine the traditional 
doctrine [of human dignity]. . .  by taking away its support.” He then informs us that “ to 
replace the doctrine of human dignity, I offer a different conception, moral individualism, 
which I argue is more in keeping with the evolutionary outlook.”3 Rachels here reveals 
his significance by directly pitting Christian morality against Darwinian evolution and
‘Rachels, CfA, 79. Rachels appears to be alluding to a quotation by Darwin found 
in the introduction of CfA, 1. “Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy 
of the interposition of a deity. More humble and I think truer to consider him created 
from animals.” See, Charles Darwin, Charles D a rw in ’s  N otebooks, 1836-1844, 
transcribed and ed. Paul H. Barrett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 300.
2Rachels, CfA, 79-80. Emphases mine.
3Ibid., 5. “Moral individualism” will turn out to become the label by which 
Rachels identifies his proposed ethical system in chapter 5.
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joins the authors cited in the previous chapter in calling for a revolution in ethics.
But how does Rachels see Darwinian evolution as subverting human dignity and 
thus undermining traditional morality? What is the “support” that is undermined?
Two Pillars Grounding Traditional Ethics
Rachels asks, “What exactly is the traditional idea of human dignity?” He goes on 
to clarify that his question is focused, not in past historical squabbles, but “in the basic 
idea that forms the core of Western morals, and that is expressed, not only in 
philosophical writing, but in literature, religion, and in the common moral 
consciousness.”1 Why, then, does Rachels see the doctrine of human dignity such a 
critical component of traditional ethics?
In a nutshell, he sees the human dignity doctrine as resting on two premises: 
“Traditional morality depends on the idea that human beings are in a special moral 
category.. . .  Traditionally it has been supported in two ways: first, by the notion that 
man is made in the image of God, and secondly, by the notion that man is a uniquely 
rational being.”2 Rachels eventually labels these pillars of traditional morality the “image 
of God thesis” and the “rationality thesis.”3
Rachels sees two implications of placing a significant distinction between human
Tbid., 86.
2Ibid., 3-4. Emphasis in original. Rachels later gives a self-summary of his book 
that recapitulates these very points. Seep. 171.
3Some examples of this labeling can be found in, ibid., 91, 97, 171.
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and non-human life, especially in reference to the image-of-God thesis. First, human life 
is sacred and, thus, the central concern for morality is the protection and care of human 
beings. Second, non-human life is thus less valuable than human life and is therefore not 
entitled to the same degree of moral protection as a human being. Rachels notes that 
some take this distinction to mean that “non-human animals” have no moral standing at 
all. “Therefore, we may use them as we see fit.”1 How, then, does Rachels perceive the 
image of God and the rationality theses to support such a distinction between man and 
animal? Since the image-of-God thesis is where most of his engagement with the 
theological foundations of traditional ethics occurs, let us start there.
Pillar One: The Image-of-God Thesis
For Rachels, the image-of-God thesis may be the most significant underpinning of 
traditional ethics. He clearly sees this view as rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition, 
starting with the Genesis account of creation in which man is said to be created in the 
image of God. Thus, Christian morality, for Rachels, is the prime proponent of the 
doctrine of human dignity in Western society. Says Rachels:
The Western religious tradition, a blend of Judaism and Christianity, is a case 
in point. Man, it is said, was made in the image of God, with the world intended to 
be his habitation, and everything else in it given for his enjoyment and use. This 
makes man, apart from God himself, the leading character in the whole cosmic 
drama. But that is only the beginning of the story. Other details reinforce the 
initial thought. Throughout human history, God has continued to watch over and 
interact with man, communicating with him through the saints and prophets. One 
of the things communicated is a set of instructions telling us how we are to live;
'Ibid., 86.
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and almost all those instructions concern how we must treat other humans. Our 
fellow humans are not to be killed, lied to, or otherwise mistreated. Their lives are 
sacred. Their needs are always taken into account, their rights always respected.
The concern we are to show one another is, however, only a dim reflection of the 
love that God himself has for mankind: so great is God’s love that he even became 
a man, and died sacrificially to redeem sinful mankind. And finally, we are told 
that after we die, we may be united with God to live forever. What is said about the 
animals is strikingly different. They were given by God for man’s use, to be 
worked, killed, and eaten at man’s pleasure. Like the rest of creation, they exist for 
man’s benefit.1
Rachels here identifies four key theological themes from the Judeo-Christian tradition 
that he believes undergird the doctrine of human specialness. However, Rachels will 
ultimately focus only on one of these four, leaving the other three untouched in further 
discussion.
The first theological theme, which is the one upon which Rachels trains his focus, 
is the doctrine that man was created in the image of God, and that all in this world was 
made for his use and enjoyment—the image-of-God thesis. We shall soon see that for 
Rachels, the concept of the image of God is the most crucial undergirding principle for 
establishing the doctrine of human dignity. Thus if the image-of-God thesis can be called 
into question, a major pillar of Western ethics is thought to have been crumbled. We 
have seen, however, that Rachels identifies three other theological themes that he 
believes undergird the traditional view of human dignity.
In the second theme, we saw Rachels make the claim that the human preference 
found in the Genesis creation story is further bolstered by the biblical account of God’s 
continued watch-care and interaction with man, including communicating with man
•ibid., 86-87.
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through prophets, and giving them a set of instructions on how to live (i.e., the 10 
Commandments). Thus he alleged that the morality thus attributed to divine prescription 
is focused on protecting humans from mistreatment, while the animals were relegated to 
human exploitation and use. These provisions are said to be understood by the Judeo- 
Christian tradition as an evidence of God’s great love for mankind, presumably above the 
animals.
The third theological foundation for human preference presented by Rachels is the 
doctrine of salvation. In his depiction of Christian thinking, God so loves mankind that 
He became a man and died sacrificially to redeem mankind. It is implied in the context 
of the previous quotation that God did not offer to do anything for animal redemption. 
Thus Rachels asserts that the incarnation is interpreted to mean that animals are less 
valuable than humans. The use of salvation to bolster human preference has also been 
depicted by the animal theologian from Oxford, Andrew Linzey. He asserts that the 
tendency of Christian theology to juxtapose humans over against the animals “is 
encapsulated in Karl Barth’s view that ‘God’s eternal Son and Logos did not will to be an 
angel or animal but man’ and that ‘ this and this alone was the content of the eternal 
election of grace’ [sz'c]. Given this overarching divine election of divine humanity, it 
must follow that human kind is special, unique, distinct, superior, and so o n .. . .  The 
incarnation is used as the trump card to vanquish all other creaturely rights to specialness, 
intrinsic worth, and respectful treatment.”1
'Linzey, “Introduction,” xv. Linzey’s citation of Barth is, “Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, III/l, The Doctrine o f  Creation, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, T &
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In addition to the doctrine of salvation, the fourth and final theological concept that 
Rachels believes supports the doctrine of human preference over animals is the doctrine 
of final destiny. Humans are promised the hope of life with God after death. While the 
exact depiction of the relationship of death and eschatology can be debated,1 the more 
important point to this discussion is that traditional Christian theology promises some 
kind of afterlife in paradise with God, while animals seem to miss out because salvation 
is presented as human-centered.
Rachels concludes that “the central idea of our [i.e., Western] moral tradition 
springs directly from this remarkable story. The story embodies a doctrine of the 
specialness of man and a matching ethical precept.” He reiterates the elements found in 
this story—that man alone is made in the image of God and that creation was made for 
his use and benefit, and that man is the center of God’s love and attention—and then calls 
this theological package the “image of God thesis.” He then articulates the moral 
meaning of the image-of-God thesis as having two dimensions: “The matching moral 
idea. . .  is that human life is sacred, and the central concern of our morality must be 
protection and care of human beings, whereas we may use other creatures as we see fit.”2
T Clark 1960, pp. 1 6 ,1 8 ;. . .” Emphases in original.
'Not all Christians agree on the exact nature of death, nor of eschatological events. 
Debates between Dispensationalists and non-Dispensationalists could be cited as one 
example of disagreement over eschatology within Christendom. Likewise, there is 
division over whether a soul remains conscious after death. But for Rachels these are 
moot issues. The issue is that in whatever theological form presented, individual humans 
are promised the possibility of some kind afterlife while individual animals seem not to 
be given this privilege.
2Rachels, CfA, 87. Emphasis mine.
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Rachels repeats and enlarges these two points by suggesting “some practical 
implications of the idea of human dignity.” First is the doctrine of the sanctity of human 
life— innocent human life to be more precise. Rachels observes that traditional ethics 
usually recognizes that “guilty persons—criminals, aggressors, and soldiers fighting 
unjust wars—are not given this protection, and in some circumstances they may be justly 
killed.” However, traditional ethics is said to erect an inviolable wall of protection 
around the innocent. The practical outworking of this doctrine, notes Rachels, is that 
traditional morality does not permit practices such as suicide, infanticide, and 
euthanasia.1 Thus, innocent human life becomes untouchable.
Rachels further explores the second implication of the human dignity doctrine by 
appealing to Aquinas and Kant to show the “traditional” view of the moral status of 
animals. The usual statements of everything in nature being made for man’s usage are 
repeated, and Aquinas is cited as saying that “charity does not extend to irrational 
creatures.” Kant is cited as claiming that animals have no ends in themselves but are 
merely means to an end and that end is man.2
Succinctly stated, then, for Rachels the overall basis of human dignity is rooted in 
the theological premise that if man is the central object of God’s love and watch-care, 
then man’s protection should be the central object and focus of morality. Thus the 
image-of-God thesis becomes the first central pillar for upholding the sanctify of human
‘Ibid., 88.
2Ibid., CfA, 90-91.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
life over animal life in Rachels’s argument. But the appeal to Kant brings us to the 
second pillar of the human dignity position, the rationality thesis.
Pillar Two: The Rationality Thesis
In Rachels’s words, “Few Western moralists have been satisfied to leave the idea of 
man’s specialness stated in an overtly theological way.” Thus he notes that they 
reasoned that they should be able to identify the essential nature of this divine image that 
is possessed by man. “The favored answer, throughout Western history, has been that 
man alone is rational.” He notes that “the doctors of the Church” adopted Aristotle’s 
argument that man alone is rational, this being the single characteristic distinguishing 
him from animals. Rachels calls this the “rationality thesis: man is special because he 
alone is rational. Non-human animals are not rational, and so are not to be compared, in 
this regard, with humans.”1
Rachels asserts that the importance of the rationality thesis is that it “secularized” 
the doctrine of man’s specialness. Thus, “even if the image of God thesis is rejected, the 
matching moral idea need not be abandoned.”2 Rachels casts this “rejection” in the 
context of Christian apologetics, where secular arguments are used to defend the same 
conclusion that was reached by theological debate. But without saying it directly, 
Rachels demonstrates that he sees a second possibility: If the image-of-God thesis
‘Ibid., 87-88.
2Ibid., 88.
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becomes weakened or is eliminated from theology, then only one pillar would remain for 
supporting human dignity.
Here we find the significance of Darwinian evolution for Rachels. The image-of- 
God thesis, according to Rachels, is ultimately rooted in the doctrine of biblical creation. 
But Darwin’s theory of evolution, in many circles, has brought the Genesis account into 
disrepute. Thus we earlier saw Rachels label it a “remarkable story.” Darwinist 
evolution is the alternative that allows creation to fall and thus undermine the image-of- 
God thesis. Then Rachels only has to undermine the rationality thesis, and, in his mind, 
human dignity will be a dead issue.
We have seen why Rachels believes the image of God and rationality theses are 
foundational to traditional ethics. But how does Rachels understand Darwinism to 
undermine these theses?
“How Darwinism Might Undermine the Idea of Human Dignity”1
Before showing how Darwinism may undermine the traditional pillars of Christian 
ethics, Rachels first sees it necessary to show us that it is possible to discuss ethics in the 
context of Darwin’s theory. To make his case, Rachels addresses the problem of the is- 
ought fallacy, or “Hume’s Guillotine,” as he likes to call it. Simply stated, the argument 
is made that it is logically improper to derive a moral imperative (an “ought”) from a 
basic matter of fact (an “is”). To derive an “ought” from an “is” is to fall into the
'ibid., 91. This is an actual section heading used by Rachels.
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is-ought fallacy. In Rachels's words, “Factual statements can never by themselves 
logically entail evaluations.”1
Overcoming Hume’s Guillotine
Rachels observes that, in traditional morality, the elements in the image of God and 
rationality theses (i.e., God exists, He created man in His image, etc.) “are, speaking 
loosely, matters of (purported) fact.” Once these “facts” are established (the “is”), they 
are said to entail (the “ought”) that the purpose of morality is the protection of human 
life. Rachels asserts that this logic commits the is-ought fallacy. Rachels, however, 
notes that Hume’s Guillotine is just as merciless with those who wish to argue that 
Darwinism undermines the doctrine of human dignity, “For the facts of evolution do not, 
by themselves, entail any moral conclusions.”2 Thus, for Rachels, Hume’s Guillotine 
cuts both ways, giving neither Creationist nor evolutionist an advantage. So what is 
Rachels’s solution to this apparent dilemma?
Rachels notes that philosophical reassurances that we cannot derive “ought” from 
“is” are “too quick and easy,” and thus, “the nagging thought remains that Darwinism 
does have unsettling consequences.” He continues, “I believe this feeling of discomfort 
is justified. Matters are more complicated than a simple reliance on Hume’s Guillotine 
would suggest.” The key reason matters are more complicated is that “our beliefs are 
often tied together by connections other than strict logical entailment.” Rachels uses the
'Ibid., 91-92.
2Ibid.
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anti-abortion movement to illustrate how a position can be maintained when new 
evidence removes the original grounds for the viewpoint. He asserts new grounds are 
found and substituted but the position is not forsaken. Strict logical entailment would say 
the position should have been given up. But we are not strictly logical beings.1 And this, 
in turn, opens the way for Rachels’s solution to the is-ought issue. And his solution 
provides his logic for how Darwinism “might” undermine traditional ethics.
Rachels is arguing that, in a similar fashion, believers in the human dignity doctrine 
have essentially proven that traditional ethics does not deduce the doctrine of human 
sanctity from the image of God by strict logic. This is because, asserts Rachels, that as 
old reasons are overthrown by new evidence, they keep shifting their argument to 
continue to provide support for the established belief. Thus, traditional morality “never 
depended on taking the matching moral idea as a strict logical deduction from the image- 
of-God thesis or the rationality thesis.” Rather, these theses provided moralists with what 
they felt were “good reasons” (i.e., good justifications) for accepting the moral 
conclusion of a human centered ethics.2 The difference between merely providing “good 
reasons” and strict logical entailment is the key that Rachels believes delivers both 
traditional ethics and his own work from the impact of Hume’s Guillotine. In other 
words, for Rachels, by never claiming to supply absolute proof, but rather merely 
providing “good reasons,” we escape the is-ought fallacy. Notice how he now argues on
•ibid., 92-97.
2Ibid., 97.
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what grounds Darwinism undermines traditional ethics.
First, Rachels observes that claiming that Darwinism undermines traditional 
morality “is not the claim that it entails that the doctrine of human dignity is false.” 
Rather, “it is, instead, the claim that Darwinism provides reason for doubting the truth of 
the considerations that support the doctrine. From a Darwinian perspective, both the 
image-of-God thesis and the rationality thesis are suspect.” Second, Rachels asserts that 
there are “good Darwinian reasons, for thinking it unlikely that any other support for 
human dignity can be found. Thus Darwinism is believed to furnish the ‘new 
information’ that undermines human dignity by taking away its support.”1 So what is this 
“new information”?
How Darwin’s Theory Undermines the 
Image-of-God thesis
Rachels’s primary tactic to undermine the image-of-God thesis will be to try to 
show that Darwinian evolution cannot support the kind of theism necessary to produce 
such a conclusion.2 But what in Darwinism does Rachels see as undermining the grounds 
of the image-of-God thesis? Rachels offers two aspects of Darwinism that he believes
'Ibid., 97-98.
2Rachels summarizes his work at the end of chapter 4 in CfA, by stating that 
chapter 3 is dedicated to showing how Darwinism undermines the image-of-God thesis, 
while chapter 4 is focused on undermining the rationality thesis. See Rachels, CfA, 171.
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undermine classical theism, and in undermining classical theism, undermine the image- 
of-God thesis.
The problem of evil
The first aspect is the issue of evil and suffering in the world. As Rachels notes, 
“The existence of evil has always been a chief obstacle to belief in an all-good, all- 
powerful God. How can God and evil co-exist? If God is perfectly good, he would not 
want evil to exist; and if he is all-powerful, he is able to eliminate it. Yet evil exists. 
Therefore, the argument goes, God must not exist.”1 Rachels then gives a short list of 
traditional answers offered by theologians “through the centuries.”
1. Perhaps evil is necessary so that we may appreciate the good.. . .
2. Perhaps evil is a punishment for man’s sin. Before the fall people lived in 
Paradise. It was their own fault sin that resulted in their expulsion. Therefore, 
people suffer because they have brought it on themselves.
3. Perhaps evil is placed in the world so that, by struggling with it, human beings 
can develop moral character.. . .
4. Perhaps evil is the unavoidable consequence of man’s free will. In order to 
make us moral agents, rather than mere robots, it was necessary for God to endow 
us with free will. But in making us free agents, God enabled us to cause evil, even 
though he would not cause it himself.
5. Or, if all else fails, the theist can always fall back on the idea that our limited 
human intelligence is insufficient to comprehend God’s great design. There is a 
reason for evil; we just aren’t smart enough to figure out what it is.
All these arguments are available to reconcile God’s existence with evil. Certainly,
'Ibid., 103.
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then, the simple version of the argument from evil does not force the theist to
abandon belief.1
Rachels does not further analyze these particular arguments for he has already concluded 
they are not overly effective in changing the theist’s mind. Rather he gives two common 
rejoinders to these arguments before proceeding to his conclusion.
The first rejoinder, which may come in varying forms, focuses on the fact that there 
is an excessive amount of evil in the world for the first three arguments to be valid. The 
second rejoinder argues against number 4 by appealing to the distinction between moral 
and natural evil. Free will is only responsible for the former and is inadequate for the 
latter.2 But, as we have seen, these do not force the believer to forsake their belief in 
God.
Rachels thus argues that Darwin contributes “two distinctive twists” that strengthen 
the argument from evil. First, theological arguments justifying the existence of God and 
the presence of evil in this world center on human suffering, belying the human centered 
focus of traditional morality. But for Darwin, says Rachels, these arguments assume, 
based on the creation story, that man has always been a co-occupant with animal and 
plant life forms on the earth, whereas in the evolutionary view evil and suffering existed 
for millions of years before man arrived on the scene. Thus, “the traditional theistic 
rejoinders do not even come close to justifying that ev il.. . .  The evolutionary
'Ibid., 104. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid., 104-105.
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perspective puts the problem in a new and more difficult form.”1 Rachels does not 
further develop this point.
Second, Rachels asserts that Darwin’s theory would expect natural evil, suffering 
and unhappiness to be widespread as it is, while the divine hypothesis view would not. 
“Thus, Darwin believed, natural selection accounts for the facts regarding happiness and 
unhappiness in the world, whereas the rival hypothesis of divine creation did not.”2
This second point is especially crucial for Rachels. He notes that Darwin sought an 
account of origins and life that most easily fits the facts of suffering with the least amount 
of explanatory contortions. On this account, Rachels claims that “Divine creation is a 
poor hypothesis because it fits the facts badly.”3 He asserts that in the creation 
hypothesis, we would expect evil not to exist at all, and that it requires too many 
explanations, ultimately claiming that the coexistence of God and evil is beyond our 
ability to understand. In the mean time, the current patterns of suffering are said to be 
just what Darwin and his theory would expect with natural selection in process. “Thus, 
Darwin believed, natural selection accounts for the facts regarding happiness and 
unhappiness in the world, whereas the rival hypothesis of divine creation does not.”4
To put it another way, Rachels’s fundamental argument against the image-of-God 
thesis, which he claims to have derived from Darwin himself, is that the doctrine of
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creation upon which the image-of-God thesis depends is less parsimonious than 
Darwinian evolution.1 Darwin’s theory is said to require less explanation to satisfy the 
facts on the extent of evil and suffering. Since Darwin has, in Rachels’s view, presented 
an alternative to divine creation that is viable and exhibits greater parsimony, the divine 
creation hypothesis is now undermined by good reasons. And of course, to spell out the 
implication of Rachels’s argument, if there is no divine creation, and possibly no God, 
how can man be created in the image of God? If man can no longer be the image of God, 
then that pillar of traditional ethics is toppled by Darwin’s theory, and traditional ethics 
begins to crumble. In raising the specter of denying the existence of God altogether, 
Rachels brings us to his second major set of arguments for why Darwin undermines 
traditional ethics.
Teleology: The central issue
Rachels credits Marx for pinpointing the “philosophical nerve” of Darwin’s theory 
in declaring the theory of evolution to be “the death b low . . .  to ‘Teleology’ in the 
natural sciences.”2 Thus, it may be that the most significant aspect of Darwin’s theory is 
his overall rejection of teleology in nature. Rachels reminds us that “a teleological 
explanation is an explanation of something in terms of its function and purpose: the heart
‘Tom Regan places much emphasis on the principle of parsimony or simplicity in 
his argumentation, including some discussion and description of the principle. See The 
Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 21-24.
2Rachels, CfA, 110-111.
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is for pumping blood, the lungs are for breathing, and so on.”1 Teleology thus implies a 
purpose or design, which must have been determined by the intentions of a maker.2 But 
there can be no designer in Darwinian evolution, and as Rachels notes, “If there is no 
maker—if the object in question is not an artifact—does it make sense to speak of a 
‘purpose’?” The answer is, “No,” says Rachels. Any purposes attributed are merely 
those we assign. Thus, “the connection between function and conscious intention is, in 
Darwin’s theory, completely severed.3
Rachels has thus highlighted the debate over the design argument (offered by 
Paley) which is considered by many to be definitively refuted by Hume.4 The problem is, 
notes Rachels, that Hume, and other critics of the design argument, only pointed out 
logical deficiencies in the design argument, but “they could not supply a better way of 
understanding the apparent design of nature.. . .  Darwin did what Hume could not do: he
‘Ibid. Rachels admits, “It is an exaggeration to say that Darwin dealt teleology a 
death blow; even after Darwin we still find biologists offering teleological explanations. 
But now they are offered in a different spirit. Biological function is no longer compared 
to the function of consciously designed artifacts” (112).
2The term "Teleology" is used in two fundamentally different, but related ways. In 
the philosophical realm, teleology asserts there is some kind of ordering design or 
purpose in nature that produces the predictable formulas and laws used in the sciences 
today. The discipline of Ethics also uses the term, "teleology, to designate systems of 
morality in which good and evil are determined by consequences. Teleological ethics are 
thus goal oriented instead of duty oriented. For example, the woman hiding the Jew from 
the Nazis would not worry about duties to tell the truth regardless o f  consequences, but in 
teleological ethics, would lie when questioned by the Gestapo with the goal of saving the 
Jew's life (not to mention avoiding significant trouble for herself).
3Ibid., 111-112.
4Ibid., 118.
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provided an alternative, giving people something else they could believe. Only then was 
the design hypothesis dead.”1 For Rachels, then, the significance of Darwin is that he 
provided the “good reasons” that Hume was unable to provide, which made the rejection 
of teleology plausible because there was a viable alternative for interpreting data. It is 
the fact that Darwin’s theory provided rational reasons for rejecting teleology that makes 
Darwin’s theory so capable of undermining the image-of-God thesis.
Removing teleology undermines a divinely 
designed ethics
The rejection of teleology is a major weapon in the war to divorce morality from
religious and theological grounding. In his textbook, The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy,
Rachels notes that, “in popular thinking, morality and religion are inseparable. People
commonly believe that morality can be understood only in the context of religion.”2
Rachels asserts this is partly due to the fact that, “when viewed from a non-religious
perspective, the universe seemed to be a cold, meaningless place, devoid of value or
purpose.”3 By contrast, for Judaism and Christianity,
the world is not devoid of meaning and purpose. It is the arena in which God’s 
plans and purposes are realized. What could be more natural, then, than to think 
that “morality” is a part of the religious view of the world, whereas the atheist’s 
view of the world has no place for values?
. . .  In both the Jewish and Christian traditions, God is conceived as a
'Ibid., 120. Emphasis in original.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 54. The title of this chapter, “Does Morality Depend on 
Religion?” also hints at the vernacular view that indeed the one does depend on the other.
3Ibid., 54.
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lawgiver who has created us, and the world we live in, for a purpose.. . .  God has 
promulgated rules that we are to obey.. . .  But if live as we should live, we must 
follow God’s laws. This, it is said, is the essence of morality.1
Rachels further intimates that this populist opinion is merely seeking order and design 
where there are none, for evolution shows us that there is no teleology, no divine 
purpose, but only blind laws of nature. Thus Rachels clearly tries to show that traditional 
ethics can only be grounded in the concept of being part of a grand design created by an 
almighty Creator-God. He clearly asserts that Darwinism undermines this foundation. 
Peter Singer echoes the same sentiment. “Once we admit that Darwin was right when he 
argued that human ethics evolved from social instincts that we inherited from our non­
human ancestors, we can put aside the hypothesis of the divine origin for ethics.”2 
The issue here, however, is not the efficacy of the design versus materialism 
argument. It is, rather, that to accept Darwin’s theory is to accept that there is no purpose 
or design in nature at all. This completely opposes classic Judeo-Christian theism, in 
which there is a cosmic design and purpose in which the image-of-God concept plays a 
specific role. Rachels asks the clinching question: “Can theism be separated from belief 
in design? It would be a heroic step, because the design hypothesis is not an insignificant 
component of traditional religious belief. But it can be done, and in fact it has been done, 
by eighteenth-century deists.”3
'Ibid., 55.
2Peter Singer, “Introduction,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 6.
3Rachels, CfA, 125.
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The retreat to deism
Deism, he notes, rejects any personal-relational view of God, replacing that with a 
God who created natural laws, made the world, and now lets it run itself by those natural 
laws. The God of deism is hands-off and not concerned with details. Thus there is 
theism without teleological design.1 What is the significance of this for Rachels?
Rachels declares, “Since deism is a consistent theistic view, it is tempting simply to 
conclude that theism and Darwinism must be compatible, and to say no more. But the 
temptation should be resisted, at least until we have made clear what has been given up 
in the retreat to deism.”2 And just what is it that must be given up in the “retreat to 
deism”? Rachels asserts that “when the world is interpreted non-teleologically—when 
God is no longer necessary to explain things—then theology is diminished.”3 And how is 
theology diminished? “The image of God thesis does not go along with just any theistic 
view. It requires a theism that sees God as actively designing man and the world as a 
home for man. If, by abolishing the view of nature as designed in substantial detail, 
Darwinism forces a retreat to something like deism, then we are deprived of the idea that 
man has a special place in the divine order. Even if we can still view nature in some
■ibid.
2Ibid. Emphasis mine.
3Singer also uses these arguments but in reverse order: “When we reject belief in a 
god we must give up the idea that life on this planet has any preordained meaning. Life 
as a whole has no meaning.” Thus Singer connects rejection of teleology with atheism. 
Singer, Practical Ethics, 331.
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sense as God’s creation, we will no longer have a theism that supports the doctrine of 
human dignity.”1
In the words of Sigmund Freud, the God of the deists is “nothing but an 
insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine.”2 All 
that is left is the concept of God as the original cause. But, says Rachels, Darwin has 
asserted that to say the original cause is God is merest speculation. It can be asserted but 
no good reasons can be given to substantiate it. And, in fact, Rachels asserts that if we 
can accept that God is uncaused, then there is no good reason to reject the assertion that 
the universe is uncaused.3 Thus what is left is a theism so worthless as to make religious 
belief essentially nonsense.
Two statements of Rachels bring us to his crowning conclusion: “I have already 
argued in this chapter that Darwinism undermines theism.” How severe is this 
undermining of theism in Rachels’s view? Says Rachels, “In summary then, the
'Rachels, CfA, 127-128.
2Sigmund Freud, The Future o f an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: 
Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1928), 57. Of further interest is that between pp. 25 
and 35, Freud argues that deities are human inventions to personalize the forces of nature 
so that man can feel he has a relationship with these forces that will enable man to 
manipulate nature or at least be protected from it. Thus Freud casts human culture as a 
tool to aid the dynamic of man versus nature. This clearly depicts a culture where man is 
viewed as special apart from nature and juxtaposed against it. In relation to Rachels’s 
use o f  the quotation in the text above, it is significant that Freud asserts, “And the m ore 
autonomous nature becomes and the more the gods withdraw from her, the more 
earnestly are all expectations concentrated on the third task assigned to them” (p. 31, 
emphasis mine). Freud astutely connects autonomy of nature to a withdrawal from 
divine dominance, thus underscoring Rachels’s assertion that deism is too anemic a 
theism to support traditional morality.
3Rachels, CfA, 108,126.
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atheistical conclusion can be resisted, but only at great cost.”1 Indeed the theological cost 
is great enough to leave traditional ethics reeling. But just how irresistible is the 
“atheistic conclusion?” For Rachels, it is irresistible enough to assert, in another work, 
that theism is incompatible with morality!
Is the existence of god antithetical to morality?
In an essay entitled “God and Moral Autonomy,”2 Rachels directly asserts that the 
existence of God is antithetical to morality. He quickly comes to his overall theological 
proposition: “The argument is that God cannot exist, because there could not be a being 
toward whom we should adopt such an attitude.”3 But Rachels does sum up his argument 
with the following syllogism:
1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the 
abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent.
3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.4
This overall logic causes him to make the following moral conclusion:
In saying that a being is worthy of worship, we would be recognizing him as 
having an unqualified claim on our obedience. The question, then, is whether there 
could be such an unqualified claim .. . .
‘Ibid., 127, 126.
2James Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” in Can Ethics Provide Answers? And 
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. . .  There is a long tradition in moral philosophy, from Plato to Kant, 
according to which such a recognition could never be made 
by a moral agent. According to this tradition, to be a moral agent is to be 
autonomous, or self-directed.. . .
On this view, to deliver oneself over to a moral authority for directions about 
what to do is simply incompatible with being a moral agent. To say “I will 
follow so-and-so’s directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own 
conscience would otherwise direct me to do” is to opt out of moral thinking 
altogether; it is to abandon one's role as a moral agent. And it does not matter 
whether “so-and-so” is the law, the customs of one's society, or Jehovah.. . .
We have, then, a conflict between the role of worshiper, which by its very 
nature commits one to total subservience to God, and the role of moral agent, 
which necessarily involves autonomous decision making.1
So, then, what seems to lie behind Rachels’s dismissals of theistic ethics is a
philosophical argument that an absolutely supreme being to whom we ought to fully
submit is incompatible with our being free moral agents. For Rachels, we cannot both
think for ourselves and submit to a divine moral authority. As a result, in The Elements o f
Moral Philosophy, Rachels promotes reason over religion, the latter being depicted as
being morally useless. In his own words, “Right and wrong are not to be defined in terms
of God’s will; morality is a matter of reason and conscience, not religious faith; and in
any case, religious considerations do not provide definitive solutions to the specific moral
problems that confront us.”2
Rachels here seems to imply that Judeo-Christian morality is essentially rote
obedience to divine commands and rules which are seen as being related to God’s master
‘Ibid., 118-119.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 69.
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purposes.1 A second possible implication intended by Rachels is that obedience to 
divinely prescribed norms is incompatible with human reason.
Rachels’s disconnection of morality and religion
In his college textbook, Rachels explicitly develops the position that submission to 
divinely prescribed moral standards is essentially an unreasoned belief that is maintained 
by popular opinion.2 He further charges then that those who adhere to a religious 
viewpoint actually first make up their minds concerning a moral issue, and then interpret 
the Bible or Tradition to justify their pre-fabricated conclusion.3 In fact, he charges that
'Singer makes a similar argument, though from a slightly different angle, in the 
context of asserting and implying that Christian ethics is often irrelevant and impractical 
to today’s society. He then argues that “ethics is practical, or it not really ethical. If it is 
no good in practice, it is no good in theory either. Getting rid o f  the idea that an ethical 
life must consist o f absolute obedience to some short and simple set o f  moral rules makes 
it easier to avoid the trap of an unworkable ethic.” And just what is the simple set of 
moral rules Singer has in mind? “Some don’t think of an ethical approach to life as one 
in which every time we are about to enjoy ourselves, an image of a stone table drops 
from some section of our mind, engraved with a commandment saying,4 Thou shalt 
not\’” (all emphases mine). The language in the last sentence clearly evokes biblical 
language referring to the ten commandments. Thus Singer rejects any definition of 
morality rooted in the idea of an unchanging, moral code that is to be always obeyed, and 
like Rachels, divorces ethics from religion. See Peter Singer, How Are We to Live? 
Ethics in an Age o f Self-Interest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 203-204.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 54.
3See ibid., 66-68, where Rachels tries to illustrate such mis-uses of Scripture and
Tradition in reference to abortion. His basic premise is that the interpreter is first against 
abortion and then searches for apparent justification in the text or tradition. He 
essentially argues that texts are pulled out of context and used in an illicit way. Rachels 
is to be commended for sensitivity to context but he himself may fall victim to his own 
criticism. In discussing the use of Jer 1.5, he quotes vss. 4-6 to supply context. Rachels 
argues that the context is of Jeremiah asserting the divine source of his prophetic call and 
authority. “He is saying, ‘God authorized me to speak for him; even though I resisted, he 
commanded me to speak.’” But then Rachels asserts that Jeremiah was merely being
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this often happens.1 Thus, believers in religion are depicted as unthinking, unreasonable 
folk who have the conclusion prior to looking at the evidence. Essentially, this also 
means that Rachels is charging Jews and Christians with being emotivist (or subjectivist) 
in their ethics since they supposedly arrive at their moral conclusions apart from any 
meaningful evidence. Nevertheless, he feels he has sufficiently undermined the efficacy 
of Scripture as a moral authority to not have to address the issue in further detail.2
Rachels illustrates the charge that any ethics rooted in divinely prescribed norms or
poetic when he says God intended him to be prophet before he was bom. The question, 
of course, is what evidence is there in the context that Jeremiah intended this poetically? 
Rachels offers none. In so doing, he seems to fall into the same kind of eisogesis of 
which he accuses others. While it is not possible to do a full exegesis here, it seems that 
Rachels has undermined his own argument. If the divine call to Jeremiah is poetic 
regarding the unborn stage of Jeremiah’s life, why not explain the prophetic office to 
which he is called as merely poetical language as well. Rachels never considers how 
Jeremiah understood his own statement. Instead of addressing the moral argument that 
God’s call to the unborn has moral implications for abortion, Rachels tritely dismisses it 
as poetic. He seems to forget others in the Scriptures who had divine purposes prescribed 
for them prior to conception or while in-utero, such as Sampson, Cyrus, and John the 
Baptist. Are these all poetic as well? Rachels has not interpreted the text in a fair and 
impartial manner, but rather a shallow manner suited to his purposes and thus falls to his 
own criticisms of twisting the Scriptures to fit a preconceived belief.
'ibid., 55. See also James Park, “From Rule-Morality to Rational Ethics: Debating 
the Ten Commandments,” Undated, http://www.tc.umn.edu/~parkx032/O-ETHICS.html 
(20 May 2000), where he even more clearly expresses the same sentiment as Rachels 
concerning Christian morality: “In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Ten Commandments 
are often thought to be the basic moral code. But most people raised as Jews or Christians 
cannot name all 10 commandments. Rather, they affirm their own morality based on 
these commandments. As a matter of historical fact, the various denominations of 
Judaism and Christianity do have systems of morality, which have developed over the 
centuries within each religious community—sometimes loosely based on the Bible.''’ 
Emphasis mine.
2Tom Regan also argues that the multiplicity o f interpretations of Scripture make it 
invalid for use as a moral authority. See, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, 125-126.
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commandments is really a prefabricated morality by appealing to Plato’s famous 
argument in Euthyphro. The central challenge by Euthyphro to theism concerns whether 
there is a standard of good apart from God. In succinct form Plato’s dialogue asks if 
one’s conduct is good because God commanded it, or did God command the conduct 
because it was good?1 For Rachels, this is a poison-pill for theism. On the one hand, if 
“conduct is right because God commands it,” then, “this leads to trouble, for it represents 
God’s commands as arbitrary.”2 For example, argues Rachels, honesty could not be said 
to be morally right before God commanded it. Thus, if God commanded lying instead, 
lying would be morally good, and thus, “the doctrine of God’s goodness is reduced to
‘Rachels gives no specific reference data, but the argument referred to can be found 
in Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler,
Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1966), 35-39. Michel Ruse also makes use of the Euthyphro argument. See, Ruse, Can a 
Darwinian Be a Christian? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167-169. 
Interestingly, it is not “good” (ayaGog or Kcdo<;) that Socrates debates with Euthyphro but 
“holiness” (ooioq). The word, ooiog, has to do with what the gods command, that is, with 
pious duty. Thus Rachels extrapolates the more narrow definition of “good” out of this 
dialog. Of further note is that the argument invoked by Rachels draws some of its power 
from Socrates’ earlier argument that “holiness” cannot be defined as being what the gods 
love since the gods argue over what is holy and is not. If the gods cannot agree on what 
is holy, then holiness must be defined independently from the gods, who are now then 
subjected to this higher standard. (We cannot help but see here a major moral 
disadvantage of polytheism in contrast to monotheism). Thus the argument invoked by 
Rachels and Ruse is the second major argument by Socrates against holiness being 
determined by the gods. It is also interesting to note that Socrates complains he is being 
prosecuted for denying the stories of the gods to be true (p. 21). In a similar fashion, 
Rachels’s denial o f  the existence o f  God is a fundamental foundation o f  his argument.
The possibility is rased that both Rachels and Socrates have argued, in part, on the basis 
of personal ideology and not merely from pure principles of reason.
2Rachels, Elements (1999), 56. Emphasis in original.
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nonsense.”1 The reciprocal problem would be this. If “GoJ commands right because it is 
right,” then we face a “different problem, which is equally troublesome for the 
theological conception of right and wrong,” for it means there is an independent standard 
of right and wrong apart from God.2 This would seem to imply that we would not need 
God to know what is good, an equally unpalatable option for the classical theist. This is 
why, says Rachels, that a “theological conception” of the good has been “virtually 
abandoned.”3 Thus Rachels sees theistic ethical theories as rooted in beliefs that are self- 
defeating, eliminating their relevance for moral guidance.4
Rachels’s arguments against the role of religion clearly advocate the conclusion 
that God and ethics have no valid relationship. While his arguments in this realm are not 
all explicitly grounded in Darwinian thought, Rachels’s conclusion makes sense in light 
of his commitment to Darwinism. Since Rachels has accepted the anti-design views of 
Darwin, it would seem natural, even logical, to reject the existence of a designing, 
almighty God and thus His moral authority. So while Rachels does not seem to fully 
ground this ethical conclusion directly in Darwinism, it certainly fits into his moral
‘Ibid., 57.
2Ibid., 57-58. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid. In the context of the chapter, the “theological conception of right and 
wrong” is another term for the D ivine Command theory o f  morality, in which good is 
good because God commanded it.
4Rachels makes this argument in criticizing the Divine Command Theory of ethics. 
What he seems not to recognize is that the Divine Command Theory is not the only 
theological moral theory that Christians can espouse. Not all Christian views of ethics 
contain the voluntarism found in some versions of the Divine Command Theory.
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package based on evolutionary theory. Thus for Rachels, the doctrine of human dignity 
requires a certain doctrine of creation, which requires a particular doctrine of God, who 
can prescribe a humano-centric ethics. Rachels believes that Darwin’s theory clearly and 
successfully undermines these foundations of traditional, Judeo-Christian morality. For 
Rachels, the image-of-God thesis is dead. But what of Rachels’s second pillar of 
traditional ethics—the rationality thesis?
How Evolution Undermines the Rationality Thesis
Rachels’s attempt to rebut the rationality thesis does not engage Christianity to any 
significant degree, and so is less significant to this study. Therefore, I shall only give a 
cursory summary.1 The simple core of his argument is based on the conclusion that 
“Darwin did not deny that human rational abilities far exceeded those of other animals. 
But, he insisted that the difference is only one o f degree, not o f kind."2 Thus, 
“intelligence is not, for Darwin, an all-or-nothing thing that one either has fully or lacks 
completely.. . .  Man is not the only rational animal; he is merely more rational than other 
animals.”3 Thus humans cannot be viewed as the unique possessors of reason, and, by
‘Rachels himself states that the entire fourth chapter of CfA is dedicated to 
rebutting the rationality thesis; see CfA, 171. The core of his rebuttal is contained in pp. 
132-147.
2Ibid., 133. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 136. Emphasis in original. In the succeeding pages Rachels sets forth 
various evidences to support the concept that rationality evolved in small stages in pre­
human ancestors, and thus, reason is not a uniquely human ability. In particular, from 
149-158, he discusses the evolution of altruism in a manner not unlike Ruse and others as 
seen in chapter 3, except that Rachels uses altruism as evidence of pre-human rationality, 
instead of drawing conclusions about the nature of morality as Ruse does.
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implication, they cannot be said to be uniquely different from animals in a way that 
entails preferential treatment.
By showing that evolutionary theory removes reason from being a uniquely human 
attribute, Rachels believes Darwinism undermines the second pillar upholding traditional 
ethics. With both the image-of-God thesis and rationality thesis believed to be removed, 
Rachels concludes his chapter by asserting, “I have argued that Darwinism must also lead 
to the rejection of the idea that man is the only rational animal. We may now draw the 
conclusion that the traditional supports for the idea of human dignity are gone. They 
have not survived the colossal shift of perspective brought about by Darwin’s theory.”1 
Thus Rachels feels he has toppled the second and final pillar holding up the edifice of 
traditional, Christian ethics. What does he propose for replacing traditional ethics?
Morality without Human Specialness
With the pillars of traditional ethics believed to be toppled, Rachels now asks, “If 
the idea of human dignity is abandoned, what sort of moral view should be adopted in its 
place?” Rachels answers his own question by proposing a new view of ethics, based on 
Darwin’s theory of evolution which he labels “moral individualism.”2 In addition, 
Rachels pursues the question of how morality will work without human preference in his
‘Ibid., 171.
2Ibid., 173.
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textbook. He asks, “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Be Like?”1 His approach 
in the textbook is built in a way different enough from Created from Animals that one 
cannot really synthesize them into one presentation, yet the conclusions are 
complementary. They are two different roads to the same destination.
Because of this difference, I shall first finish his work in Created From Animals, 
and then move on to his work in his textbook. In using the textbook, I follow a more 
chronological order, focusing first on the first edition, then noting refinements made in 
the third and fourth editions. With this in mind, let us move to Rachels’s proposed ethics 
of moral individualism.
Rachels’s Ethics of Moral Individualism
According to Rachels, in moral individualism, “the basic idea is that how an 
individual may be treated is to be determined, not by considering his group memberships, 
but by considering his own particular characteristics.”2 For Rachels, all moral decisions 
are to be made based on the individual’s own personal characteristics and not on the basis 
of species or other group membership. Thus, “If A is to be treated differently from B, the 
justification must be in terms of A ’s individual characteristics and B ’s individual 
characteristics. Treating them differently cannot be justified by pointing out that one or
‘Rachels, Elements (1986), 139. This is the chapter title for the 12th and final 
chapter of the book.
2Rachels, CfA, 173.
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the other is a member of some preferred group, not even the ‘group’ of human beings.”1 
Rachels further drives his point home by arguing that in making a moral decision 
involving chimps and humans, “it is not good enough simply to observe that chimps are 
not members of the preferred group.. . .  Instead, we would have to look at specific 
chimpanzees and specific humans.”2 In other words, we would have to ask why this 
specific chimp or specific human was entitled to moral consideration. The consideration 
is decided strictly on the individual’s characteristics and capacities. In a nutshell, then, 
for Rachels, moral status is merited on an individual basis. It is not granted by a higher 
moral authority, nor is it granted on the basis of any kind of connection to group.
Rachels asserts that these conclusions are grounded in Darwinian evolution when 
he states:
This kind of thinking goes naturally with an evolutionary perspective because 
an evolutionary perspective denies that humans are different in kind from other 
animals; and one cannot reasonably make distinctions in morals where none exist 
in fact. If Darwin is correct, there are no absolute differences between humans and 
the members of all other species—in fact there are no absolute differences between 
the members of any species and all others.. . .  As Darwin puts it, there are only 
differences of degree.. . .  Therefore, the fundamental reality is best represented by 
saying that the earth is populated by individuals who resemble one another, and 
who differ from on another, in myriad ways, rather than saying that the earth is 
populated by different kinds of beings.3
We here see that the crux of Rachels’s argument is that differences of kind do not exist in
evolutionary fact, but rather, all creatures share sameness and difference. Therefore
'Ibid., 173-4.
2Ibid., 174. Emphases mine.
3Ibid. First emphasis mine; all other emphases in original.
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Rachels interprets this to imply that species boundaries are arbitrary and meaningless for 
morals. Furthermore, moral status cannot thus be based on that which is not “factual,” 
namely the concept of species boundaries. Based on these arguments, Rachels asserts 
that “moral individualism is a view that looks at individual similarities and differences 
for moral justification, whereas human dignity emphasized the now-discredited idea that 
humans are of a special kind.”1
Moral Individualism and Aristotle
Rachels expands on this foundation by appealing to a maxim he asserts was 
recognized by Aristotle: The principle that “like cases should be treated alike, and 
different cases should be treated differently.”2 Since Rachels believes species 
membership has been excluded from being a factual reality, he cannot advocate it as 
being part of the criteria for determining what constitutes “like cases.” Thus, Rachels 
argues that moral individualism implies that, “if he [Darwin] was right,. . .  it would 
follow that, often, when we object to treating humans in a certain way, we would have 
similar grounds for objecting to the similar treatment for a non-human animal.” He 
asserts that such a conclusion is demanded by consistency.3
Rachels here seems to assume the moral standing of humans, and thus tries to
'Ibid., 174-175.
2Ibid., 196.
3Ibid., 175. Rachels here is on the edge of using the marginal-cases argument, but 
he does not develop it fully, nor does he use the term “marginal cases” in this work.
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elevate animals to a human level of moral protection in the name of logical consistency. 
However, he does not explore the issue of whether animals should be promoted to equal 
status with humans, or whether some “defective” humans should be demoted in status to 
the level of animals. Rachels seems to take human rights for granted and thus appears to 
assume the elevation of the moral status of animals as a natural consequence. The 
bottom line, though, is that for Rachels, moral status is only to be granted based on a 
being’s individual characteristics.
Equality of Treatment versus Equal Status
Rachels seeks to illustrate the individualistic nature of granting moral status by 
noting that Western thinkers for the last three centuries have argued the principle that all 
humans are equal. But, asks Rachels, what does this really mean? The fact is that not all 
men are equal.1 Rachels interprets this principle as being a statement about human 
treatment and not about human status. The principle of equality, for Rachels, is thus to 
grant rights to equal consideration and treatment, with the emphasis on treatment. But, 
Rachels notes, not all people are treated equally, sometimes for good reasons. Here is 
where Rachels may stumble, for his illustrations of good reasons are not drawn from 
analogous cases.
For example, he argues that all can apply to law school but not all are accepted.
All get the opportunity, but some are rejected for good reasons. A second example is the 
fact that doctors do not prescribe the same treatment to every patient. Thus equal people
•ibid., 175-76.
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are treated differently for “relevant reasons.”1 The problem, of course, is that most 
moralists would not consider entrance to law school a “right” that the applicant is entitled 
to, nor would one be considered to have a “right” to a given medical treatment. Both are 
privileges that can be sought if one can meet certain conditions such as being able to pay 
for the service sought. Thus Rachels is trying to make an analogy between privileges and 
rights, which thus seems fundamentally flawed. Rights fundamentally do not have the 
contingencies that privileges have. Freedom of Speech and having a job are not morally 
analogous. The first is guaranteed to Americans as a fundamental right, while the other 
is obtained through merit. Of course, Rachels is precisely treating rights as something 
merited by individuals, which reduces rights to privileges.
Rachels has well illustrated his fundamental moral principle that each individual 
deserves equal consideration, though not necessarily equal treatment. Few would argue 
against his position that some criteria are more relevant than others. Law school, for 
example, requires a certain level of educational training, which is why a high-school drop 
out could never qualify. Likewise, a doctor should base treatment on medical symptoms 
and not on irrelevant characteristics such as place of birth, race, or gender. But a possible 
weakness in his analogies is that the services provided by the law school and physician 
are fundamentally privileges, not rights. Both the doctor and law school can be moral 
while refusing to give their services if one has no resources to pay for the services 
requested, even if  that individual is qualified in all other ways. If one is entitled by right
’Ibid., 176.
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to those services, then such refusal is wrong and no payment would be necessary.
Despite the possible weakness of analogy, what Rachels is trying to do is to 
establish Aristotle’s maxim as a basic moral principle of moral individualism. 
Furthermore, he is taking advantage of the fact that Aristotle’s language is not humano- 
centric. “Like cases should be treated alike.” For Rachels, these “cases” cannot be 
restricted by species membership. Thus, whatever the species, “individuals are to be 
treated the same way unless there is a relevant difference between them that justifies a 
difference in treatment.”1 This, of course, begs the question of what constitutes a 
relevant difference?
The Principle of Equality /Equal Consideration 
ofInterests
In pursuing the question of what constitutes a morally relevant characteristic to 
justify differentiation o f treatment between individuals, two things will become clear in 
regard to Rachels’s viewpoint. First, as we have already seen, for Rachels, species 
membership is not a morally relevant characteristic and thus, any system of ethics giving 
moral relevance to species (i.e., to being human) is speciesist, which of course is seen as 
undesirable.2
Second, what constitutes a morally relevant difference between individuals
'Ibid.
2We have already examined Rachels on speciesism so will not pursue this issue 
further here. His fundamental argument is found in CfA, 181-194.
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“depends on the treatment we have in mind.”1 Here a situational element is introduced 
into Rachels’s moral theory. But what criteria should be used to determine the situational 
relevance of a given characteristic? Is this to be determined by common sense or 
intuition? Common sense seems easily used in some cases—blindness would likely not 
be a relevant factor in seeking to become a musician, but would be most definitely a 
problem for someone wanting to become an airline pilot—but in other cases could be less 
than clear from a common-sense perspective. So the question remains: What criteria do 
we use to determine a morally relevant characteristic from an incidental characteristic?
Rachels responds to this challenge by admitting that, “I cannot develop a complete 
theory of relevant differences here—that would take us too far from the subject at hand, 
and would involve controversies whose resolutions do not really matter for present 
purposes. But I do indeed need to say something about what such a theory would look 
like.”2 Therefore, Rachels seeks to address this problem by offering a “general 
principle” for defining morally relevant differences: “Whether a difference between 
individuals justifies a difference in treatment depends on the kind of treatment that is in 
question. A difference that justifies one kind of difference in treatment need not justify
'Ibid., 177.
2Ibid. Rachels here is stuck in a dilemma. To not address the issue of establishing 
the criteria for determining what constitutes a relevant difference for moral purposes is to 
torpedo the theory of moral individualism which he is advocating. But to develop such a 
criteria is said to be so complicated as to be seemingly impossible to accomplish in a 
portion of one chapter. Rachels seems to seek the advantage of expounding his ideas 
while hiding from rigorous criticism in the name of not being able to adequately pursue 
the issue.
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another.”1 Rachels, continues that the corollary conclusion is “that there is no one big 
difference between individuals that is relevant to justifying all differences in treatment.” 
Thus any differences of treatment cannot be based on species membership. But as 
eloquent as this sounds, we are still left with the problem of how to know what a relevant 
difference is.
Rachels offers no surefire way to determine a morally significant difference, but 
rather gives various examples that attempt to illustrate the concept of relevant 
differences. In the final analysis, Rachels gives only this one criterion: If it is permissible 
to treat one individual one way, and a second individual in a differing way, “surely there 
must be some difference between them that explains why. This is what the principle of 
equality requires.”2 Such an assertion, however, does not tell us how to determine if that 
“reason” is a good reason or not. The closest he comes is to adopt the painist 
perspective and argue that beings able to experience pain should not be caused such pain 
without a good reason, and species membership is not a good reason. So Rachels talks 
much, but in the end offers no clear criteria on how to determine morally relevant 
differences for justifying differing treatments. Instead he focuses on what are not 
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To illustrate how this moral equality between humans and animals might work, and 
riding the evolutionary argument that humans are different from animals only in degree, 
and not in kind, Rachels argues that the grounds of ethical importance are not found in 
the individual itself, but “that it is the richness and complexity of the individual life that 
is morally significant.”1 And here Rachels confesses a major implication: “Some 
humans, unfortunately, are not capable of having the kind of rich life that we are 
discussing. An infant with severe brain damage . . .  may never learn to speak, and its 
mental powers may never rise above a primitive level. In fact, its psychological 
capabilities may be markedly inferior to those of a rhesus monkey. In that case, moral 
individualism would see no reason to prefer its life over the monkey’s.”2 The most 
controversial portion is the obvious favoring of the monkey over the baby and the clear 
application of the doctrine of no human dignity. As Rachels notes in his textbook, this 
means that not every life is precious. It is only lives with certain qualities that become 
precious.3 But underlying this argument is a more foundational concept: That moral 
standing is granted on the basis of currently active attributes and capabilities.
In short, Rachels is taking a functional model of determining moral significance, 
treating rights as being more like privileges, and thus, regardless of species membership, 
those individuals who meet a specified level of minimum function deserve to be
'Ibid., 189. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid.
3Rachels, Elements (1999), 9.
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considered while those falling short of the required functions deserve to be excluded. 
Therefore, for Rachels, when the principles of Darwinian evolution are applied to ethics, 
rights are earned and not granted. There can be no God-granted rights that are 
inalienable. Nor are rights granted by any other authority. They are earned by the 
“richness” of our individual life, and forfeited with ease. The individual is just one 
accident away from losing the functions on which rights are said to be given.
We see here, of course, teleological ethics in the form of Utilitarianism.
Individuals are merely containers holding experiences, and the container is of no value. 
The container is disposable. The richer the experiences of the individual life, the greater 
the moral status. This “richness” of the individual life eventually is refined by Rachels 
into the concept, apparently borrowed from Regan, of an individual being the “subject of 
a life.”1
Subjects of a Life
For Rachels, being the subject of a life gives one moral standing. Again, tying 
himself to Darwinism, he asserts that after Darwin’s theory, “the value of a life is, first 
and foremost, the value it has fo r the person who is the subject o f  a life. Our lives are
'Rachels, CfA, 198. It appears that Rachels is indebted to Regan for this concept, 
yet he never cites Regan as a source in this chapter. However, Regan had discussed the 
concept of being a “subject of a life” in 1983, seven years prior to Rachels’s use of the 
term here. See Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 243-248; 392. (See Pluhar, 231, where 
she hints that Regan introduced this concept.) This concept is also discussed by Tom 
Regan, The Thee Generation: Reflections on the Coming Revolution (Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 1991), 57-58, 77-78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
valuable, not to God or to nature or to the universe, but to us.”1 This concept is then 
developed into the concept of having biographical life, not just a biological life. 
Biological life is merely being biologically alive. The irreversibly comatose person is 
biologically alive but has no biographical experiences. Rachels declares that for such a 
person, “being alive, sadly, does such a person no good at all. The value of being alive 
may therefore be understood as instrumental.” This is because biological life is 
necessary to have a biographical life.2 Therefore, biographical life is the only kind of life 
worth having. To take a biological life, when no biographical life is possible, is not 
morally evil. Termination of a biological life is only morally wrong when it destroys a 
biographical life. In such a case, the animal or person has an interest in staying alive.3 
The primary evil then consists in the loss to the victim, who can recognize the magnitude 
of the impending loss.4
At this point, we should note here the total self-centeredness of this viewpoint. 
Ultimately our lives have meaning only to us, individually. Unlike Singer,5 Rachels does
'Rachels, CfA, 198. Emphasis in original. Most of this discussion is duplicated in 
Rachels, End o f  Life, 5,22-28, 65.
2Rachels, CfA, 199.
3Rachels, End o f  Life, 28.
4Rachels, CfA, 198.
5See Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 216-217, where Singer discusses the non- 
personhood of infants and, in some cases, the need to euthanize an infant before familial 
attachments are made. See also Singer, Practical Ethics, 182-183, where Singer argues 
that even a healthy newborn infant has no claim to life through its own characteristics, 
but only through being desired by biological or adoptive parents.
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not explicitly make any room here for the value of our life to others. (We would note 
however, that his concept of multiple strategies Utilitarianism, which he published later 
and which we shall soon examine, would seem capable of recognizing the moral 
significance of the value of our lives to others.) The bottom line is that some animals and 
some, but not all, humans are considered to be subjects of a life and thus qualify to 
receive moral protection. We again see a functional model of rights—only those 
intelligent enough to be subjects of a life, who can prefer to stay alive should be 
protected.
Rachels, however, does insert a loophole that can elevate humans over animals. He 
recognizes that humans are capable of a biographically more complex life than most 
other animals. Thus if one had to sacrifice an animal or a human, being unable to save 
both, the greater complexity o f the average human’s biographical life over that of the 
animal would suggest the loss of the human’s life is the greater loss. However, this also 
leaves the door open for a sub-average human to be judged to have a biographically 
inferior life to the animal, in which case the animal would be argued to take preference.1
But why should greater biographical complexity be the determining criterion of 
moral protection or exclusion? This is not made clear by Rachels. He appears to depend 
solely on the appearance of having a self-evident maxim to commend this argument. 
However, it seems suspiciously akin to Utilitarianism. The creature with a more complex 
biographical life can have far more pleasures, and thus has higher utility. While Rachels
'Rachels, CfA, 209.
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has derived a type of Utilitarian ethics from Darwin, he seems to have moved from the 
primary foundation of Darwinian evolution to the secondary foundation of Utilitarianism. 
He makes no argument to directly tie his subjects of a life view to Darwinism as such. 
Rather it becomes a second generation, logical, extrapolation from his more foundational 
principle of denying human specialness due to Darwin.
Rachels’s vision of morality without human specialness, then, has led us a long 
ways. We have seen him argue that Darwinism undermines the foundations of traditional 
Western or Judeo-Christian ethics by making it impossible for man to be the image of 
God, and by undermining the rationality thesis. Further, Rachels has attempted to give 
some criteria on how to establish which individuals have moral status and which do not. 
While deriving much from Darwinism, his primary criterion of being the “subject of a 
life” seems more rooted in Utilitarian thinking than in Darwinism itself. A form of 
Utilitarianism has been used to fill the vacuum left by the perceived fall of the pillars 
supporting traditional ethics. And this is where moral individualism ties into Rachels’s 
work in his textbook. A survey of three editions o f his textbook will help us expand our 
understanding of his vision of ethics without human preference.
Ethics without Human Preference as Depicted in 
The Elements ofM oral Philosophy
Published first in 1986, The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy lays out the basic 
rationale of Rachels’s ethical structure to a target audience of college students. The core 
elements of his theory remain essentially the same in each edition. The later editions 
update illustrations with more recent stories while making minor changes to sharpen the
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argumentation. The fourth edition carries somewhat greater significance as it makes an 
important expansion to Rachels’s moral theory. In each edition, Rachels surveys most of 
the key, classical theories of the past 2,500 years, and argues why he believes each is 
insufficient. He then proceeds to propose his own system of ethics. It is his own ethical 
proposals that we shall examine. For the sake of clarity, I will outline his theory as given 
in the first edition, and then survey later editions for new developments and refinements.
The First Edition
In the first edition of his textbook, Rachels introduces his system of ethics with this 
question: “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory Be Like?”1 To answer this 
question, Rachels will ultimately work through arguments to produce three key axioms 
describing such a system: (1) We should not prefer humans over non-humans, (2) we 
should act to promote the interests of everyone alike, and (3) we should treat people as 
they deserve to be treated, considering how they themselves have chosen to behave. Let 
us see how he gets to each one, especially noting the role of Darwinian evolution in the 
process, and also noting other moral implications as well.
“Morality without Human Hubris”
Rachels proposes the first characteristic of a satisfactory moral system in the first 
heading of the chapter text, “Morality Without Human Hubris,” before any discussion is 
waged. Rachels then argues that “a satisfactory theory would, first of all, be sensitive to
•Rachels, Elements (1986), 139. This is the chapter title for the 12th and final 
chapter of the book.
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the facts about human nature, and it would be appropriately modest about the place of 
human beings in the scheme of things.”1 What “facts about human nature” does Rachels 
have in mind and why do they diminish human importance?
Rachels, as we would expect, turns to Darwinian evolution to supply those facts. 
His first evolutionary “fact” is that humans are relative newcomers on the evolutionary 
scene. “The first humans appeared quite recently. The extinction of the great dinosaurs 
65 million years ago . . .  left ecological room for the evolution of the few little animals 
that were about, and after 63 or 64 million more years, one line of that evolution finally 
produced us. In geological time, we arrived only yesterday.”2 This is interpreted to 
mean that we do not have the right to oust other animals from positions of moral 
significance. Thus his first evolutionary argument is quite different from the line of 
reasoning in Created from Animals, for here he uses Evolution to make a simple 
argument from seniority. We are too new, in evolutionary terms, to have the seniority to 
oust other animals from the sphere of moral status. Therefore, we get the first of 
Rachels’s proposed three moral axioms of a satisfactory moral system: The proposition 
that we should not prefer humans over non-humans.
Rachels further develops this conclusion from evolution by arguing that our early 
ancestors evolved a warped and erroneous view of ethics. Rachels asserts:
But no sooner did our ancestors arrive than they began to think of themselves as the
'Ibid., 139. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 140. Emphasis in original.
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most important things in all creation. Some of them even imagined that the whole 
universe had been made for their benefit. Thus, when they began to develop 
theories of right and wrong, they held that the protection o f  their own interests had 
a kind o f ultimate in objective value. The rest of creation, they reasoned, was 
intended for their use. We now know better. We now know that we exist by 
evolutionary accident, as one species among many, on a small insignificant world 
in one little quarter of the cosmos.1
By this line of argumentation, the student is taught that early humans wrongly reduced
morality to the protection of human interests alone, and that an ethics that focuses on
protecting human interests is inherently opposed to the “facts” of evolution. In addition,
Rachels adds to his argument against human importance by citing the philosopher David
Hume. ‘“The life of man,’ he wrote, ‘is of no greater importance to the universe than an
oyster.’”2 Thus the student is led to believe that there is no cosmic design or importance
to our lives, and thus no special importance in moral consideration.
Before moving to the second axiom of a satisfactory moral system, we must note
some further moral implications of Rachels’s evolutionary argument thus far. In
claiming that ethics evolved as part of human evolution, Rachels opens the door for the
conclusion, as we have seen earlier with Dawkins and Ruse, that ethics must therefore be
inherently relativistic, capable of evolving and adapting with new data. Although
‘Ibid. Emphasis mine. The astute reader can see the subtle but direct attack on 
classic Christian anthropology regarding man’s relationship to nature (which we 
discussed earlier in this work), although Christianity is not explicitly named here.
2Ibid. Rachels gives no reference data for the citation. Rachels further asserts that 
Hume recognized “that our lives are important to us.” Emphasis in original. This is 
highly reminiscent of his “subjects of a life” argument found in CfA earlier, but Rachels 
does not develop that angle in the textbook. Additionally, beliefs used to characterize 
Christian ethics in CfA are now attributed to an evolutionary development and thus are 
cast with much less significance than was done in CfA.
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Rachels does not explicitly develop this aspect of the argument, the relativist bent 
nevertheless lurks in the shadows influencing the ethical process. Rachels’s evolutionary 
explanation of how morals evolved leads to further implications and will generate his 
second axiom.
Consequentialism: The means of determining 
good reasons
Rachels observes that while human hubris is “largely unjustified,” it is not “entirely 
unjustified,” for “we have evolved as rational beings.”1 In a separate article, Rachels 
quotes the claim from Darwin’s The Descent o f  Man that “as man gradually advanced in 
intellectual power and was enabled to trace the more remote consequences of our actions; 
. . .  so would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher.”2 Thus, for Rachels, our 
powers o f reason evolved to give us abilities not found in the animal kingdom—abilities 
to reason based on cause and effect. Hence, Rachels develops a teleological approach to 
ethics, in part, as a logical product of Darwinian evolution.3
Once the consequentialist approach to ethics is established, Rachels then sees 
another implication for morality. Consequentialism introduces the ability to have 
personal interests—X consequence is in my interests while Y consequences is not. For
'Ibid., 140-141.
2Charles Darwin, The Descent o f  Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: 
John Murray, 1871), 101, quoted in Rachels, “Why Darwinians Should Support,” 153.
3This is not to say that consequentialism is ethically bad or good. I am merely 
showing that Rachels builds his case for consequentialism as a natural outgrowth of 
Darwinian evolution.
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Rachels, our superior powers of reason are what “makes us capable of having a 
morality.. . .  Thus we take the fact that an action would help satisfy our desires, needs, 
and so on—in short, the fact that an action would promote our interests—as a reason in 
favor of doing that action.”1 Rachels then concludes that, “the origin of our concept of 
‘ought’ may be found in these facts [regarding the development of recognizing personal 
interests].” Thus, for Rachels, human intelligence evolved to where we can conclude that 
we ought to perform said action, not because of impulse or emotions, but because we 
have good, substantive reasons. “We use the world ‘ought’ to mark this new 
development of the situation: we ought to do the act supported by the weightiest 
reasons.”2 Through the influence of Darwinian evolution, morality thus becomes defined 
as acting according to reason as opposed to irrational impulse.
But reason alone is not enough for Rachels. He argues it must be supplemented 
with the concept of consistency—we must be consistent in applying our reasons. 
Therefore, he concludes that consistency of reasoning should produce similar actions for 
similar situations, which means reason must act with impartiality. This leads Rachels to 
give his second moral axiom: “Reason requires impartiality: we ought to act so as to 
promote the interests of everyone alike.”3
'Rachels, Elements (1986), 140-141.
2Ibid., 141. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid.
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Resembles Utilitarianism
So far, then, Rachels has argued that a sufficient moral theory should (1) not prefer 
humans over non-humans, and (2) be based on reason, applied impartially with 
consistency. This moral theory would prescribe that we should act to promote the 
interests of everyone alike. While not yet developed by Rachels in this volume, we 
would note that “everyone” is to be controlled by the proposition that “everyone” cannot 
be restricted to human beings. Again evolution plays a factor.
Evolution, for Rachels, shows man is a social creature, who lives in communities 
where cooperation and caring for one another’s welfare are crucial to human survival and 
existence. Thus, “There is pleasing theoretical ‘fit’ between (a) what reason requires, 
namely impartiality; (b) the requirements of social living, mainly the adherence to a set 
of rules that, if fairly applied, would serve everyone’s interests; and (c) our natural 
inclination to care about others, at least to a modest degree.”1 Rachels’s use of language 
such as to “serve everyone’s interests” and “fairly applied” cannot help but cause a reader 
familiar with classic ethical theories to conclude that there is an element of Utilitarianism 
creeping into Rachels’s ethical reasoning.
Moral status earned, not granted
Rachels admits the Utilitarian bent of his conclusion, stating, “So far, M[orality] 
W[ithout] H[ubris] sounds very much like Utilitarianism. However there is another fact
’Ibid., 141-142.
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about human beings that must be taken into account, and doing this will give the theory a 
decidedly non-Utilitarian twist.”1 What is this new “fact” that will deliver Rachels from 
the implications of Utilitarianism? It is that humans are not only rational agents capable 
of choice, but such agents can be held accountable for their actions. In short, humans can 
be held “responsible for their freely chosen actions.”2
Rachels develops the ability to be held responsible in social reciprocity as a means 
of holding people accountable. Thus, for Rachels, since we evolved as social beings, 
being held responsible through reciprocal relationships ensures we will get treated as we 
deserve. Thus, Rachels’s final axiom of a satisfactory moral theory is stated: “We should 
treat people as they deserve to be treated, considering how they themselves have chosen 
to behave.”3
The grounds for exceptions
Thus far in his textbook, Rachels’s moral theory has given three major axioms for 
morals: (1) We should not prefer humans over non-humans, (2) we should act to promote 
the interests of everyone alike, and (3) we should treat people as they deserve to be 
treated, considering how they themselves have chosen to behave. He now moves on to 
question how the second and third axioms are connected. Rachels answers this question
'Rachels, Elements (1986), 142. Rachels in this edition calls his theory “Morality 
Without Hubris” which he abbreviates MWH. In Created from Animals, we saw it 
named “Moral Individualism,” which is the title most recognized by other authors.
2Ibid., 142. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid., 143.
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by arguing that the second moral axiom “establishes a general presumption in favor of 
promoting everyone’s interests, impartially.” Axiom three “specifies the grounds upon 
which the presumption may be overridden.”1 In short, axiom three provides the grounds 
for determining what is a “good reason” for justifying exceptions in treatment. Rachels 
now synthesizes the whole axiomatic package with this simple statement: “We ought to 
act so as to promote impartially the interests of everyone alike, except when individuals 
deserve particular responses as a result of their own past behavior.”2
With this synthesis, Rachels claims that “this principle combines the best elements 
of both Utilitarianism and Kantian ‘respect for persons,’ but is not produced simply by 
stitching those two philosophies together.”3 Furthermore, he argues that he is not merely 
eclectically combining elements from two contradicting schools of ethics, but rather these 
elements have been synthesized together based on the “facts of the human condition.”4 It 
is this effort to start with evolution, instead of with a particular school of ethics (such as 
Singer who is unabashedly Utilitarian) that sets Rachels apart from his peers.
Rachels admits, however, that his present presentation could be more 
comprehensive. “Although more needs to be said about the theoretical basis of this view, 
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fairness it should be noted that his book was designed as a college text for those 
uninitiated in the realm of ethics, and thus we would expect the theoretical portion to be 
understated.1 But having laid the foundations as he has, Rachels now turns to the issue of 
who is to be included the moral community in which everyone’s interests are impartially 
protected and advanced?
Who is part of the newly defined moral community?
In this new, Darwinist morality, who, then, should be given moral status and 
protection? Rachels’s Utilitarian tendencies reveal themselves in his answer: “We ought 
to give equal consideration to the interests of everyone who will be affected by our 
conduct.”2 But who is affected by our conduct? “In principle, the community with 
which we should be concerned is limited only by the number of individuals who have 
interests, and that, as we shall see, is a very large number indeed.”3 Rachels is forced by 
logic to conclude that those impacted by our choices cannot be limited by time or place. 
For Rachels we are obliged to consider all their interests equally, including future 
generations or someone on a distant continent. Thus, in what Rachels admits is a 
“radical” example, “when a person is faced with the choice of spending ten dollars on a 
trip to the movies or contributing to famine relief, he should ask himself which action
‘It should also be noted that Rachels has not avoided this duty, but has more 
thoroughly examined those foundations in Created from Animals.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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would most effectively promote human welfare, with each person’s interests counted as 
equally important. Would we benefit more from seeing the movie than a starving person 
would from getting food? Clearly he would not. So he should contribute the money to 
famine relief.”1 Likewise, he seeks to expand the moral community to future generations 
who have interests in inheriting a world not polluted by nuclear waste, etc. These two 
expansions of the moral community (to include those on the other side of the globe and 
not just those near me; and future generations) lead Rachels to conclude that “the 
Utilitarians were right to insist that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given 
weight in our moral calculations. As Bentham pointed out, excluding creatures from 
moral consideration because of their species is no more justified than excluding them 
because of race, nationality, or sex.”2 The animals are affected by what we do, and have 
interests in not having to suffer unnecessarily. Rachels finally appeals to impartiality as 
the reason that our circle of moral protection should be expanded both through space and 
time into the future, and across species boundaries.3
Rachels again admits that his Morality Without Hubris “has much in common with 
Utilitarianism,”4 but notes that in an earlier chapter, the reader was shown that
‘Ibid., 145-145.
2Ibid., 146. I have not been able to find such a statement in the writings of 
Bentham. However, in our earlier discussions, w e have seen Singer make such a 
statement. I suspect Rachels may have crossed over the concept accidentally, in part due 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
Utilitarianism failed to account for the values of justice and fairness. He asks, “Can 
MWH do any better in this regard? It does, because it makes a person’s past behavior 
relevant to how he or she should be treated. This introduces into the theory an 
acknowledgment of personal [i.e., individual] merit that is lacking in unqualified 
Utilitarianism.”1 In other words, Rachels claims to have introduced a theory of 
individual punishment missing in classic Utilitarian theory. Punishment by definition 
means differential treatment of one person over another, he argues, but “this is justified, 
on our account, by the person’s own past deeds.. . .  The account of punishment 
suggested by MWH is very close to Kant’s.”2 By including this theory of punishment, 
Rachels believes he has essentially fixed the justice problem in Utilitarianism, so that 
with Kant, one can punish an offender, not as a means to an end, but in reference to 
holding the offender responsible for his deeds. What is important for this study is not the 
fine points of Kant and Utilitarianism, but rather that this Kantian-Utilitarian hybrid was 
synthesized in attempting to create an ethics that harmonized with a Darwinian 
anthropology. Rachels has avowedly come to these conclusions seeking to keep in 
harmony with evolutionary theory and its principles. Now that we have seen Rachels’s 
outline of his undergraduate version of Darwinist ethics, let us briefly look at the third 
and fourth editions to see how Rachels further refines and argues his theory.
Tbid.
2Ibid., 147.
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Third Edition: Mild Refinements
What about love and loyalty?
In his introduction to the third addition, Rachels states that the only chapter to have 
been substantially altered was the final chapter, ‘“ What Would a Satisfactory Moral 
Theory Be Like?’ My opinion about the proper answer to that question has changed 
since the second edition, and the revised chapter reflects that.”1 However, a careful 
reading of the final chapter in comparison to the first edition shows, in my opinion, little 
if any real difference. The same fundamental skeletal structure and argumentation are 
found, albeit some arguments are shortened and others lengthened. He still promotes the 
same three core components for his moral system: Morality without human hubris, 
promoting everyone’s interests alike, and treating people as they deserve to be treated 
based on their past behavior. However, he does add a short section apparently addressing 
a potential criticism not considered in the first edition.
Focusing on the second axiom of promoting everyone’s interests alike, Rachels 
observes that it “apparently fails to capture the whole of moral life.”2 He does allow that 
he thinks this failure is only apparent and not real, however. Rachels works his way out 
of his apparent dilemma by noting that promoting everyone’s interests alike “is not the
‘Rachels, Elements (1999), xii. This quote shows there must have been a second 
edition, but my university’s library was unable to find another institution with the second 
edition in its holdings. Thus there is no coverage of that edition in this analysis.
2Ibid., 198.
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only morally praiseworthy motive.”1 He notes that a mother has different attitudes for a 
child not her own and her own child. She is not as concerned with the other child’s 
interests. Loyalty among friends can likewise cause differential treatment. Yet we value 
both a mother’s love for her child, and the loyalty o f friends. Rachels responds to this 
tension by concluding that “only a philosophical idiot would propose to eliminate love 
and loyalty, and the like from our understanding of moral life. If such motives were 
eliminated, and instead people simply calculated what was best, we would be much 
worse off.”2 Rachels is fundamentally correct to make this observation, which seems to 
overturn his previous argument in the book’s first edition (but not found in the third 
edition), that all interests must be considered regardless of space and time. Possibly this 
is the substantial change he referred to in his introduction.
Consequential reasons for including love and loyalty
It is significant that Rachels focuses on the lack of welfare generated by a purely 
Utilitarian moral calculus devoid of such motives as love and loyalty. Rachels, as a 
consequentialist, is arguing to keep love, loyalty, and the like in our system of morality 
because he believes the benefits outweigh the consequences of an emotionless moral 
calculus. In so doing, Rachels has here introduced a seminal form of an argument that 
we shall see him further develop in the fourth edition of his textbook. He names this 
seminal form, “Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism. The ultimate end is the general
'Ibid., 199.
2Ibid.
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welfare, but diverse strategies may be endorsed as a means of achieving that end.”1
However, this innovative use of consequentialism to include certain emotional factors in
morality does not mean that Rachels is subverting the role of reason in defining and
determining morality.
Quite to the contrary, Rachels continues to equate morality with rationally based
action as he did in Created from Animals. In this same opening chapter, Rachels argues
that moral judgments must be backed by good reasons, by logic, and not merely by citing
moral authorities.2 He further states that,
the minimum conception [of morality] may now be stated very briefly: morality is, 
at the very least, the effort to guide one’s conduct by reason—that is, to do what 
there are the best reasons for doing—while giving equal weight to the interests of 
each individual will be affected by warns conduct.. . .
The conscientious moral agent is someone who is concerned impartially with 
the interests of everyone affected by what he or she does; who carefully sifts facts 
and examines the implications; who accepts principles of conduct only after 
scrutinizing them to make sure they are sound; who is willing to listen to reason 
even when it means that his or her earlier convictions may have to be revised; and 
who finally, is willing to act on the results of this deliberation.3
Certainly there is much appeal in Rachels’s assertions. We all like to believe we are
objective, rational agents willing to face the evidence, whatever it its. Rachels has used
some very rational arguments to include attitudes of love and loyalty in the Utilitarian
calculations, giving his position great emotional appeal. Let us now examine his
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Fourth Edition: Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism
Expanding the arguments for Multiple-Strategies 
Utilitarianism
Rachels informs us that the fourth edition of The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy is 
essentially unchanged in content from the third edition, with changes mostly focused on 
updating illustrations. However, Rachels does tell us that a new section has been added 
to the final chapter which “further elaborates what a satisfactory moral theory would be 
like.”1 This new section, in conjunction with modifications in the previous section, 
further develops the argument for love and loyalty as part of renaming his satisfactory 
moral system. In the first and third editions, his moral theory was called Morality 
Without Hubris. In the third edition he introduced the term Multiple-Strategies 
Utilitarianism (MSU). Now, in the fourth edition he more fully develops MSU.
Rachels returns to his benefits argument, introduced in the third edition, and 
repeats the essential foundational arguments, again showing concern for the lack of 
attention to motives and virtues in classical Utilitarianism. Unlike the previous edition, 
in this one, Rachels credits the Utilitarian, Henry Sidgewick, as the source of his idea 
that non-Utilitarian actions can have an overall Utilitarian benefit.2 The essential concept 
Rachels seeks to perfect is that some actions, having no direct Utilitarian motive, still 
produce good overall, Utilitarian results. Rachels notes, for example, that loving your
'Rachels, Elements (2002), xi. The “further elaboration” is found on pp. 198-199.
2Ibid., 197.
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child preferentially over non-relatives violates classical Utilitarian calls for equal 
consideration of interests, yet human society is better off because of such love. Likewise 
for loyalty, honesty, and other virtues—even if not perfectly Utilitarian, they bring 
positive benefits to the whole community. The upshot, then, is that Rachels argues that 
non-Utilitarian actions having Utilitarian results are therefore morally desirable. We thus 
are able to achieve utility by multiple strategies instead of just consequential moral 
calculus. Thus Rachels coined the name: Multiple Strategies Utilitarianism.1
How MSU works
In some ways this twist on Utilitarianism is a stroke of genius. Until now, Rachels 
has struggled with the usual limits of Utilitarianism in accommodating motives and 
virtues (i.e., character) into the moral system. The MSU argument allows him to remain 
a Utilitarian while incorporating these desirable traits into his moral system. Rachels 
now tries to give us a glimpse of how this new morality would work in practice.
Rachels proposes that every person whose life is both satisfying to himself or 
herself and contributes positively to the welfare of others will be characterized by an 
“optimum list” of virtues, motives, and methods of decision making.2 This optimum list 
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This list would include at least the following:
• The virtues that are needed to make one’s life go well;
• The motives on which one will act;
• The commitments and personal relationships that one will have to friends,
family, and others;
• The social roles that one will occupy, with the responsibilities and demands 
that go with them;
• The duties and concerns associated with projects one will 
undertake . . . ;
• The everyday rules that one will follow most of the time without even 
thinking; and
• A strategy, or group of strategies, about when to consider making exceptions
to the rules, and the grounds on which exceptions can be made.
The list would also include specification of the relations between the other items on
the list—what takes priority over what.1
It is of utmost importance to emphasize that the focus is placed on the individual—no one 
shares the same optimal list with another, though they could share components in the list. 
No other combination of virtues, motives, and methods of decision making could better 
equip that specific moral agent. This seems to reflect Rachels’s adherence to the Kantian 
principle that moral precepts are self-imposed by a rational, autonomous, free moral 
agent. The penalty for violating these self-imposed moral precepts, notes Rachels, is, “in 
Kant’s words, ‘self-contempt and inner abhorrence.’”2 It also dovetails with the 
individualist moral focus in Rachels’s moral individualism as seen in Created from 
Animals. Thus in MSU, there can be no universal code of moral precepts. Each best plan 
is to be custom designed by the individual and imposed on himself. The key in 
constructing that optimum list is that it must be made to optimize the agent’s chances of
'Ibid., 198-199.
2Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” 118.
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the individual’s “having a good life, while at the same time optimizing the chances of 
other people having good lives.”1 Thus this should still promote everyone’s interests 
alike.
Rachels admits that the individual’s optimal list “might be extremely hard to 
construct.. . .  As a practical matter, it might even be impossible.”2 Also, the relativist 
bent is clearly seen in this statement about one’s optimal list: “It would help us keep our 
promises, but not always, and to refrain from hurting people, but not always; and so on.”3 
MSU, therefore, includes a number of elements we have seen Rachels and others propose 
on the basis of Darwin’s theory of evolution. MSU ends up assuming a resemblance to 
Rule Utilitarianism when Rachels concludes that, for MSU, “the [morally] right thing for
‘Rachels, Elements (2002), 199. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 198-199. See also, Rachels, End o f Life, 2-3, where Rachels shows his 
relativistic bent by stating that “moral philosophy may be revisionary, and not merely 
descriptive.. . .  I shall assume that we may reject received opinion [i.e., Christian 
teaching] if it goes against reason.” Also, Rachels makes an analogy between breaking 
the rules of the road to avoid and accident, and making exceptions to moral rules. “It is 
the same with moral rules. It is important to understand their point because otherwise we 
will not be able to judge intelligently when to make exceptions to them” (27). One 
possible flaw in Rachels’s analogy is that the laws for driving often have provisions 
written into the law whereby one is entitled to break a rule to avoid an accident (often 
because the other driver is breaking the rules). In other words, such provisions are made 
because it is realized that the law cannot handle all situations encountered on the road. 
Rachels seems to assume that morality has the same kind of limits, thus needing the 
provision for making exceptions. However, it seems that all Rachels has done is to open 
a free-for-all argument on when to make exceptions, which leaves us with little to no 
moral guidance for making decisions.
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me to do is to act in accordance with my best plan.”1
Rachels’s conception of a satisfactory moral system
Now that we have used The Elements o f Moral Philosophy to look at Rachels’s 
conception of the major elements of a satisfactory moral system, I will summarize the 
essential points before critiquing them. First, Rachels believes that a satisfactory system 
of ethics must take into account the “facts” of human nature as revealed by Darwinian 
evolution. These “facts” led Rachels to conclude that since humans are relatively recent 
in the evolutionary timetable, they should not be so quick to claim special moral 
privileges and protections for humans. Thus he proposes Morality Without Human 
Hubris. This first major premise means that the circle of moral inclusion must include 
some or many of the animals.
Since Rachels believes man evolved, the next move is to note that humans have 
evolved capacities of reason far superior to other animals. These capacities of reason 
allow man to perceive the workings of cause and effect in freely chosen actions. This 
evolutionary capability opens the way to define good and evil in terms of consequences, 
and to argue an obligation to make choices most likely to produce good consequences. 
Thus, for Rachels, it seems that consequentialism is a key implication of Darwinism.
’Ibid., 199. This concept of grading moral imperatives is surprisingly similar to 
Norman Geisler’s concept of Graded Absolutism, in which Geisler argues that divinely 
commanded absolutes sometimes conflict, and so must be graded or ranked to see which 
absolute takes precedence in the conflict. Thus, for Geisler, in Nazi Germany, when 
confronted by the Gestapo and you are hiding Jews, the moral imperative to save life is 
argued to take priority over the imperative to tell the truth, and you would be exempted 
from the requirement against lying. See Geisler, 116-117.
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This leads to Rachels’s second major premise, that everyone’s interests should be 
promoted alike. Rachels asserts that we must consider the interests of everyone who may 
be affected by our actions, and that our considerations must not be limited by space or 
time. Thus strangers on the other side of the world deserve equal consideration along 
with, say, your child. Likewise, future generations must have their interests considered. 
Rachels admits the strong Utilitarian flavor in his ethical system to this point.
But Utilitarian consequentialism is flawed for Rachels because it can justify 
injustice. Therefore, Rachels borrows from Kant to develop the concept of deserts, 
which becomes his third major premise: People deserve to be treated according to their 
previously and freely chosen behaviors. This third principle regulates when to make 
exceptions to promoting everyone’s interests alike.
Rachels then notes one other issue that permits some exceptions based on 
geographical proximity. We love and care for those closest to us. He concludes that 
moral systems must incorporate virtues such as love and loyalty even though they are not 
directly Utilitarian in promoting everyone’s interests alike. This argument is eventually 
developed into Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism, where virtues such as love and loyalty, 
although not directly Utilitarian because they prefer some people’s interests over others, 
ultimately produce more benefits to society than a pure Utilitarianism could. Thus, non- 
Utilitarian means can still accomplish Utilitarian ends, hence the designation of Multiple- 
Strategies Utilitarianism.
MSU in turn is revealed to be an individualistic ethics, where each individual 
develops his optimum list/best plan of moral virtues, values, rules, principles, criterion
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for exceptions, and a prioritization of the items on the list in a moral hierarchy, to name 
some elements in the list. No two lists are alike as Rachels believes there can be no 
universal, one-size-fits-all morality. In this way, MSU dovetails nicely with his concept 
of moral individualism.
Rachels appears to believe that MSU is worked out and chosen on the basis of a 
Darwinian world-view.1 Combined with his work in Created from Animals, Rachels has 
shown that Darwinism undermines traditional, Western, Christian ethics. He has 
proposed in its place a radically different form of ethics in which rights are earned, not 
granted, to individuals who are subjects of a life, and based on their individual, 
functioning characteristics. What are we to make of Rachels’s ethics from a biblical 
Christian perspective? How efficacious is Rachels’s argument? Let us analyze his 
assertions.
‘Not all recognize Darwinism as a “world-view.” Of significance, however, is the 
observation by the evolutionist Robert Wright concerning the impact of E. O. Wilson’s 
Sociobiology, published in 1975. Says Wright, “A small but growing group of scholars 
has taken what Wilson called ‘the new synthesis,’ and carried it into the social sciences 
with the aim of overhauling them .. . .  Slowly but unmistakably, a new worldview is 
emerging.. . .  Here ‘worldview’ is meant quite literally. The new Darwinian synthesis is, 
like quantum physics or molecular biology, a body of scientific theory and fact; but 
unlike them is also a way o f seeing everyday life” (emphasis mine). Wright, The Moral 
Animal, 4-5.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EVALUATION OF ANTI-SPECIESIST USES OF EVOLUTION 
TO INFORM AND SHAPE ETHICS
Introduction
It is time now to turn to the task of analyzing the moral implications of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution. To stay within the limits of this study I shall focus on evaluating the 
connections between evolution and ethics, especially the impact on Christian ethics.
First, I shall analyze the three arguments against speciesism, their veracity and their 
implications for traditional ethics. This chapter will cover the work presented earlier by 
several notable authors, including Rachels. The next chapter will evaluate the unique 
contributions of Rachels in showing how Darwinism undermines Christian theology and 
ethics. Finally, in both chapters, I will use an exploration of implications as the primary 
means of conducting my analysis.
Analysis of Arguments Against Speciesism
We have seen several ways of arguing against human speciesism on the grounds of 
evolution. However, my purpose is to analyze these arguments, not in reference to the 
veracity of animal rights, but rather as a means of distilling moral implications from 
Darwinism. In this analysis, then, I shall analyze three issues where anti-speciesist views
162
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impinge on ethics, often in reference to principles based in Darwinism. Then I shall offer 
some alternative suggestions.
Analysis of the Kinship Argument 
Dawkins’s concept of evolutionary kinship seems to be one of the more substantive 
arguments in justifying the rejection of human preference speciesism.1 The centerpiece 
of establishing an evolutionary kinship between humans and the animal kingdom was the 
concept of the ring-species. This argument inherently challenges the concept of species 
fixity that is asserted as being necessary to justify human preference. Dawkins’s ring- 
species argument, then, carries significance in that it specifically engages in the more
‘While not as directly tied to belief in evolution, a foundational argument against 
speciesism is exemplified by Ryder’s assertion, which is also echoed by others including 
Rachels, that speciesism is merely based in external appearance as is racism and sexism 
and is thus morally equivalent to both. It is of interest to note that virtually none of these 
leading authors offer substantive reasons for justifying this analogy. Rather, they 
virtually seem to assume that the analogy is self-evident.
The analogy to racism and sexism seems convincing only if certain presuppositions 
are held, some of which may be rooted in Darwinian evolution. Thus, to those not 
holding those beliefs, the analogy to racism and sexism is less than convincing. One key 
reason is that those who practice racism and sexism are making distinctions in rights and 
privileges between fellow members of the human race who possess an extremely high 
degree of similarity. By contrast, speciesism makes its moral differentiation between 
human and non-human beings, where the contrast is much greater, and there is thus more 
room to argue in favor of differential treatment based in those dissimilarities. The 
differences between a male and female human, or two races of humans regardless of 
gender, are much less distinct than those between humans and, for example, a dog, 
chimpanzee, or donkey. Because o f  this lack o f  full analogy, the racism-sexism  
argument seems to be more emotive or psychological than moral, resonating with basic 
civil rights themes, and appealing to a generation with strong tendencies to interpret 
issues in terms of power and oppression.
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specific task of discrediting human dignity, and does so on the basis of evolution.1
'A less related, but interesting parallel to this argument is the attempt to 
undermine human dignity through the issue of extraterrestrial life. Paul Davies asserts, 
“The existence of extra-terrestrial intelligences would have a profound impact on 
religion, shattering completely the traditional perspective of God’s special relationship 
with man. The difficulties are particularly acute for Christianity, which postulates that 
Jesus Christ was God incarnate whose mission was to provide salvation for man on 
Earth.” He further claims that multiple worlds would necessitate a host of alien Christs 
to save the aliens, which he deems as absurd. See, Paul Davies, God and the New 
Physics (New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1983), 71.
Wiker seems to assert a similar conclusion in arguing that there was a revival of 
Epicureanism, culminating in the Renaissance and Reformation. In discussing what he 
believes to be the morally relativistic influence of William of Occam, Wiker asserts that 
part of this relativism is rooted in the affirmation by radical Augustinians that there is a 
“plurality of worlds” beyond earth. Wiker juxtaposes this with the Aristotelian view that 
“the first cause cannot make more than one world.” Thus, for Wiker, this radical 
Augustinian view and the ensuing attacks on Aristotelianism “affected the moderate 
users of Aristotle, the Thomists, as well.” Thus, if human dignity is partly rooted in the 
earth’s being the only inhabited planet created by God, Davies’s assertion carries heavier 
weight in the human dignity debate. See, Wiker, 106-107.
However, it seems that belief in multiple worlds does not have to undermine human 
dignity or the absoluteness of Christian ethics. In fact, the multiple worlds argument can 
be used in favor of human dignity. One of the founders of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church, Ellen White, asserted the existence of other inhabited worlds in many statements. 
For example, “Man was created a free moral agent. Like the inhabitants o f all other 
worlds, he must be subjected to the test of obedience.” Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and 
Prophets (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958), 331-332. In another statement 
she uses the idea of multiple worlds to assert the specialness of this one: “How grateful 
we should be that, notwithstanding this earth is so small amid the created worlds, God 
notices even us. The nations are before him as the drop in the bucket, and as the small 
dust in the balance; and yet the great, the stupendous work that has been done for us 
shows how much he loves us.” Idem, “The Government of God,” Review and Herald, 
March 9,1886, 145-146. It seems, then, that human dignity is not solely dependent on 
Aristotelian philosophical foundations as Wiker seems to assert. Likewise, neither 
Augustine nor Ellen White is known for their moral relativism, so it seems that belief in 
multiple worlds does not entail moral relativism as Wiker seems to conclude.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
Kinship as Organic Union
The kinship argument at first seems compelling enough to be self-evident. But one 
wonders if certain key elements of evolutionary theory are being excluded from the 
argument, which, if included, might change the entire picture of ethics based in kinship. 
Dawkins does not appear to take into account the theory espoused by Ruse and others 
that our moral capacity evolved through manifestations of altruism, as part of our 
evolution, and thus making morality to be primarily understood as helping others, 
especially one’s immediate kin. If morality did evolve this manner, then at best, only the 
higher primates can be claimed as evolutionary kin entitled to equal consideration. One 
look at the evolutionary tree raises serious questions concerning who in the animal 
kingdom are truly our evolutionary kin. Are those not in our branch of the evolutionary 
tree disqualified as kin worthy of altruism? It seems likely that dogs, donkeys, dolphins, 
and ducks, for example, would not be in ring-species relationship with humans, and thus 
would not qualify as kin entitled to moral inclusion with man since their organic 
connection to us is less complete. On this ground, then, the extension of moral protection 
to non-kin branches of the evolutionary tree becomes a less compelling, if not downright 
contradictory, basis for the broad inclusion argued by Dawkins.
A partial rebuttal to this objection may be offered through Dawkins’s use of the 
organic inclusion tactic by raising the specter of creating human-animal transgenic 
hybrids. If a human-nonhuman transgenic creature can be developed through our genetic 
technology, Dawkins sees this as again blurring the boundary between human and
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animal, thus demonstrating an organic interconnection which discredits human 
preference. More importantly, it permits interbreeding between species who are not 
neighbors in the sequence of the ring-species. However, this is less than compelling 
support for the organic kinship argument because this form of transgenic breeding is 
accomplished, not through the natural selection processes of evolution, but through 
artificial intervention by humans. Therefore, transgenic creations by human 
technological prowess cannot provide support to ring-species organic union argument.
However, the potential for artificial transgenic breeding mentioned by Dawkins is 
of significance to the human preference issue in a different way. We have seen Ryder 
question, in reference to pigs with human genes spliced into their genome, how many 
human genes are needed in the pig to qualify it for human status. In other words, 
transgenic breeding raises the specter of so blurring the boundaries between human and 
animal that human preference in ethics becomes impossible to practice at the practical 
level. This is a valid and unavoidable consequence of creating transgenic hybrids of 
humans with non-human beings. The intent seems to be to elevate the animals to 
human-like moral status. Thus R. G. Frey asserts that “the more we can pile up the 
human traits we are prepared to endow animals with, the more likely we will regard them 
as honorary persons and so to put them into a position to possess rights.”1 However, the 
implications may not open vistas of greater moral inclusion as Dawkins and Ryder 
envision.
•Frey, 86. Frey calls this humanizing of animals, “rampant anthropomorphism.”
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Dawkins and Ryder clearly believe that the kinship argument should elevate the 
moral status of animals rather than undermine the moral status of humans. However, this 
conclusion is by no means guaranteed and the kinship principle might just as readily 
produce a universalist ethics in which humans are diminished significantly while animals 
are elevated moderately if at all.' We shall see this more clearly in my examination of 
marginal cases.
An Arbitrary Criterion
Another potential problem in the kinship argument is that it can be criticized as 
being both arbitrary and a new form of exclusivism. The ring-species relationship
'It is interesting to note, that in Seventh-day Adventism, where Ellen White is 
regarded as having exercised the ministry of a prophet, a hotly disputed statement may 
add some insight into Ryder’s issue of how interbreeding human and animal might 
change ethics. In 1864 Ellen White wrote of the antediluvial world: “But if there was 
one sin above another which called for the destruction of the race by the flood, it was the 
base crime of amalgamation of man and beast which defaced the image of God, and 
caused confusion everywhere.” The infamous phrase, “amalgamation of man and beast,” 
has been much debated and I wish not to pursue that debate here. My point in raising the 
issue is that it may be possible that she really intended to assert that in the days of Noah, 
his contemporaries created human-animal hybrids. Whether or not she intended 
hybridization of human with animal, she clearly associates this “amalgamation” with a 
defacement of the “image of God.” This assertion correlates with Rachels’s argument 
that evolution blurs the moral boundary between human and animal by undermining the 
image-of-God thesis. See, Ellen G. White, Spiritual Gifts, vol. 3 (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Edwards Brothers, 1864; facsimile reprint: Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1945), 
64.
If w e take some homiletical license with Christ’s statement that the days before His 
second advent will be like the days of Noah (Matt 24:37; Luke 17:26), the technological 
possibility of such hybridization now discussed would suggest that Ellen White would 
likely see Ryder’s interbreeding of humans and animals precisely as producing a 
callousness towards human life more than an elevation of animal life in moral status. For 
more history of the discussion on Ellen White’s statements on amalgamation, see F. D. 
Nichol, Ellen G. White and Her Critics: An Answer to the Major Charges that Critics 
Have Brought Against Mrs. Ellen G. White (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1951).
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becomes merely a new type of exclusionary boundary. But why should one ring of 
species be included while another is excluded? Has Dawkins merely expanded 
speciesism into genus-ism or phyla-ism? In other words, it seems that the kinship 
argument violates the fundamental dictum of anti-speciesism authors that moral rights 
and privileges do not come by membership in a group but on individual capabilities and 
merits. Kinship ethics, however, is still based first on group membership, though it can 
also be based on a minimum functionality criteria. But, as the anti-speciesists including 
Rachels have charged, human preference in ethics is also based on group membership 
and can likewise be based on defining the minimum functional attributes to qualify for 
human status. How then is kinship ethics not essentially speciesist, when it simply is 
expanding the boundary of the group?
Dawkins’s moral model still seems to base moral privilege in a new kind of group 
membership— evolutionary kinship to man. But this begs the question of why kinship 
with the animals should be a criterion for moral status? I have already raised the problem 
of how to define who is included in the kinship criterion. But on what grounds do we 
conclude that kinship between man and members of other branches of the evolutionary 
tree is morally significant? Why should these other branches be included or excluded? 
Dawkins does not address such issues. He merely assumes that if the species barrier is 
broken by the organic connections, then human preference is gone. This is a valid 
inference, but when he redraws the line of moral inclusion around organic kinship, the 
new boundary seems just as arbitrary, if  not more so, than the old boundary is accused of.
William Saletan illustrates the arbitrary nature of such argumentation in looking at
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the Korean practice of eating dog meat. He cites Brigitte Bardot as arguing that eating 
dogs is wrong because they are “friends, not animals.” He continues by quoting her as 
saying, “Cows are grown to be eaten, dogs are not.” Saletan observes that “if you refuse 
to eat only the meat of ‘companion’ animals . . .  you’re saying that the morality of killing 
depends on habit or even whim.”1
To illustrate this argument, Saletan notes that the companionship standard is 
completely subjective. For Koreans, dogs are livestock, not companions, so eating them 
is not a problem, whereas for Bardot, dogs are only companions. But, he notes, a change 
is underway in Korea, especially the cities, where citizens are now starting to keep dogs 
as pets. Korea now has two classes of dogs: “pet dogs,” and “meat dogs”—also called 
“junk dogs” or “lower grade” dogs. From the perspective of the dogs, Saletan notes,
“But you don’t become a Tower-grade’ dog by flunking an IQ test. You’re just bom in 
the wrong place.”2 One could also note a potentially similar twist on this argument, 
where the division is by breed instead o f by birth place. Both seem quite arbitrary and 
whimsical.
In a similar fashion, the kinship argument has not shed the alleged arbitrary nature 
of the speciesism it seeks to refute. Thus, it leaves us with the choice of who is kin with
'William Saletan, “Wok the Dog,” Slate, 16 January 2002, 
www.slate.com/?id=2060840 (20 May 2003). Saletan gives no citations for the quotes 
by Brigitte Bardot. The significance of his argument, however, is not dependent on 
Bardot actually having said these things.
2Ibid. Saletan also notes that in parts of Spain, cat stew is eaten, while the French 
eat horses, both o f which could be argued as companion animals by many people.
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moral status, and who is not, being at least partially grounded in human whim. A high 
degree of moral relativism is thus manifested in ethical arguments based in evolution. 
This lack of firm foundations undermines the felicity of evolutionary kinship as being a 
significant criterion for defining moral status. And there is yet another reason to doubt 
the efficacy of evolutionary kinship as a standard for determining the boundary of moral 
status.
Does the Kinship Argument Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy?
Robert Griffiths argues that proponents of the animal rights movement commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. In simple terms, Griffith states the fallacy as applied to animal rights: 
‘“Man is evolved from lower forms of life, therefore lower forms of life ought to be 
treated in certain ways;’ or ‘Some animals are intelligent, therefore they ought to possess 
rights;’ or ‘Animals are capable o f suffering, therefore they ought to be spared it.’”1 
Griffiths argues that all naturalistic philosophies including Utilitarianism commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. He concedes that this fallacy “does not negate naturalistic ethics 
entirely, but it does show that ethics cannot be grounded exclusively in the facts of 
human (or animal) experience.”2 Griffiths states that the fallacy is a logical one in that 
there may be excellent moral reasons why I should not do what another dislikes (such as 
cause pain). But, he concludes, the imperative to not cause pain cannot be logically
'Robert Griffiths, The Human Use o f Animals, Grove Booklets on Ethics, no. 46 
(N.p.: Grove Books, 1982), 17.
2Ibid.
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derived from the fact that the potential victim does not like pain.1
Griffiths illustrates the problem in a different way. He distills the kinship argument 
into a syllogism: “All men have rights; all men are animals; therefore animals have 
rights.” While sounding very logical, Griffiths charges it contains a lapse of logic. The 
subject of the second phrase is not the subject of the final phrase, thus invalidating the 
syllogism. He uses the following syllogism: “All cats have fur; all Tigers are cats; 
therefore all Tigers have fur,” to show how “tigers” is the subject of the last two-thirds of 
the syllogism. Taken that way, the animal rights syllogism should read, “All men have 
rights; all animals are men, therefore animals have rights,” but this is clearly problematic. 
For animals to get rights, “animals,” not “men,” should be the subject of the final two- 
thirds of the syllogism.2 In other words, just because men have rights does not 
automatically entitle animals to rights even if  we are “kin.”
Based on the arbitrary nature of the kinship criterion demonstrated by Saletan, and 
the questionable logic of the argument shown by Griffiths, it seems safe to conclude that 
kinship can only undermine human preference. It is incapable of providing a criterion of 
moral inclusion that requires the uplifting of animals. Ultimately, Dawkins’s argument 
seems almost spiritual rather than scientific in nature. As Christians argue for equal 
human rights on the basis that we are all children of God, brothers and sisters in Christ, 
so Dawkins seems to ultimately argue that we are all children of evolution—humans and
'Ibid.
2Ibid., 4-5.
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animals—and thus are all brothers and sisters in Darwin! It seems likely that the kinship 
argument provides a less than compelling foundation for determining moral inclusion, 
and this may be why it is not often used to provide those definitions. Instead, two major 
veins of criteria were proposed to help determine the boundary of moral status. They are 
the sentiency criterion and the argument from marginal cases.
Analysis of The Sentiency Criterion (Painism) for Moral Inclusion
We have seen the sentiency criterion proposed as the means of determining who is 
entitled to moral protection. It is rooted in Bentham’s argument that the real question for 
determining moral status is not whether the individual in question can reason or speak, 
but whether they can suffer. Thus, we saw Ryder christen this view with the term 
“Painism.” We will recall that this criterion is expressed succinctly in the statment: “We 
should do to others what we believe will give them pleasure and not do to them what we 
believe will cause them pain.” 1 But is it really that simple?
Regan’s Qualification of Painism
Regan opines that we cannot merely assert that causing pain is bad. He qualifies 
the concept of pain with the word, “unnecessary.” It is unnecessary, unjustifiable pain 
that is morally wrong.2 But this begs two questions: How are we to define 
“unnecessary,” and who determines that definition? We generally consider causing
‘Ryder, Painism, 196, 198-199.
2Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 50-51.
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unnecessary pain to children as child abuse. But what the child may consider abusive 
and what adults consider abusive may drastically differ. For example, neither the parent 
who takes their child to the doctor for immunization shots, or for surgery to correct a 
congenital defect, nor the medical personnel who perform the procedures are considered 
to be abusing the child, even though the child may feel the pain is neither justifiable nor 
necessary. Likewise, Regan’s argument opens the door to undermine the very ethics he 
is trying to build, for humans historically have shown great ability to justify immoral 
treatment of marginal groups or individuals in the name of a greater or common good. 
How easily might we justify the necessity of animal suffering for a greater good. Thus, 
not ALL pain is bad, as we saw Ryder claim. And this now raises the question of who 
has the right to decide what pain is justifiable, especially for agents like animals and 
small children who are incapable of making such judgments? Who becomes the moral 
authority?
This is a vexing matter, for the need of a paternalistic moral authority goes against 
the very nature of the painists’ argumentation which is trying to appeal to a universal 
code of reason that will compel all human debaters into agreement with the sentience 
criterion. Indeed, Ryder has observed that “unless one adopts a religious view, right and 
wrong are intrinsically about what is desired and what is avoided.”1 This is a telling 
comment. For it is precisely apart from religious influence, in harmony with Darwin and
‘Ryder, Painism, 198. This also raises the specter that the hedonist base o f the 
speciesist model of morality, and its affinities for Utilitarianism, is antithetical to 
religion, presumably here referring to the Judeo-Christian religion that has dominated 
Western culture and its associated approach to morality.
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Bentham, that these thinkers use suffering and pain as the grounds for morality. Yet, the 
very issue that some pain, even involuntary pain, is justifiable, leads to the need of 
establishing a paternalistic authority to decide such matters. But this need, in turn, opens 
the door for an outside value system such as religion to control the definition of morally 
versus immorally inflicted pain, and thus, Bentham’s hedonistic principle is no longer the 
true grounding point of the moral system. Also, without the possible re-introduction of 
theological or other clarifying influences,1 there are several other weaknesses to pain or 
suffering as the grounding criterion of moral status.
The Problem of Assessing Pain
A key problem for the sentiency-painism position is the issue of how to define the 
boundaries of sentiency. What is the difference in sentiency between a chimpanzee, dog, 
and snail? This is not an easy question, particularly if we take the continuous mind-set of 
Dawkins where creatures can be 37 percent or 99 percent sentient. What is 100 percent 
sentiency? A key admission of Ryder is that the premise that sentience fades with 
descent on the phylogenic scale is unproven.2 In his discussion of vivisection, C. S.
Lewis highlights this problem by asserting that we have no real way of knowing how
‘This is the route Andrew Linzey takes, seeking to re-interpret what he sees as 
traditional, speciesist Christian theology, into a more animal-friendly system. See 
Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 
chapters 1-4; idem, Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster-John Knox Press,
2000), chapters 1-6.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 332.
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conscious an animal is, and that arguments here are essentially opinions.1 In similar 
fashion, Singer questions the ability to compare the sufferings of men with other animals, 
in order to undermine the argument that beasts suffer less than humans.2 Singer, 
however, has caused himself a problem: If we cannot say for certain that animals suffer 
less than humans (especially in response to a standardized stimulus), then it is equally 
impossible to claim any similarity between human and animal suffering, and Singer’s 
attempt to equate the two falls flat.
A corollary problem is raised by Marian Stamp Dawkins. She observes that a key 
area of division between the animal rights activists and animal use advocates “is a failure 
to agree on how to recognize and define suffering.”3 Not only is there a failure to agree 
on how to measure animal suffering, but an even more fundamental issue which 
undermines the use of suffering to determine the moral boundaries of inclusion. 
Ultimately, we are faced with the even more basic question, How can we know how 
much an animal is suffering? Says Dawkins, “We do not know infallibly what the mental 
experiences of other animals are like, particularly those animals that are structurally very 
different from us.”4 We thus end up with two key problems for ethical rights being based 
in the capacity to suffer.
*C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter 
Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 225.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 232-33.
3Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science o f  Animal Welfare (New 
York: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 1.
4Ibid., 2.
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First, suffering is subjective. Two creatures experiencing the same pains can suffer 
differently. How then can such variable perceptions provide a stable foundation for 
building our concepts of ethical preferences and rights? And who defines suffering?
How often have oppressors caused suffering while denying that their victims were indeed 
suffering? It would seem that such a malleable criterion leaves us with no real ethics at 
all.
Second, if we cannot enter into the mental experiences of animals, and thereby 
enter into their suffering, how can we possibly objectively evaluate their suffering or 
potential suffering sufficiently enough to build the moral boundaries o f exclusion and 
inclusion on such limited evidence? Again we are given a foundation for ethics that 
becomes highly subjective and unstable. Should ethics, especially Christian ethics, be 
based on and built from such an unstable foundation of speculation and opinion?
Is pain the same as suffering?
R. G. Frey observes that suffering is not merely unpleasant or painful sensations, 
but that it requires the organism having the sensations to possess a mental capacity 
capable of suffering.1 And yet we have seen it argued that our ability to assess whether 
such mental capacity exists in animals, and to evaluate how equivalent their suffering is 
to ours, is impossible, or at best very limited. As C. S. Lewis cogently asserts in regard 
to vivisection, “Unless we know on other grounds, that vivisection is right we must not
'Frey, 39-41.
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take the moral risk of tormenting them [animals] on a mere opinion.”1 In restated form, 
willingness to risk inflicting unjustified pain is, defacto, a willingness to knowingly 
inflict unjustified pain.
When Frey asserts that suffering is more than merely painful sensations, and that a 
certain mental capacity is required to be capable of suffering, he implies that pain and 
suffering are not one and the same thing. Thus it becomes hypothetically possible for 
two sentient creatures to experience identical pains, but different levels of suffering.
Ryder notes that the ability to anticipate pain can increase the total suffering, while 
the ability to project a positive future consequence can reduce the total suffering.2 This is 
because, as Leahy notes, many scholars, including some of the key animal rights 
advocates, concede that humans can suffer more than animals because of the superiority
'Lewis, God in the Dock, 225. Note however, how Lewis reverses the logic 
from the sentience school. Lewis, instead of arguing how much pain animals feel, 
instead takes the higher moral road by asserting that the lack of objective data on 
animals’ ability to experience pain is precisely why we should not risk inflicting 
suffering by procedures such as vivisection. Thus Lewis takes a restrictive approach to 
ambiguity instead of a permissive approach and in so doing side-steps the animal rights 
advocates who are programmed only to confront the permissive mind-set.
Griffiths uses a similar tactic to argue that basing animal rights in evolution is not a 
prudent methodology. “To base an ethics of animal welfare on what is still widely 
regarded as only a hypothesis is to skate on thin ice. It is bad ethics to make one’s morals 
depend so heavily on the vagaries of the results of scientific research” (17). Both men 
underscore the problem of basing ethics on the moving targets of opinion and science. 
However, both men clearly have an absolutist view of ethics, which the evolutionist 
would see as a weakness. Nevertheless, it does seem  that an ethics based on a moving 
target could hardly be normative in the practical world.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 326.
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of human intelligence.1 Ryder’s point is well taken but opens a new problem. If suffering 
does not have to include pain, then we should become less supportive of defining the 
limits of morality in terms of pain. Rather we must now define the moral boundaries in 
terms of the broader criterion of suffering. Furthermore, suffering now becomes a 
function of “mental capacity,” which becomes a euphemism for rational intelligence. If 
suffering implies and requires a minimum level of intelligence, then Bentham’s 
foundation for including the animals has artificially separated reason from the capacity to 
suffer. Reason and thinking do play a role after all. Thus the very concept that is 
supposed to deliver the animal rights proponent from the use of intelligence and reason as 
criteria for defining the boundaries of moral preference ends up being grounded in the 
very intelligence it was invented to replace.
Why Choose Pain for a Criterion?
Both Frey and Griffith attack what they perceive to be a subjective or arbitrary 
designation of pain as the primary grounds of establishing moral rights. They both assert 
that it is not clear that the experience of pain automatically has intrinsic moral value to 
ground rights. Frey charges essentially that the adequacy of the criterion of sentience (or 
pain) is an unargued, unproved assumption. Second, both argue that even if experiences 
of pain do have intrinsic moral value, this is no guarantee that pain is the only experience
'Michael Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 29.
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to have intrinsic moral value.1 On what basis is pain to be chosen over these other 
options as the grounding value of morality? What justification is offered by the animal 
rights advocates for choosing pain over these other experiences? Frey declares he is 
aware of no answer to this last question.2
There appears to be no direct attempt to answer to Frey’s objection. The closest 
thing to an answer may be the general, Bentham-based hedonist argument that human 
and animal behaviors are grounded in avoiding pain and in seeking pleasure. Thus, 
morality ought to be grounded in avoiding pain and promoting pleasure (or happiness). 
But why should behaviorism be the grounding principle for ethics? Just because an act 
appears to produce pleasure or happiness does not entail the conclusion it is moral. 
Adultery is mutually pleasurable but few would assert that it is morally good.
Frey argues that pain is an ineffective means for establishing rights if it is the sole 
ground, as it is with Bentham and the animal rights advocates. He illustrates his point by 
presenting the case of a war veteran who is quite conscious and cogent, but his war injury 
made him incapable of feeling pain. Has he lost his rights since he can no longer feel 
pain? This argument can be extended to the comatose human as well. Have they lost 
their rights and interests because they are comatose? Could a photographer enter the 
room of a comatose person and take immodest photos because they cannot feel pain nor
'Frey, 46-50, 145; Griffiths, 15. Chapter 11 of Frey has a major section arguing 
this issue in detail.
2Frey, 46-50; Griffiths, 15.
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can they suffer?1 Does a person bom with a congenital condition making them unable to 
feel pain have no rights?2
Frey also observes that if pain is the sole basis of moral rights and interests, then 
future generations can have no moral rights or interests as they do not yet have a nervous 
system enabling them to feel pain (or suffer).3 Such an argument would undermine key 
moral positions on caring for the earth and the environment because the future 
generations are entitled to receive a habitable earth from us. Could it not be convincingly 
argued that preventing real, present pain, trumps actions to prevent potential, future pain 
that may not occur? Frey concludes that the painists offer no objective test criteria to be 
met in order to demonstrate pain and suffering, and thus it becomes a version of 
speciesism that simply has expanded the circle to include more than just humans. It is 
still discrimination in the speciesist sense, just on a broader scale.4
One other point about pain should be made here. Casserley, writing well before
'Frey, 34-36; 145-147.
2An actual case history of such a person can be found in Robert Marion, The Boy 
Who Felt No Pain (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990). Marion’s book is a personal 
memoir of his early career in medicine. In this volume he tells the story of treating an 
infant who felt no pain at all. Several years later he encountered the boy again, and the 
patient was a physical and medical mess due to not feeling any injuries. Would the 
painists say he was not suffering and thus had no rights? Could we do experiments on 
him that we could not do on others since he feels no pain?
This example highlights the fact that every criterion based in functionality is bound 
to face a situation where one faces a marginal case where granting moral status is an 
exception to the criterion and yet seems to be in order. I shall examine the issue of 
arguing from marginal cases shortly.
3Frey, 34-36.
4Ibid., 44.
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painism was in vogue, declares, “Pain is not the worst of evils.”1 He contends that there 
is “widespread modem superstition that all pain is stark and unredeemable evil, and that 
indeed, evil and pain necessarily amount to the same thing.. . .  Pain is indeed a species 
of evil, but pain is not, so to speak the most evil form of evil. Both moral evil, sin, and 
social evil, injustice, are worse than pain. The fight against pain may never be carried on 
by immoral or unjust means. It is never worth while [sic] to corrupt men or societies in 
order to avoid pain.” 2 Casserley’s point is well taken. Bentham’s foundation for 
painism presupposes hedonist consequentialism in judging good and evil by the pleasure 
or pain produced by choices and actions. Few would argue that pain is evil. The 
frequent instances of individuals willingly placing themselves in a position to suffer pain 
for various higher purposes would seem to indicated that many do not see pain as the 
ultimate evil. Thus Pinches rightly argues that “sentience, therefore, turns out to be one 
of a number of features of a given animal that humans must consider when seeking to 
treat it well. It has no special, privileged status.”3 There is one other problem for the 
sentiency criterion.
1J. V. Langmead Casserley, M an’s Pain and God’s Goodness (London: A. R. 
Mowbray & Co., 1951), 63. See also Peter Anthony Bertocci, Introduction to the 
Philosophy o f  Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951), 394: “Hardship is not 
necessarily evil.”
2Casserley, M a n ’s Pain, 60-61.
3Charles Pinches, “Each According to Its Kind,” in Good News fo r  Animals? 
Christian Approaches fo r  Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 201.
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The Problem of Predation
Another challenge for the sentiency view is the problem of predation. Those 
advocating the sentiency criterion for moral protection do not appear to address this 
issue adequately. The issue of predation begs the question of why it should be 
considered morally wrong for a man to kill and eat a zebra, while for a lion to kill and eat 
a zebra is not immoral. Peter Alward clarifies the argument, saying, “In particular, what 
is in need of explanation is exactly why non-human carnivores, but not humans, may 
permissibly eat meat. That is, the (relevant) properties differentiating humans from non­
human carnivores need to be delineated and an explanation needs to be given as to why 
possession of such properties, or the lack thereof, ground the moral distinction at issue.”1 
This issue is particularly problematic in these modem times when it is likely that the lion 
will inflict more pain and suffering on the zebra than the man.2 Why is the pain inflicted 
by the lion not morally evil (or at least not as evil) as that given by a man?
Singer tries to show why a predator can kill other animals to eat with no moral 
culpability, while humans cannot. He appeals to William Paley’s argument that
the reasons alleged in vindication of this practice [humans killing animals to
‘Peter Alward, Naive! Who Me? 2000, http://people.uleth.ca/~peter.alward/papers/ 
Naive-who-me.htm (6 July 2003).
2With a scoped rifle, a hunter can easily kill a game animal up to 800 yards away. 
The bullet will reach the animal before the sound of the rifle shot, and with an accurate 
shot, the animal will be dead before it can be fully aware that anything happened. 
However, if the shot is off, then the animal may well suffer but this can be quickly 
remedied with a second shot. Any way you look at it, the modem hunter is likely to 
inflict far less pain and suffering than the lion.
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eat], are the following: that the several species of brutes being created to prey upon 
one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove that the human species were 
intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would overrun the earth, and 
exclude mankind from the occupation of it; that they are requited for what they 
suffer at our hands by our care and protection.
Upon which reasons I would observe, that the analogy contended for is 
extremely lame; since brutes have no power to support life by any other means, 
and since we have; for the whole human species might subsist entirely 
upon fruit, pulse, herbs, and roots, as many tribes of the Hindoos actually do.1
Singer is arguing that the lion or wolf has no other options for food, whereas we do.
Thus killing prey animals is necessary for lion and wolf. Furthermore, Singer argues that
predators do not kill for pleasure, in contrast to humans who do kill for sport. He
therefore joins Paley in arguing that just because some animals kill others for food, it is
not a moral ground to justify our killing for food.2
All of this wrangling over necessity leaves the prime question unanswered: Why is
it wrong for a man to kill a zebra and eat it while it is morally acceptable for the lion to
kill and eat it? Pain is still pain whether inflicted by a lion or a human. Singer offers one
other answer to this conundrum: “The most decisive point, however, is that nonhuman
animals are not capable of considering the alternatives open to them or o f  reflecting on
the ethics o f their diet. Hence it is impossible to hold the animals responsible for what
they do.”3 Thus, he argues that the difference between animal and human predation is
‘William Paley, The Principles o f  Moral and Political Philosophy (Boston, MA: 
West and Richardson, 1818), 70. Second emphasis is mine. Singer merely summarizes 
Paley’s point. He makes no direct quotation. See Singer, Animal Liberation, 237.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 235, 237.
3Singer, Practical Ethics, 71. Emphasis mine.
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that the animals have no moral ability and thus cannot be held accountable, while humans 
can make such reflections and be held culpable. But this is begging the question for the 
argument assumes that there is a moral problem with humans eating animals. Why 
should my sense of morality defacto prohibit eating animal flesh? There needs to be a 
separate reason for having such a moral requirement.1 Neither Singer, nor any of his 
cohorts adequately addresses the problem of distinguishing between animal suffering 
caused by predacious animals, and similar forms of suffering caused by humans.
Thus Bentham’s hedonism is challenged in two key ways. First, because for 
Bentham, all pain is evil whether intended or unintended. The zebra suffers either way, 
and for the painists, the issue is suffering, not motive or intent. Second, the major feature 
distinguishing the morality of the lion from that of man is not pain but the ability to 
reason creatively.2 The very criteria of human preference ethics that is discarded in favor
lIt is interesting that Singer then asserts that “it must be admitted that the 
existence of carnivorous animals poses one more problem for the ethics of Animal 
Liberation, and that is whether or not we should do anything about i t . . . .  The short and 
simple answer is that once we give up our claim to ‘dominion’ over the other species we 
have no right to interfere with them at al l . . . .  We should not try to play Big Brother 
either.” A little later he asserts that “we cannot and should not try to police nature.” See 
Singer, Animal Liberation, 238-239. By contrast, Steve Sapontzis argues the opposite, in 
an apparently Utilitarian argument. “Where we can prevent predation without 
occasioning as much or more suffering than we would prevent, we are obligated to do so 
by the principle that we are obligated to alleviate avoidable animal suffering.” Steve 
Sapontzis, “Predation,” Ethics and Animals 5 (1984): 36.
2The attempt to make a moral difference between predatory animals and humans 
is based on the argument that humans have powers of judgment and reason that animals 
do not have. Sapontzis tries to refute this type of argument by using the illustration of an 
human toddler tormenting a cat, and then concluding: “Tormenting cats remains wrong, 
whether it is done by someone who ‘ought to know better’ or by someone who ‘can’t tell 
right from wrong” (27-28). But Sapontzis seems to deliberately ignore the fact that the 
moral judgement in this case is neither made by the cat, nor by the toddler, but by a
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of sentiency, returns as the defining criteria that gives humans moral obligations not 
binding on the animals. But why should our superior intelligence diminish the right for a 
human to be a predator while not impacting the lion? No one seems to address these 
problems.
The presence of predators has proved to be a major challenge for morality based on 
the capacity to suffer or experience pain. It has proven itself to be situationally relative 
and is thus unstable. The sentiency criterion has been shown to be subservient to survival, 
and is thus a form of moral relativism. No substantial explanation has been found to 
explain why pain caused by predatory animals is morally acceptable while pain caused 
by human predators is not ethically justifiable.
Potentially Grounded in Emotivism
Not only are the advocates of sentiency accused of providing no solid grounds for 
using pain as the master criterion for extending rights, but it is asserted that there is an 
emotivist basis involved in selecting the hedonist concept of good and evil. Griffiths 
argues that the use of pain and pleasure to determine moral status is very appealing to the 
modem man because most modems use this standard for their own behaviors,1 while
human sufficiently developed to have judgmental powers sufficient to morally evaluate 
the situation. So, the immorality of the situation cannot be known except by superior 
human powers. While cat and toddler can express their preference against suffering, they 
can make no moral judgment on it. The morality is dependent on someone outside the 
dynamics between them.
•Griffiths, 15.
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Ryder explicitly links this moral mind-set to the work of Freud and Skinner.1 It seems 
reasonable to suspect that painism is rooted in the modem psyche with its focus on self­
esteem and avoiding suffering. Thus, the animal rights position seems partly, if not 
mainly, rooted in emotional preference.
A significant problem, then, as C. S. Lewis observes in regard to vivisection, is that 
opposing views can both end up grounding their appeals primarily in emotive arguments. 
“And neither appeal proves anything. If the thing is right—and if right at all, it is a 
duty—then pity for the animal is one of the temptations we must resist in order to 
perform that duty. If the thing is wrong, then pity for human suffering is precisely the 
temptation which will most probably lure us into doing the wrong thing. But the real 
question—whether it is right or wrong—remains meanwhile just where it was.”2 This 
being the case, it makes sense that another means of elevating animals to moral status has 
been proposed in the form of the marginal-cases argument.
Analysis of the Marginal-Cases Argument
Introduction
The marginal-cases argument is another weapon in the arsenal of the animal rights 
advocates to try to elevate animals to inclusion in the moral community with humans. By 
way of review, we saw that there were two versions: The categorical version and the 
bioconditional version. The categorical form, simply stated, claims that marginal
'Ryder, Painism, 198.
2Lewis, God in the Dock, 224.
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humans, such as the mentally handicapped, often have less capabilities than many 
animals, especially higher mammals. Thus, it is argued that since marginal humans are 
included in the protected moral community, then there is no good reason to exclude the 
higher mammals. This view essentially assumes that marginal humans have rights and 
thus argues that animals of similar characteristics to marginal humans deserve the same 
rights.
We also saw Pluhar assert the existence of a “bioconditional” version of the 
marginal-cases argument. This version assumed no rights and merely asserts that 
marginal humans and animals of similar functionality deserve the same consideration. 
However, both marginal humans and animals can be excluded from the moral community 
as easily as being included. Thus, this view, does not guarantee the elevation of animals 
to protected moral status.
Evaluation of the Argument from Marginal Cases
Unintended implications
The potential for the marginal-cases argument to undermine basic human rights is 
illustrated by Kevin Dolan. He questions why we ascribe human dignity to “mentally 
defective” infants, and psychopaths like Hitler, a dignity which an elephant or pig can 
never achieve.1 Dolan’s question clearly opens the
'Dolan, Ethics, 121. On p. 119, Dolan also applies this type of argument to 
the fetus, concluding that to give infant rights based on potential humanness which is not 
yet developed, would mean that we should also extend those rights to the unborn. He 
rejects this argument, declaring it invalid, saying it is akin to arguing that contraception 
and abstinence are wrong since the egg and sperm have the same potential being denied.
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door for undermining the concept of a unique and intrinsic dignity being ascribed to 
humans.
C. S. Lewis details the essence of this demotion of human rights when he asserts
that Darwinian scientists must be naturalistic in their outlook, which, in turn, says Lewis,
brings us up against a very alarming fact. The very same people who most 
contemptuously brush aside any consideration of animal suffering if it stands in the 
way of “research” will also, on another context, most vehemently deny that there is 
any radical difference between man and the other animals. On the naturalistic 
view, the beasts are at bottom just the same sort of thing as ourselves. Man is 
simply the cleverest of the anthropoids.. . .
. . .  Once the old Christian idea of a total difference in kind between man and 
beast has been abandoned, then no argument for experiments on animals can be 
found which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men.1
Singer makes this exact point, arguing that if non-speciesist criterion justifies the
suffering of some less sentient for the greater good of the more developed, then we
cannot exclude human infants—he specifically stipulates orphaned infants—or retarded
humans from consideration.2
Frey likewise concurs that unless we include babies and the mentally handicapped
within the class of right holders on the grounds that they potentially possess certain
However, his analogy falls short. The sperm and egg do not have that potential until they 
unite and the ensuing embryo is implanted in the uterine wall. Until both conception and 
implantation occur, the potential development is limited to a cell mass with no developed 
biological systems. Thus he falls short in his criticism.
’Lewis, G od in the D ock , 226-227.
2Singer, Animal Liberation, 16-17. See also, Dolan, 119, where he asserts that 
Singer’s use of an orphaned infant to make his point is calculated to divest the argument 
of extraneous issues such as parental feelings, thus isolating the issue of protecting the 
infant solely on grounds of human status. Nevertheless, Singer’s example illustrates the 
truth of Lewis’s argument.
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human attributes, there is no reason to grant them rights at all. Significantly, Frey 
declares that the arguments for human preference are essentially religious arguments and 
that “unless one of these arguments is accepted, we have no basis upon which to 
differentiate the cases of babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled from that of 
animals.”1 Frey lucidly highlights the distinct possibility when the boundary between 
human and animal is blurred, the marginal cases will be further marginalized instead of 
further protected. That is, we become more likely to exploit babies and the mentally 
handicapped than to protect the sentient animals, because the argument from marginal 
cases is grounded in granting rights based on functionality. If the functions on which 
rights are granted are too broad, rights lose their significance and no one will take them 
seriously.
We saw Rachels go one step further in raising the possibility that there may be 
instances where the animal may be entitled to preference over the human.2 Granted, 
Rachels seems to try to limit the possibilities to extremely marginal cases, but 
nevertheless, we see the potential of a complete reversal of the overall intent of the 
argument from marginal cases residing within the argument itself.
What do these practitioners of the marginal-cases argument do with these 
criticisms? Virtually nothing. Pluhar suggests that Frey, who defends human preference,
•Frey, 31-32.
2Rachels, CfA, 209.
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is one of the few who actually face up to the possibility of lost rights.1 Pluhar herself 
exhibits strong tendencies to dismiss such challenges to the argument from marginal 
cases by asserting that the criticism applies only to the bioconditional version.2 But why 
should the bioconditional view impact only the human-person criterion of moral 
inclusion and not the categorical version as well? Pluhar does not address this issue. The 
argument from marginal cases is capable of results opposite to the purpose for which it is 
used. Saletan gives us a good illustration of how unintended consequences can cause 
severe problems for the argument from marginal cases.
Saletan’s reversal of the marginal-cases argument
Responding to a Peter Singer article on bestiality,3 William Saletan turns the 
marginal-cases argument against one of its own champions. Singer appears to argue that 
social mores against bestiality are part of a larger program of speciesism (influenced by 
Christianity) to differentiate humans from animals. Singer hints that the current world 
view of man and animals not being different means we may need to re-think the issue. In 
other words, sex between humans and animals may not be evil if it is not cruel to one of
'Pluhar, 121.
2For example, she responds to an attack on the argument from marginal cases by 
asserting that the “‘reversibility’ charge [i.e. that marginal cases undermines human 
rights instead of increasing animal rights] . . . applies on ly  to the bioconditional version 
of the argument.” Ibid., 72. She never says why it does not apply to the categorical 
version.
3Singer, “Heavy Petting.” See also, William Saletan, “Shag the Dog,” Slate, 5 
April 2001, http://www.slate.com/id/103801/ (20 May 2002).
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the participants, and is mutually satisfying.1
Saletan responds by raising the issue of consent: Is sex without consent immoral? 
What mental capacities are needed to give consent? If Singer believes consent is 
necessary, then the marginal-cases argument kills him, for as Saletan points out, “A 
philosopher’s duty is to clarify his principles and defend their consistent application. 
Those who embrace the principle of consent, and who agree that an animal ‘is no more 
capable than a child of giving meaningful consent,’ have done both. They have stated 
their principle and applied it to sex with children.”2 Saletan has brilliantly reversed the 
direction of the argument from marginal cases. The crucial implication is that if it is 
morally acceptable to have sex with an non-consenting animal, then there must be no 
ethical inhibition to having sex with non-consenting humans of similar capabilities to the 
animals. Thus, Saletan has astutely pointed out that if Singer sticks with his argument 
from marginal cases in general, and holds to his proposals on bestiality, then defacto he 
has to approve of some types of pedophilia.
This specter diminishes the attractiveness of the argument from marginal cases. 
The destructive effects of pedophilia and other sexual abuse of children are widely 
recognized. Even apart from speciesism, we have sound reasons to conclude such 
practices are morally wrong. Saletan has masterfully exploited this issue, and has 
convincingly demonstrated that the marginal-cases argument is not automatically in favor
'Singer, “Heavy Petting.”
2Saletan, “Shag the Dog.”
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of rights for marginal humans, nor does it automatically create equal rights for animals.
Danger of basing moral duties on extreme cases
It is possible that Singer might respond to this critique by chastising Saletan for 
using an overly extreme case for grounding his moral criticism of Singer’s position. But 
this is no more extreme than Singer’s own tactics. Neuhaus, reporting on a debate he had 
with Singer, depicts Singer’s propensity to begin the argument “with hard cases (the 
anencephalic infant being his prime example),” and then develop the general moral rule 
(for example, a general moral rule concerning abortion).1 Of more significance to us is 
that Rachels is equally prone to the same method. In his fourth edition of his textbook, 
he opens the book with three extreme cases to begin establishing the foundations of 
moral reasoning.2 Throughout the book several more such cases are used, and major
'John Neuhaus, “A Curious Encounter with a Philosopher from Nowhere,” First 
Things: A Journal o f  Religion and Public Life 120 (February 2002): 3. For a specific 
example see Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem o f  
Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1-3, where Singer and 
Kuhse open with a Down’s Syndrome case to begin establishing a case for euthanizing 
handicapped infants. Instead of developing the moral norms based on the average 
healthy baby, the norm is first set to accommodate the extreme case, then applied to the 
normal cases. He uses another Down’s Syndrome example in Unsanctifying, 218, to 
debunk the concept of the sanctity of human life to again argue in favor of euthanasia. 
Such tactics appear to be the norm for Singer.
2Rachels, Elements (2002), 1-11. In reference to euthanasia, Rachels’s first chapter 
o f  the 4th edition o f  his textbook uses cases ranging from an anencephalic baby, 
co-joined twins who could not be separated without forfeiting the life of one, to a father 
who killed his 2 year old daughter with advanced cerebral palsy an act of mercy killing. 
Each of these cases is used to stretch traditional ethical views to logical absurdities which 
are then said to discredit the traditional views. See also Rachels, Elements (1999), 1-15. 
Another example can be found in, CfA, 189, where Rachels contrasts a severely brain­
damaged infant, instead of a normal healthy infant, with an ape to argue for granting 
higher rights to the latter.
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moral policies are suggested based on such cases. Therefore, it seems that Saletan’s 
turning of the tables is not inappropriate.
Rachels notes that precedential arguments based on these extreme cases are often 
opposed by the “slippery slope” argument. Stated in simple form, the slippery slope 
argument would assert that if we accept case A to be legal and moral, it will eventually 
lead to radicalized applications, B, C , . . .  Z. Rachels rightly notes that “this kind of 
argument is easy to abuse.” He then continues, “If you are opposed to something, but you 
have no good arguments against it, you can always make up a prediction about what it 
might lead to; and no matter how implausible your prediction is, no one can prove you 
wrong.”1 There is some truth to this. However, the moral conclusions drawn by Rachels 
(and Singer) are extreme enough to authenticate the charges that they are sliding down 
the slippery slope. Grounding morality on extreme or marginal cases seems less than 
prudent, and seems to make it possible for one to justify the violation of individuals in 
less extreme circumstances.
Marginal-cases argument rooted in human preference
A second possible way that Singer might respond to Saletan’s argument is that it 
still belies human speciesism. This is indeed possible. But the attractiveness of Pluhar’s 
and Singer’s marginal case arguments is no less speciesist. Their efforts to gain support 
for animal rights create an emotive tie between the rights of animals and certain classes 
of humans. Thus, it seems implied that if we wish to preserve these rights for certain
Rachels, Elements (2002), 11.
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humans (a key assumption of this argument), we must concede that the animals have 
rights as well. Such an position, however, appeals to species-based self-interest.
The speciesist taint is not limited to the argument from marginal cases. Singer 
seeks to make animal rights more palatable to the unconvinced reader by arguing that 
animal rights advocates have a better record of caring for human beings than do 
speciesist humans, and that the elimination of human moral preference will create more 
compassion for humans. Singer asserts rightly that to care for animals does not mean we 
do not and cannot care for humans.1 By appealing to humanocentric interests in 
advocating animals’ rights, Singer is making a speciesist appeal, rooted in species self- 
benefit.
Ryder argues from the reverse angle. He asserts that if we persist in the total 
subordination of nonhumans, we are paving the way for a more callous attitude towards 
the weak, the elderly and the handicapped in our own species.2 Here, again, the case is 
argued in terms of human benefit. Thus the very premise being rejected is relied upon to 
ground the assertion. The animal rights advocates cannot seem to fully avoid basing 
rights on being human, much as they try to avoid doing just that. We must suggest that 
this is evidence that humanness has moral meaning, or of a common, inherently speciesist 
mind-set. Either way, the animal rights advocates end up with a contradiction that makes 
less than full sense. The marginal-cases argument is inadequate because it does not
‘Singer, Animal Liberation, 234-35.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 11.
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clearly define the minimum standard of moral inclusion. At best, it hints at functions like 
self-awareness, or at least a minimum level of intelligence, but the standard is not clear.
Trying to ground rights in personal abilities and functions has shown itself to be 
problematic. There is one final proposal that attempts to fill this void. Up to this point, I 
have focused my evaluation on arguments made by a grouping of scholars allied in the 
cause for elevating animal rights. What remains is the task of evaluating the individual 
position of Rachels and his ethics of moral individualism.
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CHAPTER SIX
EVALUATION OF RACHELS’S USE OF EVOLUTION 
TO INFORM AND SHAPE ETHICS
Moral individualism is Rachels’s attempt to solve some of the challenges 
associated with the marginal-cases argument. In moral individualism, Rachels strongly 
advocates that all rights are to be determined by the individual’s capacities and abilities. 
Species membership has no moral relevance. This radical rejection of species as relevant 
to morals, and the ensuing emphasis on the moral significance of the individual, raises 
some new challenges.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that reaction to Rachels is virtually non­
existent. There appears to be two reasons for this. First, the evolutionary world-view is 
so dominant that, even in many Christian circles, it is now beyond question. Thus the 
fundamental premises of the arguments rooted in evolutionary development go 
unchallenged and the arguments are seen as self-evidently sensible. Second, concerning 
Rachels, Peter Singer has published abundantly more than Rachels and thus has been the 
central focal point o f  Christian reaction. This has left little reaction if any to the work of 
Rachels. Therefore, I shall, to a great extent, have to press on alone in my analysis of 
these issues.
196
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Implications of Rejecting the Moral Significance 
of Species Membership
Charles Pinches argues that the radical anti-speciesists can only deal with the rights 
of individual specimens. This individualistic focus leaves them with little or no ability to 
deal with issues pertinent to populations of a species, since species distinctions are 
virtually denied.1 Pinches offers the additional criticism that those who oppose 
speciesism make a “strong anthropocentric/nonanthropocentric distinction” which he 
argues to be a false dichotomy that separates the interests of others entirely from my own, 
which is impossible, even with animals.2 In other words, radical moral individualism 
leads to an isolationist morality where the interrelationships between individuals can 
become morally minimized. This could lead to some interesting results.
Take, for example, Saletan’s reversal of the marginal-cases argument as related to 
bestiality, which was examined earlier.3 If Saletan is correct, Rachels’s position would 
undermine the concept that bestiality is somehow unnatural, for why should trans-species 
sexuality seem odd if species membership is morally irrelevant?
This possibility is further illustrated in a news report about a man in Maine who 
came out of the closet as a “zoophile”—one who practices bestiality. The man’s father 
responded to this news by attempting to kill him, thus bringing the issue into a court of
'Pinches, 196-197.
2Ibid„ 189.
3Saletan, “Shag the Dog,” 4-5.
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law. The victim petitioned the court to allow his “wife” (i.e., his dog with whom he 
commits his acts of bestiality), to be permitted to accompany him into the court room.
The petition was signed “Philip and Lady Buble” with a paw-print near his signature. In 
verbal arguments, Mr. Buble told the judge, “I've been informed your personal 
permission is needed, given that my wife is not human, being a dog of about 36 pounds 
weight and very well behaved.”1
Now if the dog and Mr. Buble are not different in kind, as Rachels claims, but 
merely share some characteristics, while not sharing others, why should the concept of a 
human being married to a dog (let alone the bestiality involved) strike us as being 
bizarre? According to moral individualism, this case should be judged strictly on the 
individual characteristics of the dog and Mr. Buble without regard to species 
membership. And even if Rachels finds grounds to reject this case as morally valid, it 
remains a theoretical possibility that one human and a particular dog could qualify for a 
trans-species marriage by having the right cocktail of individual characteristics. For 
moral individualism, one cannot automatically say that such an arrangement is bizarre, 
for the apparent oddity is rooted in species significance. Rachels might well object that 
an overly radical case has been chosen to make this point, yet we have already seen his 
penchant for using extreme cases to develop his ethics. Therefore we are not out of
•“Admitted Zoophile Is Beaten by Father with Crowbar Piscataquis County ME 
(US),” 7 December 2000, http://www.pet-abuse.eom/cases/854/ME/US/l (7 November 
2005). Originally found in May 2002 at a now-defunct site. Emphasis mine. See also, 
“Philip Buble,” 31 October 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Buble (7 November 
2005).
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bounds to evaluate a real, but unusual case by the methods he advocates. Moral 
individualism thus seems capable of supporting ethical conclusions quite contrary to 
common sense and moral intuitions. Aside from this, the significance of moral 
individualism is found in the underlying criterion for determining, one individual at a 
time, who is included in the moral community: being the subject of a life.
Analysis of the Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
Questionable Use of Regan’s Work
The subjects-of-a-life criterion seems logical and appealing, even self-evidently 
true. It would appear that Rachels has offered a unique contribution, as no credit is given 
to any other authors during his presentation of the issue. However, eight years earlier, 
Tom Regan proposed the “subjects-of-a-life” criterion.1 In fact, Regan’s presentation is 
more substantive, yet Rachels neither mentions nor offers any citation to Regan in 
connection with the subjects-of-a-life criterion. Rachels lists Regan’s book in the 
bibliography of Created from Animals, and discusses the significance of Regan a number 
of pages later, so he would appear to be aware of Regan’s work including this proposed 
criterion. In addition, Rachels makes periodic use of the argument in The End o f Life,2 
sometimes in veiled form, but again never ties it to Regan. Whether purposely or 
accidentally, the failure to properly credit Regan as the source of this idea would seem to
'Regan, Case fo r  Animal Rights, 243-248.
2See Rachels, The End o f Life, 5,23-28,49-55, 64-66. In all of these Rachels is 
arguing favorably towards euthanasia for those who cannot have a biographical life.
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be a grievous omission. Furthermore, such an omission raises questions on the 
originality of other, undocumented arguments given by Rachels. It may be that Rachels’s 
unique referencing style— in general, he only give references for direct quotations—may 
have contributed to this oversight.1 Be that as it may, Rachels’s argument while very 
similar to Regan’s, is communicated in a manner more easy for the common man to 
understand. This ability to communicate to the non-scholar is a key strength of Rachels 
which is demonstrated throughout much of his work.
Significance of Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
The significance of the subject-of-a-life criterion is highlighted by Ryder, when he 
notes that Regan was reacting to Utilitarian arguments, mainly by Singer, for the 
sentiency-painist criterion of moral inclusion. Ryder notes that for Regan, Singer’s view 
is too limiting, and that “nonhumans as well as humans have a certain ‘inherent value’ 
which may be independent o f the pleasure and pain which they experience.”2 The key 
point is that Regan himself argues that this inherent value is “a categorical value, 
admitting of no degrees.. . .  One either is a subject of a life . . .  or one is not. All those 
who are, are so equally.”3 Why it is categorical is not clearly argued by Regan but seems 
to be accepted as a given. This definition of an equally inherent value to all subjects-of-
‘In CfA, Rachels’s referencing style is rather unique. It is very cumbersome to use 
and generally only gives references for direct quotations. These are unnumbered, and 
listed by the opening line of the quotation in lists located at the end of the book, and 
indexed by each chapter. He has no numbered footnotes or endnotes.
2Ryder, Animal Revolution, 325.
3Regan, Case fo r  Animal Rights, 245. Emphasis in original.
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a-life appears to be the foundational concept for Rachels’s assertion that all subjects-of-a-
life deserve equal consideration, though not necessarily equal treatment.
Rachels likewise acknowledges the significance of Regan, by describing the
Utilitarian position as protecting animal welfare.
Singer, a utilitarian, would acknowledge that if an experiment [on animals] was 
designed so as to minimize suffering, and if it actually did more good than harm, it 
could be justified. He only criticized the great mass of research that could not pass 
even this minimum test. But Regan would have none of this utilitarian calculating. 
Instead, he said, we must acknowledge that, like humans, animals have rights that 
should not be violated under any circumstances whatever, not even if we think 
there is a great good to be achieved. While Singer was a reformer, Regan was an 
abolitionist.1
Thus, Rachels appears to join Regan in the abolitionist position. And the significance is 
this: According to online notes posted by Professor Ransom Slack, “Regan’s perspective 
is actually very similar to Kant’s.” Both define persons as having inherent moral value 
and thus we have a duty to respect their rights. Where they disagree is in how they 
define the inherently valuable person. “For Kant, persons are those with rational souls. 
For Regan, persons are those who are subjects of a life.”2 Thus Regan differs from 
Singer by locating the moral value within the individual instead of in the ability to suffer.
Rachels, CfA, 217-218. Emphasis in original. This argument clearly evidences 
connection to the subjects-of-a-life criterion but Rachels never makes the direct 
connection.
2Ransom Slack, “Lecture Notes 11,” Undated, 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/philosophy/15.275_notes_l 1 .pdf (17 May 2002). 
These appear to be the professor’s notes for a class. See, Ransom Slack, “15.275 L02 
Ethics and the Environment,” University o f Manitoba, Winter 2001, 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/philosophy/15.275%20L02%20MainPage.htm 
(17 May 2002). The wording between the two direct quotes is heavily dependent on 
Slack’s outline but some editing was needed to smooth out the grammar.
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Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion Based in Functions 
At first glance, this seems to exclude the subjects-of-a-life criterion from being a 
functional definition of rights because of the appeal to inherent value. But further 
information proves otherwise. The individual who is the subject of a life is so because of 
a multiplicity of functions. According to Regan, the subjects of a life “have beliefs and 
desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an 
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare- 
interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a 
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their 
experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for 
others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.”1 
This is a staggering list of functions and capacities that are deemed necessary to be the 
subject of a life. Rachels merely condenses Regan’s explanation into the concept of 
having a biographical life as opposed to merely a biological life. Even in simplified 
form, this list is, to a great degree, merely asserting a form of self-awareness as the grand 
criterion of moral protection. But this means, as Rachels notes, that “having a 
biographical life requires some fairly sophisticated mental capacities.”2
This leads to an apparent difference between Rachels and Regan in that Rachels 
argues that the richness of one biographical life over another seems to give it more value
'Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 243.
2Rachels, CfA, 208.
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than the less rich individual. “Thus, killing an animal that has a rich biographical life 
might be more objectionable than killing one with a simpler life.”1 He then notes the 
following implication: “The lives of humans and non-humans need not be accorded 
exactly the same value.” This, however, would seem to open the way for a new form of 
human speciesism, to which Rachels is clearly opposed. It could now be argued that the 
richness of a human’s life is greater than that of a dog or ape, therefore the human gets 
automatic preference. Furthermore, Rachels seems to have thus reintroduced the 
Utilitarian concept of the individual being mere receptacles of experiences, which Regan 
vehemently opposed.2 But there is a second question embedded in this differentiation of 
value based on the richness of the biographical life. How much biographical richness 
can the individual lose before disqualification for the moral status of being the subject of 
a life? In addressing this last issue, Rachels makes applications not found in Regan.
Subjects of a Life and Marginal Cases
Rachels uses the subjects-of-a-life criterion to argue that loss of biographical life 
may be grounds for justifying suicide and euthanasia, citing actual cases to bolster his 
point for each.3 But this raises a problem. Why should an otherwise rational person be
'Ibid., 209. On this and the preceding page, Rachels contrasts bugs and shrimp, 
who apparently have no biographical lives, with the rhesus monkey and humans, who are 
asserted to have biographical lives.
2See, Regan, Case fo r  Animal Rights, 243, where he argues, “Those who satisfy the 
subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value— inherent 
value—and are not to be viewed as mere receptacles.”
3Rachels, CfA, 200-205.
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able to commit suicide or request euthanasia? Has not Regan argued that if the 
individual is rational, enough to no longer desire life, has the capacity of carry out 
initiative, etc., as being inherently valuable and not to be violated under any 
circumstances? Why should the subject of a life be permitted to violate his own inherent 
value through being a subject of a life? It seems that the biographical life criterion has 
now become a matter of subjective preference.
For example, Rachels uses “the famous ‘Texas bum case”’ to argue for the 
preferential interpretation of biographical life. This case involved one Donald C. who 
was horribly burned in an a gas-line explosion. He was left blind, crippled, without 
fingers, and other injuries. Donald had been a rodeo performer, pilot, and “ladies man” 
among other things. Donald was treated against his will for two years, before changing 
his mind. Rachels claims that nine years later, Donald still maintained the doctors should 
have let him die and this was rational on Donald’s part, because “what his injury had 
done, from his point of view, was to destroy his ability to lead the life that made him the 
distinctive individual he was.”1 It would appear, then, that for Rachels, biographical life 
is something chosen, a collection of choices and experiences, which makes one the 
individual he or she is, and not merely the possession of certain capacities as Regan 
argued. Thus, Donald lost his biographical life of choice but not his biological life. 
Because Donald’s biographical life was no longer of no value to him, his biological life, 
upon which his biographical life depends, would have no further worth.
•Rachels, End o f Life, 54-55.
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Criticisms of the Subjects-of-a-Life Criterion
J. P. Moreland criticizes Rachels’s assertions based on the Donald C. case as being
totally subjective. He proposes a hypothetical counterexample in which a woman
chooses the biographical life of prostitution.
Her life plan is to become the best prostitute she can be. She enjoys bestiality, 
group sex, and certain forms of masochism. Her life has value from her point of 
view if and only if she can achieve these goals. Now suppose that she is in an 
accident that confines her to a wheelchair such that she is in no pain, she can lead a 
relatively productive life in various ways, but she can no longer pursue her desire 
to be the best prostitute ever. Does it make any sense to say that she would be 
rational to desire to die? Does it make sense to say that her biographical life is 
what gave her life value? . . .  Without objective material grounds that constitute a 
morally appropriate life plan, subjectivism would seem to follow.1
Indeed, Rachels’s concept of biograhical life seems to have departed from Regan’s
inherent value model to extreme subjectivity. If one’s biographical life is the primary
ground of personal identity, as was argued with Donald C., it makes other characteristics
morally insignificant, and seems to raise the possibility of one individual maintaining
multiple biographical lives. Moreland charges Rachels with teaching such. “It is even
possible for a bigamist, says Rachels, to lead two biographical lives.”2 Thus, Rachels has
moved from the inherent-value model to a personal preferential model not far from
personal egoism.
'J. P. Moreland, “James Rachels and the Active Euthanasia Debate,” Journal o f the 
Evangelical Theological Society 31 (1988): 88.
2Ibid., 86. Moreland does not reference this source. Whether or not Rachels 
actually makes this assertion, it is a logical possibility to occur under Rachels's proposed 
criterion.
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A second area of concern is the loss of rights due to accident or injury. Suppose an 
individual becomes comatose. Is that individual no longer the subject of a life? He or 
she would currently have no self-awareness or preferences. Who determines that an 
individual is no longer the subject of a life? It cannot be made by the individual in 
question for if they can make such a judgment, they defacto have the capacity to qualify 
as a subject of a life. An external party must decide in behalf of that individual. But if 
rights are based on one’s actual condition and not on future possibilities, why should the 
comatose person be considered the subject o f a life, even if the prognosis is good that 
they will recover in the near to moderate future? If outside relationships are excluded 
from reckoning, there is no reason to save the comatose person. Thus those who are 
marginal cases could end up in a rather precarious position concerning further biological 
life.
J. P. Moreland illustrates this with his argument related to the rule against killing 
innocent persons.
According to Rachels, people without biographical lives are no longer morally
significant regarding the rule not to kill But if the person has lost the right not
be killed—for example, because he was in a persistently vegetative state—it would 
seem that he has lost other rights as well. It would seem that one could experiment 
on the person or kill him brutally if  he so desired. Why? Because we are no longer 
dealing with an object that has relevant rights. In these cases there would seem to 
be no moral difference between a lethal injection or a more brutal means of killing. 
The patient has no life and is not an object of moral consideration and thus 
approaches a thing-like status.1
'Ibid., 88.
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This is a devastating critique for it broadens the implications of a loss of rights due to 
loss of functions qualifying one to be a subject of a life. Furthermore, it would seem that 
many marginal cases and many animals could no longer qualify for being the subject of a 
life.
In addition to these challenges, Rachels’s disparaging attitude towards biological 
life seems unwarranted. As J. P. Moreland notes of Rachels, “His understanding of 
biographical life, far from rendering biological life morally insignificant, presupposes the 
importance of biological human life.”1 Thus, Moreland rightly argues the wholistic 
indivisibility of biological and biographical life. The subjects-of-a-life criterion thus 
seems less than appealing due to its highly relativistic definition based in functional 
capacities. It seems probable, then, that to define moral inclusion on the basis of 
functional capacities threatens the equivalent of a moral, graveyard spiral, in which as the 
individual diminishes in capabilities, rights diminish also. Then, as the diminishments of 
rights further hinder one’s abilities and capacities, this further diminishment causes 
additional loss of rights.
The inconsistencies of the sentiency (painist) and marginal-cases criteria point to a 
larger overall problem. These approaches, as well as Rachels’s “subjects-of-a-life” 
criterion, share the common characteristic o f grounding rights in functional capabilities. 
Thus, they have argued that there is no uniquely human function that excludes the
•ibid., 86.
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animals while including all humans, including marginally functional humans. Such 
difficulties beg the question of how rights are to be grounded.
Some Challenges of Grounding Rights
Difficulty Establishing Moral Claims
A notable challenge for the grounding of rights is that not everyone accepts them 
as an objective reality. For example, Ryder argues, “I have come around to the view that 
rights are just human inventions.”1 He continues by arguing that “morality serves a 
useful psychological function for the individual by making it easier to decide how to 
behave.”2 But this raises some key problems. If morality is merely a human invention, 
generated, as argued by Ruse and others, by evolution, why should it be universally 
binding? At most it should have relevance to the individual making the decisions. 
Furthermore, it seems that our moral sense may well complicate decisions, not simplify 
them. How often do animals get stuck in deliberating options? It would seem far less 
likely than for the average human. And if we invented rights, why should animals have 
them? Rights would precisely have entailed protection of exclusively human interests 
since the animals do not have such a concept of entitlement. So Ryder’s position makes 
the concept of rights completely subjective and human centered.
Ryder also distinguishes between rights and duties. “Rights are said to reside in the 
victim, whereas duties are in the perpetrator. Moral instruction used to place emphasis
‘Ryder, Painism, 197.
2Ibid.
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upon the doer[;] now it emphasizes the done-to.”1 Thus, for Ryder, those who possess 
power have the capability to act and control others, and thus tend to favor focusing on 
duties—how they should act. By contrast, those who feel powerless tend to focus on 
rights because they do not have the ability to fully act independently and thus worry 
about being victimized by the powerful. Thus Victorian morality was seen by Ryder as a 
means of protecting the rights of particular classes while “today morality is a concern for 
all classes.”2 And this is how Ryder tries to bring the animals into the picture: as one of 
the previously excluded classes. But why should a human invention be applied to 
animals other than an anthropomorphizing of animals as victims of the powerful? Ryder 
does not supply an answer.
Others propose various critera for rights but all tend to focus on some kind of 
function. Roslind Godlovitch argues that the fundamental grounding principle of rights 
is the right to be free from constraint. “Ultimately, all moral rights rest on a presupposed 
right which is not itself grounded on a further principle.” This presupposed principle is 
“the equal right to be free from constraint.”3 For Godlovitch, this means that “in granting 
that someone has a moral right, one recognizes his liberty to pursue those interests that 
are compatible with the like interests of others.” Thus, she believes that “the only
‘Ryder, Animal Revolution, 328.
2Ibid. Emphasis in original.
3Godlovitch, 158.
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condition to be met in order to have a moral right is that one has interests, and this 
condition is met by all sentient beings.”1
Two things of significance stand out in Godlovitch’s argument. First, she admits 
that rights are ultimately based on a principle or principles that is presupposed and not 
grounded on some other value or premise. This is fundamentally true but many, 
including Rachels, seem to feel that presuppositions can be avoided and that all the 
foundational principles of morality and rights can be grounded in reason. But this itself 
is an unprovable presupposition, therefore Godlovitch is fundamentally correct.
Second, in grounding rights in interests she presumes a minimum level of function 
as the criterion for granting rights.2 But how are interests determined? Sentiency, 
usually in the form of painism, is usually proposed, but this presupposes a minimum level 
o f intelligence to be able to give an indication of preference (i.e., such as cries of distress, 
fleeing, flinching, etc.). This functionality view, in turn, brings us back to the problems 
of the marginal-cases argument that we have just examined.
The problem of determining the criteria of moral inclusion is highlighted by 
Dolan’s claim that “a right is the power to claim what is due.”3 But one must have a 
fairly high level of intelligence to make such a claim, and a tribunal in which to voice the
‘Ibid.
2Frey also notes that some appeal to having interests as the ground of rights. 
Addionally, Angus Taylor makes the same argument that those who have interests have 
rights. See, Frey, 6; Angus Taylor, Magpies, Monkeys, and Morals: What Philosophers 
Say about Animal Liberation (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 1999), 43.
3Dolan, 135.
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claim. This is why Frey argues the inability to maintain moral rights apart from the 
concept o f legal rights.1 So the functional model, which is a type of consequentialism, 
leaves us in a state of deep confusion in clearly establishing rights.
Rawls’s Analysis of Grounding Rights
Rawls rejects using the consequences of present circumstances as a viable means of 
establishing the foundations of rights, arguing, in part, that the this approach, which he 
calls “procedural interpretation,” can justify significant inequalities and thus provides no 
real protection for the individual.2 In response to this problem, he proposes that “the 
principle of equal liberty must be secured in advance of a given situation rather than 
depending on calculations of maximal good.”3 To do this, Rawls proposes his doctrine of 
the original or initial position—a hypothetical viewpoint in which moral rights and 
protections are to be determined from the perspective of being in an original position of 
ignorance of what one’s actual future status and condition will be. Thus, there can be no 
self-serving decisions because one might end up in the morally excluded group.4
However, the individual in the original position must be a moral person, which for 
Rawls, means that they are capable of having a conception of what is good for themself, 
and are capable of having a sense of justice. By moving the functional model to the
‘Frey, 8-9.
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original position, Rawls believes he protects individuals qualifying as a marginal case, 
who through various misfortunes or circumstances end up functionally challenged in real 
life.1 Thus, Rawls seems to impute the average human qualities and intelligence to the 
original position, which would seem then to exclude animals.2 So, while Rawls has 
provided a provocative alternative, it is still functionally based and offers no reason to 
stick with the original-position basis of morality other than sheer self-interest. Thus, 
Regan classifies Rawls’s ethical theory as a form of “rational egoism.”3 Rawls’s solution 
is intriguing, but at bottom, without any real consequences for violating or rejecting the 
original-position criterion, there is little reason other than perceived self-interest for 
adopting it.
Rawls’s concept of the original position reveals another problem by grounding the 
original-position criterion of moral inclusion in a minimum level of functionality. The 
original- position considers only that the individual cannot consider a particular view of 
his or her personal future in determining moral protections. This raises the question 
about duties to future generations. Rawls has no way to commend moral duty to future 
generations due to his egoistic perspective, because the original-position criterion seems 
incapable of including the perspective of another person in its calculation.
'Ibid., 442-443.
2Regan responds vigorously against this characteristic of Rawls’s moral theory, 
noting that the one in the original position must therefore be human, thus excluding 
animals from moral consideration. Regan, Animal Rights, 166, 167.
3Ibid., 163. Rational Egoism is clearly viewed by Regan as a form of 
Contractualism. See, 156-158.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
A similar dilemma is found in Singer’s work. Singer rejects the fetus as having 
actual characteristics entailing rights, and denies that potential characteristics have any 
moral bearing. In which case, the fetus is entitled to no rights, including to life.1 It 
would seem that Singer’s position would deny moral duties to future generations because 
they have no actual functions and capacities on which to base rights. The only 
consideration that could be given is to the present generation. So functional criteria do 
not give us a clear moral picture, nor do they provide a compelling case for protecting 
animals or marginal human cases. This may be why Griffiths chastises those who try to 
ground animal rights in evolution, for he sees evolution as under effective attack and 
criticism. Thus, “to base an ethics o f animal welfare on what is still widely regarded as 
only a hypothesis is to skate on thin ice. It is bad ethics to make one’s morals depend so 
heavily on the vagaries of the results of scientific research.”2
Must Animals Have Rights to Be Given Moral Protection?
The arguments we have examined seem to assume that if animals are not granted 
equal rights with humans, then animals are automatically open to exploitation and abuse. 
Frey flatly denies this, asserting that denial of moral rights to animals does not leave 
them defenseless. He states that even if  no moral rights are posited, actions can still be 
morally wrong. The issue is sufficient justification, not rights.3 Thus, we see that having
linger, Rethinking, 210.
2Griffiths, 17.
3Frey, Interests and Rights, 170.
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rights is no guarantee that sufficient reason to suspend those rights will not be found, and 
even when rights are possessed, there is no guarantee they will be respected. This last 
point is significant precisely because these animal rights proponents uncritically assume 
that right will be respected and that a denial of rights for animals entails their exploitation 
and abuse, yet this latter entailment is not necessarily true.
Carruthers likewise argues that regarding the question whether animals have moral 
standing, “A negative reply need not entail that there are no moral constraints on our 
treatment of animals.”1 Thus, “even if we were to agree that animals lack moral standing, 
it would not follow that we can, with impunity, treat animals as we please.”2 Carruthers 
notes that “things that lack moral standing may nonetheless have indirect moral 
significance, giving rise to moral duties in a round-about way.”3 Furthermore, “it needs 
to be emphasized that our question about the moral standing of animals is not the same as 
the question whether animals matter.”4
On what grounds then do they matter? Carruthers argues that castles have no moral 
significance for rights, but can have moral significance because many people care about 
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them. Likewise, observes Carruthers, we can have indirect duties to animals because of 
the people who love them.1
The Indirect Duty Criterion 
Regan describes the argument represented by Carruthers as the “indirect duty 
view” of rights.2 This is because there must a third party who has an interest in the 
subject whose rights are in question. In reference to animals, David DeGrazia describes 
this position as asserting that “we have indirect duties to animals based on direct duties to 
humans.”3 This view, however, is not without its critics.
Regan argues that if the third party to whom the duty is owed is somehow removed 
from the situation (e.g., by death or by change of mind), then the individuals to whom the 
indirect duty is due lose their rights.4 DeGrazia attacks the indirect duty criterion from
‘Ibid, 2. See also p. 194, where he gives two contractualist reasons for treating 
animals well: (1) Out of respect for animal lovers; (2) on the basis of the good or bad 
character qualities of character that animals may evoke in us. Both are clearly rooted in 
human interests and both are based on the ability to have a contractual relationship.
2Regan, Animal Rights, 150.
3David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41. An example of a lack of moral 
spillover, given by DeGrazia, is that if there were not other humans in the world to have 
an interest in the animals, then acts of cruelty to animals would become morally neutral. 
It is important to note also that DeGrazia tends to confuse indirect duty with the 
argument that cruelty to animals harms the character of the abusing human. These are 
actually separate arguments.
4Regan, Animal Rights, 160. An unwitting illustration of this is found in Singer’s 
Utilitarian argument concerning the rights of the fetus or newborn baby. Singer argues 
both have no inherent rights as they have no capacities worth basing rights on, but adds 
that due to the “others affected” by an abortion or infanticide, that the right to life may be 
granted. But he also clearly implies that the unwanted newborn or fetus can be
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the opposite side. Suppose one can act cruelly to animals with no undesirable moral 
spillover to others—for example, you are the only human in the world so no one can 
claim offense—then acts of cruelty to animals must be morally neutral, and DeGrazia 
finds this unacceptable.1 Thus he is forced to argue, “it is prima facie wrong to cause 
suffering (regardless o f who the sufferer is).”1 But with all the suffering caused by 
predation, we have seen this to be a problematic assumption.
By contrast, Carruthers assigns rights to the context of relationships and 
responsibilities. Rights imply responsibility to properly manage those rights in a way 
that will not interfere with others’ rights. Animals such as an elephant, dog, or dolphin 
cannot assume such responsibilities, for, as Regan notes, they cannot be held morally 
accountable for their actions.3 But this raises two questions. First, what responsibilities 
can a newborn human baby or comatose adult hold? Carruthers seems to have a good 
point but the marginal-cases argument could now be used to exclude some humans from 
possessing rights. Second, why should one treat animals nicely because unknown 
strangers love those animals? Such reasoning may well provide protection to domestic 
animals since their welfare is clearly tied to human interests, but it seems to leave little 
protection for wild creatures. Just because someone loves mice, should people be 
morally bound from setting traps in their homes to protect their property? Carruthers
terminated. See Singer, Rethinking, 210-212.
'DeGrazia, 41-43.
2Ibid, 43. Emphasis in original.
3Regan, Animal Rights, 152.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
217
hints at the right idea, but has too narrow a vision. He has come very close to a 
significant theological concept which, if taken seriously, would give us basic moral 
duties to animals, but without investing them with human-style rights.1
Theological Form of Indirect Duty Criterion 
Our duty to animals can be grounded in the biblical belief that “the earth is the 
Lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein” (Ps 24:1 KJV). 
Since God owns the animals and cares for lilies and sparrows (Matt 6:28, 10:29-31), we 
are to treat them with care because He cares. It is true that if the indirect duties are to 
man alone, this model will fail in protecting the marginal cases or the animal kingdom. 
But, for the believer in God, it is a different story. Thus, Dolan notes the propensity of
'Lest we think Carruthers is a Bible-bashing fundamentalist, let the reader be 
reminded that Carruthers is seeking a purely secular rationale to ground his ethical 
arguments. In fact, on pp. 13-14, in reference to the animal rights issue, he finds theistic 
ethics deficient for two reasons: First, Christian values carry little conviction in an 
increasingly secular era. They are not salable. Second, he uses Plato’s argument from 
Euthyphro (which we saw in the previous chapter) as to whether God chooses the good 
because it’s good or whether it’s good because God chooses it. Either way, it is argued, 
you end up with a concept of good which is independent from God. Therefore we would 
not need God in order to know what is good. Thus, he concludes, when we read the 
Bible, our interpretations should be constrained and controlled by our scientific 
knowledge, and we should reinterpret those passages which are contradictory to modem 
scientific knowledge. Carruthers states that if, in our secular view, we can find no moral 
objection to homosexuality, then we must dismiss St. Paul’s condemnation of it as Paul 
speaking as a man of his time, rather than accept it as the word of God.
I cannot digress into lengthy discussion o f  these interesting tangents at this 
juncture. Rather, the point is that Carruthers’s objections to animal rights are not rooted 
in religious argumentation. Thus he comes close to supporting the stewardship motif but 
falls short because of his lack of theistic reference.
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those advocating religiously based ethics, particularly Christians, “to deny rights to 
animals yet talk of humans having duties toward animals.”1
Recognizing Godlovitch’s claim that the grounding point of ethics is an unprovable 
presupposition, the Christian looks to God for moral guidance. In addition to the 
statement that “the earth is the Lord’s,”2 further texts reinforce the idea that God also 
owns the wild beasts and the “cattle on a thousand hills.”3 The biblical God knows and 
sees all,4 and is maker and source of wisdom.5 But these attributes alone are not enough.
As we have seen Frey argue, moral rights need to be connected to legal rights.6 
Thus, God’s awareness o f all behavior must be complemented with a judicial dimension, 
and hence the necessity of the doctrine of divine judgment of the world. As Qoheleth 
tells us, “Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his 
commandments: for this [is] the whole [duty] of man. For God shall bring every work
!Dolan, 136. Regan hardly mentions the use of God in indirect duty models, 
reserving the issue to two brief acknowledgments of such a belief, but he never interacts 
with it in any substantive way. This may be due to earlier arguments in chapter 1, where 
he eliminates religious theories as viable sources of ethics, thus siding with Rachels in 
disconnecting God from morality. See Regan, The Case fo r  Animal Rights, 150, 193. By 
contrast, we have seen Rachels acknowledge the significance of religious ethics and offer 
a thoughtful response, and thus commend him for it.
2Exod 9:29; Deut 10:14; Ps 24:1.
3Ps 50:10.
4Isa 46:10; 1 Cor 3:19-20.
5Prov 2:6; 8:22.
6Frey, 8-9.
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into judgment, with every secret thing, whether [it be] good, or whether [it be] evil.”1 
Stories like God’s reaction to Balaam beating his donkey, and His threat in Revelation to 
“destroy them which destroy the earth,”2 seem to indicate that there will be judicial 
reckoning for how men treat God’s earth and animals. And the God who never sleeps or 
slumbers, and knows when the sparrow falls, even numbering the hairs of our heads, also 
promises that he does not forget things.3 Thus the only weak point in the indirect-duty- 
to-God view is the human agent. But even then, the forgetful human will be held 
accountable. The indirect duty view, as duties to an almighty, governing God, means 
theat even if we deny that animals have unique rights and privileges in and of themselves, 
there are still universal, morally binding duties towards them. Thus, it is not duties in 
reference to man, but in reference to God that will provide the moral foundation for 
maintaining moral obligations to the animal kingdom, while still ascribing a higher level 
of moral status to humans.
After examining a number of anti-speciesist attempts to find a functional model for 
grounding individual rights that will include some animals with humans in the sphere of 
moral protection, I have found that the proposed criteria for moral status seem to create 
as many or more problems than they solve. Perhaps this is, in part, because these 
arguments are not part of an orderly, unified system of thought. Rachels’s moral
‘Eccl 12:13-14 KJV.
2Num 22:21-34; Rev 11:18. Balaam’s confession of sin is in the context of the 
angel’s confrontation over how he had treated his donkey.
3Ps 121:4; Isa 49:15; Matt 10:29-30; Luke 12:6-7.
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individualism was a start towards making an orderly system, but he does little else with 
it. Thus in later works he expanded and developed his ideas. What shall we make of his 
expanded version of ethics in reference to evolution and its impact on morality?
Analysis of Rachels’s Expanded Ethical Theory
Introduction
Rachels’s use of evolution in The Elements o f  Moral Philosophy at first seems trite. 
Maybe this is because he treats evolution as an accepted fact instead of as the scientific 
theory it is. Furthermore, Rachels does not explain why relative newness on the 
evolutionary timetable means humans should not prefer their own species over others. He 
just tosses the idea out that being relative newcomers should make us humble. But why 
should it? By evolutionary models, the humano-centric mentality must have been a trait 
that helped man avoid extinction and become the superior species he now is. So why is 
human preference wrong?
Rachels’s only answer is that it seems to open the door for mistreatment of animals. 
But in his textbooks, he never really addresses why the animals should be considered for 
moral protection, except for a brief reference to their ability to suffer. Rachels could 
have strengthened his case against human hubris had he chosen to use an evolutionary 
kinship argument similar to Dawkins. Rachels himself admits the theoretical portions are 
incomplete but rightly justifies this due to the target audience of his book—people who 
have never studied ethics.1
'Rachels, Elements (2002), ix.
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Consequentialist Tendencies
On the other side of the coin, Rachels’s other deductions from Darwinism make 
rational sense. For example, it seems nearly self-evident that consequentialism is a 
logical extension of evolutionary principles. This, in turn, leads to a teleological form of 
ethics in which the moral good is maximizing good consequences. As Peter Singer notes, 
“Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess the actions by 
the extent to which they further these goals.”1 Rawls points out the attractiveness of 
consequentialism in stating, “Teleological theories have a deep intuitive appeal since 
they seem to embody the idea of rationality. It is natural to think that rationality is 
maximizing something and that in morals it must be maximizing the good. Indeed, it is 
tempting to suppose that it is self-evident that things should be arranged as to lead to the 
most good.”2
Rachels certainly takes advantage of the intuitive appeal of teleological ethics, 
especially Utilitarianism, but he appears to avoid some of the limits of consequential 
ethics. Singer notes that “the consequences of an action vary according to the 
circumstances in which it is performed.”3 Pure consequentialism, then, has at least two 
crucial limits. First, no matter what one’s motive is, whatever one intended the 
consequences to be, they may turn out different from expected and thus the agent can end
’Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
2Rawls, 22.
3Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
up acting immorally by accident. Consequentialism thus gives little assurance that good 
intentions can produce good results. This inability to give moral confidence highlights a 
second major limitation of consequentialism.
The second weakness of consequentialism is that it is only as effective as our 
capability to forecast results of our actions. In average, simple circumstances, this may 
not be much of a problem. If a man takes the radiator cap off his car radiator 
immediately after driving, he is likely to get scalded by boiling coolant. But in more 
complicated issues, our ability to forecast results accurately diminishes significantly.
The difficulty of some medical prognoses can be good illustrations of the difficulty of 
forecasting consequences. Rachels does nothing to address these limitations except to 
acknowledge that virtues such as love and loyalty are important, even though they may 
not show immediate consequentialist value. For that we must give him credit. On the 
other hand, however, it seems that Rachels himself may have fallen victim to the 
apparent self-evidential qualities of teleological ethics.
A final aspect of the problem of forecasting consequences is one I have never seen 
addressed by consequentialists. We have seen Rachels demand that we include future 
generations in our moral reckoning. But how far into the future should we calculate 
potential consequences in order to properly consider everyone’s benefits? Suppose there 
is an energy executive deciding on policies and procedures for finding more oil, gas, 
coal, etc. How far into the future should she calculate projected consequences? A 
month? A year? 5 years? 50 years? 150 years? Assumably one should integrate all future 
consequences into the reckoning, yet the further forward in time one makes projections,
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the greater the chance of inaccuracy. This, in turn, increases the chance that an action 
that seems moral at first can end up becoming immoral over time. The limited ability of 
man to forecast consequences points us to the fact that human reason is limited and 
fallible. This raises questions about the limits of human reason.
Is Reason Alone Sufficient?
Rachels essentially tries to use reason as the sole ground of morality. His cohort in 
animal liberation philosophy, Peter Singer, likewise puts all his moral eggs in the basket 
of reason.1 Singer, however, may have unwittingly crippled the reason-alone case.
While arguing for an ethics based solely on reason, he makes a lengthy argument that 
rationality is not limited to ethics because one can be rational while still being unethical. 
Reason thus does not have to be ethical.2
This observation deals a fatal blow to the belief that morality can be determined 
solely by reason. If, as Singer says, the unethical can be equally in accordance with 
reason, then reason alone must be incapable of determining what is moral and immoral. 
Some other assisting element is now needed. As Gordon Preece states, “Reason is
'Singer, Practical Ethics, 8-9. See also: Peter Singer, Rethinking, 189, 220, where 
Singer is apparently attracted to an ethics based on reason alone because he perceives the 
“traditional” or “standard view” of ethics, i.e., the Judeo-Christian moral system, as being 
“paradoxical” and “incoherent.” His cohort in advocating infanticide, Helga Kuhse says: 
“Peter Singer has been accused of being cold-hearted and excessively rational, and it is 
true, as Singer explained to a reporter, that for him it is generally reason first and 
emotions second.” See Kuhse, “Introduction: The Practical Ethics of Peter Singer,” 11.
2Singer, Practical Ethics, 320-335.
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important, but not all-important.”1 Tony Coady notes that reason must take the facts of 
human nature into account including dispositions and emotions. He asserts that such 
moral emotions as sympathy, resentment, indignation, and compassion, are important to 
rationality and ethics.2 Thus Preece declares that “humankind does not live by head 
alone.”3 To do so would make one, in C. S. Lewis’s words, “Men Without Chests.” 
Lewis has created a word picture in which, reason, like a king, is to rule man 
through an executive officer. Thus, “the head rules the belly through the chest—the seat 
. . .  of Magnanimity, of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The 
Chest—Magnanimity, Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between 
the cerebral man and the visceral man. It may even be said that by this middle element 
man is man: for by his intellect his is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.” Lewis 
then charges that some modem educators, in the name of being intellectual, are out to 
create men without chests—without habituated moral sentiments. He then concludes that
'Gordon Preece, “The Unthinkable and Unlivable Singer,” in Rethinking Peter 
Singer: A Christian Critique, ed. Gordon Preece (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 2002), 54.
2Tony Coady, “Morality and Species,” Res Publica 8, no. 2 (1999): 12. Coady is 
reacting to Singer’s direct rejection of emotional influences in moral thinking. See 
Singer, Practical Ethics, 170-171, where Singer asserts that when contemplating 
infanticide, “We should put aside feelings based on the small, helpless 
and—sometimes— cute appearance of human infants,” and calls such emotions “strictly 
irrelevant” to the moral evaluation o f  infanticide. Thus, Rachels’s MSU is o f  
significance in that Rachels has called for morals to be based on the facts of human 
nature as explained by Darwinism, including emotions. Significantly, he also has gone 
beyond Darwinism to take the facts of our psychological and emotional nature and 
include those factors in MSU, as Coady suggests the ethicist should.
3Preece, “The Unthinkable,” 55.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
“in a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make 
men without chests and expect of them honor and virtue.. . .  We castrate and bid the 
geldings be fruitful.”1 In short, both moral intuition and sentiment are needed to assist 
our powers of reason and prevent unethical conclusions. Rachels partially acknowledges 
this need in recognizing the moral importance of virtues such as love and loyalty which 
normally would not fit into a Utilitarian-style ethics, but he does not go far enough in 
allowing moral intuitions to aid reason in shaping moral conduct.2
The Norm of Treating People as They Deserve
A final issue of Rachels’s ethics is his proposed norm of treating people as they 
deserve. Certainly, there is a need for some concept of the basic principle of just deserts. 
Justice is crippled if there is no foundational concept that freely chosen behaviors can and 
should be duly recompensed. But, Rachels has no corresponding concept of grace to 
mingle with the concept of deserts. In this regard, it seems that biblical Christianity has a 
great advantage, but as that is more a theological concern, I shall instead inquire into the 
tie between deserts and exceptions. Rachels uses the principle of deserts as a means to
'C. S. Lewis. The Abolition o f  Man: How Education Develops M an’s Sense o f  
Morality (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1947), 34-35.
2Singer illustrates the divorce of moral intuitions from reason when he argues for 
the moral acceptability o f  infanticide. In P ractica l Ethics, 170-171, he states: “We 
should put aside feelings based on the small, helpless and—sometimes—cute appearance 
of human infants.. . .  IF we can put aside these emotionally moving but strictly irrelevant 
aspects of killing of a baby we can see that the grounds for not killing persons do not 
apply to newborn infants.” Rachels appears not to be quite so radical in his devotion to 
reason. For more discussion of the need of moral intuitions, see Preece, “The 
Unthinkable,” 26-27, 32, esp. 54-59.
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know when to make an exception to the moral obligation to promote everyone’s interests 
alike. But how easily can this exception be made? How moral is a morality that can be 
relatively easily bypassed with exceptions?
We have arrived at two major but conflicting views of morality. One dictionary of 
philosophical terms defines “morality” as “what in fact people believe to be right or 
wrong.”1 Such a definition of morality makes it subject to the whims of people’s beliefs. 
Rachels’s concept of the optimal list fits into this definition of morality as being what the 
individual believes to be right or wrong for his/herself.
But this definition of morality seems tremendously fickle and shallow. Should not 
something moral carry more weight than mere “belief’ even if that belief is well 
reasoned? Morality should be more universally binding and prescriptive if it is to have 
any meaning. Thus Tom Regan declares that a moral principle, “must prescribe that all 
moral agents are required to act in certain ways, thereby providing, so we are to assume, 
rational guidance in the conduct of life.”2 The American Heritage Dictionary, however, 
provides a different definition of morality: “The quality of being in accord with standards 
of right or good conduct.”3 In a similar fashion, The Living Webster Dictionary gives the
'Gregory Pence, A Dictionary o f  Common Philosophical Terms (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2000), s.v. “morality.”
2Regan, Case fo r  Anim al Rights, 130. Emphasis mine.
3The American College Dictionary, 2d College ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1985), s.v. “morality.”
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definition, “the quality of conforming to principles of good conduct.”1 Notice that here 
morality involves conformity to moral standards, which seem to be cast as universal. 
Regan thus correctly catches the prescriptive and universal elements of morality. It 
seems that Rachels’s planning for exceptions weakens these two key elements of 
morality, leaving us on the edge of ethical subjectivism—right and wrong are what we 
believe or decide is right and wrong. On the other hand, we must not confuse situational 
flexibility in applying moral principles. Rachels is to be commended for his situational 
sensitivity, but it seems he has sacrificed too much in the process, leaving morality as 
less than universally prescriptive.
Another key problem comes in Rachels’s argument that we should treat individuals 
as they deserve to be treated based on their prior, freely chosen behavior. If just deserts 
are based on what the agent has freely chosen, then the whole subjects-of-a-life argument 
from Created from Animals gets called into question. The marginal human, including the 
infant, and the shrimp have not freely chosen their condition. Why then should their lack 
of self-awareness become a criteria for moral exclusion in some circumstances? By 
arguing for treatment based on recompensing responsibility, Rachels introduces a huge 
conflict into his system of ethics, particularly in reference to justifying differential 
treatment between the interests of marginal human cases and a higher animal, as neither 
party has the ability to make the free choices upon which the principle of just deserts 
stands. Rachels neither shows recognition of this problem, nor offers any solution to it.
]The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary o f the English Language (Chicago, 
IL: The English Language Institute of America, 1975), s.v. “morality.”
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Analysis of Rachels’s Attacks on the Image-of-God Thesis
Introduction
We come now to Rachels’s unique contribution. Rachels appears to be unique in 
his effort to use the theory of evolution to dethrone traditional, Christian ethics, and then 
to propose a replacement moral system based on the principles of Darwinism. I shall 
divide this analysis into two sections. First I shall examine Rachels’s claims that 
Darwinism undermines traditional ethics. In particular, I shall especially focus on his 
attempts to discredit the image of God thesis, though I shall also briefly survey his efforts 
to undermine the rationality thesis. Second, I shall analyze the nature of the ethics that 
Rachels proposes for replacing traditional ethics to see key implications for Christian 
morality.
It would be easy to merely say that it is self-evident that if man evolved from apes 
instead of being specially created by God for a particular purpose, then man cannot be 
made in the image of God so therefore cannot claim special significance over the rest of 
creation. Though true, if  Rachels is right, such an argument seems shallow and trite. 
Rachels provides substantive reasons beyond this basic truism for concluding that 
evolution indeed undermines man’s special status as the image of God. We saw that 
Rachels uses two closely related issues to assert that Darwinism gives good reasons for 
rejecting the image-of-God-thesis: Teleology and the problem of evil. These two pillars 
of Rachels’s argument open some key vistas of moral and theological implications, some 
of which we have seen Rachels explicate. At the heart of both arguments is the belief
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that the present natural order is, in some way, incompatible with the existence of God as 
traditionally depicted in Christianity.
Analysis of the Attack on Teleology 
The traditional view of God has been seen to heavily involve the concept of a 
divine design that can be found in nature. By contrast, Rachels has flatly asserted that 
Darwinism is devoid of any such design and thus is incompatible with a traditional view 
of God. In identifying teleology as the philosophical nerve of Darwinism, Rachels thus 
intersects a long-standing philosophical debate to which he makes little or no reference. 
Wiker frames the design issue in terms of a war between two philosophical world-views: 
Aristotelian and Epicurean. Teleology was later argued in German philosophical circles, 
with Kant and Hegel favoring cosmic design while Nietzsche rejected it.
Aristotle versus Epicurus
Epicurus
Wiker asserts that “Aristotle’s account of nature is teleological. . .  because nature 
always acts for an end, the completeness of particular forms.. . .  Epicurean materialism 
is nonteleological.”1 Aristotle's belief that there was a purpose and design in nature can 
be seen, for example, in his work, Parts o f Animals (De partibus animalium). Here, 
Aristotle discusses which is first in priority: The Final Cause, that for the sake of which 
the thing is formed, and the Efficient Cause, to which the beginning of motion (i.e.,
‘Wiker, 103. See also pp. 20-21, where Wiker identifies this point as “the 
argument o f this book.”
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development) is due. Aristotle concludes that it is clearly the Final Cause that is first, 
since it is the logos or rational ground that determines course of development of each 
entity of nature.1 "Logically prior to the seed stands that of which it is the seed, because 
the End is an actual thing and the seed is but a formative process."2
Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that anything in nature originates or develops 
through chance. "So Empedocles was wrong when he said that many of the 
characteristics which animals have are due to some accident in the process of their 
formation."3 By contrast, he asserts, based on his teleological principle of the Final 
Cause, that, "because the essence of man is what it is, therefore a man has such and such 
parts, since there cannot be man without them .. . .  Because man is such and such, 
therefore the process of his formation must of necessity be such and such and take place 
in such a manner.. . .  And thus similarly with all the things that are constructed by 
nature."4 Thus, Aristotle clearly believes in an internal principle, which inherently 
contains design, which makes the man, dog, oak, etc., what they are. There is a design
'Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 12, Parts o f Animals, trans. A. 
L. Peck, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1968), 57, 59.
2Ibid., 75.
3Ibid., 61.
4Ibid., 63 (emphases original in the English translation). Aristotle makes similar 
arguments when discussing the formation of the embryo. See, Aristotle, Aristotle in 
Twenty Three Volumes, vol. 13, Generation o f Animals, trans. A. L. Peck, Loeb Classical 
Library, ed. G. P. Gould (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 145-155.
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for each entity. By contrast, we shall see that Epicurus rejected any concept of design in 
the cosmos, and did so, in part, through severing the gods from any work of rulership.
Epicurus
Epicurus was an atomist who believed that all matter is eternal, though the atoms 
may recombine. Hence he interpreted reality as being fundamentally materialist, without 
design in nature, and that true knowledge of that reality is to be gained through our 
senses.1 This view, in turn, affects his view of the nature of man and of the gods. 
Concerning man, Epicurus taught that the human soul disintegrates at death, and that in 
death there is no sense-perception.2 In a letter to Menoeceus, he wrote, "Get used to 
believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, 
and death is the privation of sense-experience."3 Here we see a clear connection of 
ethical good being connected to sense-experience and thus consequences. This is the 
hedonist principle that what brings pleasure is good, while that which causes displeasure 
or pain is evil. As Epicurus asserted, "We say that pleasure is the starting-point and goal 
of living blessedly."4 It seems significant that Rachels, as a modem materialist, follows
'Epicurus, "Letter to Herodotus," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and 
Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1994), 6-7. This also means that for Epicurus, there can be an 
infinite number of cosmoi (8).
2Ibid., 14, 18.
3Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and 
Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1994), 29.
4Ibid., 30.
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the Epicurean pattern of uniting his materialism with a consequentialist criterion of good 
and evil. It seems probable that there is a natural linkage between them. But why?
For Epicurus, the gods cannot be gods, enjoying a blessed and happy existence, 
unless they are free from "disturbance in the mind and leisure from all duties."1 Cicero 
describes the Epicurean view as believing that a god is not needed to explain the origins 
of this earth and its contents when one understands the vast reaches of space, filled with 
an infinite number of atoms that combine and recombine to produce "those forms and 
shapes which you think cannot be produced without the use of a veritable blacksmith's 
shop!"2 Cicero's Epicurus thus rails against the advocates of divine design, saying,
"And so you have burdened us with the yoke of an eternal master whom we are to fear by 
day and by night; for who would not fear an inquisitive and busy god who foresees 
everything, thinks about and notices everything, and supposes that everything is his own 
business?"3 Design is here linked to accountability. If God is busy, designing and 
creating, then everything is His business, and we can be held accountable to Him, thus 
the fear by day and night. Thus, in his own words, Epicurus concludes, "It was 
impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe [i.e., his atomistic, 
materialist view] but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths [i.e., about gods and
'Cicero, "On the Nature of the Gods," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings 
and Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1994), 53.
2Ibid„ 54.
3Ibid.
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death] to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters."1 Thus, for 
Epicurus, natural science was the means to disassociate the gods from our reality and 
give us the "just life" which is "most free from disturbance" by the gods and death.2
The contrasting positions on teleology in the natural world held by Aristotle and 
Epicurus have been discussed and advocated periodically through the ensuing centuries, 
and we cannot pursue all of those views within the scope of this work. However, I shall 
briefly move a few centuries forward to two German Idealists—Kant and Hegel—who 
advocated teleology, and then Nietzsche, who rejected it. Because Nietzsche is so 
significant in this postmodern era, and the fact that he reacted, in part, to Kant, makes it 
seem prudent to briefly explore their views of teleology in nature.
Selected Views from German Philosophers
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant seems to hold a teleological view of history and nature. Kant 
argues that "whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view,
'Epicurus, "Ancient Collection of Maxims," in The Epicurus Reader: Selected 
Writings and Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 33.
2Ibid. Lucretius adopted this Epicurean view and argued against Aristotelian 
teleology. We are not to fall into the error that eyes were made so that we can see, etc. 
"Nothing is bom  is us simply in order that w e may use it, but that w hich is bom  creates 
the use .. . .  All the members . . .  existed long before their use; they could not have grown 
up for the sake of the use." Clearly he rejects any design or designer in nature, and 
significantly, sounds exceptionally close to Darwin's view nearly two millennia later.
This would imply no design in reality or morality, and Epicurus has already demonstrated 
the logical moral outcomes of such a view. See, Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. W.
H. D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), 341, 343.
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concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, 
like every other natural event are determined by universal law s.. . .  Each, according to 
his own inclination, follows his own purpose, often in opposition to others; yet each 
individual and people, as if following some guiding thread, go toward a natural but to 
each of them unknown goal; all work toward furthering it, even if they would set little 
store by it if they did know it."1 Thus Kant believed that some universal inner principle 
drove humans and nature towards an overarching, but generally unspecified, goal.
In this regard, he is reminiscent of Aristotle's concept of an inner logos that moves 
the things of nature towards particular goals. Kant gives several theses that further 
express his belief in a larger, goal-driven process working in human kind and nature at 
large. For example, the first two theses are, "All natural capacities of a creature are 
destined to evolve completely to their natural end," and, "In man (as the only rational 
creature on earth) those natural capacities which are directed to the use o f his reason are 
to be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual."2 Nature is regularly spoken 
of as determining and regulating things to particular purposes and ends. This would 
make sense in light of Kant's epistemology where nature has endowed all human minds 
with certain a priori categories with which they experience life and reality.3 All reality 
for Kant seems to be imbued with a type of rational structure. It would make sense that if
‘Immanuel Kant, On History, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Aulen, and Emil 
L. Fackenheim, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 11.
2Ibid., 12, 13.
3See, Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New 
York: Willey Book Co., 1900), 2-12.
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nature has design and purpose, then morality would be a part of that reality and originate 
out of some larger design. Thus, in arguing how self-restrained compliance with duty is 
preferable to compliance through external constraint, Kant argues that this shift from 
external to internal motivation comes, in part, by the laying down of "ends," not 
prescribed by our preferences, but by the designs found within practical reason itself. 
Then he concludes, "The highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason (which is 
still a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers 
on human beings, also its own reward."1 Kant thus associated prescriptive morality with 
a teleological view of reality. This would make sense, for if there is a master design for 
reality, morals must be included in that design.
Georg Hegel
Georg Hegel adopted and refined this Kantian teleology while rejecting some of 
Kant's epistemological theory.2 He especially highlighted the role of teleology in the 
movements of history. Reason is "the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life, 
and the infinite form which activates this material content.. . .  Its end is the absolute and 
ultimate end of everything; and on the other, it is itself the agent which implements and 
realizes this end, translating it from potentiality into actuality both in the natural universe
‘Immanuel Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 158.
2For more discussion of the epistemological differences between Hegel and Kant 
see Andrew Schouten, "Naturalism Contra Idealism: Metaphysics, Teleology, Ethics," 20 
April 2004, 7, andrew_redux.blogs.com/redux/files/naturalism_contra_idealism_ 
metaphysics_teleology_ethics.doc (6-12-06).
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and in the spiritual world—that is, in world history."1 Even more explicitly, he asserts 
"that world history is governed by an ultimate design, that it is a rational process—whose 
rationality is not that of a particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason—this is a 
proposition whose truth we must assume; its proof lies in the study of world history itself, 
which is the image and enactment of reason."2 Hegel also uses alternate vocabulary to 
label the teleological force that drives history, calling it a world spirit (geist) that arose as 
a necessary evolution from the rational processes. "This spirit is the substance of 
history," and is asserted to be "absolute."3
This rational, directing process or spirit is also described as being "the divine will 
which rules supreme and is strong enough to determine the overall content."4 Hegel goes 
so far as to label this guided process of history as both "the realization of Spirit," and the 
"true Theodiccea," finally asserting that what "is happening every day, is not only not 
'without God,' but is essentially His Work."5 It seems self-evident that Hegel is 
essentially promoting a form of pantheism, and we shall shortly examine the work of 
evolutionary theologians who take a panentheist approach to reality, but without any real
‘Georg Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 27.
2Ibid., 28.
3Ibid., 29.
4Ibid., 30. This spirit operates through the dialectical process described, for 
example, on page 33.
5Georg Hegel, Philosophy o f History, trans. J. Sibree ( New York: Dover 
Publications, 1956), 457. These quotations are from the final paragraph of the book.
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design or purpose, unlike Hegel. It seems evident, however, that if reason is a divine 
force in history that would also be a factor in ethics and morals as well. Thus Hegel and 
Kant support an approach to reality that seems to necessitate a prescriptive, rationally 
designed morality. But just as Epicurus saw no design when Aristotle did, in a similar 
fashion, Friedrich Nietsche denied cosmic design, contradicting the Kantian and Hegelian 
support of teleology.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche appears to have developed his nihilistic philosophy, in part, out of his 
perception of the nature of the natural world, and how language relates to objects in that 
world. In Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinne, he uses the example of 
the leaf (Blatt). Each individual leaf is unique and different, with no two being identical, 
yet we eliminate those real, living differences to create language that contains, not the 
idea of an actual leaf, but an abstraction of leaves. Thus language is always metaphoric. 
Thus all truths are actually lies since each of these truths is an abstraction. Thus he 
asserts that, "Die verschiedenen Sprachen, neben einander gestellt zeigen, dass es bei den 
Worten nie auf die Wahrheit, nie auf einen adaquaten Ausdruck ankommt: denn sonst 
gabe es nicht so viele Sprachen. Das "Ding an sich" (das wurde eben die reine folgenlose 
Wahrheit sein) ist auch dem Sprachbildner ganz unfasslich und ganz und gar nicht 
erstrebenswert."1 Since the "thing in itself' is inaccessible to human language, all
'Friedrich Nietzsche, "Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinne," n.d., 
http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tlsg.htm (8 August 2006). The site notes 
this is from the Nachlass, Fragment 1873. My translation: "The different languages
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attempts to describe it through language are abstractions and thus untruths.
Nietzsche laments the human tendency to gravitate to these abstractions and thus be self­
deceived. "Das Uebersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen giebt uns den Begriff, wie 
es uns auch die Form giebt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen und Begriffe, also auch 
keine Gattungen kennt, sondem nur ein fur uns unzugangliches und undefinirbares X. 
Denn auch unser Gegensatz von Individuum und Gattung is anthropomorphisch und 
entstammt nicht dem Wesen der Dinge, wenn wir auch nicht zu sagen wagen, dass er ihm 
nicht entspricht: das ware namlich eine dogmatische Behauptung und als solche ebenso 
unerweishlich wie ihr Gegenteil."1 Thus, Nietzsche seems to deny the correspondence 
model of truth, for the thing in itself seems viewed as unknowable. Thus, the only 
alternative is Nihilism.
For Nietzsche, the truth ultimately "turns against [Christian] morality," exposing its 
"teleology," that is, its orientation to purpose and design.2 In another work, he laments
placed beside each other demonstrate that, with words, one never comes to the truth, 
never to an adequate expression. The 'thing in itself (which also will be the pure truth 
free of consequence [i.e., outside influence]) is to the language creator [literally: sculptor] 
totally incomprehensible and not at all worth the effort." This website also has an 
English version: Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," n.d., 
http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm (8 August 2006).
'Nietzsche, "Uber Wahrheit und Luge." My translation: "The failure to notice the 
individual and the actual gives us the idea as well as giving us the form, whereas nature 
knows no forms and ideas, also no species, but only an X  [which is] consequently, for us, 
inaccessible and undefinable. Because even our contrast of [the] individual and species 
is anthropomorphic and does not originate in the nature of the thing, if we do not venture 
to say that it [the contrast] does not correspond to it [nature], that [the anthropomorphic 
contrast] would be, namely, indemonstrable as the antithesis to it [nature]."
2Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony Ludonici, The Complete 
Works of Nietzsche, vol. 14, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 9.
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this desire to explain things in terms of purpose and design as "the essence of our species 
and herd."1 In fact, he defines morality as "herd-instinct in the individual."2 This 
teleology is then called a "lie,"3 and Nietzsche goes on to argue that there is no causality 
in which something unconditioned (i.e., such as God) is a causal force and the reason for 
the conditioned.4 Thus, for the thinking man, traditional forms of morality lead to 
nihilism because their lies are discovered. For Nietzsche, Nihilism means "that the 
highest values are losing their value.. . .  There is no answer to the question: 'to what 
purpose?'. . .  Life is absurd."5
In Nietzsche's view, "Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know 
that there is no accident; for only against a world of purposes does the word 'accident' 
have a meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life."6 This rejection of 
design led Nietzsche to deny any other "worlds" (such as heaven) beyond our own, and 
any belief in having life after death, to deny the existence of hell,7 and to assert that the
‘Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27.
2Ibid., 115.
3Nietzsche, Will to Power, 9.
4Ibid., 19.
5Ibid., 8.
6Nietzsche, Gay Science, 110.
7Ibid., 131, 187; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book fo r  All or 
None, trans. Thomas Conner, The Complete Works of Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, vol. 11 
(New York: Macmillan, 1911), 7,15.
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notion that God is now dead.1 The result of our rejecting these lies is that "the authority 
of conscience" now takes first place over any of the following authorities: personal 
authority, reason, history and its immanent spirit (an apparent reference to Hegel), and 
happiness, especially the happiness of the greatest number.2 We now create ourselves 
anew through the exercise of our own wills.3
Significant to this study is his assertion that, "It is supposed that one can get along 
with a morality bereft of religious background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism 
is opened."4 A key result of this Nihilism is that "in his own estimation, man has lost an 
infinte amount of dignity."5 Nietzsche here affirms a key claim of Rachels, that loss of 
teleology leads to a loss of human dignity. Nietzsche clearly develops the formative 
concepts of Epicurus to their logical results.
Two opposing world-views
This excursus into philosophical discussion over teleology affirms Rachels’s 
assertion about its significance, and it is the tension between two opposing world-views 
that Wiker so masterfully develops. Rachels notes that it was Hume who showed the 
logical deficiencies of the design argument, but that he was not able to provide an
‘Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 6; idem, Gay Science, 119-120.
2Nietzsche, Will to Pow er, 20.
3Nietzsche, Gay Science, 189.
4Nietzsche, Will to Power, 19.
5Ibid.
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intellectually satisfying alternative for explaining the apparent design found in nature. 
Thus, Rachels rightly senses the significance of Darwin in that he “did what Hume could 
not do: he provided an alternative, giving people something else they could believe.
Only then was the design hypothesis dead.”1 Hunter concurs on this connection between 
Hume and Darwin, stating, “Darwin’s great contribution to this tradition [of distancing 
God from creation to avoid natural evil] was the scientific flavor he gave to the solution, 
to the point that most readers lost sight of the embedded metaphysical presuppositions. 
Whereas the earlier solutions lacked detailed explanations, Darwin provided scientific 
laws and biological details.”2 Wiker affirms Rachels’s conclusion with his assertion that 
“the war had already been won, so to speak, and the appearance of Darwin’s Origin was 
simply the last piece of the machine falling into place with a satisfying ‘snap.’” Again, a 
few pages later, Wiker makes his point by quoting Richard Dawkins’s assertion that 
“Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.”3 The irony is, however, 
that the choice to accept a teleological or materialist world-view seems to be grounded 
ultimately in faith, not in empirical evidence. Thus, as Richard Popkin and Avrum Stroll 
assert, "Neither of these theories can be proven or disproven, and each can develop 
arguments against the other. The philosopher who wants to meditate on philosophical
'Rachels, CfA, 120.
2Comelius Hunter, Darwin’s God: Evolution and the Problem o f  Evil (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001), 126.
3Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Experience o f  Evolution 
Reveals a Universe without Design (New York: Norton, 1986), 6; quoted in Wiker, 149.
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matters first must decide which outlook he accepts, and then proceed to construct his 
theories."1
The incompatibility of the classical view of God with Darwinism has been well 
highlighted through the issue of teleology, and Rachels is to be commended for 
expressing it so clearly. What Rachels seems to imply beyond the argument is brilliant. 
He has argued that the world “when viewed from a non-religious perspective, is a cold, 
meaningless place, devoid of value or purpose.”2 Effectively, this means that reality is 
cold, meaningless, and devoid of value or purpose. Put another way, if there is a God, 
why would He avoid design in reality, while using it in morality?3 Furthermore, if, as 
Rachels and others have charged, morality is the product of evolution, which has no 
design, how can there be a divine design for morality? Morality at best would have to be 
totally relativistic in nature. Rachels’s argument is fundamentally sound, provided he 
recognizes the assumption he explicitly included in the argument—namely that the world 
is viewed from a non-religious perspective. But why should one view the world this
‘Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, Philosophy Made Simple, 2d ed. (New York: 
Doubleday, 1993), 132.
2Rachels, CfA, 54.
3See also, Jerry D. Korsmeyer, Evolution and Eden: Balancing Original Sin and 
Contemporary Science (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 89, where he alludes to this 
issue in arguing that “the concept of a fixed human nature designed by God has been 
much used in the natural law approach to moral theology. The laws o f nature reflect the 
laws o f God, this system proposes, and violation of nature’s laws, or purposes, is deemed 
to be sinful as a result. This idea that physical processes determine the only proper 
human ends (phyicalism) provides the support for such things as the [Catholic] Church’s 
position on contraception, because interference with the physical purpose of the sex act is 
considered to violate divine law. The nature o f  evolution belies this particular version o f  
a natural law approach.” Emphasis mine.
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way? Rachels logically turns to the classic form of the argument from the problem of 
evil to provide most of his rationale for rejecting a religious perspective of the world.
Does Natural Evil Undermine the Image-of-God Thesis?
Hume on the Problem of Evil
In addition to attacking teleology, Rachels makes use of the larger problem of 
natural evil to undermine theism, and thus theistic ethics. The problem of natural evil is 
most famously articulated by David Hume in the late eighteenth century. In his 
Dialogues, parts 10 and 11, Hume seeks to refute the ability to do Natural Theology, and 
in the portion we shall examine, makes specific arguments denying we can make any 
analogy from man to God. In Part 10, Hume introduces the argument with a long, almost 
redundant, yet pathos laden description of human and animal misery in this world.1 
Through the character Philo, Hume challenges another character, Cleanthes:
And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and 
infinitely more, which might be subjected, you can still preserve your 
anthropomorphism [i.e., man and God are analogous], and assert the moral 
attributes of the deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the 
same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: 
Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal is happy: 
Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never 
mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to 
human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose.. . .
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, 
but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is 
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?2
‘David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Martin Bell (New 
York: Penguin Books), 103-108.
2Ibid., 108-109.
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The core of Hume’s argument, then, is that natural evil is inconsistent, yea, 
incompatible with the concept of there being an all-wise, all-powerful, all-loving God. 
This is seen in his conclusion to Part 10: “But there is no view of human life or of the 
condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral 
attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite 
wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone.”1 A few pages later, in Part 
11, Hume, through Philo, answers the rebuttal that the balance between pain and 
happiness in the world favors happiness, therefore the pain is explainable in terms of a 
good God. He declares that even if there is a balance which favors happiness over pain it 
proves nothing: “For this is not, by any means what we expect from infinite power, 
infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not 
by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the 
deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. It is contrary to his intention,? But he is 
almighty.”2 Notice the argument is based on human expectation and extrapolation about 
God. If God is loving and powerful, then Hume expects there can be no natural evil.
Hume next resorts to the bad engineer argument, in which it is argued that if God is 
an all-wise designer, why do all these problems and malfunctions abound? Every animal 
lacks a key skill for its survival and things like the weather bring both life-giving rains
'Ibid., 112.
2Ibid.
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and destructive floods.1 Thus, for Hume, God must be a poor designer or malicious in
character. Hume now comes to his crowning point. Says Hume:
The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to 
all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above 
cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the 
universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that they have perfect 
malice, that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice, that they have 
neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former 
unmixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seems to 
oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.2
This completes Hume’s articulation of the basic argument from natural evil.
C. S. Lewis has put the argument in a pithy, succinct form: ‘“ If God were good, He
would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He would
be able to do what He wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks
’Ibid., 117-119. Richard Dawkins uses a form of this argument in arguing against 
the design hypothesis. He likens the design argument to doing reverse-engineering:
Since X does Y job well, it must have been designed by its maker to do X. He adds to it 
the assumption that design is trying to “maximize” something. So he applies these two 
principles to create a bad engineer argument against teleological interpretation.
“Cheetahs give every indication of being superbly designed for something, and it should 
be easy enough to reverse engineer them and work out their utility function. They appear 
to be well designed to kill antelopes.. . .  Conversely, if we reverse engineer an antelope 
we find equally impressive evidence of design for practically the opposite end: the 
survival of antelopes and starvation among cheetahs. It is as though cheetahs had been 
designed by one deity and antelopes by another. Alternatively, if  there is only one 
Creator who made the tiger and the lamb, the cheetah and the gazelle, what is He playing 
at? Is He a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sports?” Dawkins’s conclusion is that 
evolution makes for sense because “the m axim izing o f  D N A  survival” is, by contrast, 
“elegant in its simplicity.” Richard Dawkins, River Out o f  Eden: A Darwinian View o f 
Life (New York: BasicBooks/HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 105-106.
2Hume, Dialogues, 122.
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either goodness, power, or both.’ This is the problem of pain, in its simplest form.”1 The 
fundamental argument asserts that since natural evil exists, whatever or whoever caused 
this world to exist can be neither loving, nor hostile, but rather must be indifferent. The 
argument from natural evil has been adopted in succeeding generations.
Mill and Others on the Problem of Evil
John Stuart Mill echoed Hume’s bad engineer argument, arguing that religion can
only be useful for those of inferior intellect. Says Mill:
For it is impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt 
his inquiring intellect by sophistry, should be able without misgiving to go on 
ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and 
capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants.. . .
The worship must either be greatly overclouded by doubt, and occasionally quite 
darkened by it, or the moral sentiments must sink to the low level of the ordinances 
of Nature: the worshipper [sfc] must learn to think blind partiality, atrocious 
cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object o f worship, since all these 
abound to excess in the commonest phenomena of nature.2
Mill also reiterates Hume’s argument from expectations, in a way, asserting that the
dominant expositions of the ways of God are “on many occasions totally at variance”
with the precepts said to be prescribed by this morally perfect deity. He cites several
examples of these teachings including the doctrines of Hell, and the doctrinal duo of
Predestination and Limited Atonement.3
'C. S. Lewis, The Problem o f Pain: How Human Suffering Raises Almost 
Intolerable Intellectual Problems (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1962), 26.
2John Stuart Mill, "Utility of Religion," in Three Essays on Religion (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1874), 112.
3Ibid., 113-115. Note that two of the three examples are explicitly Calvinist: 
Predestination and Limited Atonement. While Mill does not use these exact terms, he
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What is his response to these doctrines? Mill declares, “Is there any moral 
enormity which could not be justified by imitation of such a deity?”1 Mill's argument 
seems to be that if God can will such suffering in hell by willfully withholding salvation 
from “so many,” then such a God is immoral and would certainly not be concerned with 
natural evil. So, like Hume, Mill found the dominant Christian teachings about God’s 
perfections to be incompatible with the existence of natural evil. The incompatibility of 
natural evil with God as depicted by Christianity has been an oft-repeated refrain since 
Hume and Mill articulated their opinions.2
Korsmeyer refines the definition of the problem by noting that the locus of the 
problem of evil is in the natural realm. “Moral evil could always be explained as the 
result of human sin. But the problem was natural for physical evil.”3 Ruse is even more 
bold in asserting that “the biggest question of all for the Christian believer is the 
‘theodicy’ problem. If, as the Christian believes, God is omnipotent (all powerful) and 
all-loving, then why evil? . . .  How do we explain it?”4 The British theologian, Julian 
Casserley, describes the problem of natural evil as “a theological and intellectual
describes these two doctrines in fairly exquisite detail, strongly asserting their 
immorality.
'Ibid., 114.
2An excellent source for tracing the incompatibility argument in history is 
Cornelius Hunter, Darwin’s God, cited earlier. Hunter traces this view through many 
thinkers for the purpose of deriving the doctrine of God assumed by the argument. We 
shall examine this angle a little later in this work.
3Korsmeyer, 96.
4Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be Christian? 129.
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conundrum.. . .  It is indeed without doubt the greatest of all the problems with which 
Christian thinkers and teachers have to grapple.”1 Alvin Plantinga verifies the 
problematic nature of Hume’s challenge in saying, “The amount and variety of evil in our 
world has often baffled and perplexed believers in God.” He continues by noting that 
philosophers have argued that the fact of evil in our world “is both obvious and 
undeniable; but then belief in G od,. . .  is in some way intellectually dubious, or 
questionable, or out of order, or worse.”2 Thus many great minds have recognized the 
enormity of this problem. Rachels has indeed chosen a potent issue with which to 
undermine the image-of-God-thesis. However, attempts by Christian theologians and 
philosophers to formulate an answer to this challenge are not lacking. While a full study 
of this issue will not fit within the scope of this work, a brief survey of responses and 
counter-responses seems in order, due to the significance of the argument.
'Casserley, M an’s Pain, 11. This book is condensed and republished in the first 
essay of J[ulian] V. Langmead Casserley, Evil and Evolutionary Eschatology: Two 
Essays, ed. and intro, by C. Don Keys, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 39 (Lewiston, 
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 3. Hereafter cited, respectively, as M an’s Pain and 
Evil. In this same reference Casserley articulates the problem: “How can we believe, as 
the Bible and Church teach, that God is all-powerful, all-wise, all-loving, and the Creator 
and Master o f all things, when the world which He has made and governs contains so 
much that is painful and unjust? . . .  Is it possible for a man who is intelligent and 
realistic to understand and accept a faith which asserts such paradoxes as these?” For 
Casserley, how ever, the problem o f  pain is not merely theoretical, but practical: “How  
can I live as a Christian in a world in which pain happens to me, or my acquaintances, 
enemies, and friend? . . .  That is the practical problem, and it is the most urgent and 
challenging problem of all.” Casserley, M an’s Pain, 11; idem, Evil, 3.
2Alvin Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 
69-70.
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Survey of Responses to the Problem of 
Evil Argument
C. S. Lewis astutely asserts that it is Christianity itself that causes the philosophical 
problem of pain or natural evil, though the existence of Christianity in a world of pain is 
also problematic: “To ask whether the universe as we see it looks more like the work of 
a wise and good Creator or the work of chance, indifference, or malevolence, is to omit 
from the outset all the relevant factors in the religious problem.. . .  In a sense, it 
[Christianity] creates, rather than solves the problem o f  pain, fo r  pain would be no 
problem unless, side by side with our daily experience o f  this painful world, we had 
received what we think to be good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and 
loving”1
While this is a lucid and valid point, many will not consider this to be any real 
solution, for explaining the origins of the problem of evil does not solve it. Peter 
Bertocci, however, lists four standard Christian responses to the problem of evil. First, 
God did not will evil but allowed it in order to give true freedom to man. Second, 
suffering is part of God’s ultimate plan for achieving some overall greater goodness. 
Third, natural evil is a tool God uses to achieve the best possible world. Richness with 
suffering is better than poorness without it. Finally, in what seems a variant of the third 
option, suffering prepares man for a joyous eternity with God. It is a disciplinary tool for 
man’s refinement and purification in preparation for eternal life.2
'Lewis, Pain, 24. Emphasis mine.
2Bertocci, 401-408.
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The freedom argument
The freedom argument is rooted in a twofold classification of evil. Ruse observes 
that “it is customary and convenient to draw a distinction between two kinds of evil: 
moral evil, that is human-caused evil—Auschwitz—and physical evil, that is the pain of 
natural processes—the child with sickle-cell anemia.”1 He then restates the argument in 
more detail, stating: “The most popular and powerful argument to explain moral 
evil—one which goes back to Saint Augustine— is that it is something resulting from 
human free will. God is His love gave humans freedom, and that meant freedom to do ill 
as well as good.. . .  This does not mean that God is indifferent to suffering.” The 
adequacy of this particular argument depends crucially on our understanding of the 
notion of free will.2
C. S. Lewis pushes the freedom argument further by arguing that while it may be 
possible to conceive of a world in which God corrects the consequences of every misuse 
of our free will, then free will would be blotted out. For example, he argues that if my 
using a wooden beam as weapon was countered by God making it soft like grass, or if  the 
air would not be permitted to carry the waves o f sound containing abusive and dishonest 
words, then “such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible.”3
‘Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 129.
2Ibid.
3Lewis, Pain, 32-34. Most of this book is focused on the problem of moral evil, 
though there is some interaction with the issue of natural evil. Only the last chapter 
really focuses solely on the problem of natural evil, especially animal pain.
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Thus, he concludes, “Try to exclude the possiblity of suffering which the order of nature 
and existence of free wills involve, and you will find that you have excluded life itself.”1 
Ruse appears to counter the free-will choice by arguing that “free will cannot 
explain away the agony of the child in distress from a genetic ailment.”2 Paul Draper 
charges that the freedom argument still does not answer the question of pain. “Notice 
that, so far, we have no explanation of the existence of pain. For there are morally right 
actions and morally wrong actions that do not entail the existence of pain .. . .  So God 
could have given humans freedom without permitting pain.”3 It should be noted, 
however, that Draper seems to ignore the opposite side of his argument. Just because 
some forms of free choice do not involve pain, does not necessarily entail that all free 
choices can be given without possibility of suffering. Draper, however, is not content at 
criticizing the free will answer to the problem of evil. He also attacks the second 
argument, in which supreme wisdom permits pain as part o f a higher plan for producing a 
greater good.
‘Ibid.
2Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 130.
3Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” Nous 23 
(1989): 341. This article was republished in, The Evidential Argum ent fro m  Evil, ed. 
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 12-29. This 
dissertation cites the original journal paging.
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Pain as a means to a greater good
Attack of the argument of greater good. Draper summarizes this argument, 
“Since God’s knowledge about good and evil is limitless, it is not at all surprising that He 
produces or permits evils for reasons that are unknown to humans.” He offers two 
rebuttals. First, “antecedently—that is, independent of observations and testimony 
Observation] reports—we have no reason to think that God’s additional knowledge 
concerning good and evil is such that He would permit any of the facts Observation] 
reports to obtain.”
Second, “Indeed, we have no more reason antecedently to believe that such a being 
would know some great good unknown to us whose existence entails the existence of 
pain.”1 But why? By cutting out observation and testimony from influencing the 
conclusion, what is left but mere speculation? It seems, then, that the antecedent is one’s 
presuppositions, which are not necessarily provable anyway. Thus, since Draper rejects 
theism,2 the argument of divine wisdom is, de facto, nonsensical.
Bertocci attacks the argument of there being unknown, all-wise purposes, by 
asserting that the proponent of such a view “argues not from what he knows about the 
world, but from a conception of what might be.” He later calls these arguments 
“imaginary conceptions.”3 Eric Kraemer, building on Draper’s work, makes a similar
‘Ibid., 345-346. His use of “antecedently” is not fully clear but seems to be the 
equivalent of a priori.
2Ibid., 334.
3Bertocci, 408.
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argument against the idea of God having higher purposes that allow for natural evil to 
occur. He depicts the argument as “chalking up evil to incomprehensible greater goods 
that would require it.”1 Kraemer wonders if a species capable of producing the scientific 
and technological marvels that we humans have produced “is really beyond God’s ability 
to teach us even the rudiments, no matter how sketchy or incomplete, of an adequate 
account of evil.”2 But has Kraemer, like Draper, denied the conditions needed for God to 
teach those rudiments?
Responses to the attack on greater good. Alvin Plantinga does not see our 
purported ignorance of God’s methods as such a stumbling stone. While admitting that 
the Epicurean question of how a good and powerful God can permit natural evil, 
Plantinga nonetheless argues that, “There is no reason to think that if God did have a 
reason for permitting the evil in question, we would be the first to know .. . .  we don’t 
know why God permits evil; but where, so far, is the problem?”3 The only problem 
seems to be the assumption that man’s great intellectual and technological progress 
implies nothing is beyond his grasp. Plantinga at least is humble enough to acknowledge 
the limits of human ability, great as it is. He further argues that the existence of evil does 
not necessarily entail a denial of divine existence. Says Plantinga,
'Eric Russert Kraemer, “Darwin’s Doubts and the Problems of Animal Pain,” 
Undated, http://cal.calpoly.edu/~jlynch/Kraemer_Darwin.htm (6 July 2003). Internal 
evidence points to this being published sometime after 1996.
2Ibid.
3Plantinga, 71.
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At present, however, I think it widely conceded that there is nothing like 
straightforward contradiction or necessary falsehood in the joint affirmation of God 
and evil; the existence o f evil is not incompatible with the existence o f an all 
powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good God. Accordingly, those who offer an 
antitheistic argument from evil—call them ‘atheologians’—have turned from 
deductive to problematic arguments from evil. The typical atheistical claim at 
present is not that the existence of God is incompatible with that of evil, but rather 
that the latter offers the resources for a strong probabilistic argument against the 
former.1
Thus Plantinga asserts that the atheistical argument is not as compelling as it sounds. He
bolsters the conclusion that the problem of evil does not entail atheism by arguing that
the claim that evil implies God’s existence to be improbable “isn’t just clear or obvious
or self evident.. . .  Why should we think this is true?”2 Yet,
the suggestion is that there are evils such that it is simply apparent that no 
omnipotent and omniscient being, if there were such a person, would have a good 
reason for permitting them .. . .
But this to me seems clearly false; that is, it seems that there are evil states of 
affairs which, while indeed there could be an omnipotent, omniscient God who had 
a good reason for permitting them, are nonetheless such that in fact it is apparent to 
us that there isn’t any such reason—no outweighing good he couldn’t achieve 
without permitting the evil in question, and no evil he couldn’t avoid without 
permitting it. How could such a thing as that be apparent to us? Consider the case 
of the child who dies a lingering and painful death from leukemia. True enough: 
we can’t see what reason God, if there is such a person, has for permitting this child 
to suffer in that way. But (granted that it is indeed possible that he have a reason) 
can we just see that he doesn’t have a reason?3
'Ibid.. First emphasis mine; all others in original.
2Ibid., 72.
3Ibid., 73. Last two emphases mine.
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Plantinga has shown that the argument against the possibility of hidden divine 
purposes fails to acknowledge the finiteness of human knowledge and reason. He 
bolsters this point by use of the biblical character of Job.
This is the lesson of the book of Job.. . .  He can’t see any reason why God 
should allow him to be afflicted as he is; he concludes, unthinkingly, that God 
doesn’t have a good reason. As a matter of fact, according to the story, God does 
have a good reason, but the reason involves a transaction among beings some of 
whom Job has no awareness at all. The point here is that the reason fo r  Job’s 
suffering is something entirely beyond his ken. . . .
Job complains that God has no good reason for permitting the evil that befalls 
him. He believes that God doesn’t have a good reason because he, Job, can’t 
imagine what the reason might be. In reply, God does not tell him what the reason 
is; instead, he attacks Job’s unthinking assumption that if he can’t imagine what 
reason God might have, then God probably doesn’t have a reason at a ll .. . .
. . .  Clearly, the crucial problem for this probabilistic argument from evil is 
just that nothing much follows from the fact that some evils are inscrutable; if 
theism is true we would expect that there would be inscrutable evil. Indeed, a little 
reflection shows there is no reason to think we could so much as grasp God’s plans 
here, even if  he proposed to divulge them to us. But then the fact that there is 
inscrutable evil does not make it improbable that God exists.
Plantinga’s argument then is that if theism were true, we should expect inscrutable evil to
exist.
Casserley makes a similar argument and differentiates between absolute proof and
enough knowledge to enable adequate moral function.
If Christianity is true—that is, if the ultimate truth is the God revealed to us in the 
Bible—then it necessarily follows that the breadth and splendor of the truth must 
be too great for the finite human mind ever to comprehend it completely and 
exhaustively.. . .
I do not mean to say, however, that because the Christian cannot know 
everything he knows nothing.. . .  Thus Christianity gives us a real knowledge o f 
God and a real understanding o f the purposes o f human life but, quite frankly, not 
a complete one. The important thing is that the knowledge which it gives us is 
sufficient for us in practice. It gives us enough to guide and shape our lives in
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accordance with God’s will and in pursuit of valid purposes.1
C. S. Lewis builds on the inscrutability argument by asserting that,
we must never allow the problem of animal pain to become the centre of the 
problem of pain; not because it is unimportant. . .  but because it is outside the 
range of our knowledge. God has given us data which enable us, in some degree, 
to understand our own suffering: He has given us no such data about beasts.2
Then, he takes the biblical teaching that “man was not the first creature to rebel against
his maker” to posit the possibility of satanic activity as the primary cause of natural evil
including animal pain.3
Great Controversy motif
Plantinga and Lewis have introduced the concept of a conflict between God and a 
rebel creature as a partial explanation for the problem of natural evil. This is a familiar 
concept to the Seventh-day Adventist theologian, for the motif of the Great Controversy 
between Christ and Satan is a dominant theological theme in Adventism. But this motif 
entails belief in a perfect creation unlike our present one, but corrupted by the influence 
of creaturely rebellion against the creator, ergo, by sin. John Baldwin, a professor at the 
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, exemplifies this position in his article, 
“God, the Sparrow, and the Emerald Boa.” Baldwin argues that the “original creation 
was a predation-free habitat,” and that “there were no carnivores in Eden.” He further
•Casserley, M an’s Pain, 14; idem, Evil, 4.
2Lewis, Pain, 129.
3Ibid., 134.
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argues that “sin and its accompanying curses affected life on earth.” He cites the causal 
connection of sin to death in Romans 5:12 and notes Romans 8:20, that the creation was 
subjected to futility. There was “an immediate change in the original order—from a 
death-free habitat to one ruled by the life-death cycle.”1
Ellen White, a founding pioneer of the Seventh-day Adventist denomination, 
ascribes the freedom to sin and to effect such changes as part o f a master plan of God to 
permit true freedom to created moral agents. One example of her teaching in this regard 
is seen in the statement, “For the good of the entire universe through ceaseless ages, he 
must more fully develop his [Satan’s] principles, that his charges against the divine 
government might be seen in their true light by all created beings, and that the justice and 
mercy of God and the immutability of His law might be forever placed beyond all 
question.”2 Thus, White would seem to belong to the group who explain natural evil in 
terms of being permitted for a greater long-term good.
Kraemer provides a direct challenge to the Great Controversy motif, rejecting the 
argument that natural evil helps achieve some greater good as “unconvincing.” He 
suggests a hypothetical scenario in which there are some “idiotic giants, modeled perhaps 
after the Cyclops, who live on other planets but are obsessed with observing all 
nonhuman suffering on Earth through powerful telescopes,” and that “every bit of animal
1 John T. Baldwin, “God, the Sparrow, and the Emerald Boa,” in Dialogue: An 
International Journal o f Faith, Thought, and Action, 1996, 
http://dialogue.adventist.org/articles/08_3_baldwin.htm (6 July 2003).
2E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 42. See also idem, Great Controversy 
(Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1950), chapters 29 and 42.
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suffering goes towards improving the moral situation of these pathetic giants, the theist 
might claim that earthly animal suffering was counterbalanced by creating greater goods 
[s/c] elsewhere in the universe.”1 In almost sarcastic language, Kraemer rejects such a 
scenario, asserting,
However unlikely this situation might appear to us, and even if we accept the 
crude Utilitarian calculations it presupposes, the Cyclopsian scenario faces the 
standard problem confronting most theistic attempts to explain away the existence 
of evil. This is the problem of making it plausible to believe that God, an all- 
powerful and all-knowing being, really had no better method available for the 
moral improvement of the Cyclopsian race than to permit the huge amount of 
animal suffering we find on the earth. Since we can, with no apparent difficulty, 
imagine God making video tapes of animal suffering . . .  to think of God’s 
ingenuity being defeated by the mental limitations of the Cyclopsian hordes is a 
possibility that is hard to take seriously. Clearly a deeper reason is needed to make 
the necessity of animal suffering plausible.2
Kraemer here reiterates the old argument that God must have had better options 
than this one to accomplish a greater good. Thus he effectually denies that there can be 
any truly inscrutable evil within the context of theistic belief. We have already seen an 
effective response to this charge by Plantinga. Kraemer is following the well-worn path 
of failing to acknowledge the limits of human understanding. Furthermore, in the Great 
Controvery motif, there is more than mere moral improvement for the universe. There is 
also a rescue from the power of sin and a restoration of the pre-sin order.
The deliverance dimension presupposes that the current world order is altered from 
the way God originally intended and created the world, while the argument based on the
'Kraemer, 7.
2Ibid.
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problem of evil seems to presuppose that the current state of natural woe is how God 
originally created this planet. Thus, in Hume’s Dialogues, Cleanthes counters Philo with 
the argument that, for the infinitely wise God, “a less evil may then be chosen, in order 
to avoid a greater: Inconveniences are to be submitted to, in order to achieve a desirable 
end: benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may have produced a 
world such as the p r e s e n t But what if he did not create it so? On the one hand, it 
could change the nature of the argument by removing direct divine culpability for the evil 
in this world. On the other hand, it merely moves the problem backwards one step to the 
issue of why God permitted natural evil, even if he did not create it. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental position of Hume and those of similar persuasion makes a major assumption 
about the nature of creation in order to make the argument from evil efficacious.
We have seen charges, rebuttals, and countercharges on both sides of the debate 
over natural evil. Each side has strengths and weaknesses and neither position has been 
overly effective in convincing the other. There remain, however, two arguments that 
Rachels believes will strengthen the case for the alleged antithesis between God and 
natural: The excess evil argument, and the argument on the principle of parsimony.
The problem of excess evil
The basic argument. Rachels has argued that traditional theological responses to 
the problem of evil are both man centered, and more importantly, assume the co­
existence of man with animals during the whole history of natural evil. But if man
‘Hume, 113.
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evolved, there were millions of years of suffering unrelated to man, his will, or his 
choices. Rachels thus asserted that “the traditional theistic rejoinders do not even come 
close to justifying that ev il.. . .  The evolutionary perspective puts the problem in a new 
and more difficult form.”1
However, this challenge is not as difficult as it may seem for, as Rachels has 
alluded, perspective matters. The problem is that his argument mixes two perspectives. 
Because Rachels assumes the correctness of the Darwinist position, he argues for a 
presence of natural evil prior to human existence. But this merely mixes theism with 
materialism, without including the supporting theological package that comes with belief 
in God. Thus, Rachels ascribes blame to God for something not attributed to Him by 
Scripture—creation through an evolutionary process. If one wishes to posit divine 
involvement, it seems prudent that such speculation must be done on theistic and not 
materialist terms. The excess evil argument is thus rooted in a view of God skewed from 
its proper context. There is, however, a second issue buried within the argument of 
excess. Is all the excess evil compatible with belief in God? This brings us to the 
argument from the principle of parsimony.
The argument from parsimony. Rachels has appealed to Darwin’s belief that the 
“facts” of evolution better accommodated and explained the existence of natural evil than 
do the “facts” of theism. He is thus arguing that Darwinism is more parsimonious than 
Christianity when it comes to natural evil. Rachels is not alone in making such claims,
•Rachels, CfA, 105-106. Emphasis in original.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
for Draper observes that “the important question, a question that David Hume asked. . .  
but that most contemporary philosophers of religion have ignored, is whether or not any 
serious hypothesis that is logically inconsistent with theism explains some significant 
facts about evil or about good and evil much better than theism does.”1 Kraemer echoes 
the same conclusion: The fact there is widespread natural evil is best explained by a 
means of origins that is indifferent to happiness and suffering, and not by theism.2
An interesting problem is that all three of the above authors use the argument that 
theism is less parsimonious than materialism in relating to the problem of natural evil, yet 
none take time to justify the efficacy of this method. While Rachels is affirmed in that 
his claim is not unique, the question remains as to how effective parsimony is as a tool 
for evaluating the problem of natural evil.
Critique of parsimony. John Hubbard notes two key attributes of this 
philosophical tool: “Parsimony is a relative characteristic; parsimony can only be used to 
describe one theory in comparison with another. Different types of parsimony can
'Draper, 332. Emphasis mine. Draper follows Hume in offering the “Hypothesis 
of Indiference” (HI) as a better alternative to theism, urging that “HI explains the facts 
Observation] reports much better than theism does.. . .  Observation] is much more 
probable on the assumption that HI is true than on the assumption theism is true.”
2Kraemer, 5.
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conflict with each other.”1 Thus, he argues that parsimony is a limited tool with 
relativistic tendencies.
But such relativity is a problem for Rachels’s argument, for, as Cornelius Hunter 
has shown, “the problem of evil presupposes the existence of an objective evil—the very 
thing the materialist seems to deny.. . .  In other words, the problem of evil is generated 
only by the prior claim that evil exists.”2 Furthermore, the relativity of parsimony makes 
it unlikely that it can be a capable criterion for determining truth. Not all simple 
explanations are true. Hubbard illustrates this by observing that “knowing the fact that 
three points on a highway are in a strait line should yield the more parsimonious 
conclusion that the highway is a strait line. However, our previous knowledge of the 
existence of curves in roads, makes this an improbable conclusion.”3 In addition, 
sometimes data are so complex that parsimony becomes a difficult tool to use effectively. 
As James Thornton has observed, “Adoption of this principle, though seemingly obvious, 
leads to problems about the role of simplicity in science, especially when choosing 
between hypotheses that are not (or are not known to be) equivalent. There are often 
different and clashing criteria for what is the simplest hypothesis, and it is not clear
'John Hubbard, “Parsimony and the Mind,” 19 May 2003, 
http://www.tk421.net/essays/simple.html (3 July 2003). The website indicates this article 
was originally written for the Macalester College course PHIL 89: Senior Seminar, in 
May 1995. The current web copy has been updated slightly since my research, now 
being said to be last modified Februaryl9,2005. Hubbard defines three kinds of 
parsimony: Epistemological, Ontological, and Literary, and asserts than any one can be 
in contradiction with the other two.
2Hunter, 154.
3Hubbard, 4.
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whether a simpler hypothesis is pro tanto more likely to be true: and if not, what 
justification other than laziness there is for adopting it.”1 It would seem that the 
complexity of both Christian theology and Darwin’s theory would make parsimony a less 
than ideal arbiter for determining the truthfulness or preferability of one over the other. 
Could it be that the parsimony argument based on evil could be reversed back on those 
trying to eliminate theism?
The problem of good. Casserley creates such a conundrum by countering the
problem of excess evil for the theist with the problem of excess good for the atheist.
What are we to say, then to the objector who argues that the ‘problem of evil’ only 
arises for us because we believe in the good God? For the atheist, apparently, there 
is no problem of evil. If only we will abandon our belief that the source and 
foundation of the universe is morally good, the presence of evil in the universe will 
cease to perplex us.
But there is no way out of our difficulty through any such denial of God and 
the basic righteousness of existence. If the fact of evil is an intellectual problem for 
the man who believes that the order of the universe is ultimately a moral order, the 
fact of good is an equally or even more intractable problem for the man who 
believes that the order of the universe is non-moral.. . .  There is a problem o f evil 
fo r the theist, but there is also a problem ofgood fo r  the atheist. The theist must 
ask himself, ‘How is it that God’s world so often falls below its own proper level?’ 
But the atheist must likewise confront himself with the opposite question: ‘How is 
it that a basically non-moral universe occasionally rises above itself to such 
undeniable moral heights?’ The latter question is of the two the more difficult to 
answer plausibly and convincingly.2
'James Thornton, “Occam’s Razor,” in Jam es Thornton’s Theory-of-the-W eek, 22 
January 2001, http://www.jamesthomton.com/theory/theory?theory_id=8 (18 May 2004).
2Casserley, M an’s Pain, 38-39. Emphasis mine.
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In a similar statement in another work, Casserley appeals, ironically, to explanatory 
power to clinch his point. “On balance the problem of evil for the believer is less acute 
than the problem of good for the unbeliever. It is easier to understand that the good 
God’s world might fall below itself than to imagine how a non-moral world of non-moral 
beings could contrive so frequently to rise above itself.”'
Casserley has raised a significant question, for in designless materialism, we would 
not expect to find excess good which is not really necessary for survival. Survival could 
be achieved with much less good in the world. Therefore, the excess good should be a 
waste of resources in an evolutionary scenario. Why all this unnecessary good? Even 
altruism cannot account for all of it.
C. S. Lewis complicates the conundrum for the atheist by taking the problem of 
good and intensifying it into the problem of religion. Lewis observes that when he was a 
professed atheist,
'Casserley, Evil, 11. The full quotation is very similar to the previous one and 
reads: “We shall not escape from our difficulties by giving up our faith in God’s 
goodness. The objector may say to us, ‘You are wondering how it is that pain and 
injustice are found in God’s good world. You have only to stop believing in the good 
God and the problem will no longer arise.’ This sounds more reasonable at first sight than 
it really is. Certainly the fact of evil constitutes a problem for the man who believes that 
this universe is in the last resort a moral universe, created and governed by a morally 
perfect being. But there is good as well as evil in the universe, and if we deny that this is 
a moral universe, if we deny that there lies behind it an all-powerful moral being who 
made it and governs it, then we should find ourselves up against the problem  o f  good. If  
the order of the universe is non-moral, how did this goodness get into i t . . .  [i.e., good 
things like courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice]? On balance the problem of evil for the 
believer is less acute than the problem of good for the unbeliever. It is easier to 
understand that the good God’s world might fall below itself than to imagine how a non- 
moral world of non-moral beings could contrive so frequently to rise above itself.”
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there was one question which I never dreamed of raising. I never noticed that the 
very strength and facility of the pessimists’ case at once poses us a problem. I f  the 
universe is so bad, or even half so bad, how on earth did human beings ever come 
to attribute it to the activity o f a wise and good Creator? Men are fools, perhaps; 
but hardly so foolish as that. The direct inference from black to white, from evil 
flower to virtuous root, from senseless work to a workman infinitely wise, staggers 
belief. The spectacle of the universe as revealed by experience can never have 
been the ground of religion: it must always have been something in spite of which 
religion, acquired from a different source, was held.1
Lewis has raised a question even more difficult for the atheist to escape from than 
Casserley’s problem of good. But Lewis compounds the severity of this point by noting 
that
it would be an error to reply that our ancestors were ignorant and therefore 
entertained pleasing illusions about nature which the progress of science has since 
dispelled.. . .  Certainly at all periods the pain and waste of human life was equally 
obvious.. . .  It is mere nonsense to put pain among the discoveries of science. Lay 
down this book and reflect for five minutes on the fact that all the great religions 
were first preached, and long practiced, in a world without chloroform.
At all times then, an inference from the course of events in this world to the 
goodness and wisdom of the Creator would have been equally preposterous; and it 
was never made.2
This is a most powerful argument that the existence of natural evil is not incompatible 
with theistic belief. Indeed, the point is well taken that if excess pain and suffering is 
incompatible with belief in God, then why did the great religions develop under such 
stringent conditions? The problems of good and of religion are at least as great a
•Lewis, Pain, 15. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 15-16. Lewis adds a footnote at this point which reads: “i.e., never made at 
the beginnings of the religion. After belief in God has been accepted, ‘theodicies’ 
explaining, or explaining away, the miseries of life, will naturally appear often enough.” 
Emphasis in original.
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challenge for the followers of Hume, as the problem of natural evil is to the theist, 
possibly greater.
Rachels has made a generally accurate summary of the discussion of the problem of 
evil, but while giving a thoughtful look at the issue, he has not given the issue full 
treatment. The theistic responses deserve more than just mere summaries. It also seems 
odd that Rachels has not mentioned or cited key modem discussions on the issue of pain 
and natural evil. On the other hand, Rachels is to be commended for recognizing that the 
argument from natural evil does not force the renunciation of theism. Rachels admits that 
the atheistic conclusion is hard to resist, though not impossible. Since theism can be 




Rachels has asserted that if theism is maintained with belief in Darwinism, then 
the type of theism permitted cannot support traditional ethics, especially in the matter of 
human preference. But how efficacious is this claim?
There are two issues imbedded in Rachels’s conclusion. First, all the 
argumentation concerning God, from Darwin to Rachels, presupposes a particular 
doctrine of God. What kind of god is thus depicted? Second, are there any theologians 
who have attempted to build a theological view of God based on the principles of 
Darwinism? If so, does their view of God refute or support Rachels’s claim that
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Darwinian theism cannot support a robust enough view of God to be compatible with 
traditional ethics?
Darwin’s God
Plantinga offers us an initial answer to the first question. He notes that the only 
arguments for incompatibility between God and evolution “have turned from deductive to 
probabilistic arguments from evil.” Thus, “the typical atheological claim at present is not 
that the existence of God is incompatible with that of evil, but rather, that the latter offers 
the resources for a strong probabilistic argument against the former.”1 This is exactly 
what Rachels has argued, and by shifting the argument to probability instead of logical 
entailment, Rachels has felt little need to interact deeply with the argument over natural 
evil. However, the probablisitic argument (a type of parsimony assertion) itself assumes 
a particular doctrine of God. This issue is superbly developed by Cornelius Hunter.
Hunter cites numerous claims by evolutionists, giving various reasons why “God 
would not have created [the present natural order] in this way.”2 Such an approach he 
calls “negative theology” for it is offering proof by negative instead of positive 
evidence.3 But in so doing, argues Hunter, “they are beholden to a specific notion of 
God, and notions of God, no matter how carefully considered, are outside the realm of
‘Plantinga, 71.
2In many parts of this book Hunter quotes or cites an evolutionist making such a 
claim. For examples see, Hunter, 12-13, 44-49, 63-64, 81-84, 98-99, 109-110.
3Ibid., 47-48. See also 97,103.
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science.”1 Thus, a major assumption of the evolutionary position is not scientific at all! 
And this point is foundational to why Hunter calls Darwin’s theory the “evolution 
theodicy.”2 But why does Hunter see Darwin as so theological?
Hunter argues that a seminal influence on Darwin was Milton’s Parasise Lost. In 
Hunter’s view, Milton was addressing the problem of evil, and solved it by distancing 
God from the creation. “Both men were dealing with the problem of evil—Milton with 
moral evil and Darwin with natural evil—and both found solutions by distancing God 
from evil. And most important, the two held similar conceptions of God.”3 However, 
“Darwin’s solution distanced God from creation to the point that God was unnecessary. 
One could still believe in God, but not in God’s providence. Separating God from 
creation and its evils meant that God could have no direct influence or control over the 
world. God may have created the world, but ever since that point it has run according to 
impersonal natural laws that may now and then produce natural evil.”4 Therefore, 
“Darwin was now increasing this separation to the point that the link between creation
'Ibid., 92.
2Ibid., 13. Hunter frequently calls evolution a theodicy and, on 173-175, closes the 
book on this theme.
3Ibid., 12.
“Ibid., 16.
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and God was severed.”1 Thus, Hunter claims to have uncovered “the evolutionist’s 
notion of a restricted God.”2
How did Darwin and his contemporaries come to define God with such 
restrictions? Hunter notes that modernism spawned a trend towards viewing God in 
terms of being a “comprehensible deity.”3 Since the classical Christian view of God 
seemed incompatible with the natural world they observed, the concept of a supernatural 
deity who intervenes and rules was increasingly rejected, and eventually replaced with, as 
Hunter names it, “rational theism.”4 Thus God was seen as acting only according to 
natural laws. Hunter credits two key ideas for fueling this trend of invoking “divine 
sanction and intellectual necessity. In the former, God is seen as being all the greater for 
designing a world that works on its own, rather than requiring divine intervention. In the 
latter, the restricting of God to natural laws is urged because only this ensures meaningful 
scientific inquiry is possible. If natural laws are subject to violation, then we cannot
Tbid., 17. Mattill makes a similar observation to Hunter, by asserting that when 
Darwin proposed natural selection as the creative force, “Darwin rewrote Genesis and 
transferred God’s workload to the process of evolution, even as Newton had transferred 
another part of the divine workload to gravity. Biology and astronomy were dislodging 
God from governing the world." A. J. Mattill, Jr., The Seven Mighty Blows to Traditional 
Beliefs (Gordo, AL: Flatwoods Free Press, 1995), 26. Emphasis mine.
2Hunter, 47.
3Ibid., 115.
4Ibid., 115-116,128-132. Ultimately, all of chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to 
discussing the issue of how the concept of God became restricted.
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discern the law from the exception.”1 In the divine sanction argument, then, “we should 
expect God to use secondary means because this requires all the more wisdom and 
foresight.. . .  God may be almighty, but his is all the more impressive because he does 
not exercise his might.”2
But for Hunter, this raises a serious problem: “In what we might call the problem 
o f morality, how can God be so aloof from his creation, allowing even his creatures to be 
the result of blind mechanical forces, yet simultaneously be the source of our moral law 
and the ultimate judge of our actions? In the former he has become non-existent, or at 
least irrelevant; in the latter he is vital.”3 This is precisely the dilemma Rachels seeks to
‘Ibid., 116. Emphasis in original. C. S. Lewis strenuously objects to this last point 
that allowing the supernatural into the system makes differentiating between natural and 
supernatural impossible. “But there is one thing often said about our ancestors which we 
must not say. We must not say ‘They believed in miracles because they did not know the 
Laws of Nature.’ This is nonsense. When St Joseph discovered that his bride was 
pregnant, he was ‘minded to put her away.’ He knew enough biology for th a t.. . .  He 
regarded it as a miracle precisely because he knew enough about the Laws of Nature to 
know that this was a suspension of them.. . .  If a man had no conception of an 
established order in Nature, then of course he could not notice departures from that 
order.. . .  Complete ignorance of the laws of Nature would preclude the perception of the 
miraculous just as rigidly as complete disbelief in the supernatural precludes it, perhaps 
even more so.” Lewis, God in the Dock, 26. Lewis again uses Joseph, in a Socratic style 
dialog, to make the same point on pp. 72-73.
2Hunter, 118. On this page, Hunter uses a quotation from Thomas Burnet (1635- 
1715) to illustrate the divine sanction argument. Burnet argues that we would esteem a 
clock maker who makes clock that strikes the hours automatically to be a superior 
clockmaker to one making a clock requiring the maker to push a button each hour to 
make it strike. Thus a God who makes a mechanical universe that runs itself without 
miracles is deemed superior.
3Ibid., 138. Hunter is here culminating a discussion on the fact that the tension 
between natural law and morals had raged for a century or more prior to Darwin, and thus 
Darwin did not develop his arguments against, nor his views of, God in a vacuum.
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capitalize on in arguing that theism is either incompatible with morality, or that a 
Darwinian divinity is not robust enough to support traditional morality. So Rachels is 
certainly not being unreasonable to make such assertions. What kind of God, then, is 
there to believe in if the divine sanction and intellectual necessity arguments are 
accepted?
According to Hunter, the result is that “God, on the one hand, is seen as all-good 
but not necessarily all-powerful, or at least does not exercise all his power. God is 
virtuous, not dictatorial.”1 But notice, then, that elimination of God is no longer 
necessary. “The end result of Darwin’s theory is not that there is no God, but rather, that 
God is disjoint from the material world.. . .  In evolution theodicy, the Creator must be 
disjoint from creation, but no more than this is required.”2 Thus, Hunter disagrees with 
Rachels that Darwinism makes atheism difficult to resist, but agrees that the theory of 
evolution does entail a view of God not compatible with traditional Christian morality. Is 
Hunter right in arguing that Darwinism offers deliverance from the problem of evil 
through a reinterpretation of God which saves God’s goodness by limiting his power?
A Theology of Evolution
Introduction
From the late twentieth century until the present, we find movement in the direction 
of promoting such a theology. First, there is the denial that Darwinism is incompatible
Tbid., 146.
2Ibid., 165.
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with belief in God. Ruse seems to take this view, noting that “Darwinism does not 
dissolve away Christian belief,”1 and that “Darwinism is ecumenical. Its processes can 
and will accommodate wide range of theological options.”2 Kenneth Miller, a biologist, 
makes a similar argument: “The common assumption, widely shared in academic and 
intellectual circles, is that Darwinism is a fatal poison to traditional religious belief. One 
may, of course, accept the scientific validity of evolution and profess belief in a supreme 
being, but not without diluting traditional religion almost beyond recognition, or so the 
thinking goes. Incredibly, all too many traditional believers accept this view, not 
realizing that is based on a more humanistic culture of disbelief than on any finding of 
evolutionary science.”3 Like Ruse, Miller seems to be arguing that Darwinism does not 
defacto eliminate God and religion, and he seems to leave the door open for a variety of 
theological options. But how wide is a wide array of options? Ruse recognizes that, 
“obviously, if  you are a fundamentalist Christian, then the Darwinian reading of Genesis 
is going to give you major problems—insoluble problems, I suspect.”4 Thus the portal to
'Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 138.
2Ibid., 216. This is the last sentence of the body of the book. The epilogue asks, 
“can a Darwinian be a Christian? Absolutely! Is it always easy for a Darwinian to be a 
Christian? No, but whoever said that the worthwhile things in life are easy? Is the 
Darwinian obligated to be a Christian? No, but try to be understanding of those who are. 
Is the Christian obligated to be a Darwinian? No, but realize how much you are going to 
foreswear i f  you do not make the effort” (217).
3Kenneth R. Miller, Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common 
Ground Between God and Evolution (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), xii.
4Ruse, Can a Darwinian, 217.
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religious Darwinism may not be as wide as is touted. Not all may enter, though some 
have.
Putting Darwin into Theology
John F. Haught, possibly the leading scholar in the recently formed movement of 
evolutionary theology, laments that not just the discipline of theology has failed to 
grapple with the implications of Darwin’s theory, but neither have the philosophers. “If 
theology has fallen short of the reality of evolution, however, so also has the world of 
thought in general.. . .  Philosophy also has yet to produce an understanding of 
reality—an ontology—adequate of evolution.”1 Thus he charges that, “to a great extent, 
theologians still think and write almost as if Darwin had never lived.”2
One might be tempted to think that Haught has forgotten the work of Teilhard de 
Chardin in combining theology with Darwinian evolution, but Haught assures us 
otherwise. “Although Teilhard himself was a profoundly religious thinker, he was not a 
professional theologian, and so his own efforts to construe a ‘God for evolution’ stopped 
short of the systematic development his intuitions demanded.”3 Thus, Haught believes 
the challenge of properly accounting for evolution in theology still remains.
’John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology o f Evolution (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000), 1.
2Ibid., 2.
3John F. Haught, Deeper than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age o f 
Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 162.
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Haught responds to this problem by proposing the possibilities of a theology 
informed by evolution.
Scientific skeptics, of course, decided long ago that the only reasonable 
option Darwin leaves us is that of a totally Godless universe. That theology 
survives at all after Darwin is to some evolutionists a most puzzling anachronism. 
We would have to agree, of course, that if atheism is the logical correlate of 
evolutionary science, then the day of religions and theologies is over. But as we 
shall see, such a judgement is hardly warranted. I shall argue in the pages ahead 
that Darwin has gifted us with an account of life whose depth, beauty, and 
pathos—when seen in the context of the larger cosmic epic of 
evolution—expose[s] us afresh to the raw reality of the sacred and to a 
resoundingly meaningful universe.1
Haught expresses high hopes about the prospects of a Darwinian theology: “I cannot here
emphasize enough, therefore, the gift evolution can be to our theology. For us to turn our
backs on it, as so many Christians continue to do, is to lose a great opportunity to deepen
our understanding of the wisdom and self-effacing love of God.”2
But what would such a theology be like? Haught declares: “Evolutionary theology,
unlike natural theology, does not search for definitive footprints of the divine in nature.
It is not terribly concerned with ‘intelligent design,’ since the notion seems entirely too
lifeless to capture the dynamic and even disturbing way in which the God of biblical
religion interacts with the world. Instead of trying to prove God’s existence from nature,
evolutionary theology seeks to show how our new awareness of cosmic and biological
evolution can enhance and enrich traditional teachings about God and God’s way of
‘Haught, God after Darwin, 2.
2John F. Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution (New York: 
Paulist Press, 2001), 114.
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acting in the world.”1 Thus evolution is supposed to give us a richer view of God, 
presumably superior to the traditional view. Diarmuid O ’Murchu, another contemporary 
evolutionary theologian, expands on the idea of evolution enriching our view of God: 
“Evolutionary theology wishes to keep open the possibility that all forms of creaturehood 
(plant and animal alike) are dimensions of divine disclosure and can enlighten us in our 
desire to understand God more deeply and respond in faith more fully. Evolutionary 
theology is committed to a radically open-ended understanding of how the divine reveals 
itself in and to the world.”2 This means that in evolutionary theology, nature is not used 
as evidence to prove classical attributes of God. Rather, both Darwinian evolution and 
God’s creatorship are assumed to be true. Thus, evolution shows us how God created, 
and this method of creating, in turn, deepens our understanding of who God is and how 
He operates. But, cautions Haught, “trying to locate God’s activity within or at the level 
of natural biological causation really amounts to a shrinkage of God. This approach is 
known as ‘god-of-the-gaps’ theology.. . .  A god-of-the-gaps approach is a science 
stopper.. . .  But, even worse, it is theologically idolatrous. It makes divine action one 
link in the world’s chain of finite causes rather than the ultimate ground of all natural 
causes.”3
'Haught, God after Darwin, 36.
2Diarmuid O’Murchu, Evolutionary Faith: Rediscovering God in Our Great Story 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 88.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 18-19.
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This, in turn, means that we cannot ascribe specific activity to God. The result, as 
O’Murchu notes, is that “evolutionary theology borrows liberally from process thought, 
proposing God’s total involvement in the evolutionary process to be a primary conviction 
upon which everything is postulated.”1 O’Murchu further asserts that “the process 
position challenges the assumption that our God must always be a ruling, governing 
power above and beyond God’s own creation.”2 Why is the tendency to favor process 
theology significant? O’Murchu explains, “What conventional believers find 
unacceptable about the process position is the notion of a vulnerable God, allegedly at the 
mercy of capricious forces as are all other creatures of the universe.”3 Thus, the first 
significant theological impact of Darwin that we shall examine is the limiting of God’s 
power in order to save His goodness.
Limiting God’s Power to Save His Goodness
The limiting of divine power is one of the early issues that Haught examines in his 
book, God after Darwin. Early in the book, Haught examines David Hull’s argument 
that the present order is incompatible with the concept of God. Hull asks, “What kind of 
God can one infer from the sort of phenomenon epitomized by the species on Darwin’s 
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wasteful, indifferent, almost diabolical. This is not the sort of God to whom anyone
would be inclined to pray.”1
Haught’s answer to Hull’s unworshipable God involves the call to alter our
concept of God to fit the data of modem science. Says Haught,
But what if “God” is not just an originator of order, but also the disturbing 
wellspring of novelty? And, moreover, what if the cosmos is not just an “order” 
(which is what “cosmos” means in Greek) but a still unfinished process? Suppose 
we look carefully at the undeniable evidence that the universe is still being created. 
And suppose also that “God” is less concerned with imposing a plan or design on 
this process than with providing it with opportunities to participate in its own 
creation. I f  we make these conceptual adjustments, as both contemporary science 
and a consistent theology actually require that we do, the idea of God not only 
becomes compatible with evolution, but also logically anticipates the kind of life- 
world that neo-Darwinian biology sets before us.2
But would this not impeach the goodness of God as Hull has charged?
A number of theologians and philosophers would answer this question, “No.”
Their solution is to argue that natural evil is unavoidable for God because His power is
limited. Bertocci argues that “the evidence indicates God is not omnipotent,” and goes
on to argue that only by having limited power can God’s moral goodness be preserved.3
C. Don Keyes states that through the work of Julian Casserley, he has come to the
conclusion that
‘David L. Hull, “The God of the Galapagos,” Nature 352 (August 8, 1991): 486. 
The last lines are quoted in Haught, God after Darwin, 6.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 6. Final emphasis mine. Later, on p. 38, Haught again 
appeals to the argument that if God created an unfinished, evolving universe, we should 
expect natural evil and contingency.
3Bertocci, 413-414. Emphasis in original. See also 466-467 where he repeats his 
argument that limited power is the only way to maintain God’s moral goodness.
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God ought not to be defined primarily in terms of sovereignty and power. The 
implications of this statement liberated me from interpreting God’s omnipotence as 
the kind of coercive power capable of always preventing evil. Instead, I now 
firmly believe with Plato that the goodness of God is his most essential quality and 
that he is the author only of the good things that happen. Ultimately ‘power’ and 
‘good’ are different kinds of reality, but of the two, good is more absolutely 
attributable to God. The power of the good is almost always indirect.1
Keys gives no good reasons for ascribing goodness as an absolute quality while treating
omnipotence as a symbolic or relative quality, other than the ability to explain evil, and
possibly the support of Plato. It is also significant, as we shall soon see, that goodness
becomes the supreme, untouchable attribute of God to which all other attributes,
including power, seem to be subjugated.
Korsmeyer echoes the refrain in which God’s power is limited in order to preserve
his goodness.
The painfully slow evolution of life, spreading in great diversity into all available 
niches, trying out all possible avenues of advance, the huge role of chance, the
'C. Don Keys, “Julian Casserley’s Hope,” in Evil and Evolutionary Eschatology: 
Two Essays, ed. C. Don Keys, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 39 (Lewiston, NY: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), xxii-xxiii. Casserley actually says little about God’s power, 
but what he says seems to agree with Keys’s reaction to his work. In this quote, 
Casserley is combating a form of humanism he perceives to focus on developing human 
power but not human morality:
“Strangely enough, most of those humanists who seem drawn towards a humanism 
of power are precisely the people who are most apt to react against a conception of God 
as kind of a celestial policeman wielding absolute powers over men. For myself, I  not
only ob jec t to a  conception o f  G od that thinks o f  hint merely, or even prim arily  in terms 
o f sovereignty and power, but I object also to any conception of man that thinks of him 
merely or even primarily in terms of sovereignty or power, and I object to both doctrines 
for the same reason, that they misapprehend the true value and excellence of personality 
[i.e., character]. The person, whether divine or human, finds authentic self-expression in 
the range and integrity of his loving and in the wide variety of his values. A humanism 
of power is as objectionable as the Calvinistic-type o f  theism and for precisely the same 
reasons.” Casserley, Evil, 27. Emphases mine.
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stumbling advances to greater complexity, all these things suggest a divine nature 
at odds with the omnipotent God o f  classical theism. The universe, as we know it, 
was not created in an instant of absolute coercive power. The creeping advance of 
matter and life, the spread of probabilities, the diversity of approaches, all suggest 
some sharing o f power between Creator and creatures. It is as though divinity 
labored to persuade, to lure creatures forward, creatures who sometimes responded 
to the invitation, and sometimes did no t.. . .  The universe’s story is suggesting that 
divine power is different from what we have imagined. It is like the power of love, 
persuasive, patient, and persistent.. . .
. . .  The idea of creation by persuasion, surprisingly, suggests a Creator much 
closer to the biblical God of love than that of classical theism.1
All of these authors speak as if their position on limiting God’s power is so self-evident
that there can be no criticism of it.
Kraemer offers three rebuttals to the limited power view of God. First, is God only
limited in power as claimed? If He is limited in power, why not in knowledge and
goodness as well? Why limit God’s power only? Second, he picks up Hume’s argument
that if God were this limited in power, He should have created fewer animals with better
faculties for happiness. Third, Kramer questions if such a limited, imprudent God is
worthy of respect and worship. He reminds us that “other great but limited beings, saints
and heroes, clearly merit respect, but not worship. Once God is similarly limited, the
problem of justifying the worship-worthiness of God needs to be addressed.”2
Claiming a More Exalted View of God
Haught directly addresses the issue of God’s worship worthiness and does so in 
several places. He states, for example, that “if the idea of God is to arouse our instinct to
'Korsmeyer, 84. Emphases mine.
2Kraemer, 11.
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worship, this idea cannot be smaller than the universe that science has made so 
conspicuous to us.”1 By contrast, “the notion of God as an intelligent designer is 
inadequate. The God of evolution is an inexhaustible and unsettling source of new modes 
of being, forever eluding the encapsulation in orderly schemata.”2
Haught argues that the biblical view of God, which he describes as “the 
anthropomorphic one-planet deity,” is too small for the evolutionary view of the cosmos. 
Thus, “the idea of a personal God such as we have in the Bible is a stumbling block for 
many evolutionary scientists as well.” What we “traditionally called ‘God’ now appears 
too small for them.” Thus he charges that they turn to Eastern religions “and other forms 
of mysticism to satisfy their very human craving for infinite horizons.” Haught 
concludes, “in any case theology must take pains to ensure that our notion of God is not 
slighter than the epic of cosmic and biological evolution itself.”3 Haught further asserts 
that “to insist on a special creation, as many Christians do, is to shrink God to the role of 
magician. It is also a refusal to acknowledge the creative vocation that all creatures have 
in some degree, and which we humans have in a very special way. A robust theology of
'Haught, God after Darwin, ix. Interestingly, while Haught here argues that our 
concept of God must be based on a cosmological perspective supplied by science, in his 
Responses to 101 Questions, he argues that “this is not a God that theology invented just 
to accommodate Darwin. This is the empathetic God revealed in the pages of the Bible” 
(124). How can one base his view of God on the scientific discoveries interpreted 
through the theoretical perspective o f  Darwin, w hile not making any accommodation to 
Darwinism? These two statements concerning the role of science through Darwin seem to 
disagree with each other.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 9.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 36.
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creation finds more to admire in a divine creator who calls this self-creating universe into 
being, than a ‘designer’ who directly forces everything into a prefabricated.”1 Such a 
God, for Haught, loses some of the traditional concept o f transcendence, for he sees God 
as “immediately operative in the depths of all natural processes.. . .  The Spirit of God is 
hiddenly present in all instances of new creation.”2 Alluding to Teilard de Chardin, 
Haught asserts that the reality of God, from an evolutionary perspective, “begins to shift 
from the One who abides vertically ‘up above’ to the One who comes into the world from 
‘up ahead,’ out of the realm of the future.” This is asserted to match the biblical 
eschatology of Isaiah “where God is the One who ‘goes before’ the people.”3
Reversing the analogy, Haught argues for an entering of God into creation. 
“Evolution happens, ultimately, because of the ‘coming of God’ toward the entire 
universe from out of an always elusive future. And just as the arrival of God does not 
enter the human sphere by crude extrinsic forcefulness but by participating in it and 
energizing it from within, we may assume that it does no enter coercively into the pre­
human levels of cosmic and biological evolution either. The coming o f God into nature, 
like the nonintrusive effectiveness of the Tao, is always respectful of the world’s
'Ibid., 53-55.
2Ibid., 53. Emphasis mine.
3Haught, God after Darwin, 39-40. See also 101 Questions, 50-51, where Haught 
gives similar argumentation including the connection to Teilhard de Chardin. In 101 
Questions, question 94, Haught summarizes the theology of Teilhard including the 
“omega principle” to which the “up ahead” refers. Question 95 expounds on 
Whitehead’s process philosophy. These two become the pillars for Haught’s evolving 
reality drawn by a God who lures all in development towards him.
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presently realized autonomy.”1 Haught here introduces a panentheistic view of a God as 
the solution to the problem of evil. But why would God want to choose such an 
unobtrusive means of wooing evolution along? For Haught, “the world is in evolution, 
then, because God is a God of persuasive rather than coercive power.” Based on the 
assumption that evolution is how God created, Haught argues that “it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that the Creator does not want a universe that remains content with 
the way things are, but one that strives adventurously to become something more.”2
'Haught, God after Darwin, 99.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 136-137. See also, idem, God after Darwin, 42, where he 
uses the language of adventure to opine that God values surprises over order.
“According to process theology, evolution occurs because God is more interested in 
adventure than in preserving the status quo. ‘Adventure,’ in Whiteheadian terms, is the 
cosmic search for more and more intense versions of ordered novelty, another word for 
which is ‘beauty.’ God’s will, apparently, is the maximization of cosmic beauty. And the 
epic of evolution is the world’s response to God’s own longing that it strive towards ever 
richer ways of realizing aesthetic intensity.” Thus, Haught’s cosmic God of evolution 
seems more like an adventure addict who gets his ultimate thrill from creating through a 
totally contingent, random processes that surprise even Him.
Haught by his own admission appears to base this proposal on the argument the 
from imagination offered by Guy Murchie. See, Haught, God after Darwin, 29-30. Says 
Murchie, “Try to imagine that you are God. This might not come naturally to you. To be 
God of course you have to be a creator. And a creator, by definition, must create. So you, 
the creator, now find yourself creating creatures (a word meaning created beings) who 
have to have a world to live in. But what kind of world should they live in? Or more 
specifically, what kind of world will you decide to create for them? . . .  As for life and 
adventure, Earth is literally teeming with i t . . . .  Earth provides the optimum, if not the 
maximum, in prolonged stimulation of body and mind and, most particularly, she excels 
in educating the spirit.. . .  Honestly now, if you were God, could you possibly dream up 
any more educational, contrasty, thrilling, beautiful, tantalizing world than Earth to 
develop spirit in? . . .  Would you, in other words, try to make the world nice and 
safe—or would you let it be provocative, dangerous and exciting? In actual fact, if it 
ever came to that, I’m sure you would find it impossible to make a better world than God 
has already created.” Guy Murchie, The Seven Mysteries o f  Life: An Exploration in 
Science and Philosophy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), 621-622.
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Haught thus sees a God with limited power as more worship worthy.
Haught is not the only one to argue that a limited God is more deserving of worship 
than the traditional Christian God. Korsmeyer declares, “our God should be worthy of 
worship.”1 In the context of advocating panentheism, Korsmeyer asserts, “The whole of 
the created universe is within God, although God is other and superior to it. God is both 
eternal and temporal, and God both includes and transcends the world. But is such a 
God perfect, and so worthy of worship?”2 The context seems to imply an affirmative 
answer. Korsmeyer then defines divinity in a manner consistent with limited attributes: 
“Indeed, God must be greatest, must be transcendent, in all categories.. . .  God is defined 
as that perfect, supremely excellent being, than which no other individual being could 
conceivably be greater, but which itself, could become greater.”3 Thus, like Haught, 
Korsmeyer asserts that God both can and does evolve with the rest of the universe. His 
power is limited. But such a view produces an intriguing irony.
The Hidden, Humble God of Evolution
Haught proposes that such a panenthesitic God is actually more deeply involved in 
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process of creation.”1 But why should we believe such a God inhabits nature? Is there 
any evidence for this conclusion?
Ironically, the answer is, “no.” Three times in as many pages, Haught asserts that 
the concept of divine humility better explains the evolutionary data than does traditional 
theology or materialism.2 In another work, he argues that “nothing less than a 
transcendent force, radically distinct from, but also intimately incarnate in matter could 
ultimately explain evolution.”3 Haught describes this immanent presence as God’s “self­
withdrawal,” “self-absenting,” and “self-concealment,” so as to not have any external 
influence or exercise of “coercive power” over the universe.4 “God is present in the 
mode of ‘hiddenness.’”5 Twice more he asserts that God is present in the form of 
“ultimate goodness.”6 Thus Haught associates the limited power of God, represented by 
His hiddenness, as being ultimate goodness.
It seems ironic, with Haught’s dedication to modem science, that he claims this 
hidden God can only be detected by faith. Says Haught, “The world is embraced 
constantly by God’s presence. But this presence does not show up as an object to be 
grasped by ordinary awareness or scientific method. It is empirically unavailable, in
'Haught, 101 Questions, 119.
2Haught, God after Darwin, 53-55.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 163
4Haught, God after Darwin, 195, 197, 203.
5Ibid., 195.
6Ibid., 197, 203.
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other words.. . .  Only those attuned to religious experience will be aware or appreciative 
of it.”1 This is amazing! Haught is appealing to subjective experience for a major pillar 
of his theology. And he makes the appeal more than once: “The raw ingredients of 
evolution flow forth from the depths of divine love, a depth that will show up only to 
those whose personal lives have already been grasped by a sense o f G od”2 A few 
phrases later he reiterates, “The very fact that nature can lend itself to a literalist reading 
is a consequence of the humble, hidden and vulnerable way in which divine love works. 
The very possibility o f giving an atheistic interpretation of evolution is that God’s 
creative love humbly refuses to make itself available at the level o f scientific 
comprehension.”3
Haught claims to base this subjective discovery of God in nature from Tillich’s
concept of God as infinite depth. Thus,
religion is a state o f being grasped by inexhaustible depth that lurks beneath the 
surface of our lives and of nature too. In religious experience we do not so much 
grasp this depth as allow the depth to grasp us. Depth takes hold of us in such a 
powerful way that we can neither deny it nor master it, though of course we may 
try to flee from i t . . . .  This depth is a “self-authenticating force [which] assumes 
an almost revelatory character. To those who have been grasped by it, everything 
else pales in significance, including all previous renditions of reality.. . .
. . .  When I use the term ‘God’ in this book I intend, nonetheless, to follow 
Paul Tillich’s claim that God really means depth.. . .  ‘God’ means the 
inexhaustible depth that perpetually draws us towards itself, the depth without 
which no enduring joy or satisfaction or peace is possible.4
'Haught, 101 Questions, 119.
2Ibid., 60-61. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 61.
“Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 27-29. Emphasis mine.
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So Haught appeals to the self-authenticating nature of divine depth as proof of God’s 
immanent presence within nature. On the other hand, he does appeal to one vein of 
evidence that is discemable to the unbeliever as well: Indian, Taoist, Buddhist, and 
Platonic beliefs are all based on the concept of a hidden, deeper reality than the visible 
world, and that Christ espoused a similar concept by declaring that God’s Kingdom is 
within us.1
O’Murchu argues a similar point to Haught, using the evolutionary process as a 
means of revealing the divine. He concludes, “Consequently, revelation may be defined 
as the process of unveiling in which both the meaning of the world and the meaning of 
God become more apparent at the same time.”2 And again it is awakened and sustained 
by faith. “The faithfulness of the Originating and Sustaining Mystery awakens faith not 
only in the human heart, but also in the heart o f creation itself. Faith invites faith.”3
The panentheistic hiddenness of God has been argued by Haught to be an 
expression of divine humility to protect the absolute freedom of the universe. This 
concept of divine humility is significant, for Haught develops it into a metaphysics for 
grounding his theology.
‘Ibid., 29-30.
20 ’Murchu, 88, 90.
Tbid., 34.
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The Metaphysical Foundation of Divine Humility
Haught argues that “the metaphysics of divine humility . . .  explains the actual 
features of evolution much more intelligibly than either of the main alternatives.”1 But 
from where does he get ideas to turn divine humility into a metaphysics? In God after 
Darwin we get several clues all pointing to one conclusion: His metaphysics of divine 
humility is based in the concept of the kenosis of Phil 2. Haught declares:
At the very center of the Christian faith lies a trust that in the passion and 
crucifixion of Christ we are presented with the mystery of a God who pours divine 
selfhood into the world in an act of unreserved self-abandonment. The utter 
lowliness of this image has led some theologians in our century to speak carelessly 
of God as “powerless.” . . .  The image of God’s humility does not imply weakness 
and powerlessness, but rather, a kind of “defenselessness” or “vulnerability.” . . .
The image of the self-emptying God lies at the heart of Christian revelation 
and the doctrine of the Trintiy.2
A later statement asserts, “As I have noted, it is in its encounter with the crucified man
Jesus . . .  that Christian faith is given this key to God’s relation to the world.. . .  The
Creator’s power (by which I mean the capacity to influence the world) is made manifest
paradoxically in the vulnerable defenselessness of a crucified man.”3 For Haught, the
'Haught, God after Darwin, 55.
2Ibid., 48-49. Haught makes use of the theology of Moltmann to help establish the 
conclusions quoted above. A key quotation of Moltmann is found in, Jurgen Moltmann, 
G od in Creation, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco, CA: Harper and R ow , 1985), 88, 
quoted in Haught, 49, and reads: “This self-restricting love is the beginning of that self­
emptying of God which Philippians 2 sees as the divine mystery of the Messiah. Even in 
order to create heaven and earth, God emptied himself o f his all-plenishing omnipotence, 
and as Creator took. . .  the form of a servant.”
3Haught, God after Darwin, 112,113. Emphasis mine. See also p. I l l :  “At the 
center of Christian faith lies the conviction (John 3:16) that ‘God so loved the world that
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kenosis of Philippians 2, especially as seen in the crucifixion, is the primary way in 
which God has related to creation, through eternity. “It is to this image that Christian 
theology must always repair whenever it thinks about God’s relationship to the world 
and its evolution.”1 This model is one of defenseless, vulnerable love, not supervisory 
governance.2
Bertocci offers an alternative foundation for this view of love. “Plato long ago 
realized that it was the very essence of love to be in want. . . .  Love is beautiful and wise 
because it seeks the beauty and wisdom it already enjoys but incompletely; it is good 
because it is lured by a good which it incompletely possesses.”3 Thus, in the Platonic 
sense as well, love is seen as fundamentally empty and in need. This Platonic definition 
seems to exercise great influence regarding how evolutionary theologians define love.
He gave his only Son’ to redeem and renew that world. Theologically translated, this 
text and many others like it imply that the very substance o f the divine life is poured out 
into creation, and that the world is now and forever open to an infinitely replenishing 
future.” Emphases mine.
'Ibid., 111. Emphasis mine.
2In my opinion, Haught has missed the point of Phil 2 which is the voluntary self- 
sacrifice of God in Christ to provide the perfect obedience necessary to satisfy human 
duties to God as the sacrificial substitute for all men. Haught seems instead to turn the 
kenosis into the ultimate expression of the modem mentality of victimhood. Christ as 
victim arouses our sympathies and gratitude, but the substitutionary atonement dimension 
is entirely missing in Haught.
3Bertocci, 457. Bertocci is synthesizing Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 3, 
Lysias, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. 
Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 183-189. Bertocci seems to 
summarize Plato with a bit more clarity than is actually found in Plato, but the overall 
concept of love being rooted in desire for good and beautiful things seems to be the 
foundational concept Bertocci builds on.
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But if love becomes defined in terms of God’s defenseless vulnerability, then love 
becomes defined in terms of giving total, unregulated freedom to the universe and its 
creatures by his self-emptying.
Love’s Power Is Non-Coercive
A key implication of this empty, needy love is that it must be non-coercive.
Haught makes this fundamental connection by stating:
The doctrine of grace proclaims that God loves the world and all of its various 
elements fully and unconditionally. By definition, however, love does not absorb, 
annihilate, or force itself upon the beloved. Instead it longs for the beloved to 
become more and more ‘other’ or differentiated. Along with its nurturing and 
compassionate attributes, love brings with it a longing for the independence of that 
which is loved. Without such ‘letting be’ of its beloved, the dialogical intimacy 
essential to a loving relationship would be impossible.. . .
. . .  Divine love does not compel, but invites. To compel, after all would be 
contrary to the very nature of love.1
Miller argues in a similar fashion that the divine love is not a controlling power in 
the universe. “The Western God stands back from his creation, not to absent Himself, 
not to abandon His creatures, but to allow His people true freedom. A God who hovers, 
in all His visible power and majesty, over every step taken by mere mortals never allows 
them the independence that true love, true goodness, and true obedience requires.'’2
'Haught, God after Darwin, 39-41. Emphasis mine. Haught repeats these types of 
arguments on pp. 112-114.
2Miller, 253. Emphases mine. Earlier Miller has argued that “our first step would 
be to assume that an all-powerful Deity decided to make creatures and to endow them 
with free will and the ability to make moral choices.” How? “The genius of the creator’s 
plan was that by creating a separate world, a world that ran by its own rules, He would 
give His creatures the ‘space ’ they would need to become independent, to make true 
moral choices" (emphasis mine). See pp. 249-250.
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Miller reiterates the argument a little later, declaring: “A world without meaning would
be one in which a Deity pulled the string of every human puppet, and every material
particle as well . . . .  By being always in control, the Creator would deny His creatures
any real opportunity to know and worship Him. Authentic love requires freedom, not
manipulation. Such freedom is best supplied by the open contingency of evolution, and
not by strings of divine direction attached to every living creature.”1
Haught uses emotive and almost pejorative language to describe the traditional
view of God in contrast to his humble, vulnerable God.
The God of Jesus is utterly unlike . . .  our traditional images of God 
understood as divine potentate or ‘designer.’ Theology is offended by evolution 
only when it assumes a rather imperious concept o f divine omnipotence.. . .
Evolutionary science, however, demands that we give up one and for all the 
tyrannical images we may have sometimes projected onto God. The real stumbling 
block to reconciling faith and evolution, therefore, is not the sufferings in nature 
and human history, but our failure to have acquainted ourselves sufficiently with 
the startling image of a God who seeks the world’s freedom and who shares in the 
world’s pain.2
In another work, Haught declares, “Only a narrowly coercive deity would have collapsed 
. . .  creation . . .  into the dreary confines of a single originating instant.” He further 
describes such a process as ‘‘freezing nature into a state of finished perfection.”3 He calls 
such a sovereign God “our divine magician.”4 By contrast, evolution invites us to 
“recapture the often obscured portrait of a self-humbling, suffering God who is anything
'Ibid., 289. Emphasis mine.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 127. Emphasis mine.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 80. Emphasis mine.
4Ibid.
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but a divine controller or designer o f the c o s m o s The evolutionary God “refrains from 
wielding the domineering power that both skeptics and believers often project onto their 
ideal of the absolute.” Yet God is not “a weak or powerless God incapable of redeeming 
this flawed universe, but one whose salvific and creative effectiveness is all the more 
prevailing because it is rooted in a divine humility.”2
Kosmeyer makes similar arguments to Haught. “Absolute power is not a trait 
consistent with a God who is love; shared power i s . . . .  In our neoclassical model, God’s 
power is solely persuasive. God persuades creatures into being.”3 Korsmeyer ties this 
view of God to the worship issue. “A God who is love is worthy of worship; a God who 
is omnipotent, whose power is coercive, is not.”4
Haught welds the concept of non-coercive power to the effectiveness of divine 
influence. “God’s compassionate self-restraint allows for the world’s self-creation and
‘Ibid., 81.
2Ibid., 82.
3Korsmeyer, 96. Emphasis in original. In arguing for a power-sharing God, 
Korsmeyer sounds not unlike Mill. Mill argues that the problem of evil makes us 
worship a contradictory god, for “the ways of this Deity in Nature are on many occasions 
totally at variance with the precepts, as he believes, of the same Deity in the Gospel.”
The only non-contradictory view of Deity for Mill is one which posits two competing 
principles or powers, one good and one evil. But this seems, for Mill, to diminish the 
good god’s power, for, “a virtuous human assumes in this theory the exalted character of 
a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow combatant in the great strife; contributing his 
little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that 
progressive ascendency, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil,. . .  as 
planned by the Being to whom we owe all the benevolent contrivance we behold in 
nature.” Mill, 113, 116-117.
4Korsmeyer, 94.
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permits God to be much more deeply related to the world than a divine dictatorship 
would be. God’s power may be said to be relational rather than unilateral. Relational 
power is more vulnerable but ultimately more influential than unilateral power since it 
allows for more autonomy, integrity and richness in the world to which God is intimately 
related.”1 Thus Haught asserts that, “in the final analysis, persuasive power is more 
influential, more ‘powerful’, than coersion.”2 In a different text, Haught expands the 
argument, declaring: “Process theology responds that if power means ‘the capacity to 
influence’ then a persuasive God is much more powerful than a hypothetical being who 
magically forces things to correspond immediately to the divine intentions. A coercive 
deity—one that an immature religiosity often wishes for . . .  would not allow for the 
otherness, autonomy, and self-coherence necessary for the world to be a world unto 
itself.”3 Haught also ties the concept of a loving, non-coercive deity to a rejection of 
external influence in a way that essentially demands a wholly immanent view of God. 
“How effective, after all, is coercive power, even in the human sphere? At best it can 
manipulate things or persons only externally. It can never influence from within, but only
•Haught, 101 Questions, 139. Final emphasis mine; all others are original.
2Ibid., 138.
3Haught, God after Darwin, 41. Emphasis mine. See also, Haught, 101 Questions, 
where w e find question 97: “Isn’t W hitehead’s notion o f  persuasive power a gratuitous 
diminishment of God’s omnipotence?” He answers, “Process theology would answer 
that it is not. For if ‘power’ means ‘the capacity to influence,’ persuasive power has a 
much deeper impact on the world, at least in the final analysis, than would any 
hypothetically coercive exercise of force.. . .  A world created by divine compulsion 
would be nothing more than an appendage of God’s own being rather than world unto 
itself’ (138).
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superficially from without. In the presence of a vulnerable, defenseless love, however, 
the world is allowed to experience its own internal power—a power of self-creativity that 
eventually takes the form of human freedom. God’s power is manifested most fully in 
God’s self-emptying empowerment of the creation.”1 Haught is looking for the best way 
that God can exercise non-coercive, freedom-giving power to nature and to man. Thus, 
for Haughk, to avoid external coercion and demonstrate his humility, God must become 
fully immanent in relation to nature.2
Panentheistic Nature of Evolutionary Theology
We have already seen statements by Haught and others clearly implying a 
panentheistic view of God, but now we shall see that this position is clearly advocated 
through the concept of a divine incarnation with the material universe. For example, 
Haught describes his God of evolution as “a promising God already incarnate in 
matter.”3 Commenting on the saying of Jesus, “if  I be lifted up from the earth, will draw 
all [men] unto me,”4 Haught offers an alternative model of incarnation, declaring, “This
‘Haught, 101 Questions, 115. Emphasis mine.
2C. S. Lewis offers an important critique of such an overselling of divine love: “It is 
for people that we care nothing about that we demand happiness on any terms: with our 
friends, our lovers, our children, we are exacting and would rather see them suffer much 
than be happy in contemptible and estranging modes. If God is love, He is, by definition, 
something more than mere kindness.” Lew is ascribes the emphasis on a non-intervening 
view of divine love to the desire to have “a grandfather in heaven—a senile 
benevolence,” who merely wishes that “a good time was had by all.” Lewis, Problem o f 
Pain, 40-41.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 115.
4John 12:32, KJV.
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image suggests that the most glorious form of power is that which humbly invites other 
beings to enter into organic unity with God of their own accord, and not out of 
compulsion.”1 A page later, Haught describes this organic unity o f nature with God in 
these terms, “Christ’s human nature, according to the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), 
must not get lost in the divinity to which it is united. God clearly wants to relate to a 
world that is ‘other’ than God. In Christ’s human nature, Christians believe, the whole 
universe somehow subsists. So in the Christian way of looking at things, God’s presence 
in the world does not dissolve the world any more than the divine nature of Christ 
nullifies the humanity of Christ.”2
This is a most interesting argument. It argues analogically from the incarnation in 
Christ to a broader incarnation of God into the universe. Just as God was in Christ 
without destroying His human nature, so God is said to be in the world in a similar 
fashion, without obliterating it. This is quite reminiscent of the organic union model of 
Dawkins in his ring-species argument. Haught appears to see God as organically united 
with the physical cosmos. Yet it is not without some irony, that Haught also sees the 
incamational model as a way of avoiding us merging the world with God to the point that 
no distinction can be made between the two.3 He asserts a need to maintain the
'Haught, 101 Questions, 117. Emphasis mine.
2Ibid., 118. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 118-119.
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otherness of God from the world “if we are to avoid pantheism.”1 Nevertheless, Haught 
describes Jesus as having an “incamational solidarity with all of nature and history, [by 
which] the suffering in these realms is assimilated into the life of God where it takes on 
an unfathomable but redemptive meaning.”2 Thus an organic level o f union is strongly 
implied.
God Feels the Pain Found within the Cosmos
The panentheistic concept of God incarnating with the universe introduces an 
interesting implication to evolutionary theology. Because God is organically united to 
the material world, He feels its pain and suffering.3 Says Haught,
Evolutionary thought helps us move beyond the aloof apathetic deity of so much 
pre-Darwinian piety. I believe, along with many other theologians today, that the
•Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 79. Haught thus rejects a pure pantheism, but 
accepts the panentheism of process theology.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 125.
3For example, see Murchie, where he addresses the problem of finding meaning 
and solves it by advocating process theology: “The key philosophical question then boils 
down to: why the world? What are we here for? Specifically, why were you and I 
conceived such sorry worms upon a troublous mote named Earth? It is a tough one. 
Scientists and philosophers have wrestled with it for millenniums to meager avail. . . .
But one of the better [theories] among recent ones is ‘process theology,’ which postulates 
that God, along with His universe, is in a perpetual process of development.. . .  Although 
it limits God, from a human standpoint, by associating Him with a finite time field, 
process theology compensates, as I understand it, by permitting his all-knowingness to be 
explained by making all life an actual part of His experience. Thus what you and I do and 
think, God feels and knows eternally through our senses, our lives, our aspirations, our 
sacrifices, our creations, along with all such everywhere”(620). Emphasis mine. It is 
significant that God’s knowledge is argued to come through the sensory apparatus of 
creation. Does this imply that God cannot know independently of the creation? Murchie 
does not address this question.
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notion of God as self-emptying love makes sense after Darwin. This is the God 
who suffers along with creation and saves the world by taking all o f its 
evolutionary travail and triumph into the everlasting divine compassion.. ..
The suffering of living beings, therefore, is not undergone in isolation from 
God, but becomes part of God’s own story.. . .
. . .  By seeing it all as God’s own suffering, we can hope for an ultimate 
victory of love and life over pain and death.1
Haught ties this idea of God sharing in the world’s suffering to the kenosis metaphysics
by invoking Christ’s passion, declaring, “According to the Christian faith, the passion
and resurrection of Jesus present us with the portrait of a God who shares fully in the
suffering o f this world and who rises victoriously over it.”2 This is Haught’s answer to
the theodicy issue in the problem of natural evil. God suffers with us, and our suffering
is eternally recorded in God’s experience.
John Bennet makes a similar argument. “Furthermore, since God’s experience,
unlike ours, is radically and perfectly complete, his actuality is co-extensive with all that
is. In short, God includes within his experience the totality of nature—nature as we
abuse it as well as nature as we care for i t . . . .  The God of love is so related to everything
that as things occur and change, the occurrences and changes register (perfectly) with
God.”3 In fact, without this process theology view, says Bennet, “nature has no religious
value if it makes no contribution to the actuality of God.”4
That O’Murchu likewise believes in an incamational model of nature is clear for he
•Haught, 101 Questions, 124, 126. Emphasis mine. See also Murchie, 620.
2Haught, 101 Questions, 124.
3Bennet, 75-76.
4Ibid., 75.
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asserts that, “in the becoming of creation, the God-reality also takes shape and form; in 
the suffering of pain and evolution, God also suffers and struggles.”1 But he then goes a 
step further in specifically applying this paradigm to human beings. Very early in his 
book he declares, “I believe in the incarnation of the divine in the human soul, initially 
activated in Africa over four million years ago.”2 Later, he reiterates and expands on this 
point. Referring to the appearance of man in evolution as a product of the “divine 
energy” 4.4 million years ago, O’Murchu continues, “This is where we encounter 
incarnation for the first time. In its basic sense, incarnation means God coming in the 
flesh of humanity, fully entering into that embodied condition, blessing and affirming 
that all that is happening to it, and using it thenceforth as a means of bearing witness to 
the presence of the divine in the world. Everything Christians claim was happening to 
our humanity in and through Christ had started 4.4 million years ago.3 O’Murchu cites a 
widespread record of human history testifying to belief in God as an immanent force 
within nature as a major evidence for this incarnation, panentheistic paradigm of God.
He then notes that this same majority of human beings has tended to see this force in 
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Korsmeyer agrees that the feminine view of deity is helpful in understanding the 
panentheistic view of God. “Another helpful metaphor is God as Mother of the world. 
Imagine the world as present in the womb of God, created and nourished by divine 
love.”1 O’Murchu notes that in this approach God is not being viewed historically as a 
feminine being, but rather as the possessor of a certain set of qualities. “Such qualities 
include fertility, creativity, intensity of engagement, diversity of involvement, 
immanence in the cosmic and planetary processes, paradox, and above all, relationality.”2 
He then adds, “Comparing creation to a female womb has resonances in a number of 
religious traditions.”3
It should be no surprise that a mother-God has been presented by these scholars. 
Elizabeth Achtemeier, in her critique of feminist theology, notes the propensity for 
pantheistic views of God found in the concept of goddess.
It is precisely the introduction of female language for God that opens the 
door to such identification with the world, however. If God is portrayed in 
feminine language, the figures o f carrying in the womb, of giving birth, and of 
suckling immediately come into play. . . .  But if the creation has issued forth from 
the body of the deity, it shares in the deity’s substance; deity is in, through, and 
under all things, and therefore everything is divine.. . .  If God is identified with his 
creation, we finally make ourselves gods and goddesses—the ultimate and 
primeval sin (Gen 3).4
'Korsmeyer, 94.
20 ’Murchu, 90. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 91.
4Elizabeth Achtemeier, “Why God Is Not Mother: A Response to Feminist God- 
Talk in the Church,” Christianity Today, August 16, 1993, 20. As an aside, Achtemeier
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Thus, O’Murchu and Korsmeyer have made a very natural comparison of God a woman 
or mother. Such a view meshes well with a pantheistic or panentheistic view of God, 
thus strengthening their argument for a highly immanent God.
Salvation as Deification
Achtemeier’s analysis points to a tendency to argue salvation as a type of 
apotheosis. We can find this tendency in evolutionary theology. In a Roman Catholic 
newsletter of opinions, Jack Keene levels a charge against Teilard de Chardin that may 
also apply to our evolutionary theologians. After an undocumented quotation of Teilhard 
confessing pantheistic tendencies, Keen asserts, “Teilhard essentially taught that the 
world itself was being transubstantiated into Christ.”1 In Haught’s argument that God’s 
presence in the evolutionary process is hidden, but real, we can see a concept very similar 
to the commonly understood Catholic concept of the sacrament. God is said to work in 
nature in the same way that He is said to work in the sacrament. Thus it is not surprising 
that Haught, a Roman Catholic,2 uses sacramental language in defining divine revelation
observes that, “The few  instances offeminine imagery fo r  God in the Bible all take the 
form o f simile, not metaphor.. . .  That distinction is instructive. A simile compares one 
aspect of something to another. For example, in Isaiah 42:14, God will, ‘cry out like a 
woman in travail,’ but only his crying out is being referred to; he is not being identified 
as a whole with the figure of a woman in childbirth. In metaphors, on the other hand, the 
whole of one thing is compared with the whole of another” (19). All emphases in 
original.
'Jack Keene, “Teilhard, Darwin, and the Cosmic Christ,” Southern Papist 
Perspective: A Catholic Opinion News Letter, Fall 1999, Issue 44, 
http://www.trosch.org/for/teilhard-keene991.htm (18 May 2004).
2Haught, God after Darwin, 6-7.
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as “the communication of God’s own selfhood to the world.”1
Korsmeyer also expresses the ultimate destiny of the world in terms of apotheosis. 
“The divine life is constantly receiving the lives of everyone in the world, and adding 
each moment to the collected moments of their past. All these moments are experienced 
by God with no loss of intensity or immediacy. The past o f the world enters the 
everlasting present o f the divine immediacy. The world is transformed in God, who 
weaves everything that is worthwhile into greater harmony, a greater whole.”2 For 
Korsmeyer, “Perhaps we have been called into existence to assist the great divine 
evolutionary plan to move the whole universe toward divinity, to be co-workers, co­
creators in bringing about the Kingdom of God among us. Perhaps eschatology has to be 
rethought.”3
Closely associated with this new direction in eschatology is the issue of what 
happens at death. Haught tends to reject the body/soul dualism that means a separation 
of the soul from nature, and seems to see death as a further aspect o f God’s incarnating
‘Ibid., 39. In the context, the word “communication” seems to carry the 
connotation of sacrament as understood in Roman Catholicism.
2Korsmeyer, 102. Emphasis mine.
3Ibid., 88. In saying God has an evolutionary plan, Korsmeyer may be treading on 
dangerous ground. In the 1980s, one Protestant denomination combined the concepts of 
an evolutionary view  o f  origins, with the biblical doctrine o f  human dom inion over 
nature to concoct a Christianized form of Julian Huxley’s Moral Darwinism, where man 
takes over the supervision of his own evolution. This included advocacy o f eugenics and 
abortion as tools for managing our evolution. For more information see, Stephen Bauer, 
“Genesis, Dominion, and Ethics: A Critical Analysis of Ethics Based on the Concept of 
Dominion in Genesis 1:26-28,” Journal o f the Adventist Theological Society 6, no. 2 
(1995): 77-108.
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Himself into nature. Thus, death “would not be a distancing from, but a movement 
toward a deeper intimacy with, and eternally embodied deity.”1 Resurrection seems to be 
seen as almost typological, a symbol of the process where God “opens up a new future 
for humans and for the whole creation.”2 How would this panentheistic absorption into 
the divine, impact our understanding of eschatology?
Evolution, Eschatology, and Human Preference
Korsmeyer asserts that “the idea of God bringing the universe to an end in the near 
future through Christ’s second coming is not compatible with the evidence of the divine 
efforts in the universe for fifteen billion years.”3 O’Murchu likewise affirms, “I no 
longer believe in the anthropocentric myth of the end of the world. There is every 
likelihood that we humans will destroy ourselves, but not creation. Creation has an 
infinite capacity to cocreate.”4 Haught likewise denies, based on an evolutionary 
perspective of our world’s history, that there was an original, perfect world that lost its 
perfection and will once again be restored. “Thus, a scientifically informed 
understanding of redemption may no longer plausibly make themes of restoration or
'Haught, God after Darwin, 162. Here and on the next page, Haught’s presentation 
of death sounds almost like the Eastern Religions’ hope of Nirvana, the absorption of all 
individuals into the cosmic one. Says Haught, “A theology of death sensitive to ecology 
and evolution would interpret dying in Christ as a transition from our present relatively 
shallow associations with the world to an ever deepening solidiarity with the entire 
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recovery dominant.. . .  It would be absurd, therefore, to seek the restoration of a 
chronologically primordial state of material dispersal.”1 Not only does evolutionary 
theology overturn our concept of God, but it also seems unable to support the hope of a 
restored, sinless perfect world. The second coming of Christ disappears from the 
theological radar screen.2 And it is in the context of this concept of eschatology that our 
evolutionary theologians see fit to raise the issue of human preference.
For Haught, “Evolution, to repeat our theme, means the world is unfinished.” But 
on the other hand, “redemption, therefore,. . .  must mean . . .  the healing of tragedy (and 
not just the consequences of human sin) that accompanies the universe in v ia .. . .  It 
would be callous indeed on the part of theologians to perpetuate the one-sidedly 
anthropocentric and retributive notions of pain and redemption that used to fit so 
comfortably into pre-evolutionary pictures of the world.”3 Thus, the traditional plan of 
salvation is seen as being overly favorable to human status. Korsmeyer holds a similar 
position: “Second, any ‘exclusive’ theology, which in effect suggests that God is only 
concerned with one group of people on one planet of one small star, is not credible. It is 
the product of a theology that considers Scripture in a literalist manner, convinced it 
provides a comprehensive scientific worldview, and has not considered the scientific
'Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 170.
2Even without doing evolutionary theology, Darwin’s theory has historically shown 
a penchant for undermining the biblical doctrine of the second coming. One good 
example is, Zachary Hayes, What Are They Saying about the End o f  the World? (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1983), 40-46. Hayes cites a number of scholars holding to this 
denial. Of significance is that Hayes explicitly ties denial of the parousia to evolution.
3Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 169. Last emphasis mine.
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evidence of who we are, where we are, and how we got here.”1 Korsmeyer further posits 
the need of animals for a similar redemption to humans. “What we can be very sure of is 
that God loves them and wills their salvation. It is the divine nature to love.”2 So, the 
new interpretation of salvation includes animals with man in such a way that human 
preference is diminished so as to include the animals. While not as fully developed as the 
non-theistic evolutionists, there is a clear leaning towards rejecting human preference in 
moral matters, just as Rachels predicted would happen.
Divine Feeling as the Ground for Animal Rights
How, then, does God redeem man, animals, and all of nature? By feeling, 
experiencing, and remembering forever all earthly suffering through being pantheistically 
present in the world.3 For Korsmeyer, the fact that God feels all sentient suffering, 
including animals, becomes the basis of rights. “The process viewpoint even has 
implications for animal rights. Since all individuals, human and otherwise, are felt by 
God, and thus have value in themselves, they have rights and we have duties towards 
them.”* This means humans cannot be elevated over the animals because the sufferings 
of both are incorporated in the divine being. It further implies that to cause unnecessary
’Korsmeyer, 89.
2Ibid., 129.
3Haught, 101 Questions, 139; idem, Deeper than Darwin, 82; idem, God after 
Darwin, 43. See also Korsmeyer, 101-102.
“Korsmeyer, 101-102. Emphasis mine. His position appears to ground moral 
duties in the obligation not to cause further pain to God, a kind of cosmic painism, so to 
speak.
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pain to the animals is to cause that pain to God. Korsmeyer then finds another way to
undermine human significance.
Korsmeyer makes a very Rachels-like statement when he argues that “there is no
substance that has been placed into the human body that can be marked, or that is
different from animal souls. That difference is in degree, though still ‘immense.’”1 He
refines his point by asserting
that which we call soul in humans is not a substance that appears at conception or 
birth. The potential to become a human being occurs at conception. But the 
potential is not actual; therefore the becoming of a human being goes through many 
stages in time. Personhood develops in time. The mature human is self-conscious, 
has memories, hopes and fears, anticipates the future, and transcends the physical 
world in value, creativity, and knowledge of God. The development of human 
personhood goes through stages as a human matures, it is not an absolute, and 
cannot be used as though it were, to support arguments against abortion or 
euthanasia, for example.2
Thus, another reason humans cannot have moral preference is that their human status is
seen as being a relative quality, apparently based on certain individual functions instead
of some inner essence. Again we have discovered that the evolutionary and process
theologians investigated here have all ended up drawing conclusions remarkably similar
to Rachels.
The Validation of Rachels 
Evolutionary Theology Verifies Rachels’s Claims
Rachels has used the issues of teleology and the problem of evil to argue that
'Ibid., 101.
2Ibid.
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Darwinism relates to theism in one of two ways. Evolution is either incompatible with 
theism or, in the event of maintaining belief in God, cannot support a view of divinity 
robust enough to support traditional Christian ethics. I have taken a long detour through 
the problem of natural evil and then on into evolutionary theology to look at some serious 
evidence in relation to these claims. How have Rachels’s assertions fared?
I believe Rachels is fundamentally correct in this analysis of the relationship 
between Darwinism and theism, and thus between evolution and traditional morality.
The God of the evolutionary theolgians is too non-coercive to give any kind of specific 
moral guidance. Such direction would likely be seen as an infringement on human 
freedom. Furthermore, Benjamin Wiker, publishing a decade later than Rachels but 
never citing Rachels in his work, explains why Rachels is right in his conclusions 
concerning the relationship of theism to Darwinism.
The Metaphysical Nature of Evolution Verified
Wiker corroborates Rachels’s assertion that Deism is the only form of theism
compatible with Darwinism. In addition, he agrees with Rachels’s assertion that,
ultimately, atheism is not easily resisted within the Darwinist framework.
Deism therefore became the religion of the new [materialist] view of nature; 
that is, it was the religion that a closed system of nature would allow. As with 
Epicurus, the divine was both distant and impotent to interfere with nature.. . .  
[This] was rooted in the Epicurean animosity to an interfering, miracle-performing 
deity. Simply put, Deism was the form religion had to take in a Newtonian 
cosmos; and one sign that God did not ultimately belong in the system was the all
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too easy slide of Deism in the eighteenth century to materialist atheism in the 
nineteenth.1
Wiker further asserts that “it was the materialist prohibition of miracles that provided the 
strongest acid in dissolving biblical authority, and thereby helped prepare the West for 
the reception of evolutionary theory as a substitute faith.”2 It is significant that Wiker, a 
theist and Christian, has come to similar conclusions as Rachels, apparently 
independently of any influence from Rachels. Both Rachels and Wiker thus imply that 
Darwinism has a metaphysical dimension hidden within the theory. In fact, Wiker is 
quite explicit, saying, “Darwinism in its most fundamental sense is not merely 
biological, but truly cosmological in scope.”3 Hunter concurs, charging evolution with 
masking its metaphysical tendencies. “Darwin’s great contribution to this tradition [of 
distancing God from creation to avoid natural evil] was the scientific flavor he gave to 
the solution, to the point that most readers lost sight of the embedded metaphysical 
presuppositions. Whereas the earlier solutions lacked detailed explanations, Darwin 
provided scientific laws and biological details.”4 For Wiker, the two key consequences
'Wiker, 205. Two pages later,, Wiker proves his point that atheism becomes hard 
to resist by relating the story of one theologian, David Friedrich Straus (1808-1874). 
“Typical of a whole line of German and English scriptural scholars of the nineteenth 
century, he gave up doctrine after doctrine in an frantic effort to save the faith from 
irrelevancy, and having given everything away, he himself became a materialist denying 
Christianity altogether.. . .  The historical lesson is simple, and allows Straus to stand as a 
kind of nineteenth-century type: having adopted Epicurean means, Straus could not help 
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of this hidden metaphysics is that Darwinian materialism has “devoured God the creator 
and the immortal human soul, leaving behind a completely Godless, soulless universe.”1
The Connection between Cosmology and Morality
Wiker’s mention of the immortal soul is significant for it is only through this 
medium that Wiker sees the possibility of life after death, which, in turn, makes divine 
judgement possible.2 Wiker agues that Epicurus saw life under the threat of divine 
reward and punishment as undesirable and thus needed a new cosmology that would get 
rid of the gods and thus make the good life, a life without fear of future accountability, 
possible.3 Wiker observes, of Epicurus, that “he very astutely realized that every way of
'Wiker, 20.
2Ibid., 21-22. For Seventh-day Adventists, Wiker’s assertion that Darwinism does 
away with the concept of divine judgment, and thus human accountability to God, is 
significant on two fronts. First, SDA’s deny the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as 
being unbiblical. However, they would agree with Wiker that a concept of afterlife is 
needed in order to have a viable form of reward and punishment. This is reflected in 1 
Cor 15, where Paul argues that if there is no resurrection, then the Christian hope of 
afterlife becomes meaningless and we might as well “eat, drink; for tomorrow we die” 
(vs. 32). So, then, Wiker is correct in asserting the doctrine of afterlife as essential to the 
judgment. However, he either ignores or fails to see the bodily resurrection promised in 
1 Cor 15 as an alternate means to the immortal soul for making afterlife a viable 
possibility.
3Ibid., 20-22. See also, Wiker, where he makes a similar claim for the 
Epicureanism revived in the Renaissance and onward: “Epicureanism became hedonistic 
in modernity because its modem proponents believed that if the pleasures of this world 
were increased, the worries about, and belief in, the next world dissolve. The pleasures 
of the body, so they thought, would dispel the belief in the soul” (156). This is also seen 
in Mill, where he explicitly uses Epicureanism to argue against sacrificing present 
pleasures for future promises of reward such as is found in Christianity (105). Richard 
Dawkins, in reacting to the September 11, 2001 airliner attacks on the Twin Towers in 
New York City, also takes a very negative view of belief in an afterlife, and the religions 
that teach it. “Religion teaches the dangerous nonsense that death is not the end. If death
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life, every view of morality, is groundless unless it is grounded in the way things actually 
are, in nature.”1 This assertion Wiker labels “the great law of uniformity.”
According to the great law of uniformity, “every distinct view of the universe, 
every theory about nature, necessarily entails a view of morality; every distinct view of 
morality, every theory about human nature, necessarily entails a cosmology to support 
it.”2 This means that “materialist-defined science must necessarily lead to materialist- 
defined morality.”3 Thus, "Epicurus designed a view of nature to fit his desired way of 
life, a cosmology to support his morality. Modernity began by embracing his cosmology 
and ends by embracing his morality.”4 This is just another way of demonstrating what 
we examined earlier: Acceptance or rejection of teleology in nature determines whether 
or not one's morals also derive from a master design.5
if  final, a rational agent can be expected to value his life highly and be reluctant to risk it.
. . .  There is no doubt that the afterlife-obsessed suicidal brain really is a weapon of 
immense power and danger.” For Dawkins, “To fill a world with religion, or religions of 
the Abrahmic kind, is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not be surprised if 
they are used.” Richard Dawkins, “Religion’s Guided Missiles,” Guardian Unlimited, 15 
September 2001, www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4257777,00.html (22 
February 2004).
‘Wiker, 22.
2Ibid. Also, “A materialist cosmos must necessarily yield a materialist morality, 
and therefore Darwinism must yield moral Darwinism” (27).
3Ibid., 23.
4Ibid.
5See pp. 229-243 of this dissertation.
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Two Cosmologies at War
Wiker again mirrors Rachels in arguing that Christianity and Darwinism are 
irreconcilable. “Any attempt to reconcile the two—either from the side of theology, as 
for example, Kenneth Miller’s Finding Darwin’s God or John Haught’s God after 
Darwin, or from the side of Darwinism, as for example Michael Ruse’s Can a Darwinian 
Be a Christian? or Stephen J. Gould’s Rocks o f Ages—can only end in conjuring up a 
superfluous deity or cobbling together an incoherent, unstable, ‘two spheres’ approach 
(where the universe is tidily divided between science and religion).”1 Of the former 
charge, Wiker adds that “the problem with a superfluous deity should be obvious.. . .  
Evolutionary theism (or any of its variants), rather than providing anything new, is 
merely following in the ruts of Epicurus’ wagon.”2
As to the latter assertion, Wiker argues that Gould’s concept of non-overlapping 
magisteria (science and religion—i.e., materialism and theism) “is bound to fail,” and 
also that it “is doomed to failure.”3 This is because of the power of the great law of 
uniformity: “No amount of gerrymandering of reality whether it has its roots in Polybius, 
or the good intentions of the materialists, or the desperation of Christians, can override 
this most fundamental law: there is only one universe.”4 Thus, “as a house divided




4Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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against itself cannot stand, so also our society [or church], defined by two ancient and
antagonistic accounts of nature and human nature, cannot withstand this fundamental
disagreement for long.”1 By “releasing the gods from toil, Epicurus was really releasing
nature, and hence human nature, from any divine interference,” so fulfilling his goal of
“owr freedom from disturbance.”2 Wiker goes so far to allege that,
indeed, no greater and more effective alliance has existed for the eradication of 
Christianity, both doctrinally and morally, than that between liberal Christianity 
and materialists.
But there are other Christians, those who have made peace with Darwinism, 
but who resist the encroachments of moral Darwinism—not realizing, in 
conformity to the great law of uniformity, that acceptance of one must bring 
acceptance of the other. You cannot accept the theoretical foundations of 
Darwinism and reject the moral conclusions.3
To a great degree, this is exactly what Rachels asserted over a decade before Wiker,
though in much less detail. Wiker draws two moral implications of the cosmological
shift to materialism.
•Ibid., 25.
2Ibid., 45. Emphasis in original.
3Ibid., 301. It should be noted that for Wiker, Christianity seems very much tied to 
Aquinas and Aristotle. This is especially evident on pp. 103-104 where he speaks with 
great approval of Aquinas’s integration of Christianity with Aristotle, followed by 
allegations that “radical Augustinianism,” which appears to be his euphemism for the 
Protestant Reformation, as a major aid in reviving Epicureanism. Thus he appears to 
charge Protestantism with undermining true Christianity without directly saying so.
Wiker seems to have created a type of Great Controversy motif, but instead of 
being framed in terms of Christ verus Satan, it appears to be structure in terms of 
Aristotle (through Aquinas) vs. Epicurus. For the Protestant who claims the principle of 
Sola Scriptura, this is a problematic point for it bypasses the supremacy of scriptural 
authority, while implicating the Reformation as aiding that which is destructive to 
Christianity. Wiker’s argument that cosmology is the grounding issue is significant and 
correct. This is why the Bible starts with a cosmology in Gen 1, and why the Sola 
Scriptura Christian should reframe Wiker’s motif into Scripture vs. Epicurus.
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Two Implications for Morality
For Wiker, the first implication of the new cosmology is that in the evolutionary 
view, humans lose their preferential place in the moral universe. Wiker specifically 
asserts that Darwin’s “Descent o f Man, destroyed the distinct feature, reason, which 
nonmaterialist philosophy understood as the sign of the existence of an immortal and 
immaterial soul in man.”1 Here Wiker verifies the veracity of Rachels’s argument that 
the rationality thesis was a key pillar of establishing human preference and is undermined 
by evolution.2
Wiker then highlights a second implication of Darwinism for ethics which parallels 
with Rachels: The supreme importance of the individual. After explicating that Thomas 
Hobbes’s explanation of nature is not friendly to the concept of family, due to the 
inherently antagonistic stance between individuals asserting self-interest, Wiker adds: 
“The atomistic individualism that Hobbes’s account promoted must continually view the 
natural family as a side effect of sexual desire. As the consequence of this myth, modem 
Epicurean hedonism will continually strive to liberate sexual desire from its unintended 
side effect, procreation. Another important hallmark of Epicurean hedonism will follow 
upon this: as opposed to the natural law argument that the family is the foundation of
'Ibid., 239. Emphasis in original.
2Ibid. Wiker likewise precedes this conclusion with a similar tactic to 
Rachels—citing Darwinian statements that there is no substantive difference between the 
mental capabilities of man and animals. It is a matter of varying degrees, not of kind. So 
Wiker again, without citation of Rachels, has made a very similar moral argument and 
conclusion concerning Darwin’s theory and ethics.
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society, modem Epicureanism will make the individual—the presocial unit, as it 
were—the foundation of society.”1 If the individual is the foundation of society, then it 
would seem that morality becomes the protection of the individual’s rights, as in Hobbes. 
Rachels has merely taken this concept beyond the human to any individual, and Wiker 
has shown us why—the inherent individualism of materialist metaphysics forces such a 
conclusion unless vigorously resisted.
Rachels’s Unfinished Work
I believe Rachels is fundamentally correct in this analysis of the relationship 
between Darwinism and theism. The data from the evolutionary theologians, as well as 
from Hunter and Wiker, have repeatedly validated Rachels’s position. But Rachels, it 
seems, has not gone far enough in his effort to undermine Christianity and its moral 
veracity. While mentioning the doctrines of creation, divine revelation (including the 
moral law), the plan of salvation, and the eschatological end of the world, he focuses only 
on creation and the cosmological dimension reiterated by Wiker. In the other three areas 
he is strangely silent, not developing any of those issues to any degree of significance. I 
propose Rachels could easily have gone further than he did.
Extending Rachels’s Attack
Rachels alluded to the ten commandments as part of the biblical picture of God’s 
regard for man. But if Darwinism is accepted as factual, then the lack of teleology means
'Wiker, 164.
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there can be no divine design for morality, just as there was none for creation. Why 
would God avoid design in creation only to have design in morals? The designless 
theism that Rachels rightly demands of Darwinism would have to eliminate the ten 
commandments, and all other direct moral guidance by God as shown in the Bible. In 
such a scenario sin is eliminated since there can be no divine law or design to violate.1 
Thus Darwinism clearly undermines the foundations of biblical morality and theism.
The elimination of the ability to sin (because there is no divine design such as the 
10 commandments) means one would eliminate the need of salvation from sin and its 
penalty. There would be no need for an incarnation and sacrificial death by Christ for 
incarnation is a designed, planned, unnatural act incompatible with Darwinism or a 
deistic god who uses no design. Removing teleology thus undermines yet another pillar 
of Christian faith which points to human dignity and preference.
Additionally, if there is no divine design, how can such a theism have any 
meaningful eschatology? If suffering and death are tools of evolutionary progress, then 
death and suffering are natural. Death is no longer an enemy as the Scriptures declare 
(for example, 1 Cor 15:26). If Darwin is right, then why should we hope for the world to 
come in which death and suffering will be no more (Rev 21-22)? Man’s importance in 
the plan of salvation and divine future is replaced by an uncertain future of natural 
selection, personal insignificance and death. There can be no special destiny since there 
is no divine design which calls for it.
'Rom 4:15; 5:13; 7:7. Paul here argues that sin is not reckoned where there is no 
law and that he would not know what sin is except for the law.
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Furthermore, the destruction of eschatology destroys human accountability to God, 
a crucial element of morality for it is impossible to have accountability without design. If 
there is no design, how can there be a judgement?1 I would propose that without 
accountability one can not have a genuine morality. If the moral capacity in humans 
evolved through traits of altruism, as Rachels and others have suggested, then morality 
merely becomes being helpful to others. But morality is bigger than mere unselfishness. 
It involves justice and injustice. Thus morality is bigger than the evolutionists tend to 
depict it. Why argue over moral obligations if there is no accountability? This question 
begs a question Rachels never addresses: Why be moral?2 What difference does it make 
whether one is moral or immoral if there is no accountability to a being with universal 
moral authority?
Rachels seeks to answer the accountability question by declaring his adherence to 
the Kantian doctrine that moral precepts are self-imposed upon by the morally and 
rationally autonomous agent. The penalty for violating these self-imposed moral 
precepts is, “in Kant’s words, ‘self-contempt and inner abhorrence.”’3 But there are
'For Seventh-day Adventist theology this is especially devastating due to the great 
emphasis on the “investigative judgment.” Such a judgment is incompatible with 
Darwinism or deism, leaving man with no real accountability to God. Deism and 
Darwinism cannot sustain such a doctrine.
2W hile Rachels does not address the question, “Why be moral?” Peter Singer does. 
Helga Kuhse reports that he wrote his MA thesis on this question, and Singer devotes the 
final chapter of Practical Ethics, “Why Act Morally?” to the issue as well. See Kuhse, 9; 
Singer, Practical Ethics, 314-79. In a simplistic nutshell, Singer argues we should be 
moral because it gives our lives meaning and direction in a meaningless world, and 
brings greater personal happiness than purely self-centered living.
3Rachels, “God and Moral Autonomy,” 118.
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plenty of people who have no sense of any duty, let alone self-imposed duty, and who 
feel no “self-contempt,” regardless of their actions. Thus Rachels seems to assert that 
there is no external accountability in morality. But on what grounds can one argue with 
the “immoral” person to convince them of their immorality? Rachels has offered his 
doctrine of treating people as they deserve to be treated. But who decides this issue? If 
individuals decides just deserts, ethics will degenerate to egoism and vigilanteism. The 
alternative for Rachels is to argue for a type of contractual morality as a means of 
protecting one’s own interests.
Is the Concept of God Antithetical to Ethics?
As to the charge that the concept of the existence of God is antithetical to ethics, it 
seems that the rationale is more driven by emotion than logic. This can be seen, in part, 
by the fact that before Rachels starts his essay on this matter, he has a header quoting 
Kant: “Kneeling down or grovelling [sic] on the ground, even to express your reverence 
for heavenly things, is contrary to human dignity.”1 Such a quip clearly is designed, by 
its setting, to arouse strong emotions against the idea of submission to a supreme being.
It is seen as being contrary to human dignity. Ironically, it has been this very dignity that 
Rachels has sought to undermine by attacking the image of God thesis.
Second, the concept of God’s sovereignty presented by Rachels is nothing more 
than a caricature of divine sovereignty as found in Scripture. For Rachels, divine 
sovereignty seems to be construed as only being a mindless, moronic submission to God.
'Ibid., 109.
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Rachels may have a point if one’s understanding of God is akin to Calvin’s doctrine of 
divine sovereignty. This may be because Rachels generally appeals only to Augustine 
and Aquinas as representative of Christianity.1 Scholars holding a heavily Augustinian 
view of divine sovereignty, such as Charles Hodge and Millard J. Erickson, have 
animated discussions in their writings trying to explain how God wills everything that 
happens before it happens, and yet somehow we can still be said to freely choose to do 
what God willed we would do, and therefore must do.2 Such interpretations of divine 
sovereignty have greater vulnerability to Rachels’s charge that divine sovereignty and 
human moral accountability are incompatible. But other Christian versions of the 
doctrine o f God are less susceptible to Rachels’s complaint.
To say that God deserves unconditional submission is not necessarily contradictory 
with human moral freedom. The God of Scripture invites us to “reason” with Him (Isa 
1:18). Additionally, man must have moral freedom before this almighty God or else 
there could be no moral accountability to Him, including a judgment.3 Just because we
'Rachels never makes direct reference to Protestant sources of Christian theology. 
This seems to be a significant omission by Rachels. To never mention Calvin or Luther, 
for example, seems to be a glaring omission. Possibly due to the strong theological 
connections of Calvin and Luther to Augustine, Rachels felt them to be secondary 
sources in reference to Augustine. Still, the equation of Christianity with solely Roman 
Catholic sources seems to be a critical weakness of Rachels.
2See, for example, Charles Hodge, System atic Theology (N ew  York: Charles 
Scribner and Company, 1872), 541-546; Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), chapter 16, esp. 357-362.
3Would it be fair to hold a severely mentally handicapped human accountable for 
an action they are unable to comprehend is wrong? Suppose a 45 year old with a mental 
capacity of a three-year-old played with matches, thus starting a fire that destroyed 
several homes, killing one person. Would we charge such a person with arson? In like
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ought to submit to God does not mean that we have to submit. The Scriptures reveal a 
God who gave freedom to Adam and Eve to disobey, albeit they were held accountable 
for their free choices. Accountability to divine judgment is precisely the tool that allows 
God to be fully sovereign and humans to be truly free moral agents who can be held 
accountable. Rachels, instead, sees accountability to anyone except oneself alone as 
antithetical to morality, yet we have seen that such a position makes it all too easy to be 
immoral without consequence. Morality, without accountability to a higher authority, 
collapses. And indeed, this collapse is what Rachels argues Darwinism does to 
traditional ethics. Thus, Rachels’s argument that the existence of God is incompatible 
with the human moral freedom does not account for the necessary conditions for having 
free moral agents. It seems rooted in a psychological aversion to a God who grants 
freedoms but holds us accountable.
Rachels has offered one last trump card to oust God from morality: Plato’s 
Euthyphro argument. We have seen that Rachels clearly believes that he has proffered an 
unanswerable argument to the traditional theist. Either God is arbitrary, or there is an 
independent standard of good. One could easily get seduced into responding point by 
point to the subtleties of Plato’s argument. But I believe this misses the point. The real 
answer lies outside the parameters framed by Plato, and further developed by Rachels. 
Both fail to take into account one key attribute of God found in Scripture. For Plato this
manner, God cannot hold dogs to the same standards as humans. Morality presupposes 
the capacity to be both moral and responsible. If not, moral demands lose their authority 
and power. This does not mean that this mentally handicapped person has no rights. But 
it means they cannot be held to the same moral standard as the average human.
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is excusable as he was likely ignorant of the Hebrew Scriptures and historically prior to 
the Christian era. But for Rachels there is less excuse. And what is this attribute of God? 
Divine foreknowledge.
The Bible teaches that God knows the end from the beginning. This includes a 
knowledge of the future which separates Him from the other gods of antiquity.1 
Furthermore, it is clear that God not only knows what will occur, but also what might 
happen. This is most easily seen in the blessings and curses of the covenant with Israel. 
God lists out two possible scenarios and Israel’s choices will determine which avenue is 
actualized.2 Thus God is the only being who is qualified to determine good and evil 
consequentially. He is not subject to the limitations of consequentialism due to His 
foreknowledge and perfect wisdom. Neither Plato nor Rachels accounts for this 
possibility.3 It is not without significance that those influenced by process theology deny 
God’s ability to foresee future, freewill choices.4 In so interpreting God’s abilities, they
'Isa 45:21; 46:10. In these two chapters God contrasts Himself with the idol-gods. 
The idol-gods are made while God is maker (thus the significance o f the doctrine of 
Creation) and God is Lord of the future, and the idol-gods have no ability to control or 
foretell the future. The uniqueness of God as Lord of the future is again highlighted in 
Dan 2:27-28,47, and all of chapter 4.
2See Deut 27-29.
3In Gen 3, prior to the fall of man, God is said to have known evil. Presumably He 
also knew the workings of evil prior to the fall of Lucifer and the angels as well. How 
then, could God have known evil if  it did not yet exist, and that it was evil? 
Foreknowledge of what might happen allows Him to see what is destructive and useful to 
the welfare of His creatures.
4See, for example, Bertocci, 448-449, where he argues from a process perspective 
that in order for us to be truly free, God cannot foreknow future freewill choices. Thus 
God’s foreknowledge is limited to that which is believed to be knowable, which does not
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undermine the very means by which God knows what is good and evil, and thus able to 
show us what is good.1
James Rachels has taken great care to systematically undermine any possibility of 
combining theism with ethics. Like Sampson’s attack on the two pillars of the Philistine 
temple, Rachels is attacking two pillars he believes upholds the temple of traditional 
Christian morality—the image-of-God thesis and the rationality thesis. For the believer 
in Darwinism, the religious pillars for traditional ethics, especially human preference, 
have been removed.
Rachels has made a significant effort to produce an alternative ethical theory that is 
rooted in Darwinian principles. He has been especially insightful in showing how an 
ethics based on Darwinism might look. While I disagree with his choice of supporting 
the Darwinist position contrary to Christianity, Rachels has made a fundamentally lucid 
and accurate assessment of the fatal implications of Darwinism for Christian ethics. But 
an important question remains: Has Rachels accurately portrayed biblical theology in 
relation to nature?
include future free choices. See also, Charles Hartshome, Omnipotence and Other 
Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), 3-4, 37- 
39. Freewill Theism, also called the Openness of God, holds a view of divine 
foreknowledge similar to the process theologians, though for different reasons. For more 
on Freewill Theism, see David Basinger, The Case fo r  Freewill Theism: A Philosophical 
A ssessm ent (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), esp. chapters 1-2; Clark 
Pinnock and others, The Openness o f God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional 
Understanding o f God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). For an overview 
of the current foreknowledge debate, see Gregory A. Boyd and others, Divine 
Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2001).
‘See Mic 6:8, “He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good.”




When James Rachels published Created from Animals in 1991, theological works 
focusing animal and environmental issues were virtually nonexistent. In the decade 
following Rachels’s volume, there has been an eruption of published works seeking to 
develop theological justifications for protecting the environment and animals.1 These 
efforts have generally represented an approach to Scripture which treats the Bible and 
non-biblical sources as equal in authority. One example of this perspective is illustrated 
in the work of Stephen Webb. He asserts, “I need to substantiate my point that the Bible 
alone is for Christians a necessary but not sufficient basis for developing an ethics of 
animal compassion.”2 Thus he proposes a method based on Tillich’s concept of 
“correlational theology” in which biblical and non-biblical sources dialogue as equal 
partners in a give-and-take arrangement not “governed and controlled by a single
'A major pioneer in the theological realm has been Andrew Linzey, several of 
whose works we have cited several times previously. Additional works include, Stephen 
Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology o f Compassion fo r  Animals (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); idem, “Ecology vs. the Peaceable Kingdom: Toward a 
Better Theology of Nature,” Soundings 79 (1996): 239-252; John Passmore, “The 
Treatment of Animals,” Journal o f the History o f Ideas 36 (1975): 195-218; Lewis G. 
Regenstein, Replenish the Earth: A History o f Organized Religion’s Treatment o f  
Animals and Nature— Including the Bible’s Message o f Conservation and Kindness 
Towards Anim als (N ew  York: Crossroad Publishing, 1991); Steven Bouma-Prediger, For 
the Beauty o f  the Earth: A Christian Vision fo r  Creation Care (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Books, 2001). Thirteen different authors have contributed chapters to Good News for  
Animals? Christan Approaches to Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. 
McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993).
2Webb, God and Dogs, 20.
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philosophical method,” and having “no essential form or structure.”1
Most of the studies done in the last decade are closely allied to Webb’s 
methodology. Furthermore, most of these efforts appear to be forms of systematic rather 
than biblical theology. Nevertheless, these authors do make some significant 
observations about what Scripture says about the relationship of humans to nature, and 
particularly to animals. I shall briefly survey how these authors use Scripture to 
establish the moral value of animals as biblical. Then I shall turn to two aspects of 
biblical theology that may shed further insight. First, I shall examine what Gen 1 means 
by the term “dominion,” and second, I will survey how divine limitations on human 
usage of animals and nature demonstrate a clear limitation of that dominion.
Does Scripture Value Non-Humans?
Theological Attempts to Establish the Worth 
of Nature and Animals
Stephen Webb observes that, in Scripture, the animals were pronounced “good” 
prior to and independently of the creation of man, suggesting they have some inherent 
value in themselves. Additionally, Webb appeals to the biblical record of the inclusion 
of animals in the Sabbath commandment, the saving of animals in Noah’s ark, and 
Mosaic laws protecting both wild and domestic animals to assert that the Bible depicts 
animals as having inherent value in themselves, which entitles them to compassionate 
treatment. He likewise argues that the angel’s chastisement of Balaam, in part, for how
'Ibid., 18.
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he abused his donkey, shows God’s displeasure with animal abuse.1 Thus he lays an
effective foundation of biblical data to support his claims. It may be argued, however,
that Webb has a tendency to do minimal exegesis and thus tends to use the biblical
references more like “proof texts.”
Lewis Regenstein makes essentially the same arguments as Webb, based on the
same passages. In addition, he cites such texts as Exod 23:5, where one is to help their
enemy’s beast get up when unable to rise due to its heavy burden.2 Unfortunately,
Regenstein often does little more than cite texts, leaving it to the reader to figure out why
the text is relevant to the discussion. By contrast, Ellen White explicitly argues a direct
duty to animals based on this same text. Commenting on the story of the good
Samaritan, she says,
The merciful provisions of the law extended even to the lower animals, which 
cannot express in words their want and suffering. Directions had been given to 
Moses for the children o f Israel to this effect: “If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his 
ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of 
him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him, thou 
shalt surely help with him.” Ex. 23:4, 5. But in the man wounded by robbers, Jesus 
presented the case of a brother in suffering. How much more should their hearts 
have been moved with pity for him than for a beast of burden!3
•ibid., 20-23.
2Regenstein, 19-21.
3Ellen G. White, The Desire o f  Ages (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1940,
500.
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Ellen White insightfully argues that Mosaic law contains regulations with implications 
for animal welfare. It also seems clear that helping the enemy’s beast is precisely for the 
sake of the beast itself, in spite of its master’s reputation. Thus, Ellen White shows the 
Bible appears to depict duties to animals independently of benefitting people.
Regenstein, however, does nothing of significance to unpack this text. By contrast, 
Regenstein does do more explication in exploring the implications of the Sabbath (with 
its inclusion of the animals in the prescribed rest), Jesus’ comments on rescuing animals 
in distress on the Sabbath, the role of animals in justifying God’s concern for Nineveh, 
and Balaam’s incident with his talking donkey.1
Regenstein’s weakness is that he tends to treat texts with high exegetical potential 
too superficially, while simultaneously over-focusing on weaker texts, sometimes using 
them completely contrary to their context. For example, he cites Num 35:33-34 as 
talking about environmental pollution, when the context is the moral pollution of the 
“land” by blood-feuds.2 Such questionable exegesis undermines the credibility of the 
points just cited.
These scholarly attempts to grapple with the relationship of mankind to nature are 
commendable. It is lamentable that Rachels apparently never responded to works such as
•Ibid., 19-21,24, 36,38.
2Ibid., 20. This example is followed by using Isa. 5:8 to condemn real estate 
developers who don’t leave enough green zones in their subdivisions. The context, 
however, seems to be condemning their greed, and not to address environmental issues.
In the ensuing pages there are more examples o f such severing of the text from its 
context. See pp. 22, 34-35, and 41.
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these in the years between publishing Created from Animals and his death a little over a 
decade later. Likewise, Evangelicals have been slow to address the issue of the Bible and 
our attitudes towards animals and the environment. Thus we must ask: Can a sola 
Scriptura theology produce an ethics of respect for nature and compassion to animals? I 
suggest that there is evidence that the Bible does not support a despotic view of human 
dominion as suggested by Rachels and others. While I cannot do a full biblical theology 
of nature here, I shall use an introductory exegesis of portions from Gen 1 as a case study 
to demonstrate the despotic viewpoint does not appear to be supportable by Scripture.
Dominion in Genesis 1:26,28
Some implications of “image" and "likeness"
Genesis 1:26 states that man was made in God’s image (selem; aba) and likeness 
(cTmuf, ni&n). Elsewhere in Scripture, selem (aba) is used to depict idols and statues (see 
1 Sam 6:5, 11; Ezek 7:20; 16:17).1 Thus it connotes the idea o f something copying or 
representing a unique, original entity. In Gen 1:26, “image” is immediately 
communicated in terms of human dominion over the earth (vs. 26), suggesting, it would 
seem, that man’s dominion over the earth is to mimic or image God’s rulership over the 
universe. Nahum Sama takes such a position by observing, "The continuation of verse
‘See also, John E. Hartley, "aba," Theological Wordbook o f  the Old Testament, ed. 
R. Laird Harris (Chicago, IL: Moody, 1980), 2:767, where he notes that selem (aba) is 
used only of images depicting things related to deity. For an extended discussion of the 
nuances of aba, with many listed sources, see F. J. Stendebach, "aba selem, "
Theological Dictionary o f the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer 
Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 12:391-396.
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26 establishes the evident connection between resemblance to God and sovereignty over 
earth's resources."1
These same ideas are reinforced by the parallelism of "image" (selem; nbx) with 
"likeness" (cTmut; niQl). While "likeness" seems to be less discussed, and there is some 
disagreement on the relationship "likeness" with "image" among those who discuss it, 
there seems to be some consensus that "likeness" is either interchangeable with, or a 
modifier that limits the meaning of "image." This limitation is usually asserted in terms 
of making it clear that man as the image of God is not to be seen as identical with God, 
but rather being similar to God.2 Hamilton asserts that the "concrete term, 'image' is 
toned down by the more abstract term, 'likeness."'3 There seems to be some significance 
to this last observation. "Image" tends towards a conceptual model that is frozen and
'Nahum M. Sama, Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with New JPS 
Translation, The JPS Torah Commentary, ed. Nahum M. Sama (New York: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1989), 12. Sama goes on to make the classic argument to which 
Rachels objects: "In other words, the resemblance of man to God bespeaks the infinite 
worth of a human being and affirms the inviolability of the human person."
2Bruce Waltke, with Cathi J. Fredericks, Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Zondervan, 2001), 66; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, trans. John H. 
Marks (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1961), 56; Victor P. Hamilton, The Book o f  
Genesis: Chapters 1-17, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament, ed.
R. K. Harrison (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 135; Victor P. Hamilton, "nDT." 
Theological Wordbook o f  the Old Testament, ed. R. Laird Harris (Chicago, IL: Moody 
Press, 1980), 438; H. D. Preuss, "rtEn damah\ r w i  cTmut," Theological Dictionary o f  the 
O ld Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1978), 257.
3Hamilton, Genesis, 135. See also Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, Word 
Biblical Commentary, vol. 1, ed. David A. Hubbard, Glenn W. Barker, and John D. W. 
Watts (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 29, where he notes that cTmut ( rnD'n) has the 
ending of an abstract noun.
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rigid, like a statue. "Likeness," being more abstract, brings in a more flexible, dynamic 
dimension akin to the concept of similarity. I suggest that (fmut ( m m ) helps clarify 
selem (pbs) by adding a more dynamic dimension and nuance.
The close relationship between (fmut ( m m ) and selem ( a ^ )  is underscored in 
Gen 5:1-3 where the two words are used in an extremely similar fashion to Gen 1:26, yet 
reversing the use of the Hebrew prepositions, 3 and 3. Again this implies an essentially 
synonymous use of the two terms in Genesis.1 Sailhamer captures this synonymity when 
he observes that each animal was made according to its kind but man and woman were 
made in the image of God, not merely according to their own kind. Thus, "man's image 
is not simply of himself; he also shares a likeness to his creator."2 What is the 
significance of this emphasis, the image and likeness of man to God being a dynamic 
similarity?
The Bible presents God’s fundamental relationship to the earth and universe as one 
of nurture and sustenance (Heb 1:3; Ps 104). Since man was made to be the image of 
God, it seems evident that his dominion was meant to mimic God’s sustaining rule. Jesus 
notes that God not only cares for sparrows (Matt 10:29; Luke 12:6) but He even cares for 
“the grass of the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven” (Matt 
6:30). Frear notes that the underlying assumption of Christ’s argument assumes a basic
'See Sama (12) and Wenham (30) where both assert the interchangeability of these 
terms in the Genesis text. Hamilton also notes that some argue this view (TWOT, 438).
2John H. Sailhamer, "Genesis," The Expositor's Bible Commentary, ed. Franke E. 
Gabelein (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 2:37.
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value for animals.1 It would seem, then, that since God cares for and values plants and 
sparrows, so should His image. Therefore, we can infer a moral duty to animals and 
nature, framed in terms of humans having the obligation, as God’s image, to mimic and 
copy His nurturing and sustaining stance towards the natural world. This means that 
human dominion was to be exercised within the limits of the divine example. What, 
then, is the meaning of “dominion?”
The meaning of “dominion”
William White observes that the verb for dominion, rnn (rada), is used twenty-two
times in the Old Testament, with the first uses occurring in Gen l.2 Victor Hamilton
further asserts that whereas in the majority of the uses of rm  (rada), the word usually
describes one person or nation ruling over another, it is sometimes used to describe a
“shepherd’s supervision over his flock (Ezek 34:4).”3 He further notes that
the last passage—Ezek. 34:4— shows that rada could be connected with force and 
harshness. Such is not the normal nuance o f the verb, however. Thus the three 
passages from Lev 25 expressly say the master is not to rule over his servants with 
harshness.. . .  The reigning king of Ps 72 is also the champion of the poor and 
disadvantaged. What is expected of the king is responsible care over that which he 
rules.. .  . Man is created to rule. But this rule is to be compassionate and not
’George L. Frear, Jr., “Caring for Animals: Biblical Stimulus for Ethical 
Reflection,” in Good News fo r  Animals? Christian Approaches fo r  Animal Well-Being, 
ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 6-7.
2William White, “2121 iTTi (rada),” Theological Wordbook o f the Old Testament, 
ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago, IL: Moody 
Press, 1980), 2:833.
3Hamilton, Genesis, 137.
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exploitative. Even in the garden of Eden, he who would be lord of all must be
servant of all.1
Gerhard von Rad also notes the royal theme in Gen 1:26-28. According to von 
Rad, the concept of man as the image of God is derived from the practice of a king 
placing an image of himself in a province he does not visit, as a symbol of his claim of 
authority over the region. Thus, “man is placed upon earth in God’s image as God’s 
sovereign emblem. He is really only God’s representative, summoned to maintain and 
enforce God’s claim to dominion over the earth.”2 Accordingly, humans would not be 
entitled to do as they please. Rather, they were expected to operate within God’s policies 
which sustain and nurture, but do not exploit, von Rad notes that if we wish to discover 
what it means to be made in the image of Elohim, we find in ancient Israel that Elohim 
was characterized by descriptors, “wise” and “good” (2 Sam 14:17,20; 1 Sam 29:9).3
Claus Westermann also asserts that Gen 1 contains “echoes o f the Ancient Near 
Eastern royal ideology,” but with a key difference. In other cultures, man was said to 
have been created “to relieve the gods of the burden of everyday work.” By contrast, “in 
Gen 1:26 the goal of humans is within this world—dominion over the animals.. . .  The 
goal of the creation of humans is detached from the life of the gods and directed to the 
life of this world.”4 Thus, he asserts that “people would forfeit their kingly role among
‘Ibid., 137-138. Emphasis mine.
Von Rad, 58.
3Ibid., 57.
4Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1984), 159.
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the living . . .  were the animals made subject to their whim.”1 Westermann thus sees 
human dominion as conditioned on properly representing God’s methods of nurturing 
rulership.
Gordon Wenham echoes the arguments o f Westermann and von Rad. He further
develops, however, the idea of a philosophy of kingship when he asserts:
Because man is created in God’s image, he is king over nature. He rules the world 
on God’s behalf. This is of course no license for the unbridled exploitation and 
subjugation of nature. Ancient oriental kings were expected to be devoted to the 
welfare of their subjects, especially the poorest and weakest members of society 
(Ps 72:12-14).... Similarly, mankind is here commissioned to rule nature as a 
benevolent king, acting as God’s representative over them and therefore treating 
them in the same way as God who created them. Thus, animals, though subject to 
man, are viewed as his companions in 2:18-20.2
Nahum Sama further develops a similar concept of kingship to that asserted by Wenham:
The verbs used here and in verse 28 express the coercive power of the monarch, 
consonant with the explanation just given for “the image of God.” This power, 
however, cannot include the licence to exploit nature banefully, for the following 
reasons: the human race is not inherently sovereign, but enjoys its dominion solely 
by the grace of God. Furthermore, the model of kingship here presupposed is 
Israelite, according to which, the monarch does not possess unrestrained power and 
authority; the limits of his rule are carefully defined and circumscribed by divine 
law so that kingship is to be exercised with responsibility and is subject to 
accountability.3
Bishop echoes this same sentiment when he asserts,
The earth is not humanity’s to do with as it seems fit. It is God’s creation, and as 
God’s delegates, we are to take care of it on his behalf; humanity is accountable to 
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It is not rulership without limits. God follows on from the cultural mandate to 
place immediate constraints on dominion: men are not to kill for food (w . 29- 
30) . . . .
. . .  Dominion is not a dictatorial rulership, we are not to lord it over creation: 
it is a delegated rulership, a rulership that is accountable. As God’s stewards of 
creation, we will be called to account for how we have treated his earth.1
It seems abundantly clear that Gen 1 contains a limited-dominion motif, including
accountability to God for how that dominion is exercised. The readers of Genesis should
understand human dominion as a divinely granted gift to be managed according to God’s
sovereign will. There is doubtless more that can be done to mine the theological content
of Gen 1 concerning the relationship of mankind to nature. However, we have seen
enough biblical evidence to demonstrate a clear pattern of limited, nurturing dominion
and to exclude the viability of exploitative interpretations.
Argument from Divine Restrictions
Bishop appeals to a second body of evidence to assert that human dominion was 
always regulated. He asserts that “Gen 2:15 contains an amplification of what it means 
to subdue and rule, and here the context is that of the garden.”2 He further adds that the 
garden context of the command to dress and keep the habitat implies a servant motif 
restricting the concept of dominion.3 Bishop could have strengthened this assertion by
‘Ibid., 8-9. The “cultural mandate” is described in comments on Gen 1:26-28, as a 
call to develop and unfold creation as image bearers of God. See p. 8.
2Bishop, 9. See also, Callicot, 2.
3Bishop, 9.
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noting that in Gen 2:15, man was appointed to “cultivate” (“QI? -  ‘abadf and to “protect” 
("lOT -  shamar),2 and that neither word implies a despotic dominion. Webb aptly 
observes, “Traditionally, Christian theology portrays heaven as a garden, not a wild 
jungle, a place like the original garden of Eden where God allows life to grow without 
the countless sacrifices and violent death.” Thus, “exploitation is not a form of 
gardening.”3
Bishop interprets this conditional, limited dominion of man over nature in terms of 
a stewardship model where there can be no exercise of absolute power by man.4 In a 
similar vein, Regenstein argues that human dominion is simply a stewardship over the 
natural realm, exercised as a subsidiary governor to extend God’s nurturing dominion
‘According to the Theological Dictionary o f the Old Testament, used with an 
inanimate objects means, “to work on, develop, cultivate.” With personal objects, it 
“means ‘serve’ and expresses the relationship between an ‘ebed and his or h e r . . .  lord, 
master.” This latter use would suggest that cultivation is to be viewed from a service 
perspective and not one of exploitation. Helmer Ringgren, Theological Dictionary
o f  the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, Heinz-Josef Fabry 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 10:382. In addition, ‘ebed (a servant) is the noun 
form of the verb, thus reinforcing the service orientation of the verbal form.
2In Gen 3:24, this word describes the activity of the cherubim in guarding the 
entrance of the garden to prevent human entrance. Thus we see its connotation is of 
protection, not exploitation.
3Webb, “Ecology,” 245,246.
4See also Morris, 2, where he argues for an accountable stewardship of man over 
nature. See also Pinches, 195-201, where he asserts the concept of man being the image 
of God to mean mimicking God’s sustaining care over nature.
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into the world.1 Stewardship implies some restrictions and accountability to the owner or 
sovereign.
Prior to the fall of man, clear limits were imposed on the use of natural resources 
by divine command. First, a particular fruit tree is declared off limits, apparently as a 
means of demonstrating God’s ownership and man’s stewardship (Gen 2:15-17).
Second, Keil and Delitsch note that both man and animals were given a diet “exclusively 
from the vegetable kingdom.” They further conclude, “From this it follows, that, 
according to the creative will of God, men were not to slaughter animals for food, nor 
were animals to prey upon one another.”2 As Webb states, “The Genesis account 
provocatively portrays a vegetarian world . . .  in which the humans exercise authority 
over the animals but do not use or kill them.”3 Thus even prior to the fall, we see limits 
on man’s use of nature. He is given no opportunity to act at whim.
After the fall, Bishop notes that we find further limitations on human dominion. 
People were not to eat the blood of animals; fields are not to be reaped to the borders; 
fruit trees could not be harvested during their first five years, nor could their wood be 
used to build siege works; a kid could not be boiled in its mother’s milk; the ox was not
'Regenstein, 27.
2C. F. Keil, and F. Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, Biblical Commentary on the Old 
Testament, vol. 1, trans. James Marti (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1949), 65. See 
also, Gary L. Comstock, “Pigs and Piety: A Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals,” 
in Good News fo r  Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, ed. Charles 
Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 112, where he makes 
a similar argument.
3Webb, God and Dogs, 20.
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to be muzzled while threshing grain; they were to obey the law of the bird nest in which a 
mother bird was not to be taken with the young; and they were to implement sabbatical 
years for resting the land.1
Jo Ann Davidson highlights the divine limitation on human dominion by citing 
Mosaic laws that protect both the environment and animals. For example, in war, fruit 
trees were not to be cut for military usage. While this could be interpreted as primarily 
for the benefit of humans—not destroying the food supply—the protection of trees shows 
a limit on human sovereignty. Humans thus were not allowed to use nature any way they 
wished. In addition, Davidson cites the protection of animals employed in labor for 
human masters—the ox is not muzzled while threshing grain (Deut 25:4); one should 
help his enemy’s animal rise with a heavy load (Exod 23:4-5; Deut 22:1-4); and the 
sabbatical years for the land (Lev 25:6-7).2 Such divinely given regulations reinforce the 
idea that human dominion over nature was never absolute, nor does it justify exploitative 
use of the natural world. Clearly such restrictions imply that it is not God’s plan that man 
have unrestricted dominion over nature.
Both Davidson and Henry Morris appeal to the implications of the weekly Sabbath 
rest prescribed even for animals (Exod 20:8-11; 23:12). Morris asserts that this
•ibid. Biblical citations, in order, are: Lev 17:10-14,19:9,23; Deut 20:19,25:4, 
22:6; Lev 25:1-12.
2Jo Ann Davidson, “Seventh-day Adventists and Ecology,” in The Word o f God for  
the People o f  God: A Tribute to the Ministry o f Jack J. Blanco, ed. Ron du Preez, Philip 
G. Samaan, and Ron E. M. Clouzet (Collegedale, TN: School of Religion, Southern 
Adventist University, 2004), 360-361. A similar argument can be found in Frear, 6-7.
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addresses the issue of human dominion, for God “ordained a weekly rest for animals as 
well as people.”1 This point is significant, in that the extension of the Sabbath restriction 
on work to draft animals suggests that humans were not seen as having unrestricted 
dominion over the animals. Thus, the Sabbath commandment protects animals from 
undue exploitation by humans. While it is true that Jesus declared the Sabbath was made 
for man, this does not have to mean it was made exclusively for man. Rather, the 
Sabbath protection of work animals seems better understood as part of God’s overall care 
for the animals, including the wild animals.2 Morris ties the weekly Sabbath protection 
for animals to the resting of the land during sabbatical years to further show that God 
restricted man’s use of nature. “Although His greatest provisions are for men and 
women, He also provides for animals, and even for the land itself.. . .  If God is so 
careful to provide for His creatures, we as His stewards thereof should also care for 
them.”3 Morris’s comments evoke yet again a stewardship model of man’s relationship 
to nature. Thus the biblical model appears to fit well with the theistic version of the 
indirect duty model for determining moral obligations to nature and animals.
Duties to Animals Based in Creation Kinship
In addition to restrictions on the use of nature by humans, we also find a form of
'Davidson, 361; Morris, 3.
2Both in the Psalms and in the sayings of Christ we find depictions of God’s care 
for the wild animals. For example see, Pss 104:14, 21, 27, 28; 136:25; 147:9; Matt 6:27- 
30; 10:29-31; Luke 12:6-7, 27.
3Ibid.
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kinship argument depicted in Scripture. George Frear argues cogently that “the Bible 
recognizes human kinship with animals. The terms ‘flesh’ and ‘all flesh,’ for instance, 
often join human and animal together.” He observes that “the Hebrew word, nephesh
denotes the ‘life’ or ‘will’ or ‘soul’ of human and animal.” He also notes that 
animals share the same “breath of life” and man.1 Frear argues that the Bible does 
differentiate between man and animal as well, but insightfully concludes, “This aspect of 
the biblical outlook only qualifies, it does not remove, the sense of kinship.”2 This 
commonality highlights the stewardship and indirect duty models proposed earlier, 
pointing to the common creator of all and His loving, sustaining rulership over all. 
Creation kinship, however, does not undermine human preference.
Steve Bishop argues that “the opening chapters of Genesis show that humanity’s 
relationship with the rest of creation is ambiguous: we are part of it and we are above 
it.”3 While highlighting God’s care for the sparrow, Christ reminds us that “you are of 
more value than many sparrows” (Matt 10:29). The elevated status of man over the rest 
of nature is no more incompatible with moral duties to animals than God’s exalted status 
is with His nurturing care of us and of the non-human realm. One can believe both in 
special human moral status and in moral duties to animals.
Since I have argued for basing animal treatment on an indirect duty to God as part
'Frear, 5. He appears to be alluding to Gen 2:7; 6:17; Eccl 3:19, though he does 
not cite specific texts.
2Ibid.
3Bishop, 9. Emphasis in original.
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of a theology of stewardship, this means that I have essentially argued that animals have 
a type of moral status, even rights. I have argued that God grants special status to 
humans as the image of God, while Rachels has argued contrarily to both points. Since 
God owns humans too (1 Cor 6:19-20, is it not possible that God grants rights to animals 
too, and may those rights not differ in their content and level o f protection from humans? 
To grant rights to animals does not entail equal rights with humans. Thus, while the 
Bible never classifies killing an animal as murder, it does exhort us that the righteous 
man regards the life of his beast (Pro 12:10). Furthermore, a functional model is 
theologically akin to legalism where salvation—in this case rights—are meritoriously 
earned. By contrast, God's kingdom is based in grace, where free moral agents are called 
to deny self and protect the poor and weak (Rom 6:14; 15:1-2; Matt 16:24; 25:40-45;
Jas 2:1-7). Therefore, humans rights are graciously extended to marginal humans while 
basic protections against abuse and exploitation are graciously given to animals. Hence, 
to grant rights to humans based on species membership is neither speciesist not 
exploitative, but rather a gracious act of God. These grant-based rights protecting human 
welfare do confer on us a right to abuse and exploit those of lesser rights and status, 
including the animals.
There is much more that could be done, but it seems safe to make the following 
conclusion. There is sufficient biblical data to seriously undermine the charge that the 
doctrine of man’s being made in the image of God gives him unbridled sovereignty over 
nature. Furthermore, the curses in Gen 3 strongly suggest that a significant portion of 
that dominion was lost through the curse on Adam and Eve. Thus our dominion is even
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less absolute than prior to the fall. But the evidence appears to favor the interpretation 
that the pre-fall form of dominion was still based in a stewardship model of nurturing 
care, with due accountability to God. As Geisler has shown, “It is not the Christian view 
that encourages the abuse of nature, but the materialist view.”1 Thus, evolutionary 
materialism seems more likely to produce despotism in man, than the biblical view.
James Rachels may not have given as balanced a view of Christianity and Scripture 
as he might have. However, the sad truth is that Christendom has often given credence to 
Rachels’s charges. Ultimately, it is not the charges and countercharges that matter. 
Rachels is one of a very few to catch the significance of protology for ethics, and even if 
his presentations of theological issues are incomplete, his work with the foundational 
issues seems well done. We have seen his predictions fulfilled in regard to theism and 
the moral significance of human beings. It is time, now, to review what we have learned 
and assess its significance.
‘Geisler, 308. For Geisler’s full discussion on these two views see, 294-298, and 
302-309.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
Ever since Charles Darwin published his ideas on the theory of evolution, 
individuals have been passionately pursuing questions regarding the relationship of 
Darwinian theory to ethics and morality. Churchmen, philosophers, and scientists alike 
have made claims for and against the viability of such an endeavor. Attempts to use 
Darwin’s theory to guide ethics can be divided into three historical stages. The first stage 
covers the period from the time of Darwin to about World War One. Stage two covers 
the era from the first world war into the 1960s. The third stage extends from the 1970s to 
the present.
The third stage carries special significance for Christian ethics, for three key 
reasons. First, it is in this stage that proponents of Darwinism declare it to be more than 
science. Some now admit that evolution is a world-view, and thus ascribe a metaphysical 
dimension to Darwin’s theory. Second, the new Darwinian influence on morality has 
becom e somewhat ubiquitous, spreading from the ivory towers of academia into 
everyday life and society.
Third, this stage of evolutionary morality makes a focused attack on human
338
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preference over animals in ethics. In particular, the idea that humanity holds a special, 
superior position over the rest of nature is frequently challenged in this new view. 
Darwin’s evolution means that man is no longer viewed as a special creation—the image 
of God, but rather, man is now viewed as merely another animal among many. This 
paradigm shift is seen by its proponents as undermining the long moral tradition of 
Christian ethics, which views man as inherently more valuable than the rest of nature.
A foundational element in the attack against Christian ethics is Lynn White’s 
charge that the Judeo-Christian view of human dominion over nature is responsible for 
much of our current ecological problems. Historically, there is a strong history of 
Christian thinkers declaring the superior moral value of humans over animals and the rest 
of nature, extending from the early church fathers through the medieval period, and into 
the twentieth century. This history includes statements by key Christian theologians and 
thinkers seemingly justifying the exploitation of nature as a fundamental right of man, 
regardless o f the consequences to non-human creatures and the inanimate world.
In addition, the more secular influence of Francis Bacon’s imperative to use the 
powers of science to regain human dominion over nature helped fuel both secular and 
theological thought from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Bacon’s 
influence is evident in some works by Boyle, Hale, Derham, Mather, and even the 
Puritans, who had a strong theology of divine imperative to subdue the wilderness and 
harness its resources for human benefit. By the nineteenth century, there was increasing 
reaction and opposition to this dominionist theology which was expressed by thinkers 
such as Francis Wayland, John Muir, and Henry Thoreau. The twentieth century brought
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
340
an even stronger reaction in Lynn White’s criticism of Christianity’s tradition of 
emphasis on the dominion of man over nature. A number of Christian thinkers reacted 
to White’s charges, proposing a more balanced view of human dominion, casting it in 
terms of stewardship instead of exploitative power. For the issue of evolution and 
ethics, however, it was not until the early 1970s that a major breakthrough came in the 
form of a movement to discredit Christian morality on the basis of an evolutionary view 
of man’s relationship with nature.
It was around 1970 that the Oxford Group brought the moral status of animals into 
mainstream philosophical discussion. One fruit of this development was the invention of 
the term “speciesism” to describe the arbitrary favoring of one species’s interests over 
another. Speciesism was presented as being in the same moral genre as racism and 
sexism, with particular emphasis being focused against placing human interests over the 
interests of non-humans. The new, anti-speciesist movement called for a major moral 
revolution which would abolish the old, traditional morality and replace it with a new one 
that was not inherently speciesist. Darwin’s evolution plays a key role in the anti- 
speciesist argumentation, on the basis of the evolutionary belief that man is merely 
another, albeit highly developed animal in this world and is thus not entitled to any 
special privileges based solely on the fact of being human. Thus, the animal rights issues 
serves as a convenient foil for exploring the relationship between evolution and ethics.
A core argument in the animal rights movement is the idea that the animals and 
man are evolutionary kin, with a leading proponent of this model being Richard Dawkins. 
Dawkins argues that traditional morality is based on what he calls “discontinuous
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thinking.” Discontinuous thinking is a form of thinking in which an individual needs to 
categorize everything into separate, unrelated categories. Thus, in traditional morality, 
humans are a discontinuous species, having no relation to other species. The chasm 
perceived to exist between humans and animals is the foundation of promoting a 
sacrosanct protection of anything classified as human, including embryos. For Dawkins, 
then, we must carry out a moral revolution by replacing the discontinuous view of man 
and nature, with a continuous one based on the data of Darwin’s theory.
The new perspective is illustrated in Dawkins’s concept of the “ring species.” The 
concept is illustrated by following the geographic change in a particular species of sea 
gull around the world, thus creating a geographic circle, or ring. In Dawkins’s example, 
the two ends of the ring meet in England with two species of gulls that cannot interbreed, 
yet constitute two ends of one continuous line of interrelated species. At any point in the 
ring, one species can interbreed with the neighboring species segment, but no further. 
This is used to argue that humans are in ring-species relationship with the animals, 
especially certain apes. Thus, while the incremental relationship between man and ape is 
too wide for interbreeding, the apes are in our ring-species group and should not be 
discriminated against on the basis of speciesist rationale. The new attitude is mandated 
by the new “continuous” view of man and ape. Physical kinship is thought to imply 
moral kinship as well. Thus, the call is made to go beyond animal welfare to animal 
rights.
This kinship-based morality has some key moral implications of significance to 
Christian ethics. First, rights are viewed as possessed on the basis of quantitative
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criteria—functional abilities—instead of on qualitative grounds—possession of abstract 
qualities (such as membership in a species group such as human beings). Second, this 
means that there is no absolute ground of ethical principles, mores, or norms. All 
morality becomes relativist in order to be able to continue to adapt and evolve with man 
and nature. Third, not only is morality relative, but, if Ruse is right, our moral sense 
might be a totally arbitrary invention of our genes. Thus it has been asserted that there 
can be no absolute foundation for ethics.
To further establish their point, the issue of potential transgenic breeding of human 
with non-human creatures is used to bolster the argument that rights cannot be based on 
species membership (i.e., being human). Transgenic breeding begs the question, “How 
many human genes must a creature have to be considered human?” Thus, the possibility 
of this practice is used as evidence to blur the boundaries between human and animal, 
thus making a speciesist basis for grounding moral protection impossible.
To replace the species criterion, many thinkers have proposed some form of 
functional criterion to mark the boundaries of moral protection. A favorite proposal, 
based on Bentham’s principle of Hedonism, is the sentiency criterion—the ability to feel 
pain. In this model, pain is essentially equated with suffering, so any organism capable 
of suffering deserves moral protection. Thus, the painist approach to grounding rights 
exhibits a strong affinity to utilitarian ethics.
The utilitarian tendencies of the animal rights movement may help fuel an alternate 
argument for grounding rights, known as the marginal cases argument. In its simplest 
form, proponents of the argument, including Rachels, assert that since “marginal”
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humans—humans exhibiting less than typical development (for example, a person with 
Down’s Syndrome)—are recognized to have moral status, then animals demonstrating a 
similar level of developmental function should logically be included in the circle of 
moral protection. Thus, many animals should have similar rights to those granted to 
humans. The intended purpose of this argument is to elevate the rights of animals. 
However, the argument can be equally effective in reverse: Since animals do not have 
rights, marginal humans, whose functional level is no higher than the animals, would lose 
their moral protection. Thus, the marginal-cases criterion does not guarantee that the 
moral status of animals will be elevated, but rather leaves a door open to devalue human 
rights.
The animal rights movement provides a convenient foil for bringing out some key 
implications of Darwin’s evolution for ethics, but it offers no prescriptive, organized 
system of ethics based on Darwinism. Thus the significance of James Rachels. Rachels 
offers the foundations of a proposed moral system based on Darwin’s theory, and he does 
so by explicitly comparing and contrasting his proposed ethics with Christian ethics. His 
central premise is that Christian ethics restricts morality to the protection of human 
interests. This anthropological focus is said to be supported by two conceptual pillars. 
The first pillar, which Rachels calls the “image of God thesis,” is that humans are entitled 
to moral protection because they are fundamentally different from, and superior to, 
animals because they are the image of God. For Rachels, this sense o f human specialness 
is further bolstered by theological concepts such as God giving man special guidance in 
prescribing a moral code, God giving periodic prophetic guidance to humans, and by the
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plan of salvation which seems to save only man while excluding animals.
The second pillar is the “rationality thesis,” which argues that humans possess the 
capacity to reason while animals do not. Therefore, humans are entitled to a greater level 
of moral privilege than animals.
For Rachels, if man evolved, then he cannot be an image of God. Furthermore, he 
appeals to “Humes guillotine” to argue that even if man is the image of God, it does not 
mean that humans ought to get moral preference over the animals. Additionally, Rachels 
appeals to the problem of evil, used by Darwin and others, to argue that the prevalence of 
natural evil is incompatible with the existence of the God of traditional biblical and 
Christian theology. This brings Rachels to the “philosophical nerve” of Christian 
ethics—teleology, that is, divine design. Rachels argues that evolution is incompatible 
with Christian thinking because the former rejects teleology while the latter ties morality 
to a divine design and prescription. He bolsters his argument against teleology by 
invoking the problem of evil: There is too much natural evil in the world to be 
compatible with the Christian idea of God. If there is a God, at best He can be like the 
God of the deists, and such a God is not robust enough to support traditional biblical and 
Christian morality. Both the denial of design and the argument from evil are seen as 
undermining the image-of-God-thesis. Rachels also argues that the existence of God is 
antithetical to morality, as he believes that submission to God violates our moral sense 
and freedom. Thus true morality cannot be connected to religion. Instead it can only be 
founded on the principles of teleology, with right and wrong being solely determined by 
consequences.
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Rachels also argues that evolution undermines the rationality thesis. This is 
because, from an evolutionary perspective, reason developed incrementally, and thus, the 
issue is not one of quality—we have reason and animals do not—but rather, one of 
quantity—both animals and man have reason, but man has a higher quantity. Since the 
animals have some levels of reason (or intelligence), this blurs the boundary between 
animals and humans, making it impossible to make a moral distinction based on 
possession of reason. Having satisfied himself that evolution effectively topples the two 
pillars supporting Christian ethics, Rachels turns to developing a new morality without 
human specialness.
Rachels proposes to replace traditional ethics with a system he calls “Moral 
Individualism.” In this approach to ethics, rights are granted solely on the capacities and 
abilities found in the individual. Species membership is of no moral significance. Each 
individual stands alone, receiving no benefit or detriment in moral protection from others. 
Central to this new approach is the dictum that every individual deserves equal 
consideration of interests, which Rachels calls “the principle of equality.” Differences in 
treatment between individuals are appropriate when justified by good reasons. Thus, a 
blind man cannot be an aircraft controller, but a hypothetical ape who can read, write, 
and has good test scores, plus a solid academic track record, could not be rejected from 
law school because it is an ape, not a human.
In addition to the principle of equality, Rachels proposes a second pillar for 
supporting his new ethics—the concept of being the biographical “subject-of-a-life.” 
Biological life is only of value to one who is alive if they can prefer life over death.
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Thus, a certain level of self-awareness is needed to be the subject-of-a-life. Being the 
subject-of-a-life is the primary criterion Rachels offers for determining the boundary for 
moral protection. Thus a shrimp is not a subject-of-a-life while dogs, apes, and other 
more developed animals are subjects-of-a-life and entitled to moral protection alongside 
humans. Rachels illustrates the implication of such an ethics with the assertion that a 
healthy ape could be entitled to more rights than a comatose human. It is also on the 
grounds of the subjects-of-a-life criterion that he advocates abortion and some cases of 
euthanasia.
In ensuing publications, Rachels expands moral individualism into a form of 
utilitarian ethics. Again, he stays committed to “morality without human hubris.” Rights 
are still merited by the individual, not granted by a moral authority, and provisions are 
made for making exceptions to the general moral prescriptions provided by his proposed 
system. Rachels tries to avoid the cold, sometimes counter-intuitive claims of pure 
Utilitarianism by arguing for “Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism,” in which certain 
intuitive attractions to forms of love and loyalty that might violate a purely Utilitarian 
ethics are viewed as indirectly contributing to the greater good. Thus the mother caring 
for her child while another suffers, helps produce a good society, so the short-term utility 
seems compromised but the long-term utility is enhanced.
Rachels proposes an overall concept of a satisfactory moral system. First, a 
satisfactory moral system must take into account the “facts” of human nature as revealed 
by Darwinian evolution. Thus, since humans are relative newcomers on the evolutionary 
scene, they are not entitled to claim special privileges over other creatures. This means a
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satisfactory moral system will take into account the evolutionary development of our 
powers of reason, which are defined in terms of piecing together the chain of causes and 
effects. Thus, evolution means that ethics must be based on consequential reasoning. An 
action is good if it produces good consequences. This is what produces the utilitarian 
tendencies in his ethics.
The second major characteristic derives from the denial of human specialness. It 
asserts that everyone’s interests must receive equal consideration, though equal treatment 
is not guaranteed. Rachels couches this equal consideration of interests in a heavily 
Utilitarian context, which opens the possibility of injustice being perpetrated in the name 
of the greater good.
To solve the potential justice problem, Rachels offers a third characteristic of a 
satisfactory moral system. It is the principle of just deserts: each individual deserves to 
be treated according to his previously and freely chosen behaviors. This is the principle 
used to govern and justify exceptions to the second premise that we need to treat 
everyone’s interests alike. These three premises or principles are the governing 
principles of his alternative to Christian ethics, and were chosen on the basis of his 
explicit attempt to make ethics compatible with Darwin’s theory of evolution.
I then turned to the task of analyzing the implications for ethics that were claimed 
for evolution. I suggested that evolutionary kinship was an arbitrary criterion that may 
commit the naturalistic fallacy. I then turned to analyze painism and discovered several 
problems with this proposed criterion. These challenges include the fact that some pain 
is good and necessary, manifold problems with objectively assessing pain, and the
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assumption that pain is the equivalent of suffering. Another conundrum for the painist is 
predation. Why is it immoral for a man to kill and eat a zebra while it is moral for the 
lion to do so? The zebra experiences pain and suffering either way. I suggested that 
painism may be grounded largely in emotivism.
Next, I examined the marginal cases-argument. We saw that the marginal-cases 
argument is grounded in the intent to elevate the moral status of animals. However, there 
is nothing to prevent the unintended effect of devaluing the rights of marginal humans 
instead of strengthening the moral protection of animals. Furthermore, Saletan used the 
marginal-cases argument to refute Singer’s apparent justification of bestiality by saying 
that this defense of the practice implies approval of sexual relations with marginal 
humans since neither animals nor marginal humans are capable of giving informed 
consent. Thus the marginal-cases argument can be a two-edged sword that slices deeper 
than expected or intended. It further seems that basing rights on marginal cases bases 
moral duties on extreme cases. Normal life becomes regulated by morals grounded in 
highly abnormal scenarios, and thus seems less than prudent. Finally, the marginal-cases 
argument seems to assume human preference in ethics, thus the belief that it will elevate 
animals instead of devalue humans. But this assumption is anomalous with the anti- 
speciesist context in which the argument is offered.
My next task was directly analyzing Rachels’s challenge to Christian ethics. I first 
examined some challenges to his ethics of moral individualism. One criticism is that 
such an individualist focus makes it virtually impossible to recognize or deal with moral 
issues related to groups or populations. Thus, moral individualism leads to an
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isolationist morality where the interrelationships between individuals can become 
morally minimized.
For example, why should bestiality be viewed as aberrant if species membership 
carries no moral significance? This point was also illustrated by news story concerning a 
man who claimed to be married to a dog. If species membership does not matter, then 
the man and the dog, viewed purely individually, could theoretically be suited for a 
transgenic marriage. We would have no grounds to argue that such a practice would 
violate any design or order, for the bizarreness of the case is precisely rooted in species 
significance. Furthermore, such an argument mimics Rachels’s tendencies to establish 
ethical principles based on highly unusual and extreme cases.
Being the subject-of-a-life was the next item considered. First, we noted that 
Rachels seems to have used a concept invented by Tom Regan, yet he never credits 
Regan as the source of his idea, even though Regan is cited regularly by Rachels. This 
seems to be a grievous omission on the part of Rachels. It calls into question the veracity 
of his other, seemingly original contributions.
We then observed that the subjects-of-a-life criterion seemed quite Kantian, 
expanding the concept of “persons” who are not to be used as means to an end. We 
further noted that the criterion of being the subject-of-a-life at first seems to avoid the 
pitfalls of an ethics based in the individual’s functionality, but instead, turns out be 
ground rights in present functions and capacities after all. Most notably, to be a subject- 
of-a-life requires minimum levels of intelligence, self-awareness, memory, reason, and 
more. Thus this criterion becomes subject to the criticisms leveled against grounding
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rights in personal functions and development. Furthermore, we saw criticisms leveled 
against this view, charging that it is inherently subjective, for the subjects-of-a-life 
standard is grounded in the concept of biographical life which is self-chosen, instead of 
biological life which is mere existence. Thus, one can lose his chosen biographical life 
and wish to no longer live even though the biological organism is in fine condition. This 
would make other characteristics and relationships insignificant in that loss of one’s 
chosen “life” could be used to justify suicide, thus impacting others in the individual’s 
matrix of relationships. Finally, such a view seems to quickly digress into rank 
subjectivism.
We also saw it argued that the subjects-of-a-life criterion is inherently unstable. 
What happens if one becomes comatose so that they are no longer the conscious subject- 
of-a-life? At this point, the individual is no longer able to express a preference to remain 
alive or not. The decision must be made by an external party. But if rights are based on 
being the subject-of-a-life, then how can the comatose qualify as having rights? Based 
on the current capacities, there is no reason to recognize rights and maintain life. Thus it 
might even be possible to justify killing or to conduct experimentation on the persistently 
comatose.
Finally, the subject-of-a-life criterion seems to discredit the obvious 
interrelationship between biological life and biographical life. You cannot have the 
second without the first and thus there is a holistic dimension to these two aspects of life. 
Because of this holism, any decline in functionality would mean a decline in moral value 
and protection.
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The issue of grounding rights was thus raised and examined. The current 
proponents of animal rights give a conflicting picture of the grounding of rights. Ryder 
sees rights as a merely psychological, though useful, function. But if rights are merely a 
figment o f our imaginations, a fictitious invention, why should we take them seriously or 
impute them to animals? Another problem was the admission by Godlivitch that rights 
are ultimately grounded on unprovable presuppositions. This is complicated by the fact 
that appeals to functions, such as feeling pain, presuppose a minimum level of 
intelligence to be able to understand and interpret pain.
We examined Rawls attempt to counter the functional model with his “original 
position” model. Here, we are to imagine we are in an “original position” not knowing 
how we shall fare in life, and thus we should determine moral actions apart from 
perceived self-interest based on one’s personal station in life. Rawls’s purpose is to 
bypass the marginal-cases argument by determining right and wrong apart from direct, 
personal circumstance. However, Rawls provides no good reason to accept his original 
position approach to morality, and he merely pushes functionality back into a 
hypothetical original position in which ignorance of the future is supposed to check 
selfishness.
All this wrangling over the grounding of rights seems to miss one key point: 
Animals can have moral protection without having to possess rights. Having rights is no 
guarantee that the free exercise of them will be permitted, nor is there any assurance they 
will be respected. Further, even if we argue that animals do not have rights, this is no 
license to treat them however we please. I argued that we can have moral obligations to
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animals through an indirect duty to someone else, such as an owner, or even God. The 
claims of God to own all things in this world would imply some duty to God in reference 
to how we treat His world and its creatures.
Having looked at some of the positions related to Rachels, we turned our attention 
to analyzing Rachels’s proposals. We noted that in The Elements o f Moral Philosophy, 
Rachels’s use o f evolution in shaping ethical theory seemed almost trite. Evolution is 
treated as a fact and not a theory, and the resulting claim that humans have no right to 
claim moral priority is based on a seniority argument—as relative latecomers, humans 
have no right to make high claims of privilege. The same volume affirms the 
consequentialist tendencies of Rachels, thus placing his ethics in traditional teleological 
theories such as Utilitarian ethics. We noted that these theories have deep intuitive 
appeal but that Rachels fails to address two key limits of teleological ethics. First, there 
is no assurance that the good intended in an action will actually come to fruition. An 
action can be immoral due to its consequences in spite of motive. Second, there are 
multiple problems with trying to forecast consequences. The further into the future we 
forecast, the lower the accuracy. Furthermore, it is debatable as to how far into the future 
one must try to forecast consequences in order to assure a moral outcome.
Another issue claimed by Rachels in The Elements o f Moral Philosophy is that 
ethics should be based on reason alone. However, we saw that Singer observed that 
reason alone does not have to be ethical. One can be simultaneously rational and 
unethical. Thus reason alone is an insufficient guide to determining what is moral and 
immoral. Reason is important, but it is not all-important.
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A final element from The Elements o f Moral Philosophy which I analyzed was the 
norm of treating people as they deserve. For Rachels, justice means giving people their 
just deserts based on their freely chosen behaviors. But this means Rachels can have no 
corresponding concept of grace or forgiveness as found in Christianity. Rachels intends 
this criterion to be used to govern exceptions to the rule that we must equally consider 
everyone’s interests. However, it seems that exceptions can be easily made, thus 
bypassing his foundational criteria in authority. Second, his proposal of developing a 
personal “optimal list” of moral standards for oneself raises problems because of the 
inherent subjectivity in the concept. Personal lists can vary widely and thus no universal 
norm can be established. Yet morality assumes a universally binding obligation. How 
can there be any moral authority without moral obligation being universal? Rachels’s 
proposal weakens morality by making it relative only to the individual. Why should one 
person accept another’s moral opinion as authoritative? Rachels is situationally sensitive 
but in the process subverts the ability to have any universally binding moral standards. 
Third, this view would seem to contradict his subjects-of-a-life criterion in Created from  
Animals, for the shrimp and infant have not freely chosen their conditions, yet are 
essentially punished by exclusion from the morally protected.
The core of Rachels’s work, however, centered in its relationship to Christian 
ethics, and this is Rachels special contribution to the debate on how evolution impacts 
ethics. I argued that Rachels identification o f teleology as the philosophical nerve of 
evolution is especially important, and saw several other authors who concurred. The 
genius of Rachels argument is that it asks why, assuming the truth of evolution, God
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would avoid design in the natural world while employing it in the moral sphere. 
Furthermore, if morality is the product of evolution which has no design, then there can 
be no design in morality either. Ultimately, this argument is based on the problem of 
evil, first raised by Hume in the eighteenth century. The argument, that the presence of 
natural evil implies either that God is good, but not all-powerful, or that God is all- 
powerful, but not good, has been oft repeated between Hume and Rachels with the 
apparent assumption that it is irrefutable.
We saw several attempts to answer this objection including the arguments that 
natural evil is a necessary by-product of granting moral freedom to humans, that 
suffering can be a means to accomplishing a greater good, the Great Controversy motif 
(which introduces multiple wills into the equasion), and the problem of excess good in 
the world. This led to an examination of Darwinian theism and how it handles the 
problem of evil.
The evolutionary theologians, such as John F. Haught, and other theologians 
influenced by evolution, such as Julian Casserley, solve the problem of evil by restricting 
God’s power in order to save His goodness. Haught acknowledges the influence of 
process theology in his work. A number of problems for traditional Christian theology 
are generated by evolutionary theology. Beyond the basic claim of God being limited in 
power to preserve His goodness, evolutionary theology claims God is hidden, 
panentheistically in nature, and that this presence in nature is what lures evolution along. 
Furthermore, the master paradigm for how God relates to the universe is seen in the 
kenosis—Christ’s emptying of Himself. Thus, God’s love is so non-coercive he had to
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create by a totally random process in order to preserve the absolute freedom of creation, 
and God incarnates Himself into all of nature. God’s hidden presence in nature means 
He feels all the tragedy and evil that happens since the material universe is His body.
God is also depicted as a mother instead of a father, salvation becomes something of a 
deification and absorption into the divine, and biblical eschatology is openly denied. 
Interestingly, human preference is rejected and God’s feeling of all that happens in the 
cosmos is used as a reason to give animals rights.
The significance of evolutionary theology is that it validates Rachels’s claim that a 
theism which embraces evolution cannot depict a God robust enough to support 
traditional Christian morality. Furthermore, the work o f Wiker and Hunter shows us that 
evolution is a metaphysical system of thought, based on an Epicurean cosmology which 
needs no God. Wiker asserts that cosmologies always affect morality, and that if 
Christianity is mixed with Darwinism, the evolutionary cosmology will eventually 
overturn theology and ethics. This is a cosmological war. I finally suggested that Rachels 
pinpointed several areas of potential conflict between Christianity and evolution, but that 
he focused only on the cosmological implications related to origins. I suggested that he 
could have gone further, tracing the effect of no teleology on the veracity of the ten 
commandments, the plan of salvation, and on eschatology.
As an extension of the theological issues, I returned to Rachels’s assertion that the 
existence of God is antithetical to morality. First, I suggested that Rachels’s argument 
against the compatibility is based in a view of human dignity which he has tried to 
undermine elsewhere. Second, his understanding of divine sovereignty is a caricature of
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the biblical view, though may be valid in criticizing a Calvinist concept of God’s control 
over all. This is more than likely as Rachels only references to Christian theology are 
rooted in Augustine and Aquinas. Rachels most significant effort to oust God from 
morality is in his use of Euthyphro’s argument found in the works of Plato. The question 
is raised as to whether good is good because God declared it good, or did God choose it 
because it is already good. This would seem to leave only two options for a solution: 
Either God is arbitrary and hence His goodness is undermined, or there is an independent 
standard of good higher than God, thus H is not supreme. Neither solution is useful to 
the Christian’s faith.
I proposed that divine foreknowledge is the solution to this dilemma. In the 
biblical model of divine foreknowledge, God knows all the possibilities that may happen, 
not just those things that will actually happen. Thus, God, through foreknowledge, can 
determine good and evil consequentially from an eternal perspective. He is thus not 
arbitrary, yet can speak authoritatively to man on what is good and evil. I proposed that 
divine foreknowledge is the foundation of God’s moral authority. But a God compatible 
with evolution can have no such foreknowledge, nor can such a deity exercise the level of 
governance needed to grant rights to creatures. Thus, evolution essentially demands a 
teleological approach to ethics.
Finally, I briefly examined Rachels’s use of Scripture and found it wanting. In 
arguing that the Bible teaches that man has despotic dominion over the earth without 
need to consider the needs and sufferings of animals, Rachels has missed the biblical 
notion of stewardship, which lies at the heart of the indirect duty model mentioned
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earlier. There is much biblical evidence that human dominion was not absolute, but was 
restrained within a number of parameters, all of which offered some protection to nature. 
Restrictions such as the law of the birdnest, helping your enemy’s beast to stand up under 
its burden, and other laws benefitting animals, all point to a limited, not absolute 
dominion of man in the context of being stewards accountable to God. In short, it 
seems Rachels may have nearly created a straw man that he could then tear down. 
Nonetheless, the fact that he seeks to build an ethics based on evolution, while 
simultaneously showing how evolution undermines Christian ethics, remains a significant 
and noteworthy contribution to the discussion.
Conclusions
There are several key conclusions that can be made based on the evidence 
examined in this study. First, and foremost, James Rachels is essentially correct in his 
analysis of the impact of Darwinian evolution on Christian ethics. While he appears to 
create a partial straw-man description of Christianity based solely on Augustinian and 
Thomist foundations, but also reflecting the dominionist theology of the industrial 
revolution, his argument ultimately depends less on those assertions than on concepts 
found in the next three conclusions.
Second, possibly Rachels’s greatest contribution is his identification of the 
rejection of teleology as the philosophical center of Darwinism. While Rachels used this 
rejection of teleology primarily to refute divinely prescribed ethics (including ethics 
based on a design in nature), we saw that he could have extended the anti-design
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argument to undermine the ten commandments, the plan of salvation, and biblical 
eschatology. If there is no divine design, then there can be no morality based in divine 
revelation. Thus, as Rachels, Dawkins, Singer, and others have suggested, evolution 
cannot co-exist with an absolutist ethics. Morality must be relative and capable of 
evolving with man. Relativism in ethics is a major consequence of Darwin’s theory.
Third, Rachels’s attack on the two key pillars of traditional morality was closely 
connected with the lack of design in evolution. The argument that evolution undermines 
the image-of-God thesis by altering our view of man into a highly evolved animal was 
especially effective in undermining Christian ethics. This is reflected less precisely in 
both the ethics of evolutionary kinship promoted by several, including Richard Dawkins, 
and in the ethics of Peter Singer, particularly his explanation of the traditional rejection 
of bestiality as immoral. In short, Rachels has made a strong and effective effort to 
eliminate Christian morality and has offered a rational alternative, based in Darwin’s 
evolution, which eliminates human preference in ethics.
Fourth, Rachels was also correct in asserting that the kind of theism supportable by 
evolution cannot have a God robust enough to support the traditional, Christian system of 
morality. While Rachels did not give adequate or substantive evidence to support this 
assertion, my study on Evolutionary Theology, as championed by Haught and O’Murchu, 
demonstrated the accuracy of Rachels’s assertion. The God of evolutionary theology 
cannot be a ruling, sovereign deity for He is depicted as being too non-coercive to act in 
that manner. The theory of divine action espoused by Haught, O'Murchu, and others 
means God cannot have a kingdom, conduct a judgment, or intervene in natural events.
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As in Process Theology, God Himself is an evolving being and not absolute. Why, then, 
should morality be absolute? Thus Rachels leaves us with a strong tendency to moral 
relativism, which was demonstrated both in Dawkins’s kinship ethics, and in Ruse’s 
assertion that morality is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes. The Christian 
moralist should recognize catastrophic implications for Christian morality in such 
relativism.
Fifth, the grounding of Process Theology on evolution is also significant, not only 
because God is no longer viewed as an absolute being, but also because of its 
implications on divine foreknowledge. I have argued that divine foreknowledge is the 
key to refuting the Euthyphro argument. In this sense, I agree with Rachels that good and 
evil are determined consequentially. However, man can never have the knowledge 
needed to accurately determine good and evil because, in part, he cannot accurately 
foretell the future. This would mean, therefore, that foreknowledge of all possible events 
and choices is the foundational quality that makes God a moral authority possessing both 
the ability and the right to prescribe to finite creatures what is good and what is evil, for 
He alone has the consequential knowledge needed to determine moral standards. Neither 
Plato nor Rachels accounts for this possibility. It is especially significant that 
professedly Bible-believing Christians are generating interpretations of Scripture that 
question at least some of God’s capacity to foreknow—especially in the matter of future 
free-will choices by created beings. The similarity of such a view to that o f evolutionary 
theology is astounding. Both have a limited God in the name of love—love being 
defined in terms of giving absolute freedom to creatures to the point that God is either
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limited by nature or by His choice. But to limit God’s foreknowledge is to limit His 
moral authority and makes Christian morality vulnerable to the Euthyphro challenge. If 
God cannot know future, free-will decisions, then it seems that He would only be an 
authority in matters of natural evil. He could no longer be an authority in moral good and 
evil because He, Himself, cannot know the consequences of our choices, and thus, the 
outcome of human choices could surprise even God.
Sixth, it thus seems that Wiker is correct in his assertion that cosmology affects 
morality. Since it seems clear that a God compatible with designless evolution is not 
robust enough to support biblical or traditional Christian morality, that a final moral 
consequence confronts us. If the body of Christ abandons biblical protology—its belief 
in biblical creation as recorded in Genesis—and adopts an evolution view of our origins, 
then an eventual shift of morality is inevitable. The first generation or two involved in 
such a switch will retain a strong enough sense of tradition that it will keep them from 
developing the implications of the conversion to their fullness. With each ensuing 
generation, however, the staying power of tradition wanes and the moral implications of 
evolution will eventually become more manifest in the Church. A God compatible with 
evolution cannot be the source of the prescriptive, absolutist, revelational ethics of 
Scripture. Thus, sooner or later, traditional ethics will be undermined.
A seventh conclusion arises. We have seen much vexation over the ground of 
rights and moral protections. Various criteria have been suggested by those favoring an 
evolutionary world-view. What all these have in common is that rights are based on 
some kind of personal capacity or function. This is what fuels the marginal-cases
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argument with its challenges. The variety of criteria seems less to establish rights than to 
undermine human preference. Even Rawls’s attempt at grounding rights in the “original 
position” is ultimately a functional criterion. The main problem with basing rights on 
functionality or capacity is that the moral protection provided is not stable. One can lose 
rights quickly through an accident. By contrast, the God of Scripture grants rights to 
man, based on His foreknowledge of consequential good and evil, rights granted by a 
supreme being are not conditioned on the capacities and functions of the recipient. 
Likewise, God can prescribe duties to animals without conferring rights on them, because 
ultimately, those duties are to God Himself. When our view of God is weakened as it is 
in the evolutionary scenario, however, such a God is not capable of granting rights, and 
Christian ethics is, again, undermined. Furthermore, the concept of all men being granted 
certain inalienable rights is destroyed.
In addition to these moral implications of Darwin’s theory, I would note two 
theological implications of evolution of significance for Christian theology. First, the 
view of God promoted by Haught and O’Murchu, in the name of evolution, seems highly 
compatible with Abelard’s Moral Influence theory of atonement. The non-coercive, non­
intervening God who feels all our pain, but cannot do anything since action is coercive, 
seems a natural match to a God who needs no satisfaction but merely demonstrates His 
love to us through the cross in an effort to morally influence us. The point, then, is that 
variants of the moral influence theory will have a greater affinity to an evolutionary view 
of God than to the biblical understanding of who He is. It thus seems that a theology 
based on the moral influence theory would be highly susceptible to being united with the
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panentheism inherent in evolutionary theology.
Second, the strong propensity of evolution to produce panentheist doctrine should 
concern biblical Christians. The evolutionary theologians claim that the incarnation of 
Christ is not confined merely to humanity, but is an incarnation of God to all of nature.
A similar claim is made by Andrew Linzey. Linzey rejects any interpretation of the 
incarnation which would give particular significance to one group such as humans, or one 
gender within humanity—that of being male. Linzey asserts concerning the incarnation 
that, “far from being God’s Yes to male humanity alone, or male and female humanity, 
the incarnation can be viewed as God’s Yes to creation: specifically to fleshly and 
sentient life. By becoming flesh, the Logos identifies, according to this paradigm, not 
only with humanity but with all creatures of flesh and blood.”1
The idea of an incarnation by Christ to all of nature, however, is an idea which we 
have seen to be closely allied with the panentheism proposed in evolutionary theology. 
The compatibility of Evolutionary Theology can adapt both panentheism in general, and 
a moral influence soteriology into its system of thought with minimal modifications. It 
appears, therefore, that Darwin’s theory has both ethical and theological implications at 
great variance to the views held by traditional Christian theologies.
This study has highlighted several key consequences of the theory of Evolution for 
biblically based Christian theology and morality. Thus, I have achieved my purpose of 
uncovering some of the implications of protology for ethics. We have seen that,
‘Linzey, “Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” xvi.
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concerning ethics, it favors ethical relativism and Utilitarianism. Furthermore, Rachels 
has rightly shown that evolution undermines the foundational pillars of traditional 
Christian ethics rooted in the specialness of humans over the rest of nature. Human 
dignity is undermined and rights become grounded in individual capacities and functions, 
instead of being a divine bequest. Theologically Rachels argued that evolution begs an 
atheistic orientation, but also argued that any God compatible with evolution is 
incompatible with Scripture, this latter point being demonstrated in the works of 
evolutionary theologians who limit God’s power in an attempt to preserve His goodness. 
Thus, whether by atheism, or by a redefined theism, the only viable moral philosophy 
compatible with evolution is one that is teleological. Both in the ethical and theological 
realms, Rachels has rightly revealed that evolution eviscerates biblical and orthodox 
Christian beliefs and values. We must still recognize, however, that having observed 
some of the key implications of evolution for Christian morality and theology, we must 
note that there remains much more to do in unpacking the theological and moral 
challenges of Darwin’s theory for Christianity.
Areas for Further Study
It seems, then, that there are several areas of further study that are called for based 
on the results o f this endeavor. First, the relationship between divine foreknowledge and 
God’s moral authority must be pursued in greater depth. In light of theological 
movements such as the Openness of God theology, which clothes itself in the garments of 
evangelical Christianity, this is a most urgent need.
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Second, in light of the current emphasis on animal rights, Bible-believing 
Christians need to develop a clear theology of animals, based on the principles and 
methods of sola Scriptura faith. Some work has been done, but mostly from a more 
liberal Christian orientation. Thus, the task remains for Bible-believing scholars to 
address this issue more comprehensively.
Third, there needs to be an effort made to produce an approach to ethics based on 
the biblical doctrine of Creation. It would appear that the Wisdom literature contains 
some moral counsels rooted in creation.1 Likewise, Jesus made an ethical application to 
marriage and divorce based on the creation design. In the ten commandments, the fourth 
commandment makes a strong appeal to creation, and may have implications concerning 
the other nine. Such data need to be gathered and developed in a systematic fashion.
Fourth, the potential relationship between the moral influence view of atonement 
and evolutionary theology needs further exploration. Does the apparent fact that the 
moral influence view can blend so easily into evolutionary theology have significant 
implications for biblically based Christian theology? Is it possible that the probable 
ability of the moral influence theory to so easily integrate with an unbiblical theology 
have any implications for the biblical veracity with the theory?
•See Craig G. Bartholomew, “A Time for War, and a Time for Peace: Old 
Testament Wisdom, Creation and O’Donovan’s Theological Ethics,” in A Royal 
Priesthood? The Use o f the Bible Ethically and Politically: A Dialogue with Oliver 
O ’Donovan (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), 91-94, where he develops the position 
that the biblical Wisdom Literature is an ethics based in creation, based on a survey of 
well-known Old Testament scholars.
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Finally, at the more practical level, greater effort must be made to ground professed 
Bible-believing Christians in biblical morality. The influence of evolution is such that 
relativism is creeping into Christian morality from the grass-roots level, partly because 
the Church assumes a depth of spirituality that may be lacking. The moral implications 
of evolution can slip into the church through non-scholarly means and alter the courses of 
both theology and morality. Darwin’s theory appears to have much deeper implications 
than many recognize.
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